SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1454. August 27, 2002]
ARIEL Y. PANGANIBAN, complainant, vs. JUDGE MA.
VICTORIA N. CUPIN-TESORERO, Presiding Judge, Second Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Silang-Amadeo, Cavite, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint against Judge
Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero, Presiding Judge of the Second Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Silang-Amadeo, Cavite, for gross ignorance of the law, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in
connection with her grant of bail to Jayson Toledo Marte, the accused in Crim.
Case No. TG-3266-00 for rape.
The facts are undisputed:
On July 26, 1999, Maricel
Toledo-Panganiban, wife of complainant Ariel Panganiban, filed a complaint
against Jayson Toledo Marte for violation of R.A. No. 7610 for allegedly
inserting his finger into the private parts of Peewai Panganiban, their
two-year old minor daughter.[1] The said criminal complaint was filed with the Second
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Silang-Amadeo, Cavite for preliminary
examination by respondent Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero. Respondent judge issued an order, dated
August 9, 1999, finding probable cause for the continued detention of the
accused Jayson Marte for violation of R.A. No. 7610.[2]
After conducting a preliminary
investigation, respondent judge issued a resolution, dated October 27, 1999,
finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against the accused
Jayson Marte for violation of Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997. She recommended bail of P120,000.00 for the
provisional liberty of the accused and ordered the transmittal of the entire
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in Cavite City.[3] Hence, on November 17, 1999, the records of the said
case were forwarded to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite for appropriate
action.[4]
On January 6, 2000, an information
was filed against the accused Jayson Marte for rape in violation of Art. 266-A
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 in relation to R.A. No.
7610, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cavite City. No bail was recommended for the provisional
liberty of the accused.[5]
The present administrative
complaint alleges that on February 26, 2000, despite the fact that an
information had already been filed against the accused Jayson Marte in the RTC
and no bail had been recommended for his provisional liberty, respondent judge
nevertheless issued an order approving the bail bond of Jayson Marte in the
amount of P120,000.00 and directing the provincial jail warden of Trece
Martirez City to cause his release from custody.[6] Complainant alleges that, in so doing, respondent
judge committed grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, dishonesty, and violation of R.A. No. 3019.[7]
In her comment, dated July 10,
2000, respondent judge does not deny that she issued the questioned order. She states, however, that after the accused
Marte was released on bail as a result of her February 26, 2000 order, the Hon.
Alfonso S. Garcia, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
issued an order directing her to explain why she approved the said bail and
ordered the release of the accused considering that she no longer had
jurisdiction over the case[8] and that Judge Garcia had cancelled the bail bond,
previously approved, of the accused Jayson Marte and had ordered the accused to
be remanded to the custody of the provincial jail warden of Cavite City.[9]
Respondent judge maintains that
her grant of bail to Jayson Marte was proper because he was charged with a
non-capital offense as the penalty for rape committed under Art. 266-A, par. 2,
in relation to Art. 266-B, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
8353, was only prision mayor.
Thus, respondent judge claims that the accused Jayson Marte is entitled
to bail as a matter of right. She
alleges that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City violated the constitutional
rights of the accused Jayson Marte as the information against him failed to
specify which particular provision of R.A. No. 8353 was violated by him and no
bail was recommended for his provisional liberty. Respondent judge likewise relies on Rule 114, §17 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure in support of her position that she had authority
to issue an order granting bail even though a case has already been filed in
court considering that the judge was unavailable at that time or was unable to
act on the request. She says that she
was the only judge present on February 26, 2000, a Saturday, when Melito
Cuadra, the process server of the Regional Trial Court, Tagaytay City, came to
her for the approval of the accused Jayson Marte's bail bond. She claims that Melito Cuadra represented to
her that Judge Garcia, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
was absent and that she was the only judge who could approve the bail
bond. She disclaims knowledge of the
fact that, at the time she issued her order granting bail to the accused Jayson
Marte, the information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor made no
recommendation for bail. She pleads
good faith in approving the bail bond in question.[10]
For his part, Melito Cuadra,
process server of the RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, executed an affidavit
admitting that he approached respondent judge on February 26, 2000 to seek the
approval of a bail bond involving a case filed in RTC, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City. However, he claimed that he did
so at the instance of a bondsman who requested his assistance. He also claimed that, upon seeing the
application for bail in question in the amount
of P120,000.00, respondent judge remarked, "Dapat P40,000.00
lang. Sabagay, mas malaki sa akin sa
2%. Ibalik na lang ninyo sa akin sa
next working day ang balanse sa aking 2%." ("It should only have been P40,000.00. In any event, my 2% is bigger. Just return to me on the next working day
the remaining balance from my 2%.")
