EN BANC
[G.R. No. 144422.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALDRIN LICAYAN y SUCANO (At Large), accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Five-year old Rowena C. Bangcong, the only girl among her siblings, was beaten, raped and killed. Her bruised and battered body which was flung into a nipa swamp was discovered the following morning after a massive search.
For the brutal rape-slay of Rowena, herein accused Aldrin Licaya y Sucano was charged with Rape with Homicide in an
Information[1] which alleges –
That on the 25th day of June 1999 at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less at Barangay Inobulan, Municipality of Salay, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) a five year old Rowena C. Bangcong against her will and consent and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and struck (sic) the different parts of the victim’s body with the use of a hard object, which accused previously provided himself, thus causing lacerated wounds, abrasions hematomas and submerging the victim in water at the nipa swamp which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Section II, Chapter III, paragraph 5 of Article 266-B of R.A. 8353.
Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded “not
guilty” to the offense charged.[2] The case thereafter proceeded to trial. However, after the prosecution had rested its
case and formally offered its evidence, accused escaped detention on
Counsel for the defense submitted the case for decision without
presenting evidence in behalf of the accused.
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered judgment[4] on
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by the Court sentencing accused to suffer the supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of Rowena Bangcong in the sum of P75,000.00, to pay moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Since accused is at large after he escaped detention while the case was still pending but after the prosecution had presented its evidence, let a warrant for his arrest, or alias warrant of his arrest issue.
Once arrested let his custodian ship his person to the National Penitentiary without delay as provided by law, there to await the result of the review of this case by the Highest Tribunal of the land.
SO ORDERED.
On automatic review, accused-appellant faults the trial court with a lone assignment of error, to wit:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE THEREBY SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE DEATH PENALTY DESPITE THE
GLARING INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.[5]
On the other hand, the Solicitor General recommends affirmance of the appealed Decision in toto.
The prosecution’s version of the incident is summarized thus in the People’s brief:
Appellant Aldrin Licayan
and Bernard Agcopra were friends from way back. On
The group continued drinking in the house of Wenny Rajal also in Barangay Inobulan, Salay, Misamis Oriental. After consuming two bottles of Beer Grande, they bought a case of the same drink, which they brought to the house of Romeo. When they arrived, Romeo’s wife Rosalinda and his children, Rey Oriente, Raymundo and five-year old Rowena were there. Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer anymore. He went with Romeo to the barangay captain leaving appellant in Romeo’s house. When Romeo returned to his house, appellant was embracing and kissing Rowena, justifying it by saying that he missed his daughter.
Appellant kept on embracing Rowena.
At
When Romeo got tired of waiting for Rowena, he went to the Dorbit house to inquire about her. Rey Oriente told him what happened, which caused him to cry.
Neighbors were alerted and immediately formed a posse to look for the
girl. While searching for Rowena, they
spotted appellant when they trained a flashlight to him. Appellant ran towards
the ricefield.
The posse chased him, but failed to catch him when he jumped into
the deep
The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found
at the swamps, where appellant told Rogelio Dahilan,
Jr., one of the searchers, she would be. Photographs were taken of the
girl. A postmortem examination of the
girl revealed that she had hematomas, lacerations,
abrasions all over her body, as well as a deep incomplete hymenal
laceration at the
As stated earlier, after the prosecution had rested its case and
formally offered its evidence, accused-appellant escaped detention and has
remained at large despite efforts to apprehend him. Once an accused escapes from prison or
confinement, he loses his standing in court and is deemed to have waived any
right to seek relief from the court unless he surrenders or submits to the
jurisdiction of the court.[7] Accused-appellant’s escape should be
considered a waiver of his right to be present at the trial and the inability
of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent the
court from continuing with the trial because the escapee is deemed to have
received notice.[8]
The fact of escape made accused-appellant’s failure to attend
unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale and
protection of the law. This being so,
the trial against the fugitive should be brought to the ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to
rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against the accused and to
render its judgment accordingly. It
should not wait for the fugitive’s appearance or re-arrest,[9] for the State as much as the accused has an
interest in and is entitled to a speedy trial and disposition of the case.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant was convicted on the basis
of circumstantial evidence. Direct
evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.[10] The rules on evidence[11] and case law sustain the conviction of the
accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur:
1.] there must be more than one circumstance; 2.] the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and 3.] the combination of all circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.[12]
In assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence, four basic guidelines must be observed:
1) it should be acted upon with caution;
2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and
4) the facts must establish
such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to convince the judgment beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the offense.[13] The
peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot
be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put
together reveals a convincing picture pointing towards the conclusion the
accused is the author of the crime.[14]
The following circumstances pointed out by the trial court lead to the inevitable conclusion that the accused-appellant perpetrated the crime:
First, before
Second, the three, accused, Bernard Agcopra
and Romeo Bangcong, reached Romeo’s house. In the house then were Romeo’s wife and
children, Rosalina and Rowena, 5 years old.
