EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137963.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO CAIÑGAT, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 1139 finding accused-appellant Rogelio Caiñgat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his daughter, Rowena Caiñgat, a minor, and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. The trial court further ordered accused-appellant to pay the victim the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) “by way of indemnification for moral damages.”
In the criminal complaint, dated
The undersigned private complainant Rowena Payumo Caiñgat, 14 years, assisted by her guardian-aunt, Dometila Nolasco, after the necessary preliminary investigation conducted by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Aladin C. Bermudez, Jr., accuses her father, Rogelio Caiñgat of Cub-Cub, Capas, Tarlac, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of July, 1996, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design, have sexual intercourse with her undersigned daughter, Rowena Payumo Caiñgat against the latter’s will and with the said accused taking advantage of his moral ascendancy equivalent to force and intimidation.
Contrary to law.[1]
At his arraignment on
Fifteen-year-old Rowena was six years old when her mother, Lucila
Payumo, died. Her father,
accused-appellant, did not re-marry.
Since then, the two of them lived together in a house in Cub-Cub, Capas,
Tarlac.[3]
Late in the evening of
In her sworn statement given to the police, Rowena stated that
she was filing a complaint against her father as he had been raping her since
she was eight years old until she was fourteen (panggagahasa sa akin mula
noong ako ay walong taong gulang pa lamang hanggang ngayong labing-apat na taon
na po ako). [5]
Rowena confirmed this statement on the witness stand when she testified that
accused-appellant had raped her two (2) times prior to
On cross-examination, Rowena testified that only she and her
father slept in their one-room house that had no divider. She did not shout when her father raped her
because she was afraid.[7]
Carlos Caiñgat, accused-appellant’s first cousin, accompanied Rowena[8] to Dr. Glothelda Rivera who, after examining her, issued a medical certificate, the pertinent portion of which states:
GENITALIA:
= slightly prominent mons pubis with scanty, black, curly pubic hairs
= hymen; (+) healed laceration,
complete at
= labia minora noted to be gaping
= ‘U’ shaped fourchet
= admits 2 fingers snugly at
introitus.[9]
According to Dr. Rivera, who claimed that a psychiatrist referred
Rowena to her on
Dr. Rivera added that Rowena, who was then under treatment for
psychosis, was “not very cooperative.” When Dr. Rivera verified from Rowena if
she was indeed abused by her father, she replied that her father “was trying to
molest her.” However, Dr. Rivera did not find Rowena to be psychotic as she
answered her questions “intelligently,” although according to Dr. Rivera, she
had to repeat the questions several times before Rowena could give her
answers. Rowena appeared then to be
“very afraid.”[11]
Only accused-appellant testified in his own defense. A laborer, shoemaker and widower,
accused-appellant admitted that Rowena is his only child with his deceased
common-law wife although he had children with another woman.[12]
On
Accused-appellant vehemently denied that he raped Rowena. According to accused-appellant, Rowena filed
the rape case against him because she “was not in her right mind.” She would laugh and be in a state of shock (tulala)
sometimes. One morning, Rowena told him, “Tata, o, bili
tanas. He-he-he,” which meant that
she wanted him to buy her an apple.
That evening of
He discovered that Rowena was mentally disturbed on
Accused-appellant made inquiries in Rowena’s school about the
person who gave her a drink but nobody knew that person. After
Accused-appellant was detained on
He was at the police station at
On cross-examination, accused-appellant again admitted that
Rowena is his daughter, that she was already sixteen (16) years of age at that
time, and that on July 28, 1996, she was only fourteen (14) years old. His first wife was Josefina Castro but she
was not Rowena’s mother. He and Rowena’s
mother, Lucila, did not get married.
Rowena was born on the eighth year that they (accused-appellant and
Lucila) were living together. In 1988,
Lucila died; Rowena was then six years old.
