EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148075.
PANGKAT LAGUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and TERESITA “NINGNING” LAZARO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
In this specie of controversy which involves, to a large extent, the determination of the true will of the electorate and, which by its very nature, touches upon the ascertainment of the people’s choice as gleaned from the hallowed medium of the ballot, this Court finds cogency to reiterate – at the outset – that the factual findings and determinations of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ought to be accorded great weight and finality, in the absence of any remarkable trace of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its constitutionally mandated tasks.
Sought to be reversed in this special civil action for certiorari
is the Resolution[1] of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en
banc in S.P.A. 01-218 promulgated on 24 May 2001, which set aside the
Resolution[2] of the COMELEC Second Division dated 11 May
2001, ordering the disqualification of herein private respondent Teresita
“Ningning” Lazaro as candidate for Governor of the Province of Laguna in the 14
May 2001 Elections.
The antecedents unfold.
On
On
In its petition for disqualification, petitioner Pangkat
Laguna specifically alleged that private respondent Lazaro, upon assuming –
by succession – the Office of the Governor on 30 January 2001, “publicly
declared her intention to run for governor” in the May 2001 elections. Thus,
according to petitioner, respondent Lazaro on 07 February 2001, ordered the
purchase of 14,513 items such as trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard
sets, and t-shirts, allegedly worth Four Million Five Hundred Fifty Six
Thousand and Five Pesos (P4,556,005.00) “serving no public purpose
but to promote her popularity as a candidate.”[5]
In addition, petitioner alleged that on P110,000.00) to various schools in Laguna, serving no
meaningful public purpose but to again promote her forthcoming candidacy.”[6] According to petitioner, the abovementioned acts, in effect,
constituted “premature campaigning” inasmuch as the same were done prior to the
start of the campaign period on
Moreover, petitioner argues that respondent Lazaro violated
Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC
Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused the bidding of seventy nine (79)
public works projects on
On
On
On
On
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by respondent Lazaro is hereby granted. The resolution
issued by the Second Division dated
“SO ORDERED.”
Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner now assails the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc dated
The petition is devoid of merit.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for
certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent
COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has
marred such factual determinations.[9] Stated differently, factual findings of the
COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are
conclusive upon the Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on
the validity of the same. The COMELEC, as the government agency tasked with the
enforcement and administration of election laws, is entitled to the presumption
of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.[10]
First, as to the issue of “premature campaigning”, this Court holds that respondent Lazaro was not guilty of violating the provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:
“SEC. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. – It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period: Provided, that political parties may hold political conventions or meetings to nominate their official candidates within thirty days before the commencement of the campaign period and forty-five days for Presidential and Vice-Presidential election.”
On this score, it bears stressing that the act of respondent Lazaro – as Chief Executive of the Province of Laguna – in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent distribution thereof to the constituents of Laguna, in line with the local government unit’s sports and education program, is – to our mind – not constitutive of the act of election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly proscribed under the pertinent provisions of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.
To this end, we quote with affirmance respondent COMELEC’s observation on the matter:
“Not every act of beneficence from a candidate may be considered
‘campaigning.’ The term ‘campaigning’ should not be made to apply to any
and every act which may influence a person to vote for a candidate, for that
would be stretching too far the meaning of the term. Examining the definition
and enumeration of election campaign and partisan political activity found in
COMELEC Resolution 3636, the Commission is convinced that only those acts
which are primarily designed to solicit votes will be covered by the definition
and enumeration.
“In this present case, the respondent was not in any way
directly (or) indirectly soliciting votes. Respondent Lazaro was merely
performing the duties and tasks imposed upon her by law, which duties she has
sworn to perform as the Governor of the
“Respondent has satisfactorily shown the regularity of the
implementation of the questioned sports and education programs. The number
of items purchased and the amount involved were within the regular purchases of
the provincial government. How the funds were sourced and how the program was
implemented, as correctly pointed out by respondent, (are) not for us to
resolve for such issue is way beyond our constitutionally mandated
jurisdiction.”[11] (Emphasis
ours).
In Lozano vs. Yorac,[12] this Court in upholding the findings of the
COMELEC negating the charge of vote-buying, in effect, affirmed the dismissal
of the petition for disqualification filed against
“We uphold the foregoing factual findings, as well as the
conclusions reached by respondent COMELEC, in dismissing the petition for the
disqualification of respondent Binay. No clear and convincing proof exists
to show that respondent Binay was indeed engaged in vote buying. The
traditional gift-giving of the
Notably, upon a close perusal of the entirety of circumstances attendant in the instant case, this Court is of the firm view that herein petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the questioned purchase and distribution of the aforesaid items were, in any significant way, perpetrated for the purpose of promoting the candidacy of respondent Lazaro or were, in any manner, calculated to directly or indirectly solicit votes on behalf or in favor of respondent. Similarly, the records are bereft of any clear and convincing proof that the purchase and distribution of the items were deliberately or consciously done to influence and induce the constituents of Laguna to vote for respondent, in direct violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
To us, respondent’s acts do not fall within, and are not contemplated by, the prohibition embodied in Section 80 of the Code so as to effectively disqualify her from the elections and bar her from holding office.
Second, as to the charge of violation of the 45-Day Public
Works Ban,[13] petitioner asserts that respondent Lazaro
transgressed the provisions of Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code, as
implemented by COMELEC Resolution No. 3479, when the latter caused or directed
the bidding of 79 public works projects on
We do not agree. Section 261 (v) of the Omnibus Election Code is explicit:
“Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
“x x x
“(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds. – Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or expends any public funds for:
“(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
“x x x
“(b) Work undertaken by contract through public bidding held, or by negotiated contract awarded, before the forty-five day period before election: Provided, that work for the purpose of this section undertaken under the so-called ‘takay’ or ‘paquiao’ system shall not be considered as work by contract; x x x.”
Beyond this, evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish and
substantiate petitioner’s bare allegation that – in furtherance of the public
bidding conducted on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition
is DENIED. ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the Commission on Elections en
banc dated
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
81-87.
[2] Ibid., pp.
32-35.
[3] Rollo, p. 99.
[4] Annex “F”; Rollo,
pp. 88-98.
[5] Records, p. 4.
[6] Ibid., p. 5.
[7] Annex “C”, Rollo,
pp. 71-75.
[8] Annex “D”, Rollo,
pp. 76-80.
[9] Rivera vs.
Commission on Elections, 199 SCRA 178 (1991).
[10] Mohammad vs. Commission on Elections,
320 SCRA 258 ( 1999).
[11] Rollo, pp.
83-84.
[12] 203 SCRA 256 (1991).
[13] Under Section 261
(v) [Prohibited Acts] of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by COMELEC
Resolution No. 3479.
[14] Article IX-C,
Section 2 par. (3) of the Constitution.