FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130489.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JESUS JAVIER a.k.a. JESSIE, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant was charged with Murder for the fatal shooting
of Romeo Jumao-as in an Information,[1] which alleges:
That on or about the 29th day of September of 1996, at about 9:30 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a handgun, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, did then and there attack, assault and shoot one Romeo Fernandez Jumao-as with the use of said weapon thereby inflicting upon said Romeo Fernandez Jumao-as fatal wounds which caused his death a few minutes later.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On
Nestor went to see Bobby, who agreed to the proposed
meeting. Nestor returned to Ramon’s
house and informed him that Bobby had agreed to come to his house.[7] Again, Nestor asked Ramon to frisk
Jessie. However, he did not see whether
Ramon actually frisked Jessie.[8] Nestor then left to fetch Bobby. Before going to Ramon’s house, Nestor told
Bobby not to bring any weapon and to take off his shirt, since the purpose of
the meeting was to settle the dispute between him and Jessie. Bobby thus took off his shirt and wrapped it
around his head like a turban.[9]
When Nestor and Bobby reached Ramon’s house, they saw Ramon and
Jessie sitting on a bench outside the house.
Ramon got up to meet them and inform them that the meeting will be held
at the barangay hall instead.[10] Suddenly, Jessie drew a gun from his waist
and pointed it at Nestor and Bobby.
Nestor raised his right hand and told Jessie, “Jess, don’t. Let’s talk about it.”[11] Jessie fired his handgun, hitting Bobby on
the right calf. Bobby ran away and
Jessie went after him.[12] When Bobby was about sixteen meters away,
Nestor heard three more gunshots.[13] Nestor ran to the house of Patricio Abesia, a policeman, when Jessie aimed the gun at him.
Bobby was brought to the
The defense, on the other hand, endeavored to prove that Jessie
Javier acted in self-defense.[16] Jessie alleged that after Nestor Miraflor learned of the fistfight between him and Bobby,
Nestor brought him to the house of Ramon Cabugason
and left to look for Bobby.[17] While waiting for Nestor and Bobby to
arrive, he narrated to Ramon that Bobby mauled him the night before because he
caused the arrest of the latter’s cousin, Daylin Miraflor, for selling drugs.[18] Daylin’s husband
is the brother of Nestor Miraflor.[19] When Nestor and Bobby arrived, the latter
attempted to pull a gun from his back.
Jessie hugged Bobby to prevent him from drawing his gun. The gun fired, hitting Bobby on the right
side and killing him.[20] Jessie immediately walked away and
surrendered to the National Bureau of Investigation.[21]
After trial on the merits, a judgment of conviction was handed
down by the
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing evidence, arguments and considerations, this court hereby finds the accused – JESUS JAVIER alias Jessie GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659. But considering that the accused has voluntarily surrendered, he is hereby sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua, together with all the accessory penalties provided for by law. The accused is also hereby ordered to indemnify the next of kin of the victim the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Hence, the instant appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER ON THE BASIS OF THE INCREDIBLE AND BIASED TESTIMONES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT BELIEVING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THAT THE VICTIM WAS SHOT ACCIDENTALLY.
The issues raised by accused-appellant rest entirely on the
question of credibility. In this regard,
it has been consistently held that the nature of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the
trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess
their credibility.[23] The general rule is that the trial courts
are in a better position to decide questions of credibility since they have
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial.[24] The findings of the trial courts with
respect to credibility of the witnesses will not be disturbed by the appellate
court unless there are factors of weight and influence which have been
overlooked or the significance of which have been misinterpreted by the trial
courts.[25]
In the case at bar, the trial court found that the testimonies of
the two prosecution witnesses “were very convincing and straightforward, and
they appear to the court as very truthful and honest in the way they narrated
to the court what they saw with their own eyes and what they heard with their
own ears.”[26] We agree.
Accused-appellant claims that the prosecution witnesses, Nestor
F. Miraflor and Vicente Torrejas,
are closely related to the victim.[27] Relationship does not necessarily give rise
to a presumption of bias or ulterior motive, nor does it impair the credibility
or tarnish the testimony of a witness.[28] The relationship of the witness to the
victim does not automatically affect the truthfulness of the testimony of the
former. There is no legal provision that
disqualifies the relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying.[29] Indeed, it has been ruled that there is
absolutely nothing in this jurisdiction which disqualifies a person from
testifying in a criminal case in which a relative is involved, if the former
was really at the scene of the crime and witnesses the execution of the
criminal act.[30] The natural interest of witnesses who are
relatives of the victim in securing the conviction of the guilty party would
prevent them from implicating persons other than the culprits. Otherwise, the latter would thereby go
unpunished.[31] We are is aware of the fact that now and
then crimes are committed with just the relatives of the victim as witnesses.[32]
In the second assignment of error, accused-appellant claims that
the trial court erred in not believing the defense that the victim was shot
accidentally.[33] In the course of the trial in the court a
quo, accused-appellant invoked self-defense.[34] Accident and self-defense do not have the
same meaning or legal effect.
