EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124666.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO SAMSON y COREA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Automatic review of the Decision dated
The Information[1] against accused Renato C. Samson reads:
“That on or about the 28th day of August 1994 in the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with treachery and with evident premeditation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill one Sol Homicillada y Batilo by then and there shooting the latter with a gun, thereby inflicting upon said Sol Homicillada y Batilo mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
On
John Dexter Tuazon Daylag
("John") is the prosecution's principal witness. He is 19 years old and a resident of
John identified the person who passed by him and fired successive shots at Sol as Renato C. Samson, accused herein, then a Barangay Tanod in their place – La Huerta, Parañaque. At that time, he had a blue scarf on his head and was wearing a white T-shirt and a green short. While passing by John's side, the scarf was blown away. John saw his face because of the light coming from a nearby flourescent lamp. The accused's companion was Marcelo Aniag, also a Barangay Tanod in La Huerta. Both were armed with a caliber .38 gun.
After the shooting incident, the accused and Aniag
went away. John, out of fear, went to the house of Jhun
Orjales. Eventually, he proceeded to Camp Ricardo
Papa in Taguig, Bicutan
where he executed a sworn statement.[3]
On
Dr. Antonio Vertido, a Medico-Legal
Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted an autopsy on
Ireneo Ordeano,
a Senior Ballistician in the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that
the 4 slugs recovered from the body of the victim were forwarded to his office
by Dr. Vertido.
He conducted the corresponding ballistic examinations on the bullets and
found that they came from a .38 caliber gun.[7]
For his defense, accused Renato C.
Samson merely denied the charge. He
testified that he does know the victim, Sol Homicillada,
nor one Marcelo Aniag, despite the fact that he is a
resident of La Huerta, Parañaque, Metro Manila and,
admittedly, a Barangay Tanod
of the place. Nonetheless, he knows John
Dexter Tuazon Daylag, a
prosecution witness, because they have had a quarrel once. Sometime in April of 1994, John maligned his
wife ("binastos niya ang asawa ko"). He confronted John resulting in a fist fight
between them. John sustained "black
eye." This incident might have impelled John to implicate him in the
commission of the crime charged.[8]
James Odialles, also a resident of
After trial, the court a quo, on
"WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused RENATO SAMSON y COREA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery as defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 7659, and hereby condemns said accused to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the
legal heirs of Sol Homicillada the amounts of P50,000.00
as death indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P72,670.00 as and for funeral and burial expenses, P10,000.00
as attorney’s fees and to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED."[10]
Hence, this automatic review.
Appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
"I.
THE
II.
THE
The appeal is not meritorious.
Prosecution's eyewitness, John Dexter Tuazon Daylag, positively identified appellant as the one who fired multiple shots at Sol Homicillada, causing his tragic death. This is clearly shown by John's testimony, thus:
"Atty. Arpa III:
Q And what happened, Mr. Witness?
A I saw Sol Homicillada fell because he was shot at the left side of his back, sir.
Q After that what happened, Mr. Witness?
A The other one passed by me and fired some more shots, sir.
Q And then what happened, Mr. witness?
A He approached Sol and fired him, Sir.
Q How many times did he
shoot Sol Homicillada, Mr. Witness?
A Three (3) to four (4) shots, sir.
x x x
Q Do you know what the other person (was doing) whom you said you bumped when you were shoved (by Sol) during that time?
A He was holding a gun pointed to Ka Sol while the other one was approaching Ka Sol, sir.
Q Now, the other person
whom you said approached and shot Sol Homicillada,
how does it look like, Mr. witness?
A He had a blue scarf on his head and he was wearing a white t-shirt and a green short, sir.
Q How was the scarf put on his head?
A It was just placed on top of his head, sir.
Q Were you able to look at his face?
A Yes, sir because when he passed by me, a scarf on his head was being blown by the wind, sir.
Q And you saw his face,
Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you able to
recognize him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who was he?
A He was a barangay tanod, sir.