Cuadra said that respondent judge never mentioned anything about any
documents he was supposed to bring her nor did she inquire about any changes
that may have been made in the case. He
also pointed to several cases wherein respondent judge granted bail even when
the judge before whom the said cases were pending were not absent.[11]
This case was referred to
Executive Judge Manuel M. Mayo, RTC, Cavite City, for investigation, report,
and recommendation.[12]
After due investigation, Executive
Judge Manuel Mayo recommended that respondent judge be reprimanded for granting
bail without authority in the following cases:
(1) Jayson Marte y Toledo in
Criminal Case No. TG-3266-00; (2) Joselito Borja in Criminal Case No.
TG-3085-99; (3) Rodelio Guardo in Criminal Case Nos. TG-3186-99 and TG-3187-99;
(4) Rodolfo Sangalang Borja in Criminal Case No. TG-3210-99; (5) Modesto Javier
y Roxas in Criminal Case No. TG-3214-99; and (6) Elmer B. Daan in Criminal Case
No. TG-3131-99.[13]
Respondent judge invokes Rule 114,
§17(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[14] to justify the issuance by her on February 26, 2000
of an order approving the accused Jayson Marte's bail bond and directing his immediate
release from custody. She says that
Melito Cuadra, process server of the RTC of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City,
told her that the judge before whom the case of Jayson Marte was pending was
unavailable on February 26, 2000, a Saturday, so that she was compelled to act
on Jayson Marte's bail bond. She claims
she was unaware that no bail was recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor with
respect to Jayson Marte's case.
These contentions are without
merit. Under Rule 114, §17(a) of the
then Rules of Criminal Procedure:
SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. - (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court where the case is pending, or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed also with any regional trial court of said place, or, if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
The case of Cruz v. Yaneza[15] has
explained this provision in this wise:
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or city. In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
Jayson Marte was not arrested in a
province, city, or municipality other than where his case is pending. To the contrary, it appears that the accused
Jayson Marte, a resident of Silang, Cavite,[16] was detained at the Municipal Jail of Silang, Cavite[17] and later transferred to the Cavite Provincial Jail,
Trece Martires City.[18] He was thus arrested in the province of Cavite and
detained there. At the time of the
issuance of respondent judge's order to release him on bail, his case was
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay
City. Applying Rule 114, §17 (a) to the
foregoing circumstances, the accused Jayson Marte could file a petition for
bail only in the court where his case is pending, that is, in Branch 18 of the
RTC of Cavite, or with another branch of the same court within the province or
city, that is, with any other branch of the RTC of Cavite. Certainly, the said provision does not allow
the accused to apply for bail before a municipal circuit trial court
judge. Hence, respondent judge did not
have authority to issue an order approving the bail bond of Jayson Marte. Respondent judge's reliance on Rule 114,
§17(a) is clearly misplaced.
More importantly, however, is the
fact that respondent judge had already lost her jurisdiction over the case of
the accused Jayson Marte. At the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation and after she had recommended the
filing of the corresponding information against Jayson Marte and had forwarded
the records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor, her court had lost its
preliminary jurisdiction over the said case.[19] Having been divested of her jurisdiction over the
said case, respondent judge no longer had authority to issue any order or
directive in connection therewith, specially such as would involve the liberty
of the accused. The case of Jayson
Marte had been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. Indeed, respondent judge even admitted that
she was aware that an information had already been filed against the accused
Jayson Marte. Whether or not she also
knew that no bail had been recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor is
irrelevant. The fact remains that she
had lost her jurisdiction over the said case and, hence, any matter that
required resolution in the said case had come within the exclusive domain of
the RTC.