Self-defense is a justifying circumstance under paragraph 1 of Article
11, while accident is an exempting circumstance under paragraph 4 of Article
12, both of the Revised Penal Code.[35]
It is a cardinal principle in criminal law that self-defense must
be established as convincingly as possible.[36] Although the prosecution has the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused, this rule is reversed where the accused
interposes self-defense. The burden is
shifted to the accused to prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[37] Unlawful aggression has been defined as an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger thereof, and not
merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[38] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine
qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.[39] Therefore, unlawful aggression is
indispensable, it being the main ingredient to self-defense.[40]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove that the
killing was justified and that, therefore, no criminal liability has
attached. Accused-appellant failed to
prove unlawful aggression. Self-defense
cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by
competent evidence but is seriously doubtful.[41] Accused-appellant’s invocation of
self-defense therefore deserves scant consideration.
As correctly observed by the trial court:
Unfortunately for the accused, he was making barefaced lies when he testified and claimed that he only heard one burst of gunfire. And yet, the victim died from multiple gunshot wounds. Upon coaxing to tell the truth, on being confronted with the physical evidence from the multiple gunshot wounds sustained by the victim, the accused readily admitted that he heard 3 more shots from the same gun.
Moreover, it is amazing how the accused could describe the gun in
its minute and particular details when all along, he claimed that he never got
hold of the fatal gun, even after he has killed the victim and leaving only
after he made sure that he was already dead, instead of bring him to the
hospital if he did not really kill the victim with deliberate intent.[42]
Furthermore, it is a well-settled rule that the nature and number
of wounds inflicted by the assailant are considered important indicators which
belie a plea of self-defense.[43] In the instant case, the cause of the
victim’s death was shock secondary to multiple gunshot wounds, as evidenced by
the post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Jesus P. Cernan,
the medico-legal officer.[44]
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of the
circumstance of treachery, which qualified the offense to Murder. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution
without the risk to himself arising from the defense, which the offended party
might make.[45] For treachery or alevosia
to be properly considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must
be present, to wit: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself; and (2) that the offender
deliberately or consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him.[46]
In the case before us, the victim was half-naked while walking towards the house of Ramon Cabugason to attend a reconciliatory meeting with accused-appellant, when the latter, suddenly and without warning, drew his gun and shot the victim on the right calf. Moreover, accused-appellant pursued the wounded victim and continued shooting at the latter when he started to run away.
The suddenness of an attack without the slightest provocation
from the victim who was unarmed and had no opportunity to repel the aggression
or defend himself necessarily qualifies the crime with treachery.[47] A frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and the unarmed victim would be in no position to repel the attack
or avoid it.[48]
The killing was further attended by the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation. For evident
premeditation to be properly appreciated, it must be clearly shown as the crime
itself.[49] Consequently, the following elements must be
competently proven: (1) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (2)
an overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act.[50]
It was clearly established by the prosecution that accused-appellant decided to commit the crime when Nestor Miraflor approached him for the purpose of reconciling accused-appellant and the victim. Sufficient time had elapsed from the decision and the execution for the accused-appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act, as shown by the following: (1) accused-appellant had to wait while Miraflor convinced Cabugason to help him with the reconciliation; (2) accused-appellant had to wait with Cabugason for Miraflor to return to Cabugason’s house to inform them that the victim agreed to reconcile; and (3) accused-appellant had to wait again for Miraflor to go back to the house of the victim in order to bring him to the house of Cabugason.
The trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, which requires the following: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to
a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is
voluntary.[51] Voluntary surrender must be spontaneous and
the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities must
be shown because he has acknowledged his guilt or he wished to save the
authorities the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search or
capture.[52]
Accused-appellant surrendered to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on the same day that the incident occurred. The fact that he surrendered to the NBI
instead of the nearest police station is of no moment since it is sufficient
that the accused surrenders to a person in authority or his agent.[53]
The penalties imposed by the trial court on accused-appellant
were likewise correct. Since treachery
qualified the offense to Murder, the penalty imposable is reclusion perpetua to death.[54] The aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation was clearly evidenced by the facts and the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender was sufficiently proven. In cases where the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties, and where both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the court shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number
and importance.[55] In this case, the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation was offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. Thus, accused-appellant was
correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, the
lesser of the two indivisible penalties.[56]
The prosecution prayed that the civil indemnity for the death of
the victim be increased from Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) to Seventy-five
Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) pursuant to the ruling in People v. Victor.[57] However, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity is awarded only to rape victims where the penalty imposed is
death. Thus, the sum of P50,000.00
awarded by the trial court as civil indemnity is in line with the policy of the
Court.[58]
Finally, we note that the trial court failed to award actual
damages for burial expenses, which was stipulated by the prosecution and the
defense in the amount of P15,000.00.[59] In this connection, we have held that
although receipts should ordinarily support claims of actual damages, the same
may be awarded where the defense stipulated thereon.[60] Therefore, accused-appellant must be ordered
to pay the further amount of P15,000.00, as burial expenses.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
[1] Record, p. 1;
Criminal Case No. CBU-42577.
