FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1509. August 8, 2002]
ASUNCION S. LIGUID, complainant, vs. JUDGE POLICARPIO S. CAMANO, JR., Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Tigaon, Camarines Sur, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Complainant owned a furniture
shop in San Antonio, Cavite City.
Sometime in 1975, she met respondent, who was then a First Lieutenant at
the Judge Advocate General’s Office in Sangley Naval Base, Cavite. As a lawyer, respondent represented
complainant in some legal matters affecting her business. Their close association and constant
communication led to a romantic relationship between the two. They lived together as husband and wife and
begot a child, whom they christened Joanne L. Camano.[1]
After several years of
cohabitation, complainant and respondent eventually separated. Complainant went to the United States and
married an American, Frank Pecot of Incinitas, California. Meanwhile, respondent was appointed
municipal judge of Baao, Camarines Sur in 1983, and later as presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Tigaon, Camarines Sur in 1995.
On November 7, 1997,
complainant filed a complaint against respondent judge for abandonment,
dishonesty, oppression, deceit, immorality and misconduct in office. She prayed that respondent be held
administratively liable and that he be ordered to give regular support to their
child, Joanne.[2]
Complainant averred that
respondent reneged on his promise to marry her and support his child. Although he executed two special powers of
attorney empowering Joanne to collect his salaries,[3] she never received
any support from respondent except for one instance. Complainant alleged that respondent frequently took unauthorized
leaves of absence from work, which resulted in the postponement of several
cases pending in his sala; that respondent was maintaining illicit relations
and cohabiting with another woman; that complainant redeemed his mortgaged
house and lot, helped him acquire a passenger jeep, subsidized the studies of
his children, and bought him a Mitsubishi Lancer for his official use. She also claimed that respondent withdrew
her savings deposit in the Tigaon Rural Bank because her passbook was in his
possession.
Complainant further
alleged that whenever she visited him in Bicol, he always got mad and threw
hollow blocks, footstools and rice at her.
She also asserts that respondent is widely referred to in Tigaon as a maniakis
(lecher); that women who went to him for assistance become his kabit (mistress);
and that he had sexual relations with a certain widow. Respondent’s secretary was even mistaken for
his wife because she was the one paying for the school fees of his daughter.
Respondent vehemently
denied the charges. According to him,
complainant knew from the beginning that he was married; hence, it is not true
that he promised to marry her.
Respondent claimed that he provided for Joanne’s basic necessities and
even executed two special powers of attorney empowering her to collect portions
of his salaries for her educational expenses, which powers of attorney he has
not revoked. Respondent narrates that
when he was appointed judge in 1983, he started to distance himself from
complainant in view of the moral and ethical obligations that came with the
position. Thus, he decided to put an
end to the relationship. After
complainant left for the United States and married Frank Pecot, respondent took
custody of Joanne.
After a little less than
a year, complainant returned to the Philippines to work on her petition for
permanent residency in the U.S.A. She
took Joanne with her back to Cavite.
With a heavy heart, respondent relinquished custody of his daughter
because of her minority. Despite this,
he regularly took time out to visit his daughter and provided financial
support, which was deposited in different banks in Cavite City.
Respondent refutes the
charges of abandonment of office. He
claims that when he was appointed municipal judge of Baao, Iriga City, Lagonoy,
San Jose Presentacion and Tigaon-Sangay, he unclogged the court’s dockets and
put it under manageable levels. As RTC
Judge of Tigaon, respondent was able to dispose of a substantial number of
cases, as shown by the monthly reports he submitted to this Court. For his accomplishments, respondent was
rated topnotcher MTC Judge of Camarines Sur in 1985. In 1993, he was awarded a Plaque of Appreciation by the
Municipality of Tigaon, and in 1997, he received a Certificate of Recognition
from the PNP Provincial Office.
Respondent clarified that he filed the requisite applications for leave
whenever he was absent.
