SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130596.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO CASTILLANO alias “RODEL”, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 47,
The Information dated
That on or about the 20th day of August, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without any justifiable cause or motive, being then armed with a .38 caliber revolver, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said revolver Ramil J. Hijapon, thereby causing upon the person of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
Cardiopulmonary arrest
Penetrating gunshot wound
# 1 chest (R)parasternal
line at the level of the nipple
which directly caused the death of the
said victim Ramil J. Hijapon.[2]
When arraigned on
The version of the prosecution:
The victim’s widow, Lucia Hijapon,
testified that at about
Lucia Hijapon attributed the killing of
her husband to the fact that on
She felt grief for the death of her husband who was working as a
waiter at the Bascon Hotel for a monthly salary,
including tips, amounting to Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00). She spent
more than Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the wake, but she
failed to adduce evidence to substantiate the expense.[7]
Buenaventura Hijapon corroborated the
testimony of his mother, Lucia Hijapon. He testified
that at around
Buenaventura Hijapon further testified
that during his father’s lifetime, his father told him and his brothers to be
careful of appellant because he was a traitor, had a grudge against their
family, and harbored a grudge against appellant. Although he saw appellant
coming when the latter was three (3) meters away from their store, he failed to
warn his parents who were conversing with each other because the incident
happened suddenly. Before
PO3 Willie Perez, who was assigned in August 1996 at Police
Station 3, Barangay Mandalagan,
Dr. Johnnie Aritao, Jr.,
Wound, gunshot 0.7 cm in diameter, roughly oval in shape,
surrounded by a contussed-abraded collar, 0.3 cm.
around the gunshot wound at the 5th intercostal
space, right along parasternal line at the level of
the nipple, directed forward posteriorly rupturing
the heart and lung and the bullet lodged at the spinal vertebra.[13]
The cause of the victim’s death was
“cardio-respiratory arrest, secondary to a penetrating wound, chest right,
along parasternal line, ruptured heart and lung due
to a gunshot wound.”[14] The bullet lodged at the spinal vertebra,
with the entrance wound at the right breast.[15] Dr. Aritao
concluded that at the time of the shooting, the barrel of the gun was more than
six (6) feet away from the victim because there were no powder burns in the
wound. Ordinarily, a distance of about six (6) inches would produce powder
burns. Dr. Aritao stated that if the victim was given
immediate medical attention, he would have probably survived. The location of
the entrance wound showed that the victim was facing his assailant when he was
shot.[16]
Viveca Natu-el,
Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
On the other hand, the appellant denounced the prosecution’s
allegation as a lie that he killed Ramil Hijapon. He put up the defense of alibi, asserting that he
was in
On cross-examination, appellant stated that he and Ramil Hijapon resided in the same
purok, but he resided at Zone 3 while Ramil resided at Zone 5. His house was two (2) blocks away
from Ramil’s house. He did not know whether a case
was filed against Ramil Hijapon
for the alleged April 1992 incident after he forwarded Ramil’s
gun to the police; and he did not execute any affidavit. He was surprised why Ramil earlier charged him with Attempted Homicide for the
shooting incident on
Dax Villadelgado,
18 years old, a first year college student, and resident of
Josefa de Paula, 54 years old,
testified that she knew the appellant and the victim, Ramil
Hijapon, because they all came from Barangay Bata,
After
Josefa de Paula knew the wife of the
victim, but she did not talk to her about the incident of
Roberto “Bobby” Picuncillo testified
that he knew the appellant and the deceased, Ramil Hijapon, since they all resided at Purok
Pepsi, Zone 5, Barangay Bata,
On
WHEREFORE, finding accused Rodolfo Castillano,
alias Rodel, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6
of Republic Act No. 7659, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered sentencing him to
suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA, as well as the accessory penalty provided by law. He
is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Ramil Hijapon P50,000.00 for his death. Cost against
accused.