He and Lucila’s mother, Fidela Tiamzon Canono, took care of Rowena. They stayed with his sister. Later, accused-appellant built a small hut
near Dometila’s house but Rowena did not stay with him yet. She would just pass by his hut to ask if he
had eaten. On
In the evening of
After the prosecution and the defense presented their respective evidence, the trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant for the crime of rape and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, ROGELIO CAIÑGAT, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
Accordingly, by virtue of the amendment therefor under Republic Act No. 7659 and as further amended in Republic Act No. 8353, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Likewise, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Caiñgat, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[21]
In this automatic appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROGELIO CAIÑGAT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 335 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED, IN RELATION TO REPUBLIC ACT NOS. 7659 AND 8353.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN IMPOSING THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF DEATH.[22]
In determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases, the Court
is guided by the following considerations: (a) that an accusation of rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) that in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime which usually involves two persons, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.[23]
In all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which
the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[24]
Further, it is the prosecution’s duty to prove each and every
element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt
for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.[25]
As defined by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the law then in effect at the time of the commission of the crime, rape is committed as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
x x x
To sustain a conviction under the above provision of law, the
prosecution must allege and prove the basic elements of: 1) sexual congress; 2)
with a woman; 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the
imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the rape; and 5) the offender
is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.[26]
The Court is mindful of the general rule that factual findings by
the trial court deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
alter the result of the case.[27]
A judicious review of the records of this case shows that the trial court did overlook some material facts and circumstances warranting the modification of its decision. The prosecution has failed to discharge its onus of proving, beyond reasonable doubt, the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of rape. Specifically, the evidence presented by the prosecution does not conclusively establish the first element of carnal knowledge. Despite her lengthy testimony, Rowena failed to mention how the alleged sexual intercourse was consummated. There was a total absence of proof that there was the slightest penetration of the female organ, not even the barest subliminal touch. When her testimony reached the critical point to demonstrate carnal knowledge, all that she said was that she was “raped” without even a modicum of details how the act was done.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of Rowena that accused-appellant “raped” her. She testified as follows:
Q Do you know of any
unusual incident that happened on
A There was, sir.
Q What is that unusual incident?
A I was sexually assault(ed) by my father, sir.
Q At about what time (did)
your father sexually assault you on
A At nighttime, sir.
Q How did your father started (sic) to sexually abused (sic) you?
A At first he removed my dress, sir.
Q And then what did he do?
A Thereafter he kissed me, sir.
Q After that?
A He had carnal knowledge on (sic) me, I was wet on the lower portion of my body, sir.
Q Where were you when your father did that to you?
A In our house, sir.
Q Your house at Cub-cub, Capas, Tarlac?
A Yes, sir.
Q On that night who were with you and your father at that house?
A I was only the one, sir.
x x x
Q On
A Yes, sir.
Q When you slept where do you sleep?
A Inside our house, sir.
Q Do you have a separate room from that of your father?
A None, sir.
Q When you sleep, do you sleep beside your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q Since the time your mother died you were sleeping beside your father?
A Yes, sir.
Q On
A I was able to sleep a little already, sir.
Q And why did you wake up?
A I was awaken(ed) when he went near me, sir.
Q By going near you, what do you mean?
A He went near me and undressed me, sir.
Q What was your position at that time when your father went near you?
A I was lying down, sir.
Q How about he (sic), what was his position at that time he was removing your dress?
A He had no shirt on, sir.
Q How about his pants, was he with pants then?
A None anymore, sir.
Q How about a brief?
A Yes, sir.
Q Then when he removed your dress what did he do?
A That was at the time he started kissing me, sir.
Q At the time he was kissing you, he is still wearing his brief?
A Yes, sir.
Q At what point did your father removed (sic) his brief?
A After he kissed me, sir.
Q And when he removed his brief, what did you do?
A That is the time he
raped me, sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to her lower
private part.
FISCAL A. YUMUL:
Q When you noticed your father is going near you and removed your dress, what did you do?
A I was afraid, sir.
Q And being afraid what did you do?
A I left away (sic) the place where I was at that time, sir.
Q When you were leaving that place what did your father do?
A He raped me, sir.
COURT: How did your father rape you?
WITNESS:
He grabbed me and as a result I was laid down, sir.
‘Napahiga ako.’ That was the time he raped me already, ma’am.
COURT: Okay, proceed.
FISCAL A. YUMUL:
Q When you woke up because your father went to you and he was undressing you, was he telling you anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was he telling you?
A He told me that he is going to kill me, sir
Q Why will he kill you?
A That is what he told me, sir.
COURT: Was that the first time that you were raped by your father?
WITNESS:
A No, ma’am.
FISCAL A. YUMUL:
Q How many times have your
father raped you before this date
A Two (2) times, sir.
Q And when where (sic) these two (2) times that your father raped you?
A I could not remember anymore, sir.
Q Now, after you were raped
on
A I cried, sir.
Q And did you tell anybody of that incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q To whom did you tell that incident?
A To my relatives,
sir.” (Emphasis supplied.)[28]
Thus, the prosecution failed to propound questions that would have proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant’s penis, at the least, reached the labia majora of Rowena’s vagina. In People vs. Tolentino,[29] the Court held:
There was nothing from RACHELLE’S testimony that proved that TOLENTINO’S penis reached the labia of the pudendum of RACHELLE’S vagina. As translated, she only said: “He placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir.” This was the translation of the word “binubundol-bundol.” And when asked to explain what she meant by it, she answered: “He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir.”