On the charges of deceit
and dishonesty, respondent claims that he lives a simple life within his means
and income; that the money used in building his house and paying off its
mortgage came from his earnings and loans obtained from the GSIS and the SCSLA;
and that he supported his children out of his earnings. He denied that complainant bought him a
Mitsubishi Lancer, claiming that he drove a Wrangler Jeep to work. He also denied having withdrawn
complainant’s savings deposits.
Respondent disclosed that complainant had a propensity to make false
statements. In fact, she was charged
sometime in 1992 with two counts of perjury and false testimony before the City
Fiscal of Cavite.
Respondent likewise
vehemently denied that he was a maniakis. He maintains that he enjoys “a good and respected image in the
community untainted by any circumstance that might cast cloud[s] or aspersions
to it.”[4] Reputable persons
in his place of residence attest to his being “well respected, admired and a
person of unquestionable integrity.”[5] His female staff
likewise attested to his competence, integrity, honesty and dedication to duty.[6] Indeed, when the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) did a background investigation in
connection with charges of abandonment of office, playing “tong-its”,
cockfighting and womanizing against him, it found no basis for the charges.[7] In a survey
conducted by the IBP, Camarines Sur Chapter, he garnered a “very satisfactory”
personality and performance rating.[8]
Respondent judge further
denied that he threw hollow blocks or a wooden stool at complainant. Finally, respondent alleges that complainant
filed this complaint in her desperation to maintain her relationship with him
despite the legal and moral proscriptions thereon.
In her “Reply to Comments
of Respondent,”[9] complainant
declared that respondent’s claim that they had not cohabited for around twenty
years was a lie, the truth being that they started living together as man and
wife on June 4, 1976. Respondent
stopped coming home on July 14, 1996, prompting her to file a complaint on
November 7, 1996. Complainant
reiterated that she helped respondent’s brother earn a living by operating a
passenger jeep;[10] that she purchased
a Mitsubishi Lancer under the name Asuncion L. Camano;[11] and that
respondent requested her to repair the chapel beside his house in Sangay,
Camarines Sur.[12]
Complainant laments that
she was not treated well when she went to live with respondent in Bicol. She was subjected to physical violence and
had to seek medical treatment for chest pains when respondent hurled hollow
blocks at her.[13] She further
alleged that when she attempted to retrieve her belongings from respondent’s
house on October 16, 1996, she was refused entry and was forced to seek the
intercession of the Mayor of Sangay, Camarines Sur.[14] Later, she
discovered that respondent was living with another woman in the house.
Complainant alleged that
respondent deviously coaxed her into transferring to him all the properties she
acquired with her husband consisting of real properties covered by eight
transfer certificates of title, a two-storey building and a Ford Pick-up
Van. This was done by respondent by
means of a “Transfer of Administration of Conjugal Property with Special Power
of Attorney,”[15] which he himself
notarized, granting complainant the absolute authority to dispose of the
conjugal assets. While it appears that
respondent was able to secure the consent of her husband, complainant refused
to sign the instrument because she wanted to preserve the properties for her
other children. It was after her
refusal that respondent started to maltreat her.
Complainant further
averred that she accepted respondent’s proposition because he confided to her
that his wife committed adultery and that they were already separated. When respondent became a judge, he began
womanizing. At one time, complainant
caught respondent with one Salvacion Bien at home. Presently, respondent is living with a certain Mabel or Maria
Mercedes at NATO Beach, Sangay, Camarines Sur.
Complainant asserts it was respondent who convinced her to go to the
United States and marry an American so that she can petition for him and their
daughter. On the alleged criminal
charges of false testimony, complainant explained that the complaints against
her were dismissed.[16] Lastly,
complainant declared that respondent wielded great influence, enabling him to
procure the favorable testimonials of his court personnel.
Subsequently, complainant
filed a “Rejoinder and Counter-Comment,”[17] wherein she denied
that she went to the U.S. and married an American on her own volition; that it
was respondent, who was the lawyer of a travel agency, who devised ways and
means for her husband, Clorando C. Bonus, to go to the U.S.A. so there would be
no more impediment to his relationship with her; and that when her petition to
bring respondent and Joanne to the U.S. was denied, he began treating her
cruelly and continued his womanizing.