Accused Rodolfo Castillano being detained in connection with the instant case, the period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor and to be fully deducted from the service of his sentence even if penalized with reclusion perpetua (People vs. Corpus, 231 SCRA 480), provided he has agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE WIDOW AND THE SON ARE BIASED WITNESSES UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES;
II
WHETHER THE
TESTIMONIES OF
III
WHETHER ALIBI MUST BE
CONSIDERED AS A LEGITIMATE AND VALID DEFENSE.[30]
Appellant contends that the evidence for the prosecution, consisting of the testimonies of the victim’s wife, Lucia Hijapon, and son, Buenaventura Hijapon, are biased and do not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he killed the victim Ramil Hijapon; and that Lucia and Buenaventura harbored ill-will against him because of the April 1992 incident; thus, they pointed to him as the assailant of the victim. It was impossible for Lucia to see him since she was facing her husband when the latter was shot. Although Lucia testified that the store was well-lighted inside and outside, she told the police after the incident that the assailant was unidentified, and it was only three (3) days thereafter that he was implicated in the commission of the crime; and that it was not true that Buenaventura saw him since he failed to warn the victim that he (appellant) was approaching. Considering the allegedly biased testimonies of the victim’s wife and son, he claims that the testimonies of the defense witnesses who are not related to the victim should have been given consideration and weight. Hence, appellant prays for his acquittal.
Appellant’s arguments are devoid of merit.
We agree with the trial court that the victim’s wife and son are
not biased witnesses. Blood relationship between a witness and the victim does
not, by itself, impair the credibility of the witness.[31] In fact, the relationship with the victim
would render the testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a
relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other
than the real culprit.[32] There is absolutely nothing in our laws to
disqualify a person from testifying in a criminal case in which said person’s
relative was involved, if the former was really at the scene of the crime and
was a witness to the execution of the criminal act.[33] Lucia and Buenaventura Hijapon
were in the store together with the victim when the shooting incident occurred.
Contrary to appellant’s argument that it was impossible for Lucia Hijapon to see the assailant since she was then facing her
husband Ramil Hijapon,
Lucia testified that although she was then opposite her husband facing the
wall, she saw the assailant because when Ramil was
hit by the first gunshot, she pulled Ramil toward her
and at the same time looked back at the window of the store where the shot came
from, and she saw the appellant Rodolfo Castillano
who was outside the store holding a gun fired the second shot which hit the
wall instead of her husband because she had pulled him.[34]
The issue of the inability of Lucia Hijapon
to identify the assailant immediately after the shooting incident as shown in
the police blotter report dated August 20, 1996[35] and the fact that the appellant was
identified as the assailant three (3) days after the incident as shown in the
police blotter report dated August 23,[36] 1996 was correctly resolved by the trial
court, thus:
In the first place, said police blotter reports (Annexes “A” and
“B” to accused’s memorandum), not having been
previously identified, marked, and offered in evidence by either the
prosecution and defense, are not to be admitted. The Court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered (People vs. Franco, G. R. No. 118607,
March 4, 1997; People vs. David, G.R. No. 105667, March 1, 1994; People
vs. Sendon, G.R. No. 101579-82, December 15, 1993).
In the second place, even if we defy the rule in the interest of justice and
confer just a modicum of evidentiary value to the report of August 20 (Annex
“A”), it will be noted on the face thereof that the blotter entry was made by
police officers Custodio, Magallanes
and Perez and not by Lucia Hijapon. Notably too, the
report inter alia, says: “The unidentified assailant
according to the bystander was wearing white shirt and black hat who walked
casually after the incident.” The “unidentified assailant” was so described by
the “bystander” and not by the widow. Reference to Lucia Hijapon,
however, says: “The victim’s wife alleged that the motive of the killing was an
old grudge.” Surely, the wife had sufficiently identified the killer of her
husband as one with an old grudge against the deceased. Such identification was
sufficiently clarified to the investigators in the subsequent police blotter
report of
The statement attributed to Lucia in Annex “A” of describing her
husband’s killer as one with an “old grudge” is a clear and convincing proof
that she already knew the name of the assailant during the initial investigation
even if the particular name did not appear in the police blotter. A police
blotter is taken ex parte. Hence, in the same manner,
it could be just as incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from other partial
suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which
the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestion to her memory and for her
accurate recollection of all that pertains to the subject. Entries in official
records are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated and are not
conclusive. (See People vs. Prado, G.R. No. 112982,
December 29, 1995; People vs. Paragua, et al., G.R.