The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get
some more important details that would demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt
that TOLENTINO’S penis reached the labia of the pudendum or the
lips of RACHELLE’S vagina. It should
have, for instance, asked whether TOLENTINO’s penis was firm and erect or
whether RACHELLE’s legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion
that, indeed, TOLENTINO’s penis was not flabby and had the capacity to directly
hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE’S vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the
slightest penetration ever took place.
x x x[30]
As it is, the bare statements of Rowena that she was “sexually
assaulted” or “raped” by accused-appellant are not sufficient to establish his
guilt for the crime of rape. Said
statements fall short of the requirement of the law on the quantum of evidence
required in the prosecution of criminal cases.[31]
Rowena’s use of the general terms of “sexual assault,” “rape” and “carnal knowledge” in her testimony is not sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of rape. In People vs. Campuhan,[32] the Court had the occasion to extensively discuss what constitutes consummated rape under Article 335 of Revised Penal Code thus:
x x x We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.
x x x
The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the
female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons
pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris,
the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that
becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or
the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the
inner surface. The skin of the outer
convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner
surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous
glands. Directly beneath the labia
majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia
majora must be entered for
rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of
the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum
is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia
of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most,
it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.[33]
The medical certificate and the testimony of Dr. Rivera likewise
do not establish to a degree of moral certainty the guilt of accused-appellant
for the crime of rape. Dr. Rivera could
not categorically say that the laceration on the hymen of Rowena was caused by
the penetration of accused-appellant’s penis. When asked whether the laceration
on Rowena’s hymen was caused by sexual abuse, Dr. Rivera could only answer: “It
is possible, sir, but I could not really say that the penis penetrated because
I have not seen it; but it is possible.”[34]
The Court cannot make this statement the basis for holding accused-appellant
liable for rape because in criminal cases, speculation and probabilities cannot
take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Suspicion, no matter
how strong, must not sway judgment.[35]
While we find that the crime of rape has not been established, the evidence advanced by the prosecution fully supports the conclusion that accused-appellant committed the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Accused-appellant insists that Rowena was suffering from mental
imbalance at the time she testified before the trial court. As such, she did not testify “voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently” and “on her own free will and without being
exploited by any other persons such as her aunt with whom the accused had a
grudge prior to the filing of this case.”[36]
It is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying.[37] The trial court observed that Rowena did not show a trace of mental affliction because she testified coherently and intelligently:
While the record of the case will disclose that the private
complainant may be said to be mentally imbalanced at the time she gave her
testimony, it is nonetheless observed by this Court that such mental condition
of the complainant did not deter her from giving a rational and coherent
testimony nor in any way affected her intelligence. In fact, no one could even tell that she is
mentally disturbed with the way she laid down her testimony even during her cross-examination. Her answers to the questions propounded to
her were answers expected from witnesses of normal disposition, showing that
she possesses the same perception as any other ordinary person of sufficient
intelligence. Notwithstanding her mental
condition, she was able to make known and transmit her perception to others,
not only from the questions thrown by the Court but also those from the public
prosecutor and the defense counsel.[38]
Indeed, the trial court would not have convicted accused-appellant had it believed that the sole prosecution eyewitness was suffering from mental impairment that seriously affected her competence as a witness. Neither is it true that Dr. Rivera corroborated the trial court’s finding on Rowena’s mental state simply because she used the word “coerce” in referring to the manner by which she was able to elicit information from Rowena. The pertinent portions of Dr. Rivera’s testimony that have a bearing on Rowena’s competence as a witness state:
COURT:
Q You said she was under psychosis examination?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q At the time you were conducting this examination, per interview as you mentioned, did you find her to be in (sic) case of psychosis?
A No, Your Honor.
Q You mean, she can answer your questions intelligently?
A Yes, your Honor, but I have to coerce her.
Q What do you mean by “coercing” her?
A I have to repeat my questions several times before she answers me, your Honor.
Q Does that mean that she cannot understand your question?
A And she seems to be very
afraid. (Emphasis supplied.)[39]
As shown above, Dr. Rivera unequivocally stated that Rowena was not suffering from psychosis. Thus, other than the mere mention of the word “psychosis” in Dr. Rivera’s testimony and accused-appellant’s self-serving claim that his daughter was mentally disturbed, there is no independent evidence that would lead to the conclusion that Rowena was an incompetent witness due to her abnormal mental state.
