THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140550.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDGAR AYUPAN, GERRY HABLONA (at large), accused, EDGAR AYUPAN, appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the evidence does not establish how the aggression commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder. In the present case, the lone prosecution witness did not see how the attack on the victim was initiated. Hence, the crime is only homicide, not murder.
The Case
Edgar Ayupan appeals the August 12,
1999 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo
City (Branch 33) in Criminal Case No. 32949, finding him guilty of murder and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The Information, dated
“That on or about the 27th day of June, 1984 in the Municipality of
Batad, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and cooperating, with an unidentified companion, with treachery,
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, and a
decided purpose to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab several times the victim
FRANCISCO MENDOZA using the bladed weapon the accused were provided at that
time, thereby hitting him and inflicting upon FRANCISCO MENDOZA several stab
wounds on different parts of his body which caused his death.”[2]
With the assistance of counsel,[3] appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned
on
“Based on the foregoing, this Court hereby decrees that.
“1. Accused Edgar Ayupan is guilty of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized by paragraph 1, Article 248 in its further relation to paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, as proven beyond reasonable doubt;
“2. Accused Edgar Ayupan is meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua by reason of the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance;
“3. Accused Edgar Ayupan is directed to
indemnify the heirs of deceased-victim Francisco Mendoza [in] the amount of P50,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
“4. The Director of [the] Bureau of Correction,
“SO ORDERED.”[5]
The
Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the facts is summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General, as follows:[6]
“On
“Horrified, Batislaong shouted at
appellant, demanding why he was stabbing Francisco Mendoza when as far as she
knew her relative had done no wrong. She shouted for people to help
“Batislaong was not able to report the incident immediately because at that time she was nervous and afraid. A week after the incident, she was able to relate the circumstances surrounding the killing to Atty. Teodosio. Atty. Teodosio told her that they ha[d] two other witnesses to the killing which he felt were quite sufficient in prosecuting appellant. But he told her that he would call her if the need arises.
“Dr. Noel C. Posadas, a retired rural health physician and a resident of Batad, conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. He testified that the victim received three (3) stab wounds on the chest, the third of which was fatal. The immediate cause of death was shock and hemorrhage.” (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following version of
the facts:[7]
“Accused Edgar Ayupan testified that he
did kn[o]w the victim but he did not stab him. On
“Roquito Penuela
corroborated the testimony of accused Ayupan that
before they entered the dance hall on
Ruling of the Trial Court
Giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Helen Batislaong, the trial court held that the witness, having been at the locus criminis had the opportunity to see and observe the specific details of the crime.
The RTC disbelieved appellant’s defense of denial and rejected
the evidence of good moral character offered by the defense witnesses. It held
that this defense was based purely on conjecture and might have even been
fabricated, since it was unsubstantiated by concrete details.[8] Further, it ruled that the flight of
appellant after the commission of the crime was an indication of his guilt.
Hence, this appeal.[9]
The Issue
Appellant raises this lone assignment of error for our consideration:
“The trial court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant Edgar Ayupan of the crime of murder
despite the insufficient, unreliable testimony of prosecution lone witness
Helen Batislaong.”[10]
This Court’s Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted only of homicide.
Main
Issue:
Credibility of Lone Witness
Appellant argues that the lower court erred in relying on the
testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Helen Batislaong,
because her testimony was not corroborated by other witnesses. We disagree.[11]
It is well-settled that the testimony of a lone witness -- if
found by the trial court to be positive, categorical and credible -- is
sufficient to support a conviction. This is so, especially if the testimony
bore the earmarks of truth and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously,
naturally and in a straightforward manner.[12] Corroborative evidence is necessary only
when there are reasons to suspect that the witness bent the truth, or that his
or her observation was inaccurate.[13] Evidence is assessed in terms of quality,
not quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted.[14] Therefore, it is not uncommon to reach a
conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness.[15]
In the case at bar, the prosecution could have presented two
other witnesses, Rodrigo L. Demayo and Noel T. Estebal, but both died before they could testify.[16] Be that as it may, the trial court found Batislaong’s narration of the incident straightforward and
categorical. She testified thus:
“ATTY TEODOSIO ON
DIRECT EXAMINATION:
May
it please the honorable court.