Q What is his name, Mr.
Witness?
A Renato
Samsom y Corea, sir.
Q When you said a scarf
was blown on his head by the wind, was there a light on that street, Mr.
Witness?
A There was, sir.
Q Where was the light
coming from, Mr. Witness?
A He crossed the street
where the light was coming, sir.
Q Where was the light
situated, Mr. Witness?
A On top of the shed
where we were playing darts, sir.
Q What kind of light
were installed there?
A A flourescent,
sir.
x x x. "[11] (Emphasis ours)
During cross-examination, John never faltered in his assertion that appellant shot the victim, thus:
"Atty. Mangalindan
Q And how far were you
from Sol Homicillada at the time he was hit?
A Three to four meters,
sir.
Court
Q Were you able to
recognize the person who shot and hit Sol Homicillada?
A Yes, your honor.
Q From the place you
were standing?
A Yes, your honor.
Q Who was this person?
A He is the one, your
honor.
Witness pointing to a person inside the
courtroom who stands and answers to the name of Renato
Samson.
Atty. Mangalindan
Q What was the suit
being worn by Renato Samson at the time?
A He was wearing a
green shorts, white T-shirt and a scarf on his head.
Q Now, this Renato Samson whom you pointed out, when you saw him, he
was running after Sol Homicillada?
A Yes, sir. He was chasing Sol Homiccillada
and he passed in front of me and his scarf was blown.
x x x
Court
Q From the time you saw
this person shooting Sol Homicillada and whom you
said was hit, how far was this person who shot Sol Homicillada
from your relative position?
A About three meters,
sir.
Q So, Sol Homicillada was only three meters away from the person who
shot him?
A Yes, your honor.
x x x
Q The question to you was
this, you said that you saw Renato Samson shot and
hit Sol Homicillada, what was the other person doing?
A He was just pointing his gun, your honor.
Q He never approached the place where Sol Homicillada went?
A No, your honor.
x x x
Atty. Mangalindan
Q You want to convey
that while the firing of the gun by the accused according to you was happening,
the other person was just standing there and still holding his gun pointed to
the direction of Sol Homicillada?
A Yes, sir."
[12] (Emphasis ours)
John's accounts of the crime corroborate with the findings of Dr.
Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, and Ireneo Ordeano, NBI Senior
Ballistician, on material points. As
well stated by the court a quo:
"For one, his (John's) testimony that the guns used in
shooting Sol Homicillada are .38 caliber firearms was
confirmed by no less than Ireneo Ordiano,
NBI Ballistician, who conducted an examination on the slugs recovered from the
body of the victim which was even the subject of stipulation by the prosecution
and the defense. According to his
findings, the slugs came from .38 caliber firearm (Exhibits "M" to
"M-4"). Another is his
(John’s) testimony that accused went near the victim and shot on the head and
that several shots were fired at the victim.
Again, this fact was confirmed by Dr. Antonio Vertido,
NBI Medico-Legal Officer, who conducted the autopsy on the victim and found six
(6) gunshot wounds on the body of the victim, three (3) of which were inflicted
on the head. He likewise found deformed
slugs on the victim which he forwarded for ballistics examination. In gunshot wound number three (3) located
below the left ear, the entrance wound was surrounded by smudging (burning)
indicating that the gun was fired less than seven (7) inches from the victim,
while the other gunshot wounds were inflicted not closer than twenty four (24)
inches from the victim. John's
testimony on how the victim was shot, definitely and conclusively proves that
he was at the scene at the crime and actually saw how the crime was committed
by the accused and his companion."[13]
Appellant's denial cannot certainly prevail over John's positive and unequivocal identification of appellant as the assailant. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, and to merit acceptance it must be buttressed by strong, clear and convincing evidence of non-culpability.[14] Appellant miserably failed to present strong and convincing evidence to substantiate his denial.