Accused was drunk. But no sooner
than they arrived that accused and Romeo started drinking the case of beer grande that they had brought. Bernard Agcopra begged off.
He went home. When Rey Oriente Bangcong,
one of Romeo’s children and elder brother of Rowena, arrived from school that
afternoon of June 25th, which was Friday, he saw accused drinking with his
father and while so doing he kissed and embraced Rowena, justifying it by
saying that he missed his daughter. This
happened in the presence of the Bangcong family. At about
Third, arriving at Dorbit’s house, Rey saw accused telling Rowena “Day come here because your father asked you to go home so that you can eat your supper.” Accused was holding the hand of Rowena and was dragging her. Soon Romeo Bangcong also arrived at Dorbit’s house looking for Rowena.
Fourth, the Bangcong’s neighbors
organized a search party. One group
spotted accused 20 meters away. He ran
toward the direction of the rice field.
They chased him but they failed to overtake him as he jumped into the
Fifth, at about
Sixth, with muddy pants, wet and without slippers accused emerged
at the place where Wilson Salvaña and companions were
drinking at about
Seventh, accused was the last person with whom Rowena was last
seen.[15]
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the foregoing circumstances are insufficient to prove his guilt. He argues that: 1.] the first three (3) circumstances do not point to accused-appellant’s guilt; 2.] prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano who was among those who organized the search party, is not credible because he did not shout upon finding accused-appellant; 3.] the witnesses could not have seen accused-appellant in the darkness; 4.] the witnesses could have seen somebody else; 5.] assuming that accused-appellant was the one seen by the posse, he was not committing any wrong by running away; 6.] the claim of prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them where Rowena’s body could be found based on accused-appellant’s admission is hearsay; 7.] granting that accused-appellant revealed where Rowena’s lifeless body could be found, he never admitted having raped and killed her; 8.] the admission made by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is inadmissible; 9.] the circumstance that accused-appellant was seen with wet pants, muddy body and without slippers lacks probative value; and 10.] there were no tell-tale signs that accused-appellant was dragging Rowena to the swamp.
We disagree.
The series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is
appreciated not singly but together. Like
strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the circumstances proved constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.[16]
The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of
the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular
piece of evidence. It is more like
weaving a tapestry of events that will culminate in a clear picture that will
reveal a convincing scenario pointing towards the accused as the author of the
crime.[17]
The credibility of prosecution witness Hernando Zambrano cannot be impeached by the mere fact that he
failed to rouse other members of the search party when he found the
accused-appellant. Suffice it to state
that different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of
situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[18]
The contention that accused-appellant could not have been identified
from a distance of about twenty (20) meters in the dark is untenable,
considering that illumination produced by a flashlight or kerosene lamp is
sufficient to allow the identification of persons.[19] In this regard, we have held that:
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether
or not an eyewitnesses could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions
of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased,
their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient
to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may,
in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination making the
attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.[20]
Accused-appellant’s argument that he did not commit any wrong in
running away upon being espied by the search party likewise deserves scant
consideration. Courts go by the biblical
truism that “the wicked flee when no man pursueth but
the righteous are as bold as a lion.”[21] Accused-appellant has not satisfactorily
explained why he fled upon being spotted by the posse.
In People v. Templo,[22] we held that “the act, declaration or
omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him. One type of act that can be
given in evidence against him is flight.
In criminal law, flight means an act of evading the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution
or continuance of criminal proceedings.
The unexplained flight of the accused person may as a general rule be
taken as evidence having tendency to establish his guilt.” In short, flight
is an indication of guilt.[23] What makes flight particularly damaging for
accused-appellant is that he fled twice, i.e. first, upon being spotted
by the search party and second, by scaling the perimeter fence of the
Provincial Jail while he was in the custody of the law and undergoing trial.
Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that the statement made by
Rogelio “Jun-jun” Dahilan,
Jr. as to the location of the victim’s body is hearsay. Any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay
by nature if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of
the witnesses but on the knowledge of some other person who was never presented
on the witness stand,[24] because it is the opportunity to
cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by a
witness are hearsay.[25] In the instant case, Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accused-appellant indeed told
him where the victim’s body can be found.
What is more, the victim’s body was actually recovered at the location
pointed by accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant’s objection to the admissibility of his statement as to where he dumped the body of the victim, which allegedly partakes of an extra-judicial confession, is just as tenuous. The impugned extra-judicial statement, as testified to by Dahilan, is as follows:
Q While you were there and Aldrin Licayan was also there did you have a chance to talk to him?