Even granting that she was indeed mentally disturbed when she testified, mental incapacity is not an absolute basis for the disqualification of a witness:
Unsoundness of mind does not per se render a witness incompetent; one may be medically or metaphysically insane, yet be capable in law of giving competent testimony in the trial of a case. The general rule is that a lunatic or a person affected with insanity is admissible as a witness if he has sufficient understanding to apprehend the obligation of an oath and is capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard with respect to the questions at issue.
It is now held universally that the insanity or intellectual
weakness of a witness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection
to his competency if, at the time he is testifying, he has mental capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong, so far as the facts in issue and his
testimony thereon are involved, understands the nature and obligation of an
oath, and can give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters
about which he testifies.[40]
Hence, in People v. Padilla,[41] the Court held that a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, disqualified from testifying in court. What matters is that the witness “can perceive, and perceiving, can make known (his or her) perception to others.”[42] The issue of competence of a witness to testify rests largely within the discretion of the trial court.[43] In this case, the trial court held that Rowena was a competent witness because she was “able to make known and transmit her perception to others, not only from the questions thrown by the Court but also from the public prosecutor and the defense counsel.”[44] There is no reason for this Court to deviate from this particular finding of the trial court.
Thus, as earlier stated, notwithstanding the prosecution’s
failure to prove accused-appellant’s guilt for rape, the Court holds that there
is sufficient evidence to convict him for acts of lasciviousness under Article
336 of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of the crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and
intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person
of either sex.[45]
Although the information was for qualified rape, accused-appellant can be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the crime of acts of lasciviousness
is included in rape.[46]
Rowena clearly testified that, wearing only his briefs, accused-appellant approached her while she was half-asleep and kissed her. With lewd design, accused-appellant grabbed Rowena and then undressed her. He also threatened to kill her. All the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are therefore present and have been sufficiently established.
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional.[47] Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, relationship is one of the alternative circumstances and in the crimes of rape under Article 335 and acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 thereof, relationship is aggravating.[48] Article 64(3) of the same Code provides that where the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods and there is one aggravating circumstance, the court shall impose the penalty prescribed by law in its maximum period. Applying said provision, the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years should be imposed upon accused-appellant. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said penalty shall constitute the maximum term, while the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense, i.e., arresto mayor or 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66 of Capas, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 1139 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Rogelio Caiñgat is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 6 years of prision correccional, as maximum. Accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Caingat, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Ibid. at 13.
[3] TSN,
[4] Ibid. at
5-13.
[5] Exhibit “A”; Folder
of Exhibits II, p. 1
[6] See Note 3 at 12-13.
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] Exhibit “B”; Folder
of Exhibits II, p. 2.
[10] TSN,
[11] Ibid, pp.
8-9.
[12] TSN,
[13] Ibid, pp.
4-9.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20]
[21] RTC Decision, p.
11.; Rollo, p. 22.
[22] Rollo, p. 39.
[23] People v. Mariano, 345 SCRA 1
(2000); People v. Tacipit, 242 SCRA 241 (1995).
[24] Ibid.
[25] People vs.
Lopez, 313 SCRA 114 (1999).
[26] People vs. Bayya, 327 SCRA 771
(2000); People vs. Silvano,
309 SCRA 362 (1999).
[27] People vs. Malbog, 342 SCRA 620
(2000); People vs.
Jagolingay, 280 SCRA 768 (1997).
[28] TSN,
[29] 308 SCRA 485 (1999).
[30]
[31] People vs. Laguerta, 344 SCRA
453 (2000).
[32] 329 SCRA 270 (2000).
[33]
[34] See Note 10.
[35] People vs. Tayag, 329 SCRA 491
(2000); People vs. Balderas,
276 SCRA 470 (1997).
[36] Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 7-8.
[37] People vs. Adajio, 343 SCRA
316 (2000).
[38] RTC Decision, p. 8; Rollo,
p. 19.
[39] TSN,
[40] VII Francisco, The
Revised Rules Of Court In The
[41] 301 SCRA 265 (1999).
[42] Sec. 20, Rule 130,
Rules of Court.
[43] VII Francisco, supra,
at p. 237 citing 97 C.J.S. 446.
[44] RTC Decision, p. 8; Rollo,
p. 19.
[45] REYES, 2 REVISED
PENAL CODE 781 (1993).
[46] People vs. Gianan, 340 SCRA
477 (2000); People vs.
Contreras, 338 SCRA 622 (2000).
[47] Article 336, REVISED
PENAL CODE.
[48] People vs. Fundano, 291
SCRA 356 (1998).