SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 143781. February 27, 2002]
JOSE CLAVANO, INC., petitioner, vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD and SPS. ENRIQUE and VENUS TENAZAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
“The tendency of the law,” observes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, “must always be to narrow the field of uncertainty.” And so was the judicial process conceived to bring about the just termination of legal disputes. The mechanisms for this objective are manifold but the essential precept underlying them is the immutability of final and executory judgments.
This fundamental principle in part affirms our recognition of instances when disputes are inadequately presented before the courts and addresses situations when parties fail to unravel what they truly desire and thus fail to set forth all the claims which they want the courts to resolve. It is only when judgments have become final and executory, or even when already deemed satisfied, that our negligent litigants belatedly come forth to pray for more relief. The distilled wisdom and genius of the ages would tell us to reject their pleas, for the loss to litigants in particular and to society in general would in the long run be greater than the gain if courts and judges were clothed with power to revise their final decisions at will. We find this basic rule decisive of the instant controversy.
On
Subsequently, private respondents filed a complaint for specific
performance with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Regional
Office in
On
1. Accept from the
complainants [herein private respondents] the amount of P1,958,000.00
covered and contained in the Manager’s Check duly tendered to it. The
complainants are accordingly directed to redeliver and again tender to the
respondent [herein petitioner] the payment previously refused; 2. Immediately
thereafter, execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants and
deliver the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title over P300,000.00)
Pesos and the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos by way
of attorney’s fees, and cost of litigation in the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00)
Pesos. The counterclaims prayed for by respondent are hereby denied for lack of
merit.[3]
On
On
On
On
x x x the
Sheriff of the
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
On P232,305.60 for the alleged actual expenses of private
respondents in notarizing and registering with the Register of Deeds the deed
of absolute sale for the house and lot and of recording the corresponding
Torrens title in private respondents’ name.[16] On 8 June 2000 reconsideration of the
Petitioner denies any obligation to pay for the expenses of
private respondents in obtaining for themselves the transfer of ownership of the
house and lot bought by them since neither the contract to sell with private
respondents nor the
We rule for petitioner. Firstly, it must be
stressed that the assailed rulings of the HLURB and the Court of Appeals
pertain to proceedings which have for their purpose the execution of the
x x x the remedies of certiorari and appeal are not mutually exclusive remedies in certain exceptional cases, such as when there is grave abuse of discretion, or when public welfare so requires. The trial court gravely abused its discretion by setting aside the order x x x which has long become final and executory x x x x Its action was clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final and executory order. x x x x Hence, though an order completely and finally disposes of the case, if appeal is not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law or the interest of substantial justice requires, a petition for certiorari may be availed of upon showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.
Secondly, the subsequent Orders of the HLURB
requiring petitioner to pay for the expenses incurred by private respondents in
securing the transfer of title in their name do not fall within the ambit of
the HLURB Decision whether expressly or by necessary inference, i.e.,
“whatever then is necessary to be done to carry out the decision should be
ordered.”[22] The Orders are completely separate from and
independent of the Decision and do not merely enforce it as the HLURB
and the Court of Appeals would want to impress. The Orders cannot therefore be
considered part of the Decision which must be executed against
petitioner. Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the
decision;[23] consequently, where the order of execution
is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order
has pro-tanto no validity.[24]
While the Decision commands petitioner to “execute a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of [private respondents] and deliver the
corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title” to them and that only a public
document would serve to cede ownership of an immovable property,[25] such as the house and lot in question, we
cannot infer from these directives that petitioner should also pay for the
expenses in notarizing the deed and in obtaining a new certificate of title.
The obligation to pay for such expenses is unconnected with and distinct
from the obligations to execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale
and the certificate of title. Since there is no qualification that the duties
to execute and to deliver shall also compel petitioner to assume the expenses
for transferring the pertinent title in favor of private respondents, the
ordinary and literal meaning of the words “execute” and “deliver” should
prevail,[26] that is, for petitioner to perform all
necessary formalities of the deed of sale[27] and give or cede the res
of the certificate of title (that certificate which naturally must be in
their possession since petitioner cannot give what it does not have) to the
actual or constructive control of private respondents.[28] Needless to stress, petitioner can actually
discharge these obligations without settling for its own account the expenses
which private respondents are demanding. In this regard, petitioner can appear
before the notary public for notarization of the deed of absolute sale and
assist in the cancellation of the certificate of title in its name by giving
this certificate together with the deed of absolute sale to private respondents
for presentation at the Registry of Deeds, which it has several times expressed
willingness to do.