She also averred that the money deposited in the Royal Bank, Prudential
Bank and the PNB allegedly for Joanne’s support were actually her personal
deposits. With regard to the Wrangler
Jeep supposedly owned by respondent, complainant asserts that the same is actually
jointly owned by them as shown by a Certification dated June 3, 1998 by Ogie
S.A. Motor Works.[18]
It appears that during
the pendency of the instant proceedings, respondent judge filed an application
for optional retirement, which was granted by the Court on June 10, 1997,
without specifying the effectivity date thereof. Subsequently, the Court fixed the date of respondent’s retirement
at the close of office hours of May 31, 1998, and directed the OCA-Fiscal
Management Office (OCA-FMO) to withhold his retirement benefits pending the
resolution of two (2) administrative complaints filed against him docketed as
OCA-IPI No. 96-228-RTJ[19] and OCA-IPI No.
96-250-RTJ.[20]
On November 17, 1999,
respondent’s request for the release of his retirement benefits was granted,
but the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos was withheld pending the resolution of
the administrative complaints filed against him.
On November 24, 1999, the
Court resolved to docket the case as a regular administrative proceeding and
required the parties to manifest if they are willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed therein.
Complainant filed a
Comment on January 11, 2000, wherein she questioned respondent’s retirement
despite the pendency of the administrative charges against him. On the other hand, respondent filed an Ex
Parte Manifestation on January 27, 2000, expressing his willingness to have
the case submitted for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed.
Complainant thereafter
filed an “Urgent Request” to be permitted to testify and support her charges.
It must be stressed in
this regard that complainant has already been given more than adequate
opportunity to explain her side. It
would not only be superfluous to allow her to further testify to support her
charges, it would also further prolong an already protracted proceeding. It must be remembered that the essence of
due process does not necessarily require a hearing, but simply a reasonable
opportunity or right to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side.[21]
Due process in an
administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those
in the courts of justice.[22] A formal
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process. What is simply required is that the party concerned is given due
notice and is afforded an opportunity or right to be heard.[23] It is enough that
the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair
decision can be made.[24] “To be heard” does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or through pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[25]
The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.[26] In other words, it
is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers,
affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.[27] Considering that
complainant was afforded an opportunity to be heard through her pleadings, her
right to due process was not impaired.[28]
Cases involving serious
charges as those leveled against respondent Judge are, as a matter of
procedure, referred to the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation. Considering that this
is no longer possible with the optional retirement of respondent from the
service, the case will have to be resolved on the basis of the evidence on
record.
Cessation from office of
a respondent because of death[29] or retirement
neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against
him while he was still in the service[30] nor does it render
said administrative case moot and academic.[31] In other words,
the jurisdiction that was this Court’s at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.[32] Indeed, the
retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not
preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be
answerable.[33]
After evaluating the
complaint, the OCA recommends the dismissal of the charge of immorality against
respondent judge on the ground that the same was committed while he was still a
lawyer and ceased when he was appointed judge.
The dismissal of the other charges for lack of substantial evidence was
likewise recommended. However, the OCA
recommends that: (1) a fine of
P10,000.00 be imposed on respondent for misconduct and violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct; and (2) respondent be ordered to support his daughter Joanne
L. Camano in the amount of P3,000.00 to be deducted from his monthly pension
without prejudice to recovery of support in arrears and the filing of an
appropriate administrative action against him as a member of the Bar.