Q Miss Batislaong, you said you are a
resident of Batad, Iloilo[;] since when have you been
a resident of Batad,
A Since I was small.
Q Do you know the accused in this case Edgar Ayupan?
A Yes, sir.
Q If he is present inside this courtroom will you please point to
us Edgar Ayupan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is he?
A (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who upon
being asked his name, x x x
answered Edgar Ayupan)
Q On the evening of
A I was at the dance hall.
COURT:
(to
witness)
Where
is that dance hall?
THE WITNESS:
At Hamod, Batad,
xxx xxx xxx
Q In going [to] the dance hall from your house, [did] you have any
companions?
A My younger sister and my cousin.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was your purpose in going to the dance hall?
A To watch the dance.
Q At about 12:00 o'clock midnight[,] June 26, 1984, could you tell
us if there was anything unusual that happened in that dance hall?
A There was a commotion.
Q Where were you when you noticed that there was a commotion?
A I was inside the dance hall on the bench.
Q And because you notice that there was a commotion, what did you
do if any?
A I ran [to] the center of the dance hall to see x x x what happened.
Q Why did you r[u]n towards the middle of the dance hall to see
what happened?
A Because I ha[d] to see x x x who were fighting because my cousin was no longer with
me.
Q And what did you observe when you proceeded to the middle portion
of the dance hall?
A I saw Francisco Mendoza lying [down while] being stabbed by
Edgar.
Q What is the family name of this Francisco?
A
Q And what is the family name of this Edgar?
A Ayupan.
Q This Edgar Ayupan whom you said was
stabbing Francisco Mendoza, was he the same Edgar Ayupan
whom you identified a while ago as the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And do you know what kind of weapon was being used by Edgar Ayupan when you saw him [stabbing] Francisco Mendoza?
A A knife.
Q What was the position of Francisco Mendoza when he was stabbed by
Edgar Ayupan?
A He was lying [down].
Q Where was he lying [down]?
A At the center of the dance hall.
Q And how about this Edgar Ayupan[,]
where was he situated in relation to Francisco Mendoza when he stabbed Francisco Mendoza while the latter was lying on
the ground?
Q Near the knee and he was kneeling.
xxx xxx xxxx
Q How many times did Edgar Ayupan stab
Francisco Mendoza?
A Many times.
Q Now what did you do when you saw Edgar Ayupan
kneeling somewhere on the knee portion of the body of Francisco Mendoza, at the
same time stabbing Francisco Mendoza?
A I shouted why he stabbed Francisco Mendoza because he ha[d] no
fault.
Q In what part of the body of. . Were you able to see if Francisco
Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for several times by Edgar Ayupan?
A Yes, sir.
Q And could you tell the Court in what part of the body of
Francisco Mendoza was hit when he was stabbed for several times by Edgar Ayupan?
A On the chest.
Q Now after you shouted considering that you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza for several times what next happened?
A I shouted for help [for] Francisco Mendoza.
Q Then what happened next?
A Nobody help[ed] us because most people ran away.
Q After Edgar Ayupan stabbed Francisco
Mendoza for several times[,] what [happened next]?
A He ran away.
Q Aside from - do you know if Edgar Ayupan
had other companions?
A Yes, sir.
Q And where [were] his companions at that time that he was stabbing
Francisco Mendoza?
A Just near him.
Q Now you said - what happened to the companions of Edgar Ayupan after Edgar Ayupan ran
away?
ATTY. LAUREA:
Incompetent,
your honor, he would be incompetent as to what happened to the companions of
Edgar Ayupan after he ran away.
COURT:
What
happened to the companions after he ran away?
ATTY. TEDOSIO:
What
happened to the companions of Edgar after Edgar Ayupan
ran away?
