FIRST DIVISION
[G. R. No. 127094.
ALEJANDRIA PINEDA and SPOUSES ADEODATO DUQUE, JR., and EVANGELINE MARY JANE DUQUE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES NELSON BAÑEZ and MERCEDES BAÑEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the decision of
the Court of Appeals,[1] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court,
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
“Appellees Nelson Bañez
and Mercedes Bañez are the original owners of a
parcel of land together with its improvements located at
“On
“In the meantime, the appellees were
allowed to occupy or lease to a tenant Pineda’s
“On December 18, 1984, unknown to the appellees, Alejandria Pineda and the appellants Adeodato C. Duque, Jr. and Evangeline Mary Jane Duque executed an ‘Agreement to Sell’ over the White Plains property whereby Pineda sold the property to the appellants for the amount of P1,600,000.00 (Exh. “1”, p. 51, Ibid). The contract provides that: 1) upon signing of the agreement, the purchaser shall pay P450,000.00 and the seller shall cause the release of the property from any encumbrance and deliver to the purchaser the title to the property; 2) balance shall be paid by the purchaser to the seller on or before the end of January 1985; 3) upon full payment, the seller shall deliver to the purchaser a deed of absolute sale duly signed by its registered owner, the appellees. On the same date, Pineda, out of the downpayment received from the appellants, paid the appellees’ mortgage obligation with the GSIS in the sum of P112,690.75 (Exhs. “D-1” to “D-3”, pp. 41-43, Ibid).
“Pineda then requested the appellees for
a written authority for the release of the title from the GSIS (pp. 18-19,
“Upon their return to the
“A series of communications ensued between the representatives of the appellees and Ms. Pineda with regards to the status of the exchange agreement which resulted in its rescission for failure of Pineda to clear her mortgage obligation of the California property (Exhs. “B”, “C” & “D”, pp. 24-29; 35-37, Folder of Exhibits). Negotiations for the purchase of the property were held between the appellants and the appellees but the same failed which resulted in the appellees demanding for the appellants to vacate the property (Exhs. “F” to “F-12”, pp. 81-93, Ibid).
“Appellees claim that upon their return
to the
“During that meeting, an agreement was reached by the appellants
and the appellees for the sale of the property at
$89,000.00. Appellees alleged that the purchase price
was reduced to $60,000.00 which appellants failed to pay (pp. 40- 41,
“On
On
“WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
“1. Declaring plaintiffs spouses Nelson S. Bañez
and Mercedes Bañez the absolute owners in fee simple
title of the house and lot in question located at
“2. Declaring as null and void ab-initio
for being a patent forgery that Deed of Absolute Sale dated
“3. Declaring as null and void that TCT No. T-338857 (Exh. H) of the land records of Quezon City, issued January 03, 1986 in the name of Alejandria (dra) B. Pineda, widow, of legal age, Filipino and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, after the finality of this decision, is hereby ordered to cancel said Certificate of Title and, in lieu thereof, to issue a new Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiffs Nelson S. Bañez, married to Mercedez Bañez, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of No. 32 Sarangaya St., White Plains, Quezon City, covering the lot in question.
“4. Declaring as null and void ab-initio
that certain “Agreement to Sell” dated
“5. Declaring alleged vendees, defendants Adeodato Duque, Jr. and Evangeline Mary Jane Duque as purchasers in bad faith of the house and land in suit and as builders in bad faith over whatever improvements introduced by them in the house and lot in question;
“6. Ordering herein defendants Adeodato Duque, Jr. and Evangeline Mary Jane Duque,
their heirs, and assigns, and all persons claiming under them to vacate and
peacefully surrender possession of the premises in question located at no. 32
“7. Ordering defendants spouses Duques to pay plaintiffs the sum of P10,000.00 monthly rentals since August 1985 until they shall have peacefully surrendered physical possession of the premises in question to plaintiffs;
“8. Ordering plaintiffs spouses Bañez to
reimburse defendants spouses the sum of P 100,000.00 representing the amount
they received when said defendants Duques offered a
proposal to buy the premises in question (Exh. N, p.
487, dated
“9. Ordering defendant Pineda to pay plaintiffs the sum of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus the sum of P 100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
“10. Ordering defendants spouses Duques to pay plaintiffs Bañezes the sum of P 100,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus the sum of P50,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
“11. Ordering herein defendant Pineda and defendants spouses Duques to pay jointly and severally the sum of P50,000.00, plus 10% of the sums awarded to plaintiffs by way of reasonable attorney’s fees; and
“12. Both defendants to pay the costs.
“SO ORDERED.”[3]
In time, petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.[4]
On
On
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification that rental payments should commence on January
1986 (not August 1985) and appellants are liable for attorney’s fees only in
the sum of P50,000.00.”[7]
On
Hence, this appeal.[10]
The Issue
The issue raised is whether petitioners validly acquired the subject property.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition. The issue raised is factual. In an appeal via
certiorari, we may not review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals.[11]
Nevertheless, it appears that the Bañez
spouses were the original owners of the parcel of land and improvements located
at
Petitioner Pineda’s “sale” of the property to petitioners Duque was not authorized by the real owners of the land,
respondent Bañez. The Civil Code provides that in a
sale of a parcel of land or any interest therein made through an agent, a
special power of attorney is essential.[12] This authority must be in writing, otherwise the sale shall be void.[13] In his testimony, petitioner Adeodato Duque confirmed that at
the time he “purchased” respondents’ property from Pineda, the latter had no
Special Power of Authority to sell the property.[14]
A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any
contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted or acquired for
a valuable consideration.[15] Without an authority in writing, petitioner
Pineda could not validly sell the subject property to petitioners Duque. Hence, any “sale” in favor of petitioners Duque is void.[16]
Further, Article 1318 of the Civil Code lists the requisites of a
valid and perfected contract, namely: “(1) consent of the contracting parties;
(2) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; (3) cause of
the obligation which is established.”[17] Pineda was not authorized to enter into a contract to sell the
property. As the consent of the real owner of the property was not obtained, no
contract was perfected.[18]
Consequently, petitioner Duque failed to validly acquire the subject property.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals,[19] in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] In CA-G.R. CV No.
38022, promulgated on
[2] Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 27-37, at pp. 30-32.
[3] CA Rollo, pp. 52-68, at pp. 67-68.
[4] Notice of Appeal,
RTC, Record, p. 342. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 38022.
[5] CA Rollo, pp. 14-21.
[6] CA Rollo, p. 74.
[7] Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 27-37, at p. 37.
[8] CA Rollo, pp. 131-137.
[9] Petition, Annex “B”,
Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[10] Filed on
[11] Cristobal
v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 320, 326 [1998]; Sarmiento
v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 834, 845-846 [1998]; Concepcion v.
Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 85, 91 [2000], citing Congregation of the Virgin
Mary v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 591, 597 [1998] and Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, supra; Arriola v.
Mahilum, 337 SCRA 464, 469 [2000]; Bolanos v.
Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 125, 130-131 [2000].
[12] Article 1878, Civil
Code.
[13] Article 1874, Civil
Code; Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 948, 957
[1996]; De los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 372
Phil. 522, 538 [1999].
[14] TSN,
[15] Cosmic Lumber v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Note 13, at p. 958.
[16]
[17] Islamic Doctorate of
the
[18]
[19] In CA-G.R. CV No.
38022, promulgated on