EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132339.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
CAMACHO TORREJA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is the decision,[1] dated
On
That on or about the 7th day of January, 1997 in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a member of the Las Piñas Police, PNP, by means of force, violence and intimidation, with lewd designs, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one BING TABERARA Y GONZALES, who was then under the custody of the Las Piñas Police, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was private complainant,
BING TABERARA, a 16-year-old housemaid residing at Pulanglupa, Las Piñas. She
testified that on P50 for
food. Once inside her cell, she told her grandmother her ordeal. It was by then
The prosecution next presented FELICISIMA BACSAL, the 50-year old
grandmother of private complainant. She
testified that sometime in January of 1997, Bing and she were brought to the
police precinct by Bing’s employer allegedly because they stole some valuables
belonging to the latter. Because the incident happened a long time ago, she
could no longer recall the exact date, but she remembered they were detained
for two days and two nights. She
recounted when Bing was brought out of the cell for the third time by appellant. When Bing returned, she was crying and she
said she was raped by Torreja.[5]
On cross-examination, Felicisima testified that she heard Bing
shouting for help while banging on the walls/doors of the office where Bing was
being raped.[6]
DR. TOMAS SUGUITAN, Medico-Legal Officer and Police Senior
Inspector at the PNP, Camp Crame, Crime Laboratory Group, was presented as
third witness for the prosecution. He testified that on
Finally, the prosecution presented INSPECTOR LUCAS LEYBA, the
Commander of the Kabayan. Center at the police station, Las Piñas. He testified
that on
In his defense, appellant JOSE CAMACHO TORREJA testified that
prior to his detention, he was assigned at Block 1 Police Station, at the area
of the
Appellant said that at that time he was wearing his police
uniform and his gun was inside the drawer of Lt. Leyba. He vehemently denied
raping Bing. He added that in 1985, he had an operation for which he had been
medically advised not to engage in strenuous activities nor to carry heavy
objects. Since Bing was big, raping her would have been impossible for him.
Further, he said he could not rape her since that would jeopardize his
retirement benefits due him in three years time. When asked why Bing would make
up such a charge, he answered that he did not know.[11]
Giving credence to the testimony of witnesses for the prosecution
while disregarding the denial of the accused, the trial court rendered its
decision on
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused JOSE CAMACHO TORREJA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE under Article 335, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
ACCORDINGLY, considering the qualifying circumstance that accused
is a member of the Philippine National Police and that the victim was in his
custody when the crime was committed, the accused is sentenced to suffer the
extreme penalty of DEATH with the means prescribed by law and to pay the victim
BING TABERARA the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,00.00) as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this appeal where appellant assigns that the trial court erred in convicting him for the following reasons:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HON. TRIAL COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WAS BASED ON ASSUMPTION, PRESUMPTION, CONJECTURE AND INCREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
II
THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT WHICH SERVED AS THE BASIS OF THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT IN CONVICTINGTHE ACCUSED IS CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
III
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT
COMPLAINANT WAS RAPED.[13]
Principally, appellant questions the credibility of private complainant’s testimony. In addition, he asserts that there was lack of physical evidence sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains
that the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the testimony of private
complainant, passes the test necessary for a conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Appellant, a police officer, employed force and intimidation
against the complainant in committing the crime of rape. However, the OSG seeks
modification of the judgment, insofar as the award for damages is concerned. It
asks for P75,000 as civil indemnity and reduction of the award of P100,000
as moral damages to P50,000.
The principal issue for our resolution is whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant SPO3 Jose Torreja and sentencing him to death for the rape of detainee Bing Taberara, a 16-year-old housemaid. Secondarily, we shall also consider the propriety of the amounts of civil indemnity and damages awarded to the private complainant.
First, it is well-settled that the trial court’s assessment of
credibility of witnesses is generally accorded great respect because the court
had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and observe their demeanor as they
testified under oath. Only when the trial court overlooked or misapplied some
facts which could have affected the result of the case is trial court’s
assessment of the credibility of witnesses reviewed by this Court.[14] In this case, nothing on record shows that
this case should fall under the exception. We agree with the trial court in its
findings complainant Bing Taberara’s testimony was straightforward and
convincing, while that of the appellant consisted of bare denials which
uncorroborated and self-serving.
