FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 139330.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO SANSAET y SANTOJALA, SILVERIO SANSAET y SANTOJALA, and LEOPOLDO SANSAET y SANTOJALA, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The combination of liquor, hot heads and a bad joke was the dangerous concoction that led to the unfortunate death of Uldarico de Castro.
The Case
Silverio Sansaet
y Santojala and Leopoldo Sansaet y Santojala, appeals from
the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court Antique, Branch
11, San Jose, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and
sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the widow of Uldarico
de Castro the sum of P21,000.00 as indemnity for funeral expenses, P50,000.00
as indemnity for death and another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In an Information[2] dated
“That on or about the 25th day of June 1989, in the Municipality of Tobias Fornier, Province of Antique, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being then armed with bolos and a sickle, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully and unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and hack with said bolos and sickle one Uldarico de Castro thereby inflicting multiple wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death shortly thereafter.”
Upon arraignment on
After trial, on
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing pronouncements, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused Silverio Sansaet y Santolaja and Leopoldo Sansaet y Santojala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of
murder as defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and,
accordingly: (a) sentencing each one of the aforenamed
accused to a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua
and the accessory penalties inherent thereto; (b) ordering both of the
aforementioned accused to pay Teresita de Castro,
widow of Uldarico de Castro the sum of P50,000.00 as
indemnity for his death; the sum of P21,000.00 as indemnity for funeral
expenses; the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for moral damages; and cost.”[4]
Hence, this appeal.[5]
The Facts
As established by the evidence of the prosecution, the facts are:
“At around
“There were verbal exchanges between the two. Thereafter, Rogelio accosted Uldarico saying “why, are you brave? Go downstairs.” Rogelio then unsheathed his bolo and went downstairs, whereas Uldarico also got his bolo and went downstairs. The two then started hacking each other. Uldarico was hit on the base of his ear and Rogelio on the bridge of his nose. Silverio and Leopoldo then positioned themselves behind Uldarico and hacked and hit the latter just above the nape and on the right shoulder. Uldarico retaliated with a hack blow wounding Silverio at the left forearm. Then Rogelio hacked Uldarico a second time. The latter raised his hand to parry the blow but was severed in the process, fell to the ground and rolled towards the river. Leopoldo and Rogelio followed and continued on hacking and hitting Uldarico on different parts of his body. Leopoldo then told Silverio, “To, we will just kill him.” His wife restrained Silverio. Not satisfied, Leopoldo and Rogelio dragged Uldarico towards the river and there they each twice hacked Uldarico. Afterwards, Leopoldo said “To, he is already dead.” The three brothers then left. Jovito Sansaet and Herminio Mondragon went to the Barangay Captain and reported the incident.
“That evening the three Sansaet brothers
surrendered to the police of Tobias Fornier. Rogelio
and Leopoldo Sansaet also
surrendered their respective bolos.”[6]
The Issues
1. Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight and credit to the testimony of prosecution witness Herminio Mondragon, a close relative of the victim, Uldarico de Castro.
2. Whether the trial court
erred in rejecting the evidence of the accused.[7]
The Court’s Ruling
We sustain the conviction of the accused, not of murder but of homicide.