Clearly, there is nothing in the body much less in the dispositive portion of the HLURB Decision nor in the
pleadings of the parties from where we may deduce that petitioner must pay for
the amounts spent in transferring title to private respondents. It is well
settled that under these circumstances no process may be issued to enforce the
asserted legal obligation.[29] In De la Cruz Vda.
de Nabong v. Sadang[30] we nullified an order requiring an indemnity bond since the requirement
was not contained in the dispositive part of the
final judgment. Similarly in Supercars,
Inc. v. Minister of Labor[31] we set aside the award of back wages for the period that the writ of
execution was unserved since the final and executory decision of the Minister of Labor merely directed
the reinstatement of the laborers to their former positions. Finally, David
v. Court of Appeals[32] affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals mandating the payment of
simple legal interest only with nothing said about compounded interest since
the judgment sought to be executed therein ordered the payment of simple legal
interest only and held nothing about payment of compounded interest. This Court
can do no less than follow these precedents in the instant petition.
Thirdly, the HLURB or the Court of Appeals cannot
order petitioner at this late stage to reimburse the charges and fees relative
to the transfer of title to private respondents of the subject house and lot
when they (private respondents) did not allege this obligation nor pray for
this relief in their complaint and other pleadings and did not attempt to prove
this cause of action one way or the other. It is elementary that a judgment
must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and
be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed
and the case was tried.[33] The judgment must be secundum
allegata et probata. In
Falcon v. Manzano[34] where the trial court rendered judgment allowing plaintiff to recover
from the defendant the unpaid portion of the purchase price of a parcel of land
when the plaintiff only asked for the nullification of the contract of sale of
the realty and the return of the property to her, we set aside the judgment of
the trial court in conceding to her a remedy which was not prayed for in the
complaint -
The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for one-half of the unpaid purchase price. The question presented in the petition was not even discussed by the lower court, to wit: the right of the plaintiff to have the contract declared null and the property in question returned to her. The court, in rendering its decision, ought to have limited itself to the issues presented by the parties in their pleadings.
In the analogous case of Lerma
v. De la Cruz[35] the plaintiff therein brought an action to recover accrued rents and
damages for the injury to the land but the trial court extended the relief
sought by giving judgment for possession of the land. We ruled: “The plaintiff
did not ask for possession, nor is there any prayer to that effect in the
complaint, and the judgment must, therefore be reversed insofar as it
undertakes to provide for the restitution of the land in question to the
plaintiff.” Clearly, in light of the pleadings and evidentiary deficiencies of
private respondents’ action, the HLURB cannot order petitioner to reimburse the
money spent by private respondents in securing the transfer of title in their
name.[36]
Fourthly, neither can we imply such obligation from
the HLURB Decision since private respondents’ complaint in the
proceedings a quo only asked for judgment to compel petitioner to accept
their payment, thereafter execute in their favor the necessary deed of absolute
sale for the disputed house and lot and to compensate them for damages they had
incurred. Stated otherwise, private respondents only sought the enforcement of
the mutually binding contract to sell so that they could finally own the house
and lot but did not, never, ask for the transfer of the title of the immovable
property in their name at petitioner’s expense. Certainly these
remedies, while not exclusive of each other in that they may be joined in one
complaint, are not one and the same, nor can we simply infer one from the
other.[37]
It was ill advised for private respondents to have failed to
include in their pleadings before the HLURB the appropriate allegations which
would have formed (legitimately, that is) the basis for an order in the
On this issue, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court held x x x x that “[T]he questions of the limited liability of petitioners and entitlement to reimbursement for necessary, useful and ornamental expenses should have been raised by them during the trial and on appeal. For the lower court to consider them now and act as petitioners wish it to would be to vary the terms of a final and executory judgment.” We find no reversible error committed by the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. A review of the records show that the petitioners brought up the matter of their limited liability only at the time of the execution of the judgment, after the same had already become final and executory. The decision of the lower court which granted the private respondents’ counterclaims condemned the petitioners, without qualification, to pay certain amounts representing the share of the former in the income of the Carriedo property. The petitioners at that point should have brought up the question which they are now raising x x x x Instead, they allowed the decision to become final and executory without seeking a limitation of their liability. When the decision was returned to the trial court for execution, all that was needed to be done was to carry out the terms of the decision which had already become final and executory. At that stage, it was too late for the petitioners to seek its modification. The petitioners cannot claim that they are being deprived of their property without due process of law since they had all the opportunity to raise the question they are now raising before the decision became final and executory. Neither can they ask this Court to disregard “procedural technicalities” to allow them to assert their claim at this very late date. What is involved here is not a matter of procedural technicality, but the doctrine of finality of judgment.
