FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141238.
SATURNINO SALERA, JR., SARAH SALERA, SAMUEL SALERA, and SUSAN SALERA, petitioners, vs. A-1 INVESTORS, INC., respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Petitioners owe the courts candor and must call a spade a spade. They seek to permanently enjoin the satisfaction of a final judgment through a mere complaint for injunction which, in hindsight, they claim is an action for annulment of judgment. We cannot allow their wily ways to make a mockery of the justice system and render a final judgment empty. They should avail of remedies for their grievances in accordance with law.
The petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari
to annul the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
The following facts spurred the present controversy:
It is undisputed that on August 27, 1992, Teodora
Salera, mother of the petitioners, contracted a P50,000.00
loan and issued a promissory note to respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. payable one
month after or on September 27, 1992, with interest of six percent (6%) per
month. The promissory note also stated
that she would pay liquidated damages of two percent (2%) per month of any
unpaid amount due and that in case legal services are necessary for collection
of payment, she would be liable for attorney's fees equivalent to 25% of the
amount due, but in no case less than P500.00.[1]
As the loan remained unpaid long after it had fallen due,
respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money on August 15, 1996, docketed as Civil Case No. 15996 in the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36, against Teodora Salera and impleaded her husband, Saturnino Salera, Sr., pursuant to Section 4, Rule 3 of the then
Rules of Court.[2] The summons for said case was received from the
sheriff by the couple's son, petitioner Samuel Salera,
at their family's residential address at
Saturnino, Sr. claims that from 1993 to
1997, he lived in Clarin,
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against defendants Spouses Saturnino Salera and Teodora Salera, as follows:
1. Ordering said defendants
to pay the sum of FIFTY (P50,000.00) PESOS with interest at the rate of
6% per month from
2. Ordering said defendants
to pay liquidated damages in amount equivalent to 2% per month from
3. Ordering the defendants to pay an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount due, as and for, attorney's fees; and,
4. Ordering the defendants
to pay the costs of suit.”[4]
A copy of the decision was sent again to the family's residential
address in
Saturnino, Sr. claims to have been
practically unaware of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15996 and was aghast
when on
As Saturnino, Sr. felt aggrieved and
denied of due process in Civil Case No. 15996, he filed on
“Though not specifically raised, the petition for prohibition is an
indirect attack on the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the
complaint for injunction, while invoking at the same time the jurisdiction of
the same court to render a summary judgment in his favor. Be that as it may, ‘(i)t
is hornbook doctrine that in order (t)o ascertain whether a court has
jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.’
(Ignacio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113947,
WHEREFORE, above premises considered,
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in the assailed Resolution dated
Hence this appeal with the following assignment of errors:
“I. WHETHER OR NOT REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER INJUNCTION CASES;
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF LACK OF JURISDICTION;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. CEB-20550 SHOULD HAVE BEEN TREATED AS A PETITION TO ANNUL THE DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 15996 OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY.”
The petition must fail.
Petitioners anchor their position that the RTC of Cebu has jurisdiction over their injunction case on Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, which states that Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over “civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.” They assert that the complaint for injunction filed by Saturnino, Sr. falls within this category of civil actions as the subject of the action was the restraint of the public auction of property levied pursuant to a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 15996.
While petitioners are correct that a complaint for injunction is a recognized remedy to enjoin the performance of an act,[14] which action falls within the province of Regional Trial Courts,[15] it must be taken into account that Saturnino, Sr. sought to permanently enjoin the public auction of property levied pursuant to a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 15996 on the ground that he was not served with summons and was denied due process. In doing so, Saturnino, Sr. was actually seeking the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 which was the basis of the writ of execution pursuant to which the public auction was to be held. The proper remedy for petitioners' predicament is therefore not an action for injunction, but for annulment of judgment.
It is thus understandable why petitioners are staunch in claiming, in hindsight, that although the complaint filed in the RTC of Cebu was captioned “Injunction with Damages,” the allegations therein suffice to constitute an action for annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 for lack of due process amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or extrinsic fraud. The issue of whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Saturnino, Sr. in Civil Case No. 15996 and his exclusion from the proceedings in said case amounted to extrinsic fraud which denied him of due process should be properly resolved in an action for annulment of judgment as mandated by Sections 1 and 2[16] in relation to Section 10 of Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, viz:
“Sec. 1. Coverage.- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment.- The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts. - An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. It shall be treated as an ordinary civil action and sections 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of this Rule shall be applicable thereto.”
Unfortunately for the petitioners, the complaint filed by Saturnino, Sr. in the RTC of Cebu was, without a shadow of doubt, not for annulment of the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 15996. Not only was the complaint captioned “Injunction with Damages,” but it likewise did not pray for annulment of judgment, viz:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Upon the filing of this Complaint, a temporary restraining order be issued and to be followed by a preliminary injunction after a preliminary hearing upon putting by the plaintiff a bond in such amount that this Honorable Court may determine, directing defendants to immediately stop from proceeding with the auction sale on July 17, 1997 and after trial, to make said injunction permanent and perpetual;
2. And on plaintiff's claim for damages, defendants be ordered jointly and solidarily to pay plaintiff the following sums of money:
a. P500,000.00 or
such amount as this Honorable Court may deem just, legal, and equitable under
the premises by way of moral damages;
b. P100,000.00 or such
amount as this Honorable Court may deem just, legal and equitable under the
premises by way of exemplary damages;
c. P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees;
d. P50,000.00 as
litigation expenses, and
e. Triple costs of this suit.
Further, plaintiff prays for such other relief and remedies this
Honorable Court may find just and equitable under the circumstances.”[17]
Section 4 in relation to the above-quoted Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on annulment of judgments or final orders provides, viz:
“Sec. 4. Filing and contents of petition.- The action shall be commenced by filing a verified petition alleging therein with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
. . . A certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution shall be attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner.