Appellant's assertion that John had an axe to grind against him
deserves scant consideration. Aside from
being uncorroborated, appellant himself admitted that he is not even sure
whether John testified against him out of revenge.[15]
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, it is reasonable to presume that
John's only desire, in testifying against appellant, was to seek justice for
the death of a dear friend. He could not
have accomplished that objective nor rest with a clear conscience if he had to implicate
an innocent person in the commission of so grave a crime as murder. Indeed, it would be against the natural order
of events and of human nature, and against the presumption of good faith, that
a prosecution witness, like John, would falsely testify against appellant.[16]
Appellant made much emphasis (1) that John was not sure what
direction he (appellant) and Aniag came from; (2) that John was not sure who between
appellant and Aniag fired the first two
gunshots; (3) that Sol, although
concentrated in throwing the dart, was the first one who noticed the arrival of
appellant and Aniag;
(4) that appellant and Aniag did not touch or harm
John despite his presence at the scene of the crime; and (5) that while
being cross examined, John was not consistent in his testimony. Initially, he stated it was appellant who
shot the victim and that Aniag merely stood and poked
his gun at him. Subsequently, John
declared that it was Aniag who fired his gun at
Sol. But when asked by the trial court,
John answered it was the appellant who really shot the victim.[17]
This Court meticulously went over the pertinent transcript of the
stenographic notes (TSN) relied upon by the appellant in support of his
defense. A perusal of the
inconsistencies and improbabilities he raised readily shows that they refer
only to minor and trivial matters which do not affect the credibility of the
witnesses for the prosecution. The
testimony of a witness need only corroborate on important and relevant details
concerning the principal occurrence of the crime.[18]
In fact, even the most candid witness may at times make mistakes due to
confusion, but far from eroding the effectiveness of his testimony, such lapses
could instead constitute signs of veracity[19]
for they remove any suspicion of being a
rehearsed witness.[20]
At any rate, the issue here hinges on the credibility of John. The trial court assessed that "John's testimony was clear, unequivocal, straightforward and carried with it the ring of truth."[21] This Court has consistently held that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are best undertaken by the trial court[22] because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.[23] As this opportunity is denied the appellate court, the lower court's findings of fact and assessment of the credibility of witnesses are generally binding on this Court absent a clear showing that they were reached arbitrarily or that the trial court had plainly overlooked certain facts or substance of value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[24] Here, we see nothing in the records which warrants a departure from the findings of the trial court.
The crime, as correctly found by the trial court, is murder as the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The elements of treachery – (1) the employment of the means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution – [25] are undoubtedly present in the instant case. Appellant and Aniag, both armed with a .38 caliber gun, unexpectedly fired two shots behind the victim and John who were playing darts. Both were unarmed. Apparently caught by surprise, Sol, the victim, barely ran 3 to 4 meters away from the appellant, but he fell when hit by the latter's third shot. As Sol slumped helplessly on the street, appellant went near him and, at close range, fired several more shots, hitting his head and the back of his body. To ensure the attack by appellant without risk to himself, Aniag had his gun pointed at Sol, ready to shoot, if necessary. Evidently, the victim was deprived of an opportunity to defend himself, thus ensuring the execution of the offense.[26] Clearly, there was treachery.
Appellant contends that there can be no treachery because the first two shots did not hit the victim and John. Obviously, those first two shots were fired to warn the victim of the impending danger. Thus, the latter was given the opportunity to defend himself.
This Court is not persuaded.
Nowhere in the records can it be deduced that the first two shots were
clearly warning shots. What is certain
from the records is after these shots were fired, the victim ran away but
appellant shot him again, hitting his back which caused him to fall. He did not have the chance to defend
himself. Even assuming that those shots
were warning shots, this does not negate the presence of treachery in the
instant case. In People v. Belaro,[27]
this Court stressed that treachery may also be appreciated even when the victim
is warned of the danger to his person as
long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate. The
essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who does not give any slightest
provocation, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself.[28]
The Information also alleges the presence of evident
premeditation in the commission of the crime.
