EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134362.
THE PEOPLE OF THE
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
For beating to death the two-year old son of his common-law wife, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y Tayag was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Manila. His case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellant was charged in an information stating:
That on or about June 12, 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one MARK ANTHONY FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 ½ years old, by then and there mauling and clubbing him on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick, approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the above charge.[2]
However, before testifying in his own
defense on
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's eight-year old brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima Francisco, a forensic chemist of the same agency.
Appellant lived in the
second floor of a three-square meter
house located at
At about
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down
the house to bring him to the hospital.
The two-year old was “already black” and no longer moving.[4]
Eight-year old Roberto
Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as Macky. According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the
house. Appellant, whom Roberto called Kuya
Chito, thus beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a “2x2” piece of wood. Roberto could not do anything to help his
brother because he was afraid Kuya Chito might also beat him up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the
hospital, his little brother, who could barely talk, was not crying anymore.[5]
Roberto identified the two pieces of wood[6] that appellant allegedly used in beating the victim. He also identified the T-shirt[7] that Macky wore when he died.
A certain Alice Valerio from the
PO3 Javier proceeded to appellant’s house at No. 2001, Batangas
Ext., Tondo,
PO3 Javier then went to the house of appellant’s sister in
The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang
Gabi Bayan turned over to PO3 Javier a brown belt which appellant allegedly
also used in beating the victim. Roberto
Fernandez, the victim’s brother, had
given the belt to the staff member.[9]
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted
the postmortem examination of the
victim’s body on
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Multiple old scars, forehead.
2. Healing lacerated wound, left forehead.
3. Healed lacerated wound, above the left eyebrow, measuring 1.2x0.2 cm.
4. Healed linear abrasions, left cheek.
5. Lacerated wound, extending up to the mucous membrane of the upper lip, measuring 2 x0.3 cm.
6. Contussion (sic), left temporo-parietal region, measuring 6x5 cms.
7. Healing lacerated wound, left zygomatic region, measuring 0.5x0.3 cm.
8. Contussion (sic), left jaw, measuring 1.5x1 cm.
9. Contussion (sic), right anterior thorax, measuring 17x12 cms.
10. Contussion (sic), right anterior forearm.
11. Lacerated wound, tip of the forefinger, right.
12. Old scar, upper 3rd , right anterior thigh.
13. Contussion (sic), right lower leg, above and below the knee measuring 9x5 cms.
14. Contussion (sic), left lower leg, above and below the knee, measuring 13x6 cms.
15. Hematoma, big toe, under the nail bed, right.
16. Contusso-abrasion, dorsum of the left foot, measuring 6x2 cms.
17. Contussion (sic), left posterior thorax, measuring 17x6 cms.
18. Contussion (sic), right postero-lateral thorax, extending up to the right lumbar region, measuring 13x6 cms.
19. Contussion (sic), right posterior forearm, measuring 24x8 cms.
20. Contussion (sic), left posterior forearm, measuring 22x7 cms.
21. Healing abrasion, right buttocks, measuring 2x0.5 cm.
22. Plucked finger nail, left middle finger, with hematoma of the nail bed.
23. Posterior hand, both swollen.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Presence of left sub-aponeurotic hematoma, temporo-parietal region and over the mid-occipital region.
2. Hematoma over the sternum and pectoralis muscles.
3. Both lungs showed patcy and confluent consolidations.
4. Small amount of rice porridge was recovered from the stomach.[11]
Felicisima M. Francisco, NBI forensic chemist, conducted an
examination to determine the presence and “grouping” of human blood found on
the steel hammer, the wooden sticks, and the T-shirt that were sent to his
office by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. of the Western Police
District in Manila.[12]
She prepared Report No. B-96-941 stating that Specimen No. 1 or the steel
hammer, was positive for human blood “but insufficient for blood group.”
Specimen Nos. 2 (the broken wooden sticks) and 3 (the white T-shirt) were also
positive for human blood “showing reactions of Group A.”[13]
Only appellant, 40, a sidewalk vendor, testified for the defense. As stated earlier, appellant admitted killing the two-year old victim, the son of his “live-in” partner. He and the boy’s mother had lived together for two years before the incident, starting when the boy was about a year old. He claimed he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his partner and that he killed the boy only because he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana and Valium 10 at that time. Appellant professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had also taken drugs two weeks before the incident.