A They ran away together.
Q Now after Edgar Ayupan and his
companions ha[d] left, what did you do?
A I shouted and cried for help for Francisco Mendoza.
Q Then what next happened when you were there?
A When I was there[,] the barangay
captain also went there and [saw] who was there and he was left there and I was
brought by the barangay captain, because I was
crying[;] since I [could] not walk, they just brought me home.
Q Were you able to reach your house?
A Yes, sir, I was brought by my younger sister and my cousin.
Q Could you tell the Court how were you able to recognize Edgar Ayupan as the person whom you saw [stab] for several times
Francisco Mendoza, considering that it was night?
A Because I already knew him and he is also from Batad.”[17]
Moreover, Batislaong had a clear view of the stabbing incident as shown by the following:
“ATTY. TEODOSIO:
How
far were you from Edgar Ayupan and rancisco
A Four (4) meters.
Q And wher were you situated in relation
to Francisco Mendoza who was lying on the ground when he was stabbed by Edgar Ayupan?
A Somewhere on the head of Francisco Mendoza
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was a condition of the light at that time in that dance hall
when you saw Edgar Ayupan [stab] Francisco Mendoza?
A The light was bright.
Q And from where [did] this brightness come x x
x?
THE WITNESS:
Because
the light [was] near x x x
them because they [were] in the center of the dance hall.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
That
would be all for the witness.
xxx xxx xxx
That
would be all.”[18]
Based on the foregoing, we find no reason to disturb the factual
findings of the RTC. Time and time again, we have held that the credibility of
witnesses is a matter best left to the determination of the trial court because
of its unique advantage of observing them firsthand; and of noting their
demeanor, conduct and attitude.[19] It is aided by various indicia that
could not be readily seen on the records. The “candid answer, the hesitant
pause, the nervous voice, the undertone, the befuddled look, the honest gaze,
the modest blush, or the guilty blanch”[20] -- these reveal if the witness is reciting
the whole truth or merely weaving a web of lies and deceptions.
Positive
Identification
Well-settled is the rule that the positive identification of the
accused -- when categorical and consistent and without any ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter -- prevails over alibi and
denial which are negative and self-serving, undeserving of weight in law.[21]
In the present case, there is no doubt that Batislaong’s
testimony positively identified appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. First,
she had a clear view of the stabbing incident, as she was standing just
four (4) meters from the victim. Moreover, the dance hall was sufficiently
illuminated. As a witness to a violent incident, she strove to see the
appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which it
was committed.[22] Second, the medicolegal’s
testimony[23] and Medical Report[24] corroborated her recollection of the specific
details of the crime -- the stabbing of the victim on the chest several times,
the use of a knife, and the position of the assailant. A detailed testimony
acquires greater weight and credibility when confirmed by autopsy findings.[25]
The fact that Batislaong is a relative
of the victim does not necessarily taint her testimony. We have held that blood
relationship between a witness and the victim does not, by itself, impair the former’s credibility. On the contrary, relationship may
strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to
falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit.[26]
On the other hand, while appellant denies being the perpetrator of the crime, he admits that he was in the dance hall where the victim was stabbed to death. His claim that he was unconscious at that particular instant does not persuade.
The denial by appellant is inherently weak and must fail vis-à-vis
Batislaong’s positive declaration affirming that
he was at the scene of the crime and was its perpetrator.[27] It was not physically impossible for him to
be at the locus criminis.[28] More so, undisputed is his admission that, prior to the stabbing
incident, his hand was slapped by the victim when the former asked a lady for a
dance.[29]
When there is no evidence to indicate that the principal witness
for the prosecution was moved by an improper motive, the presumption is that
such motive was absent, and that the witness’ testimony is entitled to full
faith and credit.[30] Between appellant’s denial and the witness’
positive testimony, there is no doubt that the latter is entitled to credence.
