THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125797. February 15, 2002]
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner, vs. GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision[1] and the June 3, 1996 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case No. 1958. The
assailed Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby
declares accused GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
“The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
“The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein respondents.
The Facts
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
“The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged [with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:
‘That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS (P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’
“Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the plea of not guilty.
“Thereafter trial was conducted.
“The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
“That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources as a Forest Ranger. On P10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber would be P729.30.
He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he was informed that it
was a certain Asan of Brgy.
Blanca Aurora. The driver also informed him that the vehicle was owned by his
employer, Narciso Lucenecio
of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in
“The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag, but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of Exhs. ‘A’ and ‘B’ and their series. Its Exhs. ‘C’ and series were rejected because the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
“For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-accused would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the following facts have been established:
“That on
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office
(DENR-CENRO) of Catbalogan,
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR,
Region 8,
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency
of evidence. The unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s
house in
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
“x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, ‘St. Jude,’ which is the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
“The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same has long become final and executory.
“Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation
proceedings conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano
Talavera of
“Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of
the vehicle is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have
conspired with any other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D.
705 or consented to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the
present case as shown by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or
its owner accused Narciso Lucenecio
has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by the Court in its
decision of
Hence, this Petition.[11]
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s consideration:
“(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to order x x x the return of property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or
misinterpreted the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
(C) The government is not estopped
from protecting its interest by reason of mistake, error or failure of its
officers to perform their duties.”[12]
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action, petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return
of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction
when it ordered the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already
become government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law.[13] A comparison of the provisions of the two
relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the jurisdiction of the RTC
covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has jurisdiction over
the confiscation of forest products and, to stress, all conveyances used
in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
“Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or
Other
“The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected,
removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and
tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are
found.”[14]
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
“SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or
His Duly Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases
of violations of this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the
Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the
confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air
in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.”[15]
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
understood in its literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation,
on the presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The
courts may not construe it differently.[16]
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances
used in the industrial arts;[17] equipment covers physical facilities
available for production, including buildings, machineries and tools;[18] and implements pertains to whatever
may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil.[19] These terms do not include conveyances
that are specifically covered by Section 68-A. The implementing guidelines of
Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner that includes “any type or
class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used either in land, water
or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport used in the movement
of any forest product.”[20]
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
confiscation of “all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same” is vested in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly
authorized representative. The DENR secretary has supervision and control over
the enforcement of forestry, reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules
and regulations.[21]
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No. 54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93 provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed to private respondents to “willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, x x x.” The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation
Without Due Process
Private respondents’ main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture
(Annex “C”) is a “false, falsified and perjurious
document.” The Order was attached to and made part of the record only when
petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration dated
Further, on
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of
Forfeiture falls outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and
Order. The basis for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private
respondents’ acquittal of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order
issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and
separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTC’s jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the
confiscated vehicle. Private respondents have not appealed the DENR’s Order of Forfeiture, the validity of which can thus
be presumed.[24] The genuineness of the Order and its proper
service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court,
which is not a trier of facts.[25]
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Court, is in the main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower
court.[26] Under PD 705, the actions and the decisions
of the DENR are reviewable by the courts only through
special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.[27]
Second
Issue:
Construing PD 705, as
Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section 68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law. Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section 68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of
the regional trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of
forestry laws. Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal
liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers
only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents. Where
the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.[28]
We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the
vehicle to private respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the
implementation of forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277
underscores the urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the
country for the benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest
resources may be effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant
enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws.[29] Strong paramount public policy should not be
degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear intent or
unreasonably restrict its scope.[30]
Third
Issue:
Estoppel
In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve petitioner’s third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutor’s failure to comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was an implied disapproval thereof. The public prosecutor’s disapproval does not vest in the trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Clemente C. Rosales; rollo, pp. 39-47.
[2] Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[3] Rollo, p. 47.
[4] RTC Decision, pp. 1-5; rollo, pp. 39-42.
[5] Rollo, pp. 33-35.
[6] Rollo, p. 35.
[7] Order of Forfeiture; rollo, p. 147.
[8] Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 1-4; rollo, pp. 48-51.
[9] Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, Annex “C,” rollo, p. 38; Annex “11,” rollo, p. 147; and Annex “H,” rollo, p. 177.
[10] Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[11] The
case was deemed submitted for resolution upon this Court’s receipt of the
Memorandum for private respondents on
[12] Rollo, p. 228. The Memorandum for Petitioner was signed by Attys. Fiel I. Marmita and Chona S. Apostol-Octa.
[13] Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, 247 SCRA 9, 18, August 2, 1995; Department of Health v. National Labor Relations Commission, 251 SCRA 700, 707, December 29, 1995.
[14] 111 VLD 74.
[15] Ibid, p. 75.
[16] Globe-Mackay
Cable & Radio Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA
701,
[17] Federico B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictonary, 2nd ed., p. 371, citing Kolambugan Lumber & Development Co. v. Yia, 56 Phil 201, 203, October 15, 1931.
[18] Ibid, p. 211, citing Lu Do & Lu Ym Corp. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 108 Phil. 566, 572, May 31, 1960.
[19]
[20] § 1, DENR Administrative Order 54-93.
[21] §§5 and 7 of PD 705 (25 YLD 6-7).
[22]
[23] Letter
dated
[24] §5 (m) and (n), Rule 131, Rules on Evidence.
[25] San
Miguel Foods, Inc. -
[26] De
Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 389, 393,
[27] §9, PD 705.
[28] Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404, 407, July 5, 1996.
[29] 111 VLD 73.
[30] Republic
v. Sandiganbayan, 240 SCRA 376, 472,