Respondent judge claims good faith
in issuing her February 26, 2000 order and makes much of the fact that she is a
relatively new judge who was appointed to her position only in December
1998. This plea is likewise unavailing. It bears emphasis that a judge, as an
advocate of justice and a visible representation of the law, is expected to
keep abreast with and be proficient in the interpretation of our laws. A judge should exhibit more than a cursory
acquaintance with the basic legal norms and precepts as well as with statutes
and procedural rules. Having accepted
her exalted position as a member of the judiciary, respondent judge owes it to
the public and to the court over which she presides to maintain professional
competence at all times and to have the basic rules at the palm of her hands.[20] In the case at bar, respondent judge failed to live
up to these standards. Not only did she
approve the bail bond of the accused without the requisite authority to do so,
but her manner of doing so shows a flagrant disregard for the very laws that
she had sworn to uphold and serve.
First, it appears that no
application for bail was in fact made by the accused Jayson Marte before
respondent judge. Respondent judge herself
admitted that it was only Melito Cuadra, the process server of the court where
the accused Jayson Marte's case was pending, who saw her on that day, seeking
approval of the bail bond posted by the said accused. She also admitted that she merely relied on Cuadra's
representations that no other judge was in court to act on the bail
petition. She did not inquire whether
or not bail was in fact recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the
provisional liberty of the accused, which, as it turned out, he did not.
Second, respondent judge did not
give notice to the prosecutor of such request to approve the bail bond of the
accused Jayson Marte, in violation of Rule 114, §18 which provides that
"the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or
require him to submit his recommendation." Whether bail is a matter of right or a matter of discretion, the
prosecutor must be given reasonable notice of the hearing or he must be asked
to submit his recommendation before the judge may grant an application for
bail.[21]
Third, respondent judge did not
conduct a hearing to afford the prosecution an opportunity to present its
side. Jayson Marte was accused of rape,
in violation of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
relation to R.A. No. 7610, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, which is not a bailable offense.
Respondent judge should thus have conducted a hearing, whether summary
or otherwise, to give the prosecution the chance to prove that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.[22] This she did not do.
Instead, she approved the bail bond of the accused on the same day that
she was approached by Melito Cuadra to do the same.
Respondent judge contends,
however, that the accused Jayson Marte was entitled to bail as a matter of
right because he was being charged with a non-capital offense as the penalty
for rape committed under Art. 266-A, par. 2, in relation to Art. 266-B, of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, was only prision mayor. Suffice it to say that a municipal judge
conducting the preliminary investigation has no legal authority to determine
the character of the crime and, regardless of his belief as to the nature of
the offense committed, his only duty after conducting the preliminary
investigation is to transmit to the Provincial Prosecutor his resolution of the
case together with the entire records of the same.[23] Jayson Marte was accused of rape by the Provincial
Prosecutor. Although she was the one
who conducted the preliminary investigation, respondent judge was not
authorized to change the designation of the offense charged against him in
order to justify her grant of bail in his favor.[24] The rationale for this is simple. After the preliminary investigation by the
municipal judge, it could very well happen that the prosecution may have
gathered such other evidence, in addition to or in connection with that which
he already has, which, when taken together, are sufficiently strong to prove
the guilt of the accused of a capital offense.[25] The fact remains that, in the case of the accused
Jayson Marte, he was accused of a capital offense and no bail was recommended
for his provisional liberty.
