THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139610.
August 12, 2002]
AUREA R. MONTEVERDE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Time and time again, this Court
has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corruption in the government.
Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders punished. However,