We take exception to the
OCA’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to support the charge for
immorality against respondent.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[34] The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of,[35] even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.[36]
In the case at bar, we
find overwhelming documentary proof of respondent judge’s perfidy. The competence and substantiality of the
pictures, letters, affidavits and other documents submitted by complainant,
while not sufficient to satisfy the quantum of preponderance required in
ordinary civil actions, assumes greater and even decisive weight in
administrative proceedings where affidavits may take the place of a witness’
direct testimony.[37]
The OCA points out that
the relationship between complainant and respondent “fizzled out” in 1983 when
the latter was appointed to the judiciary and the former went to the U.S. The evidence on record, however, proves
otherwise. It appears that complainant
and respondent cohabited and held themselves out as husband and wife for over
twenty years, from 1976 to July 14, 1996, when respondent stopped coming home.[38] Particularly
damaging for respondent is the following sworn statement of then Cavite City
Mayor Timoteo O. Encarnacion,[39] to wit:
x x x x x x x x x
2. That I personally know the couple Judge Policarpio Camano, Jr. and Mrs. Asuncion Liguid having been long time acquaintances;
3. That in fact, I became one of the wedding sponsor[s] of Mrs. Asuncion Liguid’s son Clorando Bonus;
4. That I further know
for a fact that said couple have been living together as husband and wife for
many years;
x x x x x x x x x
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
Even more damning is the
following sworn statement of Atty. Antonia Cabuco,[40] the Register of
Deeds of Cavite, who stated:
1. That, I am a lawyer by profession and have been the Register of Deeds of Cavite City for along time; It was during my term of office I [be]came acquainted with Judge Policarpio Camano, Jr. and Ms. Asuncion Liguid as well as when they were my neighbors in Mascardo St., San Antonio, Cavite City;
2. That, due to such
acquaintance and also because he is a brother in the profession, I became
godmother of their daughter, Joanne L. Camano, sometime in December 1980; in
view of all this, I certify that they have been cohabiting together as husband
and wife;
3. That, during that time the said couple have [a] furniture shop in Dra. Salamanca St., San Antonio, Cavite City;
4. That, in Cavite City the said couple are widely known as husband and wife and this relationship I came to know clearly because the two (2) of them have been staying together and operating the said furniture shop. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
The foregoing documents,
together with an assortment of billing statements up to July 1, 1997,[41] as well as letters[42] and telegrams[43] addressed to
complainant and her daughter, the last of which was dated June 25, 1992, belie
respondent’s claim that he started to distance himself from complainant when he
was appointed to the judiciary in 1983.
In fact, other evidence[44] tends to show that
respondent actually cultivated the relationship in order that the educational
needs of his other children would be subsidized by complainant,[45] a successful
businesswoman in her own right.
The testimonials
submitted by respondent attesting to his allegedly unblemished reputation and
his propriety of behavior towards the opposite sex are, at best,
self-serving. Moreover, they could have
been easily procured considering respondent’s moral ascendancy over the
affiants. It can not be denied that
judges, especially those in the provinces and remote municipalities, are looked
upon with awe by the citizenry and such could be conveniently exploited.
By the very nature of the
bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting
standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts
but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s
personal behavior, both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be
free from the appearance of impropriety.[46]
Judges must adhere to the
highest tenets of judicial conduct. They must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence.[47] A judge’s private
as well as official conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of
impropriety, and be beyond reproach.[48] Succinctly stated,
the people’s confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the
magnitude of legal knowledge and the diligence of the members of the bench, but
also on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness they are
expected to possess.[49] In this
connection, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
CANON 2 – A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
Surely, respondent’s
behavior of living openly and scandalously for over two decades with a woman
not his wife and siring a child by her constitutes gross and serious
misconduct, penalized by the ultimate penalty of dismissal under Section 22
(c), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book IV of Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. In the case at bar, respondent judge’s acts
would have warranted the penalty of dismissal had he not optionally retired.
Respondent’s optional
retirement from the service will not prevent the Court from wielding its
disciplinary authority and penalizing respondent for his deplorable conduct as
an erstwhile member of the bench.[50] Neither can he
escape administrative liability as a member of the Bar because even as an
ordinary lawyer, respondent has to conform to the strict standard of conduct
demanded of members of the profession.
Certainly, fathering children by a woman other than his lawful wife
fails to meet these standards.[51]
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
rendered finding respondent GUILTY of
Serious Misconduct and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and imposing
on him a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez,
JJ., concur.
[1] Exh. A; Rollo, p. 5.
[2] Ibid., pp. 1-4.
[3] Exhs. B and B-1; Rollo, pp. 6-7.
[4] Comment, p. 11.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Exhs. 5 and 6; Rollo, pp. 58-60.
[7] Exh. 2; Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[8] Exh. 1; Rollo, pp. 49-50.
