EN BANC
[G.R. No. 145303*-04. August 7, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.
EDUARDO T. OCAMPO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On automatic review is the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 166) finding accused
Eduardo T. Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 113837-H, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death, to
indemnify the victim in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and to
pay the costs of suit.
The Amended Information reads:
“The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, upon sworn complaint of Suzette H. Ocampo, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annes (sic) “A” and forms an integral part of this information, charges Eduardo T. Ocampo with the crime of rape, committed as follows:
“On or about June 21, 1994, in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his daughter, Suzette H. Ocampo, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.”[1]
The prosecution presented three witnesses:
the complainant, Suzette H. Ocampo; her mother, Susie Ocampo; and Dr. Maximo
Reyes, NBI Medico-Legal Officer.
Complainant’s narration of the
events that precipitated the filing of the case against appellant is as
follows:
Suzette is the eldest among four
children of appellant Eduardo T. Ocampo.
She recalls that upon waking up inside their house in Taguig, one early
morning in February, 1994, she saw bloodstains in her blanket. Upon seeing the bloodstains and knowing that
she did not have her menstrual period at that time, she concluded that she was
raped. She claims that because she was
a sound sleeper she was not awakened when she was violated. Nevertheless, she points to her father as
the culprit. When asked how he knew
that it was her father who raped her, Suzette said that the former has been
raping her for a long time.[2]
In the early morning of June 21,
1994, while alone in her room in the same house in Taguig, she woke up to find
out that she was naked and that her father, who was also naked, was on top of
her. She said that she did not shout
for help because she did not want other people to know what her father was
doing. Her mother, at that time, was in
their canteen at Buting, Pasig while her brothers were in another room. She cried and pleaded to her father to stop
what the latter was doing. After
sometime, the father stopped and left.
After her father left, the complainant put on her clothes and went back
to sleep. When she woke up she went to
school. It was only in the afternoon of
the same day that she saw her mother and it was then that the latter talked to
her. Her mother told her that her
younger sister saw what her father did to her that early morning of June 21,
1994.[3]
The following morning, complainant
and her mother went to her godmother in Sumilang, Pasig and told the latter
what happened. Her godmother no longer
allowed her to go home. Instead she was
brought by her godmother to the house of the latter’s sister in Sta. Mesa. Later, they went to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where complainant was medically examined. Afterwards, they filed a complaint against
appellant. Two (2) Informations were
filed charging him of Rape committed against her daughter Suzette, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 113836-H and Criminal Case No. 113837-H.[4]
Susie Ocampo, complainant’s
mother, testified that she does not recall any unusual incident that happened
in February, 1994. However, she said
that on June 21, 1994, her youngest daughter told her that she saw her father
rape her sister Suzette between 5:00 and 6:00 in the morning of the same
day. After having knowledge of the said
incident and fearing that appellant might do something against her and their
children, Susie sought the help of Suzette’s godmother who accompanied Suzette
to the NBI office and helped her file her complaint against appellant.[5]
Susie likewise testified that on
June 29, 1994, appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 106542, charging him of the crime of rape
committed against Suzette. However, the
case was provisionally dismissed because Suzette with the conformity of her
mother Susie, filed an Affidavit of
Desistance[6] declaring therein that the
case does not warrant criminal prosecution and Suzette is forgiving her father,
herein appellant.
The prosecution’s last witness was
Dr. Maximo Reyes, the NBI medico-legal officer who examined Suzette. He found no external injuries in the body of
the complainant. However, complainant’s
genital examination revealed the presence in her hymen of an “old-healed deep
laceration at 6:00 o’clock position corresponding to the face of a watch, edges
of which are rounded and non-coaptable.” He also testified that the laceration
could have been inflicted not later than March, 1994 and that the same might
have been caused by a fully erect penis or any other hard instrument inserted
in complainant’s vagina.[7]
Defense, on the other hand,
presented appellant as its sole witness who testified that the charges against
him are fabricated; that complainant’s mother is his common-law wife; that the
latter convinced the complainant to file the case against him because the
former is jealous of appellant’s girlfriend; that his daughter also filed a
case against him to prevent him from getting his share in the income of the
canteen that they own.
After trial, the lower court
rendered judgment finding appellant innocent of the rape allegedly committed in
February 1994 (Criminal Case No. 113836-H) but guilty of the rape allegedly committed
on June 21, 1994 (Criminal Case No. 113837-H).
Accused-appellant assails the
trial court’s judgment of conviction raising the following Assignment of
Errors:
“I
“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF RAPE AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO 113837-H DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
“II
“THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
ALLEGE THE AGE OF THE VICTIM IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 113837-H.”[8]
As to the first assigned error,
appellant claims that the testimony of complainant was inconsistent and lacks
the element of truthfulness and spontaneity.
He contends that complainant’s failure to recall the details of the
incident complained of is contrary to the normal reaction of a rape victim.
We disagree. Minor lapses in a witness’ testimony should
be expected when a person recounts the details of an experience so humiliating
and so painful to recall as rape, for rape, as a harrowing experience, is
usually not remembered in detail.[9] Moreover, records show that
the acts complained of were committed when complainant was still at a tender
age of fourteen. As such, ample margin
of error and understanding should be accorded to the young complainant who,
naturally, would be seized with fear much more than adults when required to
relive an experience she would most definitely rather forget.[10] The long-standing rule is
that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says in effect
all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her, and as long
as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted
thereof.[11]
Appellant claims that the
testimony of the complainant is incredible and inconsistent. However, it is settled that when credibility
is in issue, the Supreme Court generally defers to the findings of the trial
court considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during
trial.[12] In the instant case, we
find nothing on record to convince us to depart from the findings of the trial
court.
