EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 142561-62.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE VELASQUEZ y LUALHATI @ “UTE” AND “BANGKUTA”, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
These cases are before us on automatic review pursuant to Article
47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.[1]
Accused-appellant Jose Velasquez y Lualhati was charged in two separate informations for rape, committed as follows:
Criminal Case No. 9278 –
That sometime in the month of December, 1997 at Sitio
Maysahing, Brgy. Haligue Silangan, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd
design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
to (sic) one Annine[2] de Guzman y Lualhati,
a 9-year old girl, against the latter’s will and consent.
That the commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of trust and confidence, the accused being the uncle of the undersigned offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Criminal Case No. 9281 –
That sometime in the month of December, 1997 at Sitio Maysahing, Brgy. Haligue Silangan, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to (sic) one Nancy de Guzman y Lualhati, a 6-year old girl, against the latter’s will and consent.
That the commission of the offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of trust and confidence, the accused being the uncle of the undersigned offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
The two cases were assigned to Branch 4 of the
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Jose Velasquez y Lualhati alias “Ute” alias “Bangkuta” is hereby sentenced to Death in the manner provided for by law in each of these two (2) cases. Further, he is directed to indemnify Annie de Guzman y Lualhati and her sister, Nancy de Guzman y Lualhati in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that one
afternoon sometime in December, 1997, Annie de Guzman, then nine years old, was
asked by her Tia Arda, wife
of accused-appellant, to come to their house to take care of their baby,
Rica. While Annie was in the house,
accused-appellant dragged her into the bedroom.
He made Annie lie down on the floor and then took off her panties. Then accused-appellant unzipped his pants and
took his penis out of his briefs. He lay
on top of Annie and made jerking motions, trying to insert his penis into her
vagina. Annie felt pain in her
genitals. However, she did not shout
because she was afraid.[7]
After a while, Annie felt hot sticky substance come out of
accused-appellant’s organ. Then
accused-appellant put on his briefs and left.
Annie also put on her panties and went out to take care of Rica.[8]
Subsequently, on
When
Accused-appellant denied the charges. When asked why his nieces filed the
complaints against him, he testified that their parents envied him because he
was closer to his parents-in-law. On the
other hand, his brother-in-law and his parents-in-law did not see eye to eye.[12]
In his Appellant’s Brief, accused-appellant maintains that the evidence of the prosecution was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He makes capital of the findings of the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Melissa Lim, that the hymens of Annie and Nancy were both intact and had no lacerations.
We are not convinced.
In order to establish rape, it is not necessary to show that the
hymen was ruptured, as full penetration of the penis is not an indispensable
requirement. Even the absence of
spermatozoa in the vagina or thereabouts does not negate the commission of
rape. What is fundamental is that the
entrance, or at least the introduction of the male organ into the labia
of the pudendum, is proved. The mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia majora
of the victim’s genitalia, and not the full penetration of the complainant’s
private part, consummates the crime.
Hence, the “touching” or “entry” of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora
of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia constitutes consummated rape.[13]
xxx xxx
xxx. Jurisprudence abound that full or complete
penetration of the vaginal orifice is not required to consummate rape, for what
is essential is the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the
pudendum, no matter how slight. In People v. Villanueva,[14] this
Court emphasized: “In order that the
crime of rape may be consummated, the successful penetration by the
rapist of the female’s genital is not indispensable. Penile invasion, it has often been held,
necessarily entails contact with the labia and even the briefest of contacts
under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without
laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our jurisprudence.”[15]
To be sure, a medical examination of the victim, as well as a
medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an
essential element of rape.[16]
The accused may be convicted even on the basis of the lone uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, positive,
convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things.[17]
After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the two victims in the cases at bar, we find that their narration of the events are worthy of credit. They contain peculiar details, specifically referring to the male genitalia, which could not have been known to girls of their young age. Moreover, they did not waver even during cross-examination. They remained consistent in their story. In sharp contrast, accused-appellant merely offered bare denials of the rape charges. Indeed, our review of the records point to no other conclusion than that the trial court did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the two counts of rape.
It bears stressing that the victims herein are minors, whose
testimonies therefore deserve full credence.[18]
Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of the victim of a sexual
assault, especially a minor. No woman
would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, the
humiliation and the dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to
condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished. The embarrassment and stigma she suffers in
allowing an examination of her private parts and testifying in open court on
the painfully intimate details of her ravishment effectively rule out the
possibility of a false accusation of rape.
Her account of her horrible ordeal evinces sincerity and truthfulness.[19]
However, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty on
accused-appellant, applying Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. We have consistently held that the
circumstances under the amendatory provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,
the attendance of which could mandate the imposition of the single indivisible
penalty of death, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances which cannot be
proved as such unless alleged in the information. Even in cases were such circumstances are
proved, the death penalty cannot be imposed where the information failed to
allege them. To impose the death penalty
on the basis of a qualifying circumstance which has not been alleged in the
information would violate the accused’s
constitutional and statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.[20]
While the informations in this case alleged that accused-appellant is the uncle of the two victims, they did not state that he is their relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The testimonial evidence that accused-appellant’s wife and Luisa de Guzman are sisters[21] is immaterial. The circumstance that accused-appellant is a relative of the victims by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree must be alleged in the information. In the case at bar, the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainants was not sufficient to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. It was necessary to specifically allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.[22] Hence, accused-appellant can only be convicted of simple rape on two counts, for which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua in each case.
Finally, we agree with the trial court’s award of civil indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00 to each victim.
It has been the policy of the Court to award an amount not exceeding
P50,000.00 to victims of rape upon an indubitable showing of its commission,
which award is categorized as civil indemnity ex delicto.[23]
In addition, however, a separate award for moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 should be given to compensate for the appalling and outrageous
sexual violence which will most certainly haunt these young victims for the
rest of their lives.[24]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Consolidated Decision
of the
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] By Republic Act No.
7659, Section 22.
[2] Should read “Annie”.
[3] Rollo,
p. 5.
[4] Ibid., p. 7.
[5] Record, p. 12.
[6] Consolidated
Decision dated
[7] TSN,
[8] Ibid., pp.
18-20.
[9] TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11] Ibid., pp.
6-8.
[12] TSN,
[13] People v. Aguiluz,
G.R. No. 133480,
[14] 339 SCRA 482 [2000].
[15] People v. Makilang,
G.R. No. 139329,
[16] People v. Asuncion, G.R. No. 123916,
[17] People v. Cariño,
G.R. No. 131203, August 2, 2001; People
v. Abacia, G.R. Nos. 135552-53, June 21,
2001; People v. Buenviaje, G.R. No. 130949, April, 4, 2001.
[18] People v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
137647,
[19] People v. Manayan,
G.R. Nos. 142741-42,
[20] People v. Panganiban,
G.R. Nos. 138439-41,
[21] TSN,
[22] People v. Libo-on,
G.R. No. 136737,
[23] People v. Manayan, supra.; People v. Rapisora,
G.R. No. 140934-35,
[24] People v. Madia,
G.R. No. 130524,