FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137621.
HAGONOY MARKET VENDOR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Laws are of two (2) kinds: substantive and procedural. Substantive laws, insofar as their provisions are unambiguous, are rigorously applied to resolve legal issues on the merits. In contrast, courts generally frown upon an uncompromising application of procedural laws so as not to subvert substantial justice. Nonetheless, it is not totally uncommon for courts to decide cases based on a rigid application of the so-called technical rules of procedure as these rules exist for the orderly administration of justice. Interestingly, the case at bar singularly illustrates both instances, i.e., when procedural rules are unbendingly applied and when their rigid application may be relaxed.
This is a petition for review of the Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals, dated
The facts: On
In the last week of November, 1997, the petitioner’s members were
personally given copies of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it
shall be enforced in January, 1998. On
Respondent opposed the appeal.
It contended that the ordinance took effect on
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that
it was filed out of time, i.e., beyond thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996, as prescribed under Section
187 of the 1991 Local Government Code.
Citing the case of Tañada vs. Tuvera,[4]
the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject
ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996, after the
required publication or posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3
of said ordinance.[5]
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not assail the finding of the Secretary of Justice that their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Instead, it urged that the Secretary of Justice should have overlooked this “mere technicality” and ruled on its petition on the merits. Unfortunately, its petition for review was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.[6]
Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied.[7]
Hence, this appeal, where petitioner contends that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE
RESPECT, ERRED IN ITS STRICT, RIGID AND TECHNICAL ADHERENCE TO SECTION 6, RULE
43 OF THE 1997 RULES OF COURT AND THIS, IN EFFECT, FRUSTRATED THE VALID LEGAL
ISSUES RAISED BY THE PETITIONER THAT ORDINANCE (KAUTUSAN) NO. 28 WAS NOT
VALIDLY ENACTED, IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, TANTAMOUNT TO AN
ILLEGAL EXACTION IF ENFORCED RETROACTIVELY FROM THE DATE OF ITS APPROVAL ON
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION NOTWITHSTANDING PETITIONER’S EXPLANATION THAT ITS FAILURE TO SECURE THE CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WAS DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF AN ACT OF GOD – TYPHOON “LOLENG,” AND THAT THE ACTUAL COPIES RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER MAY BE CONSIDERED AS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES.
III
PETITIONER WILL SUFFER IRREPARABLE DAMAGE IF ORDINANCE/KAUTUSAN NO. 28 BE NOT DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND IS ALLOWED TO BE ENFORCED RETROACTIVELY FROM OCTOBER 1, 1996, CONTRARY TO THE GENERAL RULE, ARTICLE 4 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THAT NO LAW SHALL HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
The first and second assigned errors impugn the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of its petition for review for petitioner’s failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice. The petitioner insists that it had good reasons for its failure to comply with the rule and the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to accept its explanation.
We agree.
In its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals,[8] the petitioner satisfactorily explained the circumstances relative to its failure to attach to its appeal certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice, thus:
“x x x (D)uring the
preparation of the petition on
“The following day,
“To avoid being time-barred in the filing of the (p)etition, the same was filed with the Court of Appeals “as is.”
We find that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was formally deficient. It is clear from the records that the
petitioner exerted due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions
certified by the Department of Justice, but failed to do so on account of
typhoon “Loleng.” Under the
circumstances, respondent appellate court should have tempered its strict
application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous event considering
that litigation is not a game of technicalities.[9]
Nonetheless, we hold that the petition should be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Secretary of Justice is already time-barred. The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 Local Government Code which provides:
“SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for the approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax, fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings.
The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance
or revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice within
thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even during its
pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance No.
28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner
filed its appeal only in December 1997, more than a year after the
effectivity of the ordinance in 1996.
Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly dismissed it for being
time-barred. At this point, it is
apropos to state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their
legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere technicality” that can be
easily brushed aside. The periods
stated in Section 187 of the Local Government Code are mandatory.[10]
Ordinance No. 28 is a revenue measure adopted by the
In a last ditch effort to justify its failure to file a timely appeal with the Secretary of Justice, the petitioner contends that its period to appeal should be counted not from the time the ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members were personally given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. It insists that it was unaware of the approval and effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds: first, no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the ordinance and, second, the approved ordinance was not posted.
We do not agree.
Petitioner’s bold assertion that there was no public hearing
conducted prior to the passage of
Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by its own evidence. In petitioner’s two (2) communications with
the Secretary of Justice,[12]
it enumerated the various objections raised by its members before the passage
of the ordinance in several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose. These show beyond doubt that petitioner was
aware of the proposed increase and in fact participated in the public hearings
therefor. The respondent municipality
likewise submitted the Minutes and Report of the public hearings conducted by
the Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee on Appropriations and Market on February 6,
July 15 and August 19, all in 1996, for the proposed increase in the stall
rentals.[13]
Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measure were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure, public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the same. Sanggunian members are elected by the people to make laws that will promote the general interest of their constituents. They are mandated to use their discretion and best judgment in serving the people. Parties who participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the Local Government Code provides:
“Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and Revenue Measures. Within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.” (emphasis supplied)
The records is bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s
negative allegation that the subject ordinance was not posted as required by
law. In contrast, the respondent
Sangguniang Bayan of the
Finally, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must
fail. Section 6c.04 of the 1993
Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the Local Government Code limiting
the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the rates were
not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included in the Ordinance were
unreasonably determined or classified.
To be sure, the Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong Palengke, the
burnt but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent Lumang Palengke
with wet market. However, the Palengkeng
Bagong Munisipyo or Gabaldon was excluded from the increase in rentals as
it is only a makeshift, dilapidated place, with no doors or protection for
security, intended for transient peddlers who used to sell their goods along
the sidewalk.[16]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Per Justice Cancio
C. Garcia and concurred in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Teodoro P.
Regino; Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[2] Annex “E,” Petition;
Rollo, pp. 35-36; The ordinance
was signed by Councilor Felix V. Ople, Tagapangulo ng Sanggunian and Dr. Maria
Garcia Santos as Pangulo Punong Bayan.
[3] Per Certification of
Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos; Rollo, at p. 49.
[4] 146 SCRA 448,
452-454 (1986).
[5] Resolution, dated
[6] Resolution, dated
[7] Resolution, dated
[8] Rollo, pp.
11-12.
[9] Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 187 (1997).
[10] Reyes, et al., vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 320 SCRA 486 (1999), citing Agpalo, Statutory
Construction, 1995 edition, p. 266.
[11] Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1998).
[12] Pagtutol sa Kautusan
Blg. 28,
[13] Rollo, pp.
82-95.
[14] Certification of
Sanggunian Secretary Ma. Perpetua R. Santos;
Rollo, p. 49; Affidavits of municipal employee Ruperto dela Cruz
and Municipal Councilor Cruz; Rollo, pp. 99-100.
[15] See Reply; Rollo,
at p. 54.
[16] As shown in pictures
attached to respondent’s Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 117-118.