The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action or defense and a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same, and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.”
It is clear from the contents of the complaint filed by the petitioners that the action is not for annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996. It does not allege “with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action” which petitioners now claim are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Neither is a certified true copy of the decision in Civil Case No. 15996 attached to the original copy of the petition intended for the court and indicated as such by the petitioner. Nor were affidavits of witnesses or documents supporting the cause of action, i.e., annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, submitted together with the complaint. Petitioners cannot now mislead the court into treating the complaint for injunction as an action for annulment of judgment with the ancillary remedy of injunction.
More importantly, even assuming arguendo that the action was for annulment of judgment, the RTC of Cebu did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint as Section 10, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Sec. 10. Annulment of judgments or final orders of Municipal Trial Courts.- An action to annul a judgment or final order of a Municipal Trial Court shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the former. . .”
It is therefore the RTC of Quezon City which has jurisdiction over a case seeking annulment of the final decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36, which is similar in rank as the above-mentioned Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioners claim that respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC of Cebu over the subject matter of the action for two
reasons. First, respondent did not raise
this issue of jurisdiction in their Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in
the Court of Appeals. Thus, petitioners
argue that it was error for the appellate court to have granted the petition on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Second, according to petitioners, while it is
established doctrine that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be
raised at any time during the proceedings even for the first time on appeal,
this rule admits of an exception as when the defendant actively participated in
the proceedings and invoked the jurisdiction of the court in seeking
affirmative remedies such as respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment with Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution, and Answer. In such cases,
the defendant is estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the court pursuant to the policy that “it is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.”[18]
A careful perusal of the records would, however, show that
respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC of Cebu over the subject matter of the action, i.e., to
issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the public auction of property levied
pursuant to a writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 15996 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. In its motion for reconsideration of the
“4. Even assuming arguendo that the lot subject of the execution is an exclusive property of the plaintiff, this Court still has no authority to issue an injunction based on said ground because in doing so, this Court will in effect be varying the mandate of the Writ of Execution issued by the Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 36, in Civil Case No. 15996 (See Annex “D”, Complaint) which enjoins the properties of herein plaintiffs and his spouse to satisfy the money judgment in the said case.
5. With due respect, it is
well to remind this Honorable Court that it is beyond its authority to
deviate from the mandate of a lawful, valid, and enforceable Writ of Execution
issued by a court outside of its jurisdiction.”[19] (emphasis supplied)
In its Answer, respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. similarly stated in its affirmative defenses, viz:
“5. Assuming arguendo that the subject house and lot are exclusive
properties of the plaintif (sic), still this
Honorable Court has no authority to issue an injunction based on said ground
for the reason that it has no authority to deviate from the mandate of the Writ
of Execution issued by the Quezon City Metropolitan
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 15996 (See Annex D, Complaint) which enjoins
the properties of plaintiff herein and his spouse to satisfy the money judgment
in said case.”[20] (emphasis supplied)
While the respondent invoked the jurisdiction of the court and sought affirmative remedies such as the Motion for Summary Judgment and the Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment with Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, it also questioned the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter in its Motion for Reconsideration and Answer. Respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC of Cebu over the subject matter because it properly raised this lack of jurisdiction as one of its defenses in its Answer. It was thus proper for the Court of Appeals to grant the petition filed by respondent A-1 Investors, Inc. on the ground that the RTC of Cebu did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint even though respondent did not raise the issue of jurisdiction on appeal. Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides, viz:
“Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. - Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.” (emphasis supplied)
Well-settled is the rule that the issue
of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at any time, be raised by the
parties or motu proprio
considered by the Court.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. The preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
of
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Original Records, p.
163; Plaintiff's Pre-trial Brief in Civil Case No. CEB-20550 in the RTC of
[2] Sec. 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides, viz:
“Sec. 4. Married woman. - A married woman may not sue or be sued alone without joining her husband, except in the following instances:
(a) When they are judicially separated;
(b) If they have in fact been separated for at least one year;
(c) When there is a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements;
(d) If the administration of all the property in the marriage has been transferred to her, in accordance with Articles 196 and 197 of the Civil Code;
(e) When the litigation is between the husband and the wife;
(f) If the suit concerns her paraphernal property;
(g) When the action is upon the civil liability arising from a criminal offense;
(h) If the litigation is incidental to the profession, occupation or business in which she is engaged;
(i) In any civil action referred to in Articles 25 to 35 of the Civil Code; and
(j) In an action upon a quasi-delict.
In the cases mentioned in paragraphs (g)
to (j), the husband must be joined as a party defendant if the third paragraph
of Article 163 of the Civil Code is applicable.”
[3] Original Records, p.
47.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] TSN, Sarah Salera,
[8] Original Records, p.
1; Complaint, p. 1.
[9] Original Records, p.
3.
[10]
[11]
[12] Rollo,
pp. 3-7; Petition, pp. 1-5.
[13] Rollo,
p. 31; Decision, p. 7.
[14] Manila Banking
Corp., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 187 SCRA 138 (1990).
[15] Notre Dame de
Lourdes Hospital v. Mallare-Phillips, 197 SCRA
187 (1991).
[16] See also Gacutana-Fraile v.
Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 138518,
[17] Original Records, p.
3; Complaint, p. 3.
[18] Rollo,
p. 8; Petition, p. 7, citing Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968).
[19] Original Records, p.
137; Motion for Reconsideration, p. 3.
[20] Original Records, p.
144; Answer, p. 2.
[21] Namuhe v.
Ombudsman, 298 SCRA 298 (1998), citing Section 1, Rule 9, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure (formerly Section 2, Rule 9); Fabian v. Desierto,
295 SCRA 470 (1998).