On June 12, 1996, appellant came upon Macky playing with his
feces, scattering them all over the pillow, the bed sheets and the
curtains. Appellant scolded the boy, “Putang-ina
ka Macky! Bakit mo ikinalat ng ganyan
ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para hugasan!” Appellant got hold of Macky but the boy
struggled to free himself from appellant’s grasp. Appellant, still reeling from the Valium 10
he had just taken, became so angry that he picked up a broom with a wooden
handle, and hit the boy. Appellant did
not realize that he had hit Macky hard until he saw the boy sprawled on the
floor, breathing with difficulty. He
dressed Macky and brought him to the
A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. Appellant pleaded to the lady doctor to do all
she can to save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the child, the doctor told
appellant that she could not do anything more – Macky was dead. The same day, appellant surrendered to the
police. He was brought to the Homicide
Section at
Explaining his change of plea, appellant clarified that the
killing of the boy was "accidental." He reiterated that he was under
the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other. He was a drug dependent and, in fact, had
been confined at the
Nevertheless, on
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay the costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the victim Christina Tabora, moral and nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, plus death compensation in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony Fernandez. Appellant’s guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and Roberto Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further corroborated by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima Francisco, as well as the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in open court admitted beating the poor child, which beating resulted in the latter’s death.
That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler
would not exculpate him from liability.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
shall be incurred by any “person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.” The rationale
of the rule is found in the doctrine that “el que es causa de la causa es
causa
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latter’s body, the accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries.[17] Assuming, therefore, that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for the death of the victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[18]
It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor children who, by reason of their
tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is treacherous.[19]
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act.[20] The prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the
accused. The test in appreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and
sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its
commission, or inhumanly increased the victim’s suffering or
outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.[21]
The nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in
making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him moral and physical
pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of the criminal act which he
intended to commit.[22]
The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a test for determining whether
cruelty attended the commission of a crime.[23]
The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend but rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor General defends this ruling, contending that appellant’s habitual drug addiction is an alternative circumstance analogous to habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree.
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating
circumstances, which work to reduce the accused’s penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to consider “any
other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those” mentioned therein. Neither Article 14 of the same Code on
aggravating circumstances[24]
nor Article 15 on alternative circumstances,[25]
however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider
appellant’s drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed
and no person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within
them.[26]
Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal
liability. On this matter, this Court
said in People v. Ramos:[27]
To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In determining the timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of the Revised Penal Code requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating circumstance.
As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he was just about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing.
The trial court credited appellant with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these elements must be
established: (1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or
an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.[28]
It is sufficient that the surrender be “spontaneous and made in a manner
clearly indicating the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt
or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will
necessarily be incurred in searching for
and capturing him.[29]
Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he “surrendered” to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom he surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the latter. PO3 Javier’s testimony that he “learned” of appellant’s alleged surrender is hearsay and does not serve to corroborate appellant’s claim.
The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong against his victim. Appellant’s intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him. When appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the victim to the hospital.[30] Sadly, his efforts were for naught.
In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
treachery, the killing of the victim is qualified to murder, punishable under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to
death. The murder was attended by the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and
there is no aggravating circumstance.
Hence, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed upon
appellant.[31]
Appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00
without proof of damages.[32]
Moral damages that are recoverable for the mental anguish or emotional distress
suffered by the heirs of the victim cannot be awarded here as the prosecution
did not present any evidence to justify its award.[33]
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y
Tayag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, as defined and
punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Mark
Anthony Fernandez civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 1.
[2]
[3] TSN,
[4] TSN,
[5] TSN,
[6] Exhs. “F” and “F-1.”
[7] Exh. “H.”
[8] Exh. “G.”
[9] TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11] Exh. "K."
[12] Exh. "I."
[13] Exh. “N.”
[14] TSN,
[15] Records, p. 111.
[16] People vs.
Ural, 56 SCRA 138 (1974).
[17] People vs.
Flores, 252 SCRA 31 (1996).
[18] REVISED PENAL CODE,
ARTICLE 14 (16).
[19] People vs. Palomar, 278 SCRA
114 (1997); People vs. Gonzales,
311 SCRA 547 (1999).
[20] People v. Biñas, 320 SCRA 22
(1999).
[21] People v.
Iligan, 369 Phil. 1005 (1999).
[22] People v. Tanzon, 320 SCRA 762
(1999).
[23] People vs. Panida, 310 SCRA 66
(1999).
[24] ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. – The following are aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt of or with insult to the public authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his rank, age, or sex, or that it be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive, or in his presence, or where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the nighttime, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic, or other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or intentional damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other artifice involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evident premeditation.
14. That craft, fraud, or disguise be employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance is effected by a way not intended for the purpose.
19. That as a means to the commission of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of a persons under fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means.
21. That the wrong
done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commission.
[25] ART. 15. The concept. – Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending its commission. They are the relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into consideration when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the offender.
The intoxication of the offender
shall be taken into consideration as a
mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a
state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
[26]
[27] 296 SCRA 559 (1998).
[28] People v. Aquino, 314 SCRA 543
(1999).
[29] People v. Sambulan, 289 SCRA
500 (1998); People v. Ramos, supra.
[30] People vs.
Ural, supra.
[31] REVISED PENAL CODE,
ARTICLE 63(3).
[32] People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680
(1999).
[33] People v. Langres, 316 SCRA 769
(1999).