Furthermore, complainant’s
testimony is corroborated by the findings of the NBI medico-legal officer who
discovered a healed laceration in her hymen.[13] When the victim’s testimony
of her violation is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there
is sufficient foundation for concluding that there was carnal knowledge.[14]
We are not convinced by
appellant’s defense that his wife was moved by jealousy that she prevailed upon
their daughter to file the complaint against appellant. No mother in her right mind would expose her
daughter to the disgrace and trauma resulting from a prosecution for rape if
she was not genuinely motivated by a desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for her daughter’s defilement.[15]
Likewise, we are not persuaded by
accused-appellant’s contention that his daughter filed the instant case against
him because she and her mother wanted to deprive accused-appellant of his share
in the income of their canteen. A
daughter, especially one of tender age would not just accuse her own father of
a heinous crime had she not really been aggrieved.[16] Filing a case for
incestuous rape is of such nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken
seriously, it goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story
which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor,
unless that is the truth.[17] Moreover, it is hard to
fathom that a parent would use her offspring as engine of malice, especially if
the same would subject her to humiliation and stigma.[18]
The affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainant with the conformity of her mother does not carry
any evidentiary weight in favor of appellant for this kind of affidavit is best
ignored when pitted against positive evidence given at the witness stand.[19] Courts do not attach
persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an
afterthought.[20] Complainant’s mother
satisfactorily explained that they executed the affidavit of desistance after
appellant pleaded for their forgiveness.[21] As we have held in People
v. Igat, an affidavit of desistance or a pardon by the offended party cannot
justify the dismissal of the complaint for rape considering that the pardon
should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal action.[22] Hence, against the evidence
of the prosecution, the denial of the accused-appellant, which is inherently
weak, cannot prevail.
With respect to the second
assignment of error, we agree with appellant’s contention, as concurred in by
the Office of the Solicitor General, that the trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of death. Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7659 states that:
“The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
“1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x”
This Court has held in a number of
cases that under said provision, the concurrence of the minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender is a special qualifying circumstance which
must be both alleged and proved with certainty, otherwise, the death penalty
cannot be imposed. [23] In the present case, while
appellant admits that the complainant is her daughter and that there is
evidence to show that the latter was less than eighteen years of age when the
crime was committed, her age was not alleged in the Information filed against
appellant. Thus, the special qualifying
circumstance of minority and relationship cannot be appreciated against
him. Consequently, the penalty imposed
on appellant should be modified.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
An appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review and it becomes the duty of this Court to
correct such errors it may find in the appealed judgment, even if they have not
been specifically assigned.[24]
In addition to the award of civil
indemnity, the victim is entitled to moral damages pursuant to the principle
that a conviction for rape carries with it the award of moral damages to the
victim, without need of further proof.[25] Victim Suzette is entitled
to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as and for moral damages.[26]
In addition, exemplary damages in
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) should be imposed on appellant
considering that relationship is proven. [27]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City (Branch 166) convicting accused Eduardo T. Ocampo of the crime of Rape in
Criminal Case No. 113837-H is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay Suzette H. Ocampo the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, in addition to the Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) awarded by the trial court as civil indemnity and the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, and Corona, JJ., concur.
* Refers to Criminal Case No. 113836-H which should not have been docketed considering that accused Eduardo T. Ocampo was acquitted of the crime of rape by the RTC of Pasig City in said criminal case.
[1] Original Records, p. 60.
[2] TSN, January 14, 1999, p. 4.
[3] Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[4] Original Records, pp. 1 and 9; Original Records, both
Informations were amended on March 22, 1999, pp. 58 and 60.
[5] TSN, February 11, 1999, pp. 5-7.
[6] Exhibit “1”, p. 92, OR.
[7] TSN, June 30, 1999, pp. 7-10.
[8] Rollo, p. 38.
[9] People vs.
Turco, Jr., 337 SCRA 714, 727; People
vs. Abalde, 329 SCRA 418, 431; People
vs. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192, 200.
[10] People vs.
Matugas, G.R. Nos. 139698-726, February 20, 2002; People vs. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105, 116.
[11] People vs.
Dumaguing, 340 SCRA 701, 709.
[12] People vs.
Navida, 346 SCRA 821, 830; People vs.
Villanueva, 339 SCRA 482, 494.
[13] Exhibit “D”, p. 76, OR.
[14] People vs.
Segui, 346 SCRA 178, 186; People vs.
Brondial, 343 SCRA 600, 620.
[15] People vs.
Quilatan, 341 SCRA 247, 255.
[16] People vs.
Baniguid, 340 SCRA 92, 104; People
vs. Razonable, 330 SCRA 562, 574.
[17] People vs.
Tundag, 342 SCRA 704, 713.
[18] People v.
de los Reyes, 327 SCRA 56.
[19] People vs. De Guiang, 285 SCRA 404, 414.
[20] People vs. Benedictus, 288 SCRA 319, 324.
[21] TSN, March 17, 1999, p. 4.
[22] 291 SCRA 100, 107.
[23] People vs.
Baltazar, 343 SCRA 250, 265; People
vs. Arves, 343 SCRA 123, 138; People vs. Baniguid, supra;
People vs. Surilla, 336
SCRA 376, 387; People vs.
Decena, 332 SCRA 618, 625.
[24] People v.
Alipayo, 324 SCRA 447; People v. Taño, 331 SCRA 449.
[25] People vs.
Sarmiento, 344 SCRA 345, 357 [2000].
[26] Ibid.
[27] People v.
Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001.