A Yes, Ma’am.
Q What did you talk about?
A I asked him Brod, as if I was guessing, where did you leave the child?
Q What was his answer to your question?
A He told me “Did you remember the place where we were
drinking?”
Q What was your answer?
A I told him, Yes, at the place of Wennie Rajal.
Q What more?
A He said, “Yes in the place of Wennie
Rajal. From
his place there was a curve[d] road or junction. And in that junction the side of it is a ricefield. After the
ricefield there is a nipa
swamp. Try to see there maybe I left the
child there!”
Q After getting that
information from Aldrin Licayan
what did you do?
A Me and my companions went outside the Municipal Hall and proceeded to the place where Aldrin Licayan told us.
Q Did you reach the area described by Aldrin Licayan?
A Yes, Ma’am.
Q What did you see when you arrived in that place described by Aldrin?
A It is where we found the
child.[26]
The foregoing is not an extra-judicial confession, but
merely an extra-judicial admission. Sections
26[27]
and 33,[28] Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
clearly delineates their distinction. In
People v. Agustin,[29] we elucidated on the difference between the two in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
The records show that Rogelio “Jun-jun”
Dahilan was neither a law enforcement nor a public
officer conducting a custodial interrogation of accused-appellant. He was merely a jeepney
driver and an acquaintance of accused-appellant who asked the whereabouts of
the missing child of his kumpadre because the
victim was last seen with the latter.[30]
In fact, there is no showing that Dahilan
colluded with the police authorities to elicit inculpatory
evidence against accused-appellant.
Neither was he instructed by the police to extract information from
accused-appellant on the details of the crime.
In People v. Andan,[31] the accused’s
spontaneous and voluntary verbal confession made in a private meeting with the
municipal mayor was admitted in evidence because the same was not covered by
the requisites of Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
...Constitutional procedure on custodial investigation do not apply
to a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having
committed the crime…[32]
Even assuming arguendo that
accused-appellant’s admissions indeed partake of an extra-judicial confession,
the same would still be admissible not only on account of the foregoing
considerations but also because it is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Under
Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court,[33] an extra-judicial confession shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, which is defined as the body of the crime and,
in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been committed.[34] Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual
commission by someone of the particular crime charged.[35] In this case, aside from the admission made
by accused-appellant, the bruised and battered body of the victim herself
recovered at the exact spot described by accused-appellant conclusively established
the corroborating evidence of corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the admission is replete with details on the
whereabouts of the victim who at that time had not yet been found, thereby
ruling out the probability that it was involuntarily made. The voluntariness
of a confession may be inferred from its language such that if, upon its face,
the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon
its it integrity, it being replete with details - which could only be
supplied by the accused - reflecting spontaneity and coherence, it may be
considered voluntary.[36]
Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, he was in fact seen
grabbing and dragging the struggling victim from the house where she was
watching television by Rey Oriente,
the victim’s elder brother.[37]
While accused-appellant indeed did not admit to anyone that he
raped and killed Rowena, the prevailing circumstances overwhelmingly point to
his guilt. As stated earlier, direct
evidence is not always necessary to identify the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime. A witness may not have
actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, hut he may nevertheless
identify the accused as the assailant as when the latter is the person last
seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the
crime,[38] as in this case.
In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety
are as convincing as direct evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of the
accused-appellant.[39] In other words, the circumstantial evidence
against accused-appellant fully justifies the finding of his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony committed.[40]
We, therefore, find no compelling reason to reverse the ruling of
the trial court insofar as accused-appellant’s guilt is concerned. The crime of Rape with Homicide is defined
and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659. The definition of the felony was
later expanded and the same was reclassified as a crime against persons and
incorporated as Articles 266-A[41] and 266-B[42] in Title Eight, Chapter Three thereof.
The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.[43] Death being a single indivisible penalty,
the same shall be imposed “regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance that may have attended the commission of the crime.”[44] Indeed, the penalty of death must be mandatorily imposed under Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, to wit:
Art. 47. In what cases death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of death penalty cases. - The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
Under prevailing jurisprudence, the amount of civil indemnity in
cases of rape with homicide is now P100,000.00.[45] On the other hand, the award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 given to the victim’s heirs is proper
taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim’s family[46] brought about by her death.[47]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19 in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-696 finding accused Aldrin Licayan y Sucano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape with Homicide, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Rowena Bangcong, P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let a certified true copy of the record of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of clemency and pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Record, p. 1.
[2] Ibid., p. 28.
[3] Id, p. 254.