This circumstance cannot be appreciated since no evidence was presented
by the prosecution to prove that the execution of the criminal act was preceded
by "planning and preparations."[29]
The trial court committed error when it imposed the extreme
penalty of death upon appellant. In
murder, the imposition of death is not automatic. [30]
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA No. 7659, the
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death which is composed of two indivisible
penalties. Where, as in this case of
murder (qualified as such by treachery), no other mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance is present in its commission, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be applied.[31]
As regards appellant's civil liability, the trial court correctly
awarded P72, 670.00 for funeral and burial expenses as this amount was
stipulated by the private prosecutor and the defense counsel.[32]
The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delito is justified, the same
being in line with the current jurisprudence.[33]
Furthermore, the court a quo properly ruled that the
family of the victim should be entitled to moral damages. The current case law[34]
is that in homicide or murder cases, moral damages which is now fixed in the
amount of P50,000.00 should be automatically awarded to the family of
the victim. Mental anguish, serious
anxiety, moral shock and wounded feelings are too obvious to be overemphasized
for it is borne by human nature and experience that a violent death invariably
and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim's family.
The award of exemplary damages is also warranted because of the
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the
commission of the crime. This is in
accordance with our ruling in People
v. Catubig[35]
where we emphasized that insofar as the civil aspect of the crime is
concerned, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is recoverable
if there is present an aggravating circumstance (whether qualifying or
ordinary) in the commission of the crime.
Thus, the amount of P15,000.00 awarded by the trial court should
be increased to P25,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision convicting appellant Renato C. Samson of murder is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that he shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. As to
the civil aspect of the crime, appellant is ordered to pay the family of the
victim, Sol Homicillada, the amount of P50,000.00
as indemnity ex delito; P50,000.00 as
moral damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] RTC Records, Vol. I,
p. 1.
[2] Ibid., p. 41.
[3] Transcript of
Stenographic Notes (TSN), January 19, 1995, pp. 7-39; TSN dated January 31,
1995, pp. 15-20; TSN dated February 7, 1995, pp. 3-14; TSN dated March 7, 1995,
pp. 3-31.
[4] TSN,
[5] Exhibit
"G," Autopsy Report No. N-94-1712, Records of RTC, Vol. 11, p. 1169.
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10] Rollo,
p. 29.
[11] TSN,
[12] TSN,
[13] Rollo,
p. 27.
[14] People v. Acuno,
313 SCRA 667 (1999); People v. Napiot, 311 SCRA 772 (1999).
[15] TSN,
[16] Brief for The Appellee, p. 9; Rollo, p.
102.
[17] Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, pp. 63-70.
[18] People v. Sy
Bing Yok, 309 SCRA 28 (1999).
[19] People v. Salimbago,
314 SCRA 282 (1999).
[20] People v. Bermudez, 309 SCRA 124
(1999).
[21] RTC Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 26.
[22] People v. Payot,
308 SCRA 43 (1999).
[23] People v. Andaya,
306 SCRA 202 (1999); People v. Cristobal, 306 SCRA 358 (1999); People v. Limon, 306 SCRA 367
(1999).
[24] People v. Manggasin,
306 SCRA 228 (1999).
[25] People v. Realin,
301 SCRA 495 (1999).
[26] People v. Villanueva, 302 SCRA
380 (1999).
[27] 307 SCRA 591 (1999).
[28] People v. Bermas,
309 SCRA 741 (1999); People v. Macuha, 310 SCRA 14 (1999).
[29] People v. Platilla,
304 SCRA 339 (1999).
[30] People v. Rebamontan,
305 SCRA 609 (1999).
[31] See People v. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567 (1999); People v. Reduca,
301 SCRA 516 (1999).
[32] TSN,
[33] People v. Cayago,
312 SCRA 623 (1999).
[34] People v. Cortez, 348 SCRA 663
(2000); People v. Panado, 348 SCRA 679 (2000).
[35] G.R. No. 137842,