Delay in
Reporting
In a futile attempt to discredit Batislaong, appellant argues that since she did not immediately report the incident to the police, her testimony deserves scant consideration. We are not convinced.
We have held that different people react differently to a given
stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.[31] Delay in a witness’ reporting of a crime to
police authorities, when adequately explained, does not impair that witness’
credibility.[32]
In the present case, Batislaong
explained that, initially, she was nervous and afraid to report the incident.[33] In fact, she had to be brought home, as she
was weak from crying after witnessing the stabbing incident.[34] Thus, it was quite understandable that she
did not immediately report the identity of the offender after the startling
occurrence, which became an even more traumatic experience because she was
related to the victim.[35] Moreover, there is no rule that the suspect
in a crime should be immediately named by a witness.[36]
Appellant’s
Flight
The crime happened in June 1984, and the indictments against appellant commenced only in 1995. In addition, he claims that the prosecution has no record to show that the facts of the case have been preserved. We disagree.
First, as correctly pointed out by the solicitor general,[37] the relevant documents had been preserved
before the case was archived. Second, appellant is to blame for the
delay in the prosecution of this case. A review of the records reveals that an
Order for his arrest was issued on
Thereafter, the case was archived on
In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course of
justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of
the accused may, as a general rule, be taken as evidence tending to establish
guilt.[41]
In the present case, it is interesting to note that as soon as
the Information was filed and the corresponding warrant of arrest issued,
appellant could not be found in Batad, resulting in
the archiving of the case. It is thus plain that- he left the place to avoid
arrest and prosecution.[42] If it were true that he never left Batad, as he claims, he should have been apprehended by the
police a long time ago. Indeed, his flight to
Treachery
In his Reply,[43] appellant argues that if he was responsible
for the death of the victim, he would be guilty only of homicide, because the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven.
We are convinced. Well-settled is the rule that treachery must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself.[44] Any doubt as to the existence of treachery
must be resolved in favor of the accused.[45] There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof, tending directly and specially to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[46] To appreciate treachery, two conditions must
be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity for self-defense or for retaliation and (2) the
deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.[47]
The RTC explained that the crime had been attended by treachery
because, at the moment of its commission, appellant stabbed the victim who was
lying on the ground. It rationalized that such a situation propelled the method
of attack to a successful accomplishment of the criminal act without exposing
the accused to any possible retaliation from the victim.[48]
True, the essence of treachery is the swiftness and the
unexpectedness of an attack upon an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who has not
given the slightest provocation.[49] However, the suddenness of the attack does
not by itself suffice to support a finding of alevosia,
even if the purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and the
victim’s helpless position is accidental.[50] In order to appreciate treachery as a
modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, as in the present case, it
must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack.[51]
We hold that the second requisite was not sufficiently
established by the prosecution. It was not able to show that appellant had
deliberately adopted the attack, considering that it was executed during a
commotion and as a result of it.[52] The lower court failed to consider that the
lone eyewitness could not have had any knowledge of it. She arrived at the
scene sometime after the stabbing started; thus, she could not testify on
whether there was provocation on the part of the victim.[53]
It must be pointed out that appellant and the victim had an
altercation prior to the stabbing incident. Indeed, the attack could have been
done on impulse as a reaction to the latter’s actual or imagined provocation.
Such provocation negated the presence of treachery, even if the attack may have
been sudden and unexpected.[54]
Further, the mere fact that, according to the testimony of the medicolegal officer, several stab wounds were inflicted on
the victim --who was either sitting or lying down - did not show treachery
unless there was evidence that such form of attack had purposely been adopted
by the accused.[55] Also, the fact that a bladed weapon was used
did not per se make the attack treacherous.[56]
Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated.[57] One cannot substitute mere suppositions for
a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence, as the trial court apparently did.[58] Since the lone prosecution witness failed to
see how the attack had been initiated on the victim, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery cannot be applied.[59] Thus, appellant can be convicted only of
homicide,[60] for which the imposable penalty under the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the
absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.[61]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum to 14 years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The civil indemnity awarded by the RTC is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Written by Judge Virgilio M. Patag; rollo, pp. 20-31; records, pp. 197-208.