“Somewhere along the painstaking review of the evidence on
record, one version rings the semblance of truth, not necessarily because it is
the absolute truth, but simply because it is the best approximation of the
truth based on the declarations of witnesses as corroborated by material
evidence. Perforce, the other version must be rejected. Truth and falsehood, it
has been well said, are not always opposed to each other like black and white,
but oftentimes, and by design, are made to resemble each other so as to be
hardly distinguishable.”[8]
The accused-appellants argued that the judge who wrote the
decision did not try the case and hence was not able to observe first hand the
testimonies of the witnesses. Hence, when a question is raised as to whether to
believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, Judge Nery G. Duremdes not having had
the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies, can not
discern and gauge if said witnesses were telling the truth. However, we have
held in several cases that “the decision of a judge who did not try the case is
not by that reason alone erroneous.”[9] The fact that the judge who tried the case was different from the judge
who penned the decision does not in any way taint the same. Indeed, “the
efficacy of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that its writer
only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided at the trial, unless
there is showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached
by him.”[10] “Moreover, a judge who was not present
during the trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
the trial as basis of his decision. Such reliance does not violate substantive
and procedural due process of law.”[11]
We have held in a long list of cases that “[M]mere relationship
of a witness to the victim does not automatically impair his credibility and
render his testimony less worthy of credence where no improper motive can be
ascribed to him for testifying. Rather, the witness’ relationship to the
victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even make it more
credible as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in seeking
justice for the deceased to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.”[12]
The accused-appellants harped on the fact that Herminio Mondragon did not report
or tell anyone what he saw and waited for a long period of time before
revealing that he saw the killing of Uldarico de
Castro. “We do not find anything wrong with the witnesses’ failure to talk to
the police immediately after the incident. It is not uncommon for witnesses to
delay or vacillate in disclosing the identity of the offender after the
startling occurrence for fear of reprisals. The natural reluctance of witnesses
to get involved in a criminal case and to provide information to the
authorities is a matter of judicial notice. Absent any showing that these
witnesses were actuated by improper motives, their testimonies deserve full
faith and credit.”[13]
Time and time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is
the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses.
“Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill
motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the
appellants’ defense of denial and alibi. In this case, there was no
showing of any improper motive on the part of the witnesses to testify falsely
against the three accused or to falsely implicate them in the commission of the
crime. Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and
that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. Unless substantiated
by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
undeserving of any weight in law.”[14]
However, the prosecution has not sufficiently proved the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength alleged in the
information. “Mere superiority in number, even assuming it to be a fact, would
not necessarily indicate the attendance of abuse of superior strength. The
prosecution should still prove that the assailants purposely used excessive
force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons
attacked.”[15]
“Finally, to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, what should be considered is whether the aggressors took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. To
take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means available to the person attacked to defend himself.”[16] In the case at bar, the victim Uldarico de
Castro was the one who picked a fight with the accused-appellants because he
did not like the joke by one of the accused-appellants. There was no evidence
to show that the accused-appellants purposely sought and took advantage of
their number to subdue the victim.
Consequently, we rule that the prosecution failed to prove that
the accused-appellants took advantage of their superior strength. Hence, the
offense committed is homicide, not murder.[17]
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Antique, Branch 11, at
IN LIEU THEREOF, the Court finds accused-appellants Silverio Sansaet y Santojala and Leopoldo Sansaet y Santojala guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity, twenty-one thousand (P21,000.00) pesos as funeral expenses, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] Original Record,
Decision, pp. 282-299, Judge Nery G. Duremdes, presiding.
[2] Original Record,
Information, p. 85.
[3] Ibid.,
Certificate of Arraignment, p. 92.
[4] Original Record,
Decision, pp. 282-299, at p. 299, promulgated on
[5] On
[6] Brief for the Appellee, Rollo, pp.
88-100, at pp. 92-93
[7] Petition, Rollo, pp. 55-57.
[8] Tangan
v. People of the
[9] People v. Nagsagaray,
319 SCRA 622, 643 (1999), citing People v. Gazmen,
317 Phil 495 (1995).
[10] Quinao
v. People, 333 SCRA 741 (2000).
[11] People v. Hapa,
G.R. No. 125698,
[12] People v. Macandong,
G.R. No. 129534 and 1411691,
[13] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 129216,
[14] People v. Manayan,
G.R. No. 142741-43, October 23, 2001, citing People v. Banela, 361 Phil. 61 (1999) and People v. Jose, 324 SCRA 196
(2000).
[15] People v. Moyong,
344 SCRA 730 (2000).
[16] People v. Balano, 339 Phil. 164, 174-175 (1997), citing People v.
Patrolla, Jr. 324 Phil. 758 (1996).
[17] People v. Lazarte,
334 SCRA 635, 650-651 (2000); People v. Canete,
350 Phil. 933, 947-949 (1998); People v. Ortega, Jr., 342 Phil. 124,
138-140 (1997).