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the HLURB, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, in ordering petitioner to settle the expenses for the
transfer of title whereby private respondents obtained such relief by filing a
mere motion during the execution proceedings. In the case at bar, none of the
circumstances which this Court used in the past exist to justify evidentiary
hearings of new allegations during the execution of judgment as nonetheless
being part of the segmented proceedings in the suit, i.e., a fictional
continuation of the trial proper. The instant petition is not one where private
respondents are enforcing subsidiary liability of an employer in a criminal
case for negligence;[39] nor where the defense or claim sought to be
heard on execution has been raised or tried before the trial court;[40] nor where the post-judgment evidentiary
hearings are meant to address the impossibility of exacting compliance with the
judgment as specified therein.[41] In the instant case, we are not concerned
with just varying or replacing the means of executing the Judgment but with
attempts to compel an altogether different relief apart from those adjudged in
the HLURB Decision.
Likewise, for obvious reasons, the assailed Orders do not involve
supervening events where the court a quo is allowed to admit
evidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter to suspend execution of
the judgment and grant relief as may be warranted which may or may not result
in its modification. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire
after judgment has become final and executory or to
new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality,
including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.[42] Clearly, the responsibility for the expenses
for registering and titling the subject house and lot - a matter pre-dating the
filing of the complaint with the HLURB, and in fact, written in the contract to
sell which private respondents sought to enforce - does not qualify as a supervening
event which would have justified such post-judgment hearings as those
undertaken by the HLURB and validated by the Court of Appeals.
We find precedent in Baclayon
v. Court of Appeals[43] for our ruling in the instant petition. In this case, the defendants
failed to raise as counterclaim the expenses for reimbursement of improvements
built in good faith and allowed the judgment to become final and executory without a decision on the value of the
improvements. Subsequently, the trial court conducted hearings supplementary to
execution allowing defendants to prove that they were builders in good faith of
the improvements and their value. In nullifying the action of the lower court
we ruled -
x x x x The defense of builders in good faith of the improvements and evidence of the value of said improvements were not raised/presented before the trial court. More importantly, in the recent case of First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Co., Inc. x x x x [we ruled that] matters of equity which can be raised in an execution proceeding, cannot refer to those which the court could have passed upon before judgment. Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, since conceivably the proof of partial payments could be so seriously controversial as to need another full blown trial, decision and appeal. The rule is well established that once a decision has become final and executory the only jurisdiction left with the trial court is to order its execution. To require now the trial court in a hearing supplementary to execution, to receive private respondents' evidence to prove that they are builders in good faith of the improvements and the value of said improvements, is to disturb a final executory decision; which may even cause its substantial amendment.
More significantly, in the case at bar, private respondents should have asserted in the strongest language and at the earliest possible opportunity, i.e., in the complaint for specific performance, their reasons for requiring petitioner to shoulder the expenses of transferring title to them since, as the records clearly show, the same contract to sell for which they sought specific performance categorically imposed the burden at least prima facie upon them-
Upon full payment of the total purchase price of the house and lot
package applies, the SELLER shall forthwith execute and deliver to the BUYER a
final Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the property, free from all kinds of
liens and encumbrances, except such as may be subsisting by operation of law, it
being understood that the expenses for the transfer of this title to the
BUYER including documentary stamps, shall be for the exclusive account of said
buyer (underscoring supplied).