No. 96923, May 24, 1996).[38]
With regard to the argument of appellant that the testimony of the victim’s son, Buenaventura Hijapon, is not credible because he allegedly failed to warn the victim when he saw the appellant approaching, we agree with the trial court when it declared and ruled, thus:
xxx This is puerile. As amply explained by
The suddenness and swiftness of the startling and frightful event
and the shock he underwent of witnessing his father being killed in cold blood
by accused were enough justification to paralyze Buenaventura into even
uttering a warning or shouting for help. Such action or reaction of the son
from a gruesome event is understandably far from contrary to human experience
and most certainly does not imply that he did not see accused as the
perpetrator of the heinous crime. “There is no standard human behavioral
response we know when one is confronted with a strange, startling and frightful
experience” (People vs. Vinas, Jr., 245 SCRA 448;
People vs. Alban, et al., 245 SCRA 549, citing People vs. Flores, 217 SCRA 613;
People vs. Danico, 208 SCRA 472; People vs. Raptus, 198 SCRA 425; People vs. Lagota,
194 SCRA 92; People vs. Radomes, 141 SCRA 548). “The
actions and reactions of a man are not always stereotype.” (People vs. Viñas, Sr., supra, citing People vs. Salazar, 221
SCRA 170).[40]
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses since their statements were not tainted with any contradictions, inconsistency or prevarication, and they testified in. a candid, categorical and consistent manner. It credited in the eyewitnesses’ favor their honesty in acknowledging that they had a grudge against the appellant.
On the other hand, the trial court found the testimony of defense
witness Josefina de Paula that she saw the shooting incident and the face of
the assailant, who was not appellant Rodolfo Castillano,
to be unworthy of credence[41] for the following reasons. First, after
having allegedly seen the shooting and the face of the assailant who ran
towards her direction, Josefina stood by for a while and upon seeing several
people at the store of Ramil Hijapon,
she went there to take a look but did not immediately inquire if someone was
hurt considering that she heard the gunfire and saw the assailant aiming a gun
at the jalousie window of Ramil’s house. Moreover,
she did not volunteer any information about what she saw to the people
gathering around; instead, when someone stepped on her foot, she immediately
left to attend a prayer in a wake at a nearby house. Second, in the wake where
many people attended and considering that the recent shooting incident must
have been the subject of conversations, Josefina never mentioned to anyone
there what she allegedly saw. Third, on her way home from the wake, Josefina again
passed by the store of Ramil and it was only at that
time that she inquired about what happened, and somebody told her that Ramil was shot. However, she never told her barriomates present that she saw the assailant and a part
of the shooting incident; instead, she just listened to their stories and then
went home, which is contrary to human experience. Fourth, although Josefa knew the wife of the victim, she did not talk to her
about the shooting incident she witnessed wherein the victim was killed nor did
she condole with the family of the victim alleging that she did not attend the
wake of Ramil Hijapon
because of the belief that one cannot pray in two wakes at the same time.
Fifth, although she knew that appellant was previously in prison, she claimed that
she only came to know that the appellant was the suspect in the killing of Ramil Hijapon during the last
week of April 1997 when she met appellant’s mother and inquired from her if it
was true that appellant was in prison. Appellant’s mother confirmed to her that
appellant was in prison as the suspect in the killing of Ramil
Hijapon.
The trial court also did not give credence to the testimony of
defense witness Dax Villadelgado
for being incredible. According to this witness, the appellant allegedly arrived
in Cebu on July 21, 1996 to deliver fighting cocks
for which payment was due on July 29, 1996, but continued staying in Cebu for another month just to attend the birthday parties
of Dax and his mother on August 14, 1996 and August
20, 1996 respectively, despite the fact that appellant was a businessman who
must have valued his time while Dax was just a high
school student and merely an acquaintance of the appellant in 1995. Moreover, Dax’s mother was not even shown to be close to appellant to
merit the latter’s continued stay in
It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on
the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and will not be
disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial
court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance which could have altered the conviction of the
appellant.[42] After carefully reviewing the records of the
instant case, we find no valid reason to disturb the findings of the trial
court.
For appellant’s alibi to prosper, he must prove not only that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he must likewise
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.[43] As the trial court found, although appellant
claimed that he was in Cebu when the crime was
committed on August 20, 1996, he failed to adduce evidence such as plane, boat
or bus tickets, hotel bills or meal receipts or any document evincing the sale
of his fighting cocks to substantiate his alibi. The trial court took
cognizance of the fact that bus, boat or air transportation is readily
available between
The trial court, however, correctly found that the prosecution
failed to prove the presence of evident premeditation which requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the
culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[46]
The trial court also correctly found that the crime was committed
with treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods and forms in the execution thereof
which tends directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[47] The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the
part of the victim.[48] Treachery can exist even if the attack is
frontal, if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to
defend himself against such attack.[49] What is decisive is that the execution of
the attack, without the slightest provocation from the victim who is unarmed,
made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.[50] In the instant case, the appellant who
suddenly arrived outside the victim’s store, shot the victim while the latter
was sitting and conversing with his wife inside the store, thus depriving the
victim of any opportunity to defend himself. The attendant circumstance of
treachery qualifies the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code:
Art. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure of afford impunity.
