SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1398.
JOSELITO R. ENRIQUEZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE
PLACIDO B. VALLARTA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Cabiao-
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Judge Placido
B. Vallarta, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Cabiao-San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, for falsification of certificates of service, gross
ignorance of the law, and grave abuse of authority and discretion, in
connection with his handling of Criminal Case No. 215-98, entitled “People of
the P20,000.00. Since the penalty for the crime under Art.
329 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is arresto
mayor, or from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months, the case is
governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
Complainant claims in the case at bar that respondent judge
allowed the prosecution of the case to be conducted by a private prosecutor
without the participation of a public prosecutor. He further alleges that upon
the conclusion of the case, respondent judge ordered the parties to submit
memoranda, which is prohibited under §19(f) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. It appears that complainant complied with the submission of the
memorandum, but the private prosecutor did not. On
Respondent judge subsequently found complainant’s client guilty
of the crime charged and sentenced him to 25 days of imprisonment without
costs. The decision, dated
In his comment, respondent judge argues that the appearance and
intervention of a private prosecutor in the criminal case is authorized by Rule
110, §5 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (now Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure), as held in People v. Beriales.[1]
As for his order requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, respondent
judge says that what he actually meant was for them to submit a “position paper.” Respondent judge explained that such lapse
was due to the fact that he had so many things to do, having been assigned to
three courts and holding daily
hearings. Finally, he maintains that the
decision, dated
The Office of the Court Administrator found the explanation of
respondent judge on the use of “memorandum” as merely a lapse in language and
agreed that the intervention of a private prosecutor was authorized under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, it
found respondent liable for his failure to timely decide the case within 30
days from the date it was submitted for decision and recommended that
respondent be ordered to pay a fine of P1,000.00 with warning that a
repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
First. We agree with the Office of the Court Administrator that respondent judge cannot be faulted for allowing the intervention of a private prosecutor in the trial of Criminal Case No. 215-98.
Rule 110, §5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000) provides:
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority shall cease upon actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. . . . (emphasis supplied)
Absent any showing to the contrary, it will be presumed that official duty was regularly performed. This presumption is reinforced in this case by the fact that complainant, as counsel for the accused, failed to object to the absence of the public prosecutor, giving rise to the presumption that the intervention of a private prosecutor was due to the unavailability of the public prosecutor. By failing to make a timely objection, complainant must be deemed to have waived his objection to the proceedings before respondent judge.
Second. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction:
. . . .
B. Criminal Cases:
. . . .
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months or a fine
not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective of
other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability
arising therefrom, . . .
Sec. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following pleadings, motions or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
. . . .
(f) memoranda, . . . (emphasis supplied)
By directing the filing of memoranda in the criminal case, respondent judge evidently was unaware that a requirement to submit a memorandum is prohibited in a summary proceeding. The purpose of the prohibition is to carry out the objective of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure to promote the “expeditious and inexpensive determination” of small or simple cases, such as the criminal case at bar which, as already stated, simply involved the cutting of the branches of a tamarind tree by the accused.
The explanation of respondent judge that what he really meant was a “position paper” and he only stated in his order “memorandum” through inadvertence cannot be accepted by the Court. Such mistake cannot be an innocuous one because a position paper is required at the beginning of the case, after the filing by the parties of their affidavits constituting their evidence.[2] On the other hand, a memorandum is one which other trial courts may require at the conclusion of a trial.[3] What is more, the provision on position papers applies to civil cases only. In criminal cases, no provision for a position paper is allowed for the reason that after the filing of affidavits and counter-affidavits the court is required to proceed with the trial of the case.[4] Consequently, respondent judge’s excuse that what he meant was a “position paper” and not a memorandum is even more revealing of his unawareness of the applicable rules.
That respondent judge had a heavy caseload cannot justify his failure to observe a provision that particularly applies to him. The Code of Judicial Conduct pertinently provides:
Rule 3.01. – A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. (emphasis supplied)
Canon 18 of the Code of Judicial Ethics is equally clear:
Canon 18. INFLUENCE OF DECISIONS UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may become a precedent unsettling accepted principles and may have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law. (emphasis supplied)
Considering, however, that complainant failed to object to the
order requiring the parties to file memoranda and that generally the
prohibition is intended for the benefit of the prosecutor, a fine of P1,000.00
will suffice for the purposes of this case.
Third. As to the failure of respondent judge to promulgate the decision on the criminal case within the period provided under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, we find the report and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to be well taken.
Article VIII, §15 of the Constitution requires courts to decide
cases submitted for decision generally within three (3) months from the date of
submission, unless the period is reduced by this Court. With respect to cases
falling under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, promulgated by this Court
to implement the constitutional provision on the speedy disposition of cases,
first level courts are allowed only 30 days following the receipt of the last
affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the
same, within which to render judgment.[5]
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure provides in §17 that the
lower court shall promulgate the judgment not later than 30 days after the
termination of the trial. In Criminal
Case No. 215-98, the trial was terminated on
Indeed, although the decision was dated
Respondent’s failure to decide the case on time constitutes a
violation of Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoins
judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the
required period.[7]
The need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously cannot be overemphasized,
for justice delayed is justice denied.
Delay in the disposition of cases undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Hence, the failure of judges to render judgment
within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the
imposition of administrative sanctions on them.[8]
For this lapse, respondent should be fined P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, Judge Placido B.
Vallarta is found guilty of ignorance of the law and delay in the disposition
of cases and is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00, with
admonition to be more conscientious and prompt in the performance of his duties
and with warning that repetition of similar infractions will be sanctioned more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] 76 SCRA 42 (1977).
[2] Rule on Summary
Procedure, §9.
[3] National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority v. Montejo, 8 SCRA 211
(1963); People v. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321
(1981).
[4] Rule on Summary
Procedure, §§13-14.
[5] Report on the Judicial Audit
conducted in the Regional Trial Court, Brs. 87 and
98, Quezon City, 338 SCRA 141 (2000); Enriquez v. Camarista, 280 SCRA 1 (1997) citing Raboca v. Pantanosas, Jr.,
245 SCRA 293 (1995) and Cruz v. Pascual,
244 SCRA 111 (1995).
[6] Jimenez v. Republic,
22 SCRA 622 (1968).
[7] Maquiran
v. Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1606,
[8] Maquiran
v. Lopez, supra; Gil v. Janolo,
Jr., 347 SCRA 6 (2000).