Fourth, respondent judge granted
bail and ordered the release of the accused in several cases pending before the
RTC of Cavite, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, namely: (1) Joselito Borja in Criminal
Case No. TG-3085-99; (2) Rodelio Guardo in Criminal Case Nos. TG-3186-99 and
TG-3187-99; (3) Rodolfo Sangalang Borja in Criminal Case No. TG-3210-99; (4)
Modesto Javier y Roxas in Criminal Case No. TG-3214-99; and (5) Elmer B. Daan
in Criminal Case No. TG-3131-99.[26]
These circumstances belie
respondent judge's protestations of good faith. It is an imperative for a judge to remain conversant with basic
legal principles, and errors on this score deserve administrative sanction.[27] A judge presiding over a court of law must not only
apply the law but must also live by it and render justice without resorting to
shortcuts clearly uncalled for. A
judge, by the very nature of his office, should be circumspect in the
performance of his duties. He should
not only apply the law, but must also be conscientious and thorough in doing
so.[28] Respondent judge has certainly been remiss in
performing her duties in accordance with these precepts.
With respect to the charge of
Melito Cuadra that respondent judge had a pecuniary interest in granting bail
in favor of the accused Jayson Marte, this Court cannot lend credence to the
same. Although Melito Cuadra executed a
sworn statement before Investigating Judge Manuel A. Mayo on July 18, 2002, he
never appeared at the trial nor was he subjected to cross-examination by the
counsel for respondent judge. Thus, his
affidavit can only be considered hearsay which cannot be given probative value.[29] Indeed, the counsel for complainant simply dispensed
with Cuadra's testimony when he failed to attend the hearings conducted before
the Investigating Judge despite due notice to him.
On the question of penalty to be
imposed on respondent judge, in Depaymaylo v. Brotarlo,[30] this Court imposed a P20,000.00 fine on an erring
judge for her manifest partiality in granting bail in favor of the accused
without authority to do so, adamant refusal to grant the prosecution time to
study its case, haste in holding the hearing without observing the proper
procedure, and her attempt to downgrade the charge against the accused to
justify her grant of bail. Similarly,
in Sule v. Biteng,[31] this Court also fined the respondent judge therein in
the amount of P20,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law in granting a petition
for bail on the very day it was filed even though the petition contained no
notice of hearing to the prosecution.
In view of the gravity of the procedural lapses committed by respondent
judge in hastily granting bail in favor of the accused, even those charged with
capital offenses, we find the same penalty to be appropriate under the
circumstances pertaining to this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ma. Victoria N. Cupin-Tesorero, of
the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Silang-Amadeo, Cavite, is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and is FINED in the amount of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00), with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Exh. A-3; Rollo, p. 7.
[2] Exh. A-6; id., p. 15.
[3] Exh. B; id., pp. 20-21.
[4] Rollo, p. 6.
[5] Exh. C; Rollo, p. 4-5.
[6] Rollo, p. 3.
[7] Complaint-Affidavit, dated Mar. 8, 2000; Rollo,
pp. 1-2.
[8] Exh. 2-FF; id., p. 68.
[9] Rollo, p. 70.
[10] Comment to the Complaint-Affidavit of Ariel
Panganiban, pp. 4-17; Rollo, pp. 35-49.
[11] Rollo, pp. 75-76.
[12] Id., p. 157.
[13] Final Report, dated July 24, 2002, p. 22.
[14] The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was still in
effect at that time as the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect only
on December 1, 2000.
[15] 304 SCRA 285, 294 (1999).
[16] Rollo, p. 8.
[17] Id., p. 17.
[18] Id.,
p. 19.
[19] Huggland
v. Lantin, 326 SCRA 620 (2000).
[20] Santiago
v. Jovellanos, 337 SCRA 21 (2000).
[21] Caņeda v.
Alaan, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1376, Jan. 23, 2002.
[22] Basco v. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 (1997).
[23] Balagapo, Jr. v. Duquilla, 238 SCRA 645
(1994); De Guzman v. Escalona, 97 SCRA 619 (1980); Bais v.
Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101 (1979).
[24] Depamaylo v. Brotarlo, 265 SCRA 151 (1996).
[25] Santos v. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56 (1995).
[26] Final Report, dated July 24, 2002, p. 22.
[27] Martin v.
Guerrero, 317 SCRA 166 (1999).
[28] Beso v.
Daguman, 323 SCRA 566 (2000).
[29] People v. Esparas, 292 SCRA 332 (1998).
[30] 265 SCRA 151 (1996).
[31] 243 SCRA 524 (1995).