[4] Id, pp.
264-274.
[5] Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, p. 1; Rollo, p. 52.
[6] Brief for the Appellee, pp. 3-6; Rollo,
pp. 95-98.
[7] People v.
Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364 [1991].
[8] Herrera O.M.,
Remedial Law, 2001 ed., Vol. IV, p. 449.
[9] People v. Tabag,
268 SCRA 115 [1997], citing People v. Nazareno,
160 SCRA 1, 5-7 [1988].
[10] People v. Elmer Fegidero
y Cordova, 337 SCRA 274, 282 [2000], citing People v Botona,
304 SCRA 712, 728-729 [1999].
[11] Section 4, Rule 133,
Revised Rules of Court.
[12] People v Carlo Ellasos
y Mauricio @ “Rommel” & Sonny Obillo y Ganayo, G.R. No. 139323,
6 June 2001, citing People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA
368, 380-381 [1991]; People v. Alcantara, 163
SCRA 783, 786 [1988] and Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court; People v.
Larry Lavapie, et al., G.R. No. 130209, 14 March
2001; People v. Hermoso, 343 SCRA 567, 577 [2000], citing People v. Naag,
322 SCRA 716 [2000]; People v. Madriaga IV, 171 SCRA
103 [1989]; People v. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47
[1989]; see also People v. Casingal, 337 SCRA 100, 110 [2000], citing People v. Dacibar,
et al., 325 SCRA 725 [2000], citing People v. Solis, 291 SCRA
529, 539 [1998].
[13] Wharton’s Criminal
Evidence, Vol. II, p. 1643.
[14] People v. Orcula,
Sr., 335 SCRA 129 [2000], citing People
v. Locsin Fabon @ “Loklok”, 328 SCRA 302 [2000].
[15] Record, pp. 271-273.
[16] People v. Comesario,
306 SCRA 400, 404 [1999], citing People
v. Geron, 281 SCRA 36, 37 [1997].
[17] People v. Sirad,
335 SCRA 114, 124 [2000].
[18] People v. Espero,
346 SCRA 617, 624 [2000], citing People
v. Luzorata, 286 SCRA 487, 491 [1998]; People v. Matubis,
288 SCRA 210, 220 [1998].
[19] People v. Bromo,
318 SCRA 760, 777 [1999], citing People v. Penillos,
205 SCRA 546 [1992] & People v. Loste, 210
SCRA 614 [1992].
[20] People v. Biñas,
320 SCRA 22, 53 [1999], citing People v.
Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1 [1999], citing People v.
Villaruel, 330 Phil. 79 [1996]; Italics supplied.
[21] People v. Cañedo,
335 SCRA 81, 97 [2000].
[22] 346 SCRA 626, 643
[2000].
[23] People v. Alo,
348 SCRA 702, 711 [2000]; People v.
Samolde, 336 SCRA 632, 652 [2000], citing People v.
Padlan, 290 SCRA 338 [1998].
[24] People v. Cui, 314 SCRA 153
[1999].
[25] People v. Martinez, 274 SCRA
259 [1997].
[26] TSN,
[27] SEC. 26. Admission of a party - The act, declaration
or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.
[28] SEC. 33. Confession.
- The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
against him.
[29] 240 SCRA 541,
553-554 [1995]; citing 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 337 (12th ed. 1955).
[30] TSN,
[31] 269 SCRA 95 [1997].
[32] People v. Cabiles,
284 SCRA 199, 211 [1998].
[33] Section 3. Extrajudicial
confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. - an extrajudicial confession
made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for conviction, unless
corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
[34] People v. Mantung,
310 SCRA 819 [1999].
[35] People v. Robles, 333 SCRA
107, 119 [2000], citing People v. Mantung, supra.
[36] Santos v. Sandiganbayan,
347 SCRA 386, 414-415 [2000], citing People
v. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356, 362 [1997].
[37] TSN,
[38] People v. Albacin,
340 SCRA 249, 263 [2000], citing People
v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 [2000].
[39] People v. Guarin,
317 SCRA 234 [1999]; People v. Sanchez,
308 SCRA 264 [1999].
[40] People v. Tabarangao,
303 SCRA 623 [1999].
[41] ART
266-A. Rape; when and how committed. -Rape
is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
d] When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though some none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2.) By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or
any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
[42] ART. 266-B.
Penalties. - x x x When by
reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.
[43] Three justices of
the court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the
ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that
the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
[44] Article 63, Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
[45] People v. Robles, 305 SCRA 273,
283 [1999].
[46] People v. Agueda
T. Alba, et al., G.R. Nos. 130627 & 139477-78,
[47] People v. Reynaldo Langit, 337 SCRA 323 [2000]: People v.