[2] Rollo,
p.9; records, p. 1.
[3] Atty. Von Lovel Bedona.
[4] Order dated
[5] Assailed Decision,
pp. 11-12; rollo, pp. 30-31; records, pp. 207-208.
[6] Appellee’s
Brief, pp. 4-6; rollo, pp. 91-93. The Brief
was signed by Solicitor General Simeon V. Marcelo, Assistant Solicitor
General Azucena R. Balanon-Corpuz
and Associate Solicitor Jonathan L. de la Vega.
[7] Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 50-51. The Brief
was signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Teresita S. de Guzman, and Liwayway
J. Nazal, all of the Public Attorney’s Office.
[8] Assailed Decision,
pp.10-11; rollo, pp. 29-30.
[9] This case was deemed
submitted for resolution on
[10] Rollo,
p. 47.
[11] Appellant’s Brief,
p. 6; rollo, p. 52.
[12] People v. Navarro, 297
SCRA 331, October 7, 1998; People
v. Villanueva, 284 SCRA 501, June 22, 1998; People v. Hayahay,
279 SCRA 567, September 26, 1997.
[13] People v. Hillado,
307 SCRA 535,
[14] People v. Hillado, supra, citing People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369,
[15] People v. Tulop,
289 SCRA 316,
[16] TSN,
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] People v. Milliam,
324 SCRA 155, 167,
[20] People v. Bonito, 342 SCRA 405,
420-421,
[21] People v. Lovedorial,
GR No. 139340, January 17, 2001,
citing People v. Enriquez, 292
SCRA 656, July 20, 1998.
[22] People v. Pulusan,
290 SCRA 353,
[23] TSN,
[24] Records, p. 11.
[25] People v. Leal, GR No. 139313, June 19, 2001; People v. Molina, 312 SCRA 130,
August 10, 1999; People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141, October 2, 1997.
[26] People v. Tayco,
GR No. 138609,
[27] People v. Sesbreño,
314 SCRA 87,
[28] People v. Dee, 342 SCRA 115,
[29] TSN,
[30] People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675,
[31] People v. Espero,
346 SCRA 617, 624,
[32] People v. Hilot,
342 SCRA 128, 135,
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] People v. Lovedorial, supra, citing People v. Nang,
289 SCRA 16,
[36] People v. Hilot, supra, citing People v. Queliza,
279 SCRA 145,
[37] Appellee’s
Brief, pp. 11-15; rollo, pp. 98-102.
[38] Records, p. 13.
[39] Exhibit “F”;
records, p. 17.
[40] Records, p. 21.
[41] People v. Cirilo,
346 SCRA 648,
[42] People v. Bionat,
278 SCRA 454,
[43] Rollo,
p. 121.
[44] People v. Orio,
330 SCRA 576,
[45] People v. Santos, 332 SCRA 394,
[46] Section 16, Article
14, Revised Penal Code.
[47] People v. Arrojado,
GR No. 130492,
[48] Assailed Decision,
p. 11; rollo, p. 30.
[49] People v. Ubaldo,
342 SCRA 338,
[50] People v. Templo, supra.
[51] People v. Porras, 255 SCRA 514,
[52] People v. Cabareno,
GR No. 138645,
[53] People v. Macaliag,
337 SCRA 502,
[54] People v. Sabanal, 172 SCRA 430,
[55] People v. Garcia,
258 SCRA 411,
[56] People v. Hilot, supra.
[57] People v. Nalangan,
270 SCRA 234,
[58] People v. Porras, 255, supra.
[59] People v. Amamangpang,
291 SCRA 638, July 2, 1998, citing People v. Salvador, 224 SCRA 819,
July 30, 1993;and People v. Cordero, 217 SCRA 1, January 5, 1993.
[60] People v. Hilot, supra.
[61] People v. De Mesa, GR No. 137036,