It goes without saying that the foregoing matters, in addition to
alleging them in the complaint, should have also been heard during the trial on
the merits before the HLURB where the parties could have proved their
respective claims.[44] However, believing that the assailed rulings
were merely part of the execution of the HLURB Decision, the HLURB
instead precipitately resolved the issue in favor of private respondents with
nary a notice and hearing demanded in controversial cases. Jabon
v. Alto[45] invalidates such hasty approach -
As may be noted from the dispositive portion of the decision x x x x the court merely declares plaintiff owner of the portions of the land under litigation x x x. It does not give plaintiff any other relief, much less it orders plaintiff to be placed in possession of the land adjudicated to him. It later developed, however, that when plaintiff attempted to execute that part of the judgment rendered in his favor, a portion of the land was occupied by the defendants x x x. And because the decision contains no directive for their ejectment, they resisted the execution. The question now that arises x x x is whether that decision, which has become final and executory x x x can still be amended by adding thereto a relief not originally included, such as the delivery of the possession of the land and the ejectment therefrom of the defendants x x x x Our answer is in the negative x x x x Here there has been only a declaration of ownership. No other relief is awarded to the plaintiff. In the absence of any other declaration, can we consider a mere declaration of ownership as necessarily including the possession of the property adjudicated? We do not believe so, for ownership is different from possession. A person may be declared owner, but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession.
Fifthly, the assailed Orders of the HLURB did not
merely interpret for purposes of execution but actually changed, amended or
modified the HLURB Decision.[46] By ordering petitioner to pay for private respondents’ expenses in
transferring the documents of title over the house and lot in their names, the
HLURB introduced new matters in the Decision which were both material
and substantial. In the original Decision petitioner was mandated only
to execute the deed of absolute of sale and to deliver the transfer certificate
of title. But the assailed Orders granted an entirely new relief which
significantly affected the obligations of petitioner as judgment-debtor;
petitioner was not only to execute the deed and deliver the documents of title
but must also shell out money to settle the expenses incurred in the process of
transferring title to private respondents.
Verily, since the Orders in question are a wide departure from
and a material amplification of the final and at least executory
HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void
and absolutely unenforceable for any purpose. It is well settled that after the
decision has become final and executory, it can no
longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or
mistakes. In Robles v. Timario[47] we nullified and set aside the imposition of interest in a subsequent
order of the lower court on the ground that the dispositive
part of the judgment “absolutely made no mention of any interest on the amount
of the judgment, hence there is no ambiguity to be clarified from the
statements made in the body of the decision x x x.” We shall do the same in the instant case.
If neither the HLURB nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
impose such obligation upon petitioner, then the same would hold true for this
Court. Under the circumstances, we have no authority to unsettle the final and
perhaps satisfactorily executed Decision of the HLURB. As we have consistently
ruled, “the general power of courts to amend their judgments or orders to make
them conformable to justice cannot be invoked to correct an oversight or error
as a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity, curable without
a proper proceeding filed before the judgment had become final.”[48]
Finally, it is unfortunate that private respondents by their own
negligence kept the issue hanging as to who between them and petitioner should
pay for the expenses for the execution and registration of the sale as well as
the fees and taxes for the issuance of new documents of title. And so a
corollary question that we might as well resolve now (although not raised as an
issue in the present petition but conformably with Gayos
v. Gayos[49] that it is a cherished rule of procedure that a court should always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root
or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation) is whether private
respondents can still file a separate complaint against petitioner to recover
the expenses for transferring to themselves the title to the subject house and
lot.
We hold that private respondents are barred from raising the
issue either in the instant case or through another action. Under Sec. 47, Rule
39, the Rules of Court, a final and executory
judgment is conclusive upon any matter “that could have been raised in relation
thereto.” We also ruled in Gabaya v.
Mendoza[50] that a final judgment is conclusive not only as to every matter which
was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand but as to any
other admissible matter which must have been offered for that purpose.
Indubitably, the responsibility for the expenses for transferring title over
the house and lot to private respondents is a stipulation in the contract to
sell which they could have surely disputed in the same action for specific
performance of such contract. Under the contract to sell the expenses for the
transfer of title are for the account of the buyers, private respondents
herein. Moreover, the allegations and the evidence pertaining to the payment or
reimbursement of registration and titling expenses are both admissible matters
which (if not for private respondents’ neglect in not raising this question)
must have been offered in connection with the spouses’ complaint before the
HLURB. The HLURB Decision as res judicata now bars a subsequent action based upon this unpleaded cause of action.