The trial court correctly imposed the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua absent any aggravating circumstances in
the commission of the crime.[51]
In addition to the civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, Ramil
Hijapon, they should also be awarded moral damages in
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) which needs no proof
since the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged is sufficient to
justify the award of the same.[52]
Although the victim’s wife, Lucia Hijapon,
testified that she spent Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the wake
of the victim, no receipts were presented to substantiate the actual damages
incurred as required by Article 2199 of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, in lieu
of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
may be recovered under Article 2224 as it has been shown that the victim’s
family suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof cannot be proved
with certainty.[53]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Occidental, Branch 47, Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 18102 finding appellant
Rodolfo Castillano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the
victim, Ramil Hijapon,
civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is
hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that he is likewise ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
and temperate damages in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
Cost against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and
Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge
Edgar G. Garvilles, Rollo,
pp. 17-40.
[2] Records, p. 1.
[3] Records, p. 27.
[4] Exhibit “B”,
Records, p. 48.
[5] TSN,
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10] Exhibit “A”, “A-1”,
Records, pp. 45-47.
[11] TSN,
[12] Exhibit “F”,
Records, p. 53.
[13] Exhibit “F-2”,
Records, p.53 (back).
[14] Exhibit “F-3”,
Records, p. 53 (back).
[15] Exhibit “F-5-A”,
Records, p. 53.
[16] TSN,
[17] Exhibit “D”,
Records, p. 50.
[18] Exhibit “D-1”,
Records, p. 50.
[19] Exhibit “D-2”,
Records, p. 50.
[20] Exhibits “E” to
“E-1”, Records, p. 52.
[21] TSN,
[22] TSN,
[23] TSN,
[24] TSN,
[25] TSN,
[26] TSN,
[27] TSN,
[28] TSN,
[29] Rollo,
pp. 39-40.
[30] Rollo,
p. 77.
[31] People v. Realin,
301 SCRA 495, 510 (1999); People v.
Plazo, G.R. No. 120547,
[32] People v. Francisco, 315 SCRA
114, 124 (1999); People v. Sion, 277 SCRA 127, 147 (1997); People v.
Montero, Jr., 277 SCRA 197, 206 (1997).
[33] People v. Dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 632, 643 (1992); People v. Baduya, 182 SCRA 57, 64 (1990).
[34] TSN,
[35] Annex “A,” Records,
p. 69.
[36] Annex “B,” Records,
p. 70.
[37] Rollo,
pp. 30-31.
[38] Rollo,
p. 31.
[39] Rollo,
pp. 31-32.
[40] Rollo,
p. 32.
[41] Rollo,
p.33.
[42] Espano v.
Court of Appeals, et al., 288 SCRA 558, 563 (1998).
[43] People v. Banela,
301 SCRA 84, 93 (1999).
[44] Rollo,
p. 36.
[45] People v. Dinglasan,
267 SCRA 26,43 (1997); People v.
Mataro, et al., G.R. No. 130378,
[46] People v. Magno,
322 SCRA 494, 515 (2000); People v.
Valdez, 304 SCRA 611, 626 (1999).
[47] Article 14,
paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code; People v.
Naguita, 313 SCRA 292, 308 (1999).
[48] People v. Magno, supra note 45; People v. Vermudez, 312 SCRA 276, 284 (1999).
[49] People v.
[50]
[51] Article 63 (2), The
Revised Penal Code.
[52] People v. Clarino,
G.R. No. 134634, July 31, 2001; People
v. Cortez, G. R. No. 131924, December 26, 2000.
[53] People v. Suplito,
314 SCRA 493, 504 (1999); People v.
De la Tongga, 336 SCRA 687, 700 (2000); People v.
Plazo, supra note 30; People v. Buyser,
et al. G.R. Nos. 130144 & 130502-03,