As found by the trial court in the decision:
Two versions were presented on what transpired inside the office of
Insp. Leyba: the victim’s version that she was raped and the accused’[s]
version that he merely conducted further investigation on the victim relative
to the case filed against her. The
[Regional Trial] Court finds the victim’s testimony to be credible and relies
on her credibility as against the credibility of the accused. It is inconceivable that Bing, who was 16
years old at the time of the incident, would make up a story on the commission
of rape against her and falsely testify against the accused whom she never knew
before. The natural flow and logic in
her testimony as well as her facial and emotional reactions to questions and
answers during the hearing of the case strengthened the theory of the
prosecution that the victim was raped.
The defense is banking on the alleged lack of resistance exerted by the
victim. This was amply explained by the
victim when she testified that she was so scared of the accused’[s] gun and
that the accused was so strong.
Nonetheless, the status alone of the accused, being a policeman and
custodian of the victim would be sufficient to cast fear and threat and
influence on the victim.[15]
When a woman testifies that she had been raped, and if her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the appellant may be convicted on the
basis of the woman’s testimony alone.[16] In this case, the defense asked the victim
minute details of the rape incident, and tried to make the court believe that
her inconsistency on minor details was sufficient to acquit appellant on
grounds of reasonable doubt. However, a
rape victim is not expected to remember every ugly detail of her ordeal. A rape victim might even unconsciously block
out certain details of her humiliation and debasement.[17] The victim cried on the witness stand when
she was made to recall the horrifying details of her ordeal. As borne by human nature and experience[18] such reaction is a badge of honesty, showing
that she is being candid, sincere, and truthful in her testimony. The victim here testified, in this wise:
Atty. Nazal (defense counsel):
So the accused asked you to stand up, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you ask him the very reason why he was asking you to stand?
A: No, sir because I was so scared because of his gun.
Q: You just stood up?
A: He helped me in standing sir.
Q: And your jeans, is there any strap or lock in front?
A: None, sir.
Q: There is no belt?
A: None, sir.
Q: Madam Witness, when you were standing, did you extend any assistance in removing your jeans?
A: No, sir.
Q: ...Was your jeans totally removed form your feet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, when the accused pulled down the jeans you have to move in order to remove your jeans from your feet?
A: He forcibly pulled down my jeans, sir.
Q: Madam Witness, while the accused was pulling down your jeans, you just remained standing?
A: No, sir.
Q: What do you mean by no?
A: While he removed my jeans, I tried to pull it back but he forced me.
Q: But finally, he managed to pull down the jeans?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many times Madam Witness you tried to pull up your jeans?
A: Twice, sir.
Q: ...What kind of panty were you wearing at that time?
A: Garter panty, sir.
Q: Is that a bikini panty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Who also removed your panty, Madam Witness?
A: Also the accused.
Q: ...You just allow the accused to pull down your panty?
A: No sir.
Q: What do you mean by no?
A: I did not allow him to remove my panty, he forcibly removed it.
Q: ...Did you try to prevent the accused in removing your panty?
A: I told him not to do what he intended to do.
Q: ...After removing your jeans and your panty, he managed to insert his organ to your organ?
A: Yes, sir.[19]
In a further attempt to discredit the complainant’s testimony,
appellant suggests that she filed the case because she wanted to get even with
appellant for promising that he would help her, falsely. This suggestion appears most unlikely. First, Bing did not ask for the help. In fact, it was appellant who offered to help
her.[20] Second, nothing in the records supports
appellant’s suggestion that she had an ill-motive to implicate him. A victim of sexual assault ordinarily would
be unwilling to under go the humiliation of a public trial, testifying on the
details of a sexual assault and subjecting herself to an embarrassing ordeal
were it not her intent to condemn an injustice.[21] The suggestion of the defense that a
16-year-old housemaid would brazenly accuse a policeman of raping her and lie
in her testimony before the court surely taxes one’s credulity without serving
the cause of the appellant.
Bare denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[22] Here appellant’s bare-faced denial of the
charge against him constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.[23]
While the defense wants us to believe that complainant did not
show any resistance to the sexual assault on her person, the records of this
case show otherwise. We agree with the
trial court that the victim was scared, intimidated, threatened and coerced by
appellant. The law does not require
great and irresistible coercion. What is
required only is enough physical or psychological coercion to consummate the
lewd design in the mind of the offender.[24] In our view, the presence of a gun in the
possession of appellant and the ascendancy of a police officer over a detainee
under his custody are sufficient to constitute coercion to intimidate a
16-year-old housemaid to submit to the lewd intention of the malefactor.