In sum, it is settled jurisprudence that except in the case of judgments which are void ab initio or null per se for lack of jurisdiction which can be questioned at any time - and the HLURB Decision here is not of this character - once a decision becomes final, even the court which has rendered it can no longer alter or modify it, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would set to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by settling justiciable controversies with finality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. Particularly, the 15 June 1999 and 16 November 1999 Orders of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the 9 February 2000 Decision and the 8 June 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, all of which require petitioner Jose Clavano, Inc., to pay for or reimburse private respondents, the spouses Enrique and Venus Tenazas, the fees for notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale executed and delivered by petitioner by virtue of the Decision of the HLURB in REM-0113-031095 as modified by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-J-6631, as well as the expenses and taxes for registering the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Register of Deeds and for obtaining the corresponding transfer certificate of title in private respondents’ name, are SET ASIDE.
Consequently, we also NULLIFY the P232,305.60 for the alleged actual
expenses of private respondents in notarizing and registering with the Register
of Deeds the deed of absolute sale for the house and lot and of recording the
corresponding
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Docketed as
REM-0113-031095; CA Rollo, pp. 20-25.
[2]
[3] Decision recommended
for approval by Atty. Dunstan T. San Vicente and
approved by Housing and Land Use Arbiter Cesar A. Manuel; id., pp.
35-53.
[4] Docketed as
REM-A-960116-0006; Decision penned by Commissioners Romulo
Q. Fabul and Teresita A. Desierto while Chairman Dionisio
C. de la Cerna took no part; id., pp. 54-61.
[5] Docketed as O.P.
Case No. 96-J-6631; Resolution penned by Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel/Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona; id.,
pp. 62-63.
[6] Docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 48631; Resolution penned by Associate Justice Teodoro
P. Regino with the concurrence of Associate Justices Quirino D. Abad Santos, Jr. and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.;
[7] Docketed as G.R. No.
135903; Resolution rendered by the First Division; id., p. 66.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo,
p. 84.
[11] CA Rollo, pp. 14-16.
[12] The contract states
in relevant parts: “3. Upon full payment of the total purchase price of the
house and lot package applies, the SELLER shall forthwith execute and deliver to
the BUYER a final Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the property, free from all
kinds of liens and encumbrances, except such as may be subsisting by operation
of law, it being understood that the expenses for the transfer of this title to
the BUYER including documentary stamps, shall be for the exclusive account of
said buyer;” id., pp. 45, 68-73.
[13]
[14] Docketed as CA-G.R.
No. 56161; id., pp. 1-13.
[15] Decision in CA-G.R.
No. 56161; Rollo, pp. 31-42.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Caballero v.
Solano, G.R. No. 112518,
[21] G.R. No. 137285,
[22] See Sañado v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108338,
[23] David v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
115821,
[24] Mutual Security
Insurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47018,
[25] Art. 1358 of the
Civil Code reads in part: “The following must appear in a public document: (1)
Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property.”
[26] Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95625,
[27] Black’s Law
Dictionary (1990), p. 567.
[28]
[29] See Macabenta v. Ver-Reyes,
No. L-14898,
[30] G.R. No. 73304,
[31] G.R. Nos. 74151-54,
[32] See Note 23.
[33] Ramirez v. Orientalist Company, 38 Phil. 634, 647 (1918).
[34] 15 Phil. 441, 444
(1910).
[35] 7 Phil. 581, 583
(1907).
[36] Obviously referring
to the notarization of the deed of absolute sale and the expenses for
registering the same and obtaining the
[37] See Gabila v. Perez, No.
[38] G.R. No. 71033,
[39] See Vda. de Paman v. Señeris, 201 Phil. 290 (1982).
[40]
[42] Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786,
[43] G.R. No. 89132, 26
February 1990, 182 SCRA 761, 769-770; International School, Inc. v.
Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 54243, 21 July 1989, 175 SCRA 507.
[44] Samson v. Montejo, No. L-18605,
[45] 91 Phil. 750, 752
(1952).
[46] See Ablaza v. Sycip, 110 Phil.
4, 8 (1960).
[47] 107 Phil. 809, 813
(1960).
[48] Ibid.
[49] No. L-27812,
[50] G.R. No. 53560,