[9] Rollo, pp. 88-97.
[10] Annexes I, I-1 to I-4; Rollo, pp. 152-156.
[11] Annexes J, J-1, J-2; Rollo, pp. 157-159.
[12] Annexes K, K-1 to K-7; Rollo, pp. 160-161.
[13] Annexes L, L-1 to L-6; id., pp. 162-168.
[14] Annex M; Rollo, p. 169.
[15] Annex N; Rollo, pp. 172-175.
[16] Annex O; Rollo, pp. 176-182.
[17] Rollo, pp. 196-199.
[18] Ibid., p. 204.
[19] Subsequently re-docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-00-1522,
entitled Romulo SJ Tolentino v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr.
[20] Subsequently re-docketed as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1509,
entitled Asuncion S. Liguid v. Judge Policarpio S. Camano, Jr., the
instant case.
[21] Aparente v.
NLRC, 331 SCRA 82, 89-90 [2000].
[22] University
of the Philippines Board of Regents v. CA, 313 SCRA 404, 422 [1999].
[23] Ramoran v.
Jardine CMG Life Insurance co., Inc., 326 SCRA 208 [2000].
[24] Melendres, Jr. v. Comelec, 262, 281 [1999].
[25] Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 313,
337-338 [1988]; Domingo v. Comelec,
313 SCRA 311 [1999]; Gacutana-Fraile v.
Domingo, 348 SCRA 414, 423 [2000].
[26] Adamson & Adamson, Inc. v. Amores, 152
SCRA 237, 250 [1987].
[27] CMP Federal
Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, 303 SCRA 99, 110 [1999].
[28] Trinidad v.
Comelec, 315 SCRA 175, 184 [1999].
[29] Mañozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625 [1995]; Apiag
v. Cantero, 268 SCRA 47 [1997].
[30] Tuliao v. Ramos, 284 SCRA 378, 388 [1998];
Secretary of Justice v. Marcos, 76 SCRA 301 [1977].
[31] Sy Bang v. Mendez, 287 SCRA 84, 92 [1998].
[32] Flores v. Sumaljag, 290 SCRA 568, 569 [1998].
[33] Lilia
v. Judge Bartolome M. Fanuñal, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1503, 13 December
2001; Cabarloc v.
Cabusora, 348 SCRA 217, 226 [2000]; Cadauan v. Alivia,
344 SCRA 174 [2000].
[34] Audion Electric
Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 308 SCRA 340, 351 [1999]; Association of Independent Labor Unions v.
NLRC, 305 SCRA 219, 231 [1999]; Gonzales
v. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169, 174 [1999].
[35] See Consolidated
Food Corporation v. NLRC, 315 SCRA 129 [1999].
[36] Villaflor v. CA, 280 SCRA 297, 330 [1997].
[37] CMP Federal Security Agency v. NLRC, supra,
citing Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, 180 SCRA 195
[1989].
[38] Exhibits, A, B, B-1, C, C-1, C-2, D, D-1, E to
E-11, F to F-11 and G to G-7; Rollo,
pp. 98-140.
[39] Exhibit D; ibid., p. 104.
[40] Exhibit D-1; id., p. 105.
[41] Exhibits E to E-11; id., pp. 106-117.
[42] Exhibits F to F-11; id., pp. 118-133.
[43] Exhibits G to G-7; id., pp. 134-140.
[44] Exhibits H to H-10; id., pp. 141-151.
[45] Exhibits H-8; H-9; H-10; id., pp. 149-150.
[46] Citing Dawa v. De Asa, 292 SCRA 703 [1998],
citing Yulo-Tuvilla v. Balgos, 288 SCRA 358 [1998].
[47] Rule. 1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[48] Magarang
v. Jardin, Sr., 330 SCRA 79 [2000].
[49] Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 [1996].
[50] See Yu
v. Leanda, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1463, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA 58, 66.
[51] Zamudio v. Peñas, 286 SCRA 367, 375 [1998],
citing Nicolas v. Judge Yuzon, A.M. No. RTJ-89-303, 15 August 1990.