The defense likewise makes an issue of the lack of physical
evidence such as bruises or marks on the victim’s body. Note, however, that as testified to by the
medico-legal officer,[25] the healed laceration found on the victim’s
genitalia was consistent with the fact that rape had taken place. Likewise, the absence of spermatozoa in the
victim’s vagina would not necessarily negate the commission of rape.[26] Neither would the absence of fresh
lacerations prove that she was not raped.[27] In this case, the medico-legal officer, Dr.
Tomas Suguitan, testified:
Prosecutor:
Mr. Witness, could it be possible that even an erected penis was inserted to the hymen, still the hymen would suffer no laceration at all?
A: It is possible, sir.
Q: In what way would it be possible, Mr. Witness?
A: In a highly elastic hymen sir.
Q: In this case of Bing Taberara, could it be possible that there is no laceration despite the fact that a hard penis was inserted to the vagina?
A: There are lacerations.
Q: And you said while ago that in your report the hymen of Bing Taberara is elastic?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you said that if the hymen is elastic, even though a hard penis was inserted to the hymen, no laceration would be caused.
xxx
A: There are cases where there would be no laceration even if the penis is inserted in the vagina, sir.
Q: And this happened in the case of Bing Taberara.
A: Yes sir.[28]
Since the victim was under the custody of appellant who was a
police officer, when he raped her, appellant’s crime is qualified under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11, R.A. 7659. Hence, the trial court properly imposed the
penalty therefor, which is death.[29]
On the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, however,
modifications are called for. The amount
that should be awarded to the victim of qualified rape as civil indemnity ex
delicto should be increased to P75,000 pursuant to current
jurisprudence. But the amount awarded as
moral damages should be reduced to P50,000 in accordance with applicable
case law.[30]
Four members of the Court maintain their position that capital punishment is unconstitutional. However, they submit to the decision of the majority of the court upholding the legality of the law re-imposing the death penalty for heinous crimes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 275, finding appellant Jose Camacho Torreja GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape qualified by the circumstance that the
victim was a detainee under the custody of appellant as a member of the
Philippine National Police, and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P75,000
as civil indemnity ex delicto and further amount of P50,000 as
moral damages.
Upon promulgation of this decision, let the records of this case be promptly forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of her constitutional prerogative to grant executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
18-29, penned by Presiding Judge Alfredo R. Enriquez.
[2]
[3] Also referred to as
“Lt. Leyba” elsewhere in the TSN,
[4] TSN,
[5] TSN,
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8]
[9] Also referred to as
“SPO1 Rillera” elsewhere in the TSN,
[10] TSN,
[11] TSN,
[12] Rollo, p. 29.
[13]
[14] People vs. Olivo, Jr., G.R. No.
130335, January 18, 2001, p. 13; citing People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 128647,
329 SCRA 468, 483 (2000).
[15] Decision, in Rollo,
pp. 27-28.
[16] People vs. Supnad, G.R. Nos.
133791-94, August 8, 2001, p. 9, citing People vs. Celis, G.R. Nos.
125307-09, 317 SCRA 79, 91 (1999).
[17] People vs. Rabosa, G.R. Nos. 119362
& 120269, 273 SCRA 142, 149 (1997).
[18] People vs.
Cornelio Supnad, supra, note 16 at 10.
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21] People vs. Adora, G.R. Nos.
116528-31, 275 SCRA 441, 467 (1997).
[22] People vs. Burce, G.R. Nos.
108604-10, 269 SCRA 293, 314 (1997).
[23] People vs. Victor, G.R. No 127903,
292 SCRA 186, 198 (1998).
[24] People vs. Zaballero, G.R. No.
100935, 274 SCRA 627, 639 (1997).
[25] TSN,
[26] People vs. Caballes, G.R. Nos.
102723-24, 274 SCRA 83, 94 (1997).
[27] People vs. Erardo, G.R. No. 119368,
277 SCRA 643, 655 (1997).
[28] Supra, note
25 at 5.
[29] ART. 335 When and how rape is committed.
xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
xxx
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
xxx
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
[30] People vs. Brandares, G.R. No. 130092,
311 SCRA 159, 169 (1999).