[2] TSN,
[3] Ibid.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Exhibit A.
[15] Ibid.
[16] TSN,
[17] Ibid., pp.
3-4.
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22] RTC Decision, p. 5;
penned by Judge German G. Lee, Jr.
[23] People v. Tacipit, 242 SCRA 241 [1995]; People v. Sarabia,
266 SCRA 471 [1997].
[24] People v. Alvarez, 267 SCRA 266
[1997]; People v. Tanedo, 266 SCRA 34 [1997]; Lustan v.
CA, 266 SCRA 663 [1997].
[25] People v. Carpio,
282 SCRA 23 [1997]; People v. Letigio, 268 SCRA 227 [1997].
[26] RTC Decision, p. 3.
[27] Appellant’s Brief,
p. 6.
[28] People v. Galapin,
293 SCRA 474 [1998].
[29] People v. Virtucio,
Jr., 326 SCRA 198 [2000]; People v. Urgel,
134 SCRA 483 [1985].
[30] People v. dela Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992].
[31] People v. Galapin, supra; People v. Apongan,
270 SCRA 713 [1997]; People v. Enciso, 223
SCRA 675 [1993]; People v. Veinte, 225 SCRA
361 [1993].
[32] People v. Virtucio,
Jr., 326 SCRA 198 [2000]; People v.
Ronato, 316 SCRA 433 [1999].
[33] Appellant’s Brief,
p. 5.
[34] TSN,
[35] People v. Cario,
288 SCRA 404 [1998].
[36] People v. Magallano,
266 SCRA 305 [1997]; Jacobo v. CA, 270 SCRA
270 [1995].
[37] People v. Magallanes,
275 SCRA 222 [1997]; People v. Cahinde, 266 SCRA 554 [1997]; People v. Ganzagan, 247 SCRA 220 [1995].
[38] People v. Cario, supra; People
v. Ignacio, 270 SCRA 445 [1997].
[39] People v.
Ignacio, supra; People v. Bernal, 254 SCRA 659 [1996].
[40] People v. Jotay, 222 SCRA 801 [1993].
[41] People v. Bitoon,
Jr., 309 SCRA 209 [1999]; People v.
Baniel, 275 SCRA 472 [1997].
[42] RTC Decision, pp.
3-4.
[43] People v. Cario, supra; Guevarra v.
CA, 187 SCRA 484 [1997]; People v. Masankay,
157 SCRA 320 [1988]; People v. CA, 166 SCRA 436 [1988]; People v.
Ganut, 118 SCRA 35 [1982].
[44] Exhibit A.
[45] People v. Lumacang,
324 SCRA 254 [2000], citing People v. Dela
Cruz, 242 SCRA 129 [1995].
[46] People v. Romeo Magaro,
291 SCRA 681 [1998], citing People v.
Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 [1997]; People v. Azugue,
268 SCRA 711 [1997].
[47] People v. Apongan,
270 SCRA 713 [1997].
[48] People v. Adrales,
322 SCRA 424 [2000]; People v.
Guillermo, 302 SCRA 257 [1999]; People v. De Manuel, 263 SCRA 49
[1996]; People v. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115 [1996]; People v. Mirandoy, 242 SCRA 620 [1995].
[49] People v. Piamonte,
303 SCRA 577 [1999]; People v. Padama, 316 SCRA 152 [1999].
[50] People v. Sesbreno,
314 SCRA 87 [1999].
[51] People v.
Ignacio, 375 SCRA 375 [2000].
[52] People v. Real, 308 SCRA 244
[1999].
[53] People v.
Ignacio, 375 SCRA 375 [2000].
[54] Revised Penal Code,
Art. 248.
[55] Revised Penal Code,
Art. 63.
[56] Revised Penal Code,
Art. 63.
[57] 292 SCRA 186 [1998].
[58] People v. Borreros,
306 SCRA 680 [1999].
[59] TSN,
[60] People v. Galvez,
G.R. No. 136790,