FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139539.
CEROFERR REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO D. SANTIAGO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal via certiorari[1] from the decision of the Court of Appeals[2] dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the
order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,[6] are as follows:
“On
“In his answer, defendant
“In the course of the proceedings, an important issue metamorphosed
as a result of the conflicting claims of the parties over the vacant lot
actually used as a jeepney terminal – the exact identity and location thereof.
There was a verification survey, followed by a relocation survey, whereby it
would appear that the vacant lot is inside Lot No. 68. The outcome of the
survey, however, was vigorously objected to by defendant who insisted that the
area is inside his lot. Defendant, in his manifestation dated
“Because of the competing claims of ownership of the parties over the vacant lot, it became inevitable that the eye of the storm centered on the correctness of property boundaries which would necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of the respective titles of the parties. While both parties have been brandishing separate certificates of title, defendant asserted a superior claim as against that of the plaintiff in that, according to defendant, his title has been confirmed through judicial reconstitution proceedings, whereas plaintiff’s title does not carry any technical description of the property except only as it is designated in the title as Lot No. 68 of the Tala Estate Subdivision.
“It thus became clear, at least from the viewpoint of defendant, that the case would no longer merely involve a simple case of collection of damages and injunction – which was the main objective of the complaint - but a review of the title of defendant vis-à-vis that of plaintiff. At this point, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint premised primarily on his contention that the trial court cannot adjudicate the issue of damages without passing over the conflicting claims of ownership of the parties over the disputed portion.
“On
“From this ruling, plaintiff appealed to this court insisting that the complaint stated a valid cause of action which was determinable from the face thereof, and that, in any event, the trial court could proceed to try and decide the case before it since, under present law, there is now no substantial distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in a regional trial court and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a land registration court, citing Ignacio v. Court of Appeals 246 SCRA 242 (1995).”
On
Hence, this appeal.[11]
The Issues
The issues are: (1) whether Ceroferr’s complaint states a sufficient cause of action and (2) whether the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot involved in the case.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a
concise statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff’s cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out
without leaving the statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint
states a cause of action only when it has its three indispensable elements,
namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[12] If these elements are not extant, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action.[13]
These elements are present in the case at bar.
The complaint[14] alleged that petitioner Ceroferr owned
The complaint further alleged that respondent
Despite clarification from petitioner Ceroferr that the jeepney
terminal was within
A defendant who moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of cause of action, as in this case, hypothetically admits all the
averments thereof. The test of sufficiency of the facts found in a complaint as
constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged
the court can render a valid judgement upon the same in accordance with the
prayer thereof. The hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material
facts well pleaded in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
Hence, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which
the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of
the defense that may be assessed by the defendants.[15]
In this case, petitioner Ceroferr’s cause of action has been
sufficiently averred in the complaint. If it were admitted that the right of
ownership of petitioner Ceroferr to the peaceful use and possession of
On the issue of jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to determine the identity and location of the vacant lot in question.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.[16] The jurisdiction of a court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the
defendant.[17]
While the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any
stage of an action, nevertheless, the party raising such question may be
estopped if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he
questions and he only objects to the court’s jurisdiction because the judgment
or the order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.[18]
In this case, respondent
Both parties in this case claim that the vacant lot is within their property. This is an issue that can be best resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
After the land has been originally registered, the Court of Land
Registration ceases to have jurisdiction over contests concerning the location
of boundary lines. In such case, the action in personam has to be
instituted before an ordinary court of general jurisdiction.[19]
The regional trial court has jurisdiction to determine the precise identity and location of the vacant lot used as a jeepney terminal.
The Fallo
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the decision of the Court of
Appeals[20]
and the order of the trial court[21] dismissing the case. We remand the case to
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 93,
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Under Rule 45, Revised
Rules of Court.
[2] In CA-G. R. CV No.
54413, promulgated on
[3] In Civil Case No.
94-19833, dated
[4] Dated
[5] Motion for
Reconsideration, CA Rollo, pp. 134-139.
[6] With editorial
changes.
[7] Petition, Annex “C”,
Rollo, pp. 32-41.
[8] Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 25-30.
[9] CA Rollo, pp.
134-139.
[10] Petition, Annex “B”,
Rollo, p. 31.
[11] Filed on
[12] Uy v. Evangelista, G. R. No. 140365,
July 11, 2001, citing Parañaque Kings
Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 727 (1997).
[13] Uy v. Evangelista, G. R. No. 140365,
July 11, 2001, citing San Lorenzo
Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 115 (1998).
[14] Petition, Annex “C”,
Rollo, pp. 32-41.
[15] Fil-Estate Golf and
Development, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 465, 490-491 (1996).
[16] Saura v. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA
465, 472 (1999).
[17] Torres v.
Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 539, 547 (1999), citing Ganadin v. Ramos, 99
SCRA, 613, 621-622 (1980).
[18] National Steel
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 362 Phil. 150, 160 (1999), citing
[19] Peña, Narciso, et
al., Registration of Land Titles and Deeds (1994 Revised Edition), p. 439,
citing Aguilar v. Chiu, 195 Phil. 613 (1981).
[20] In CA-G. R. CV No.
54413.
[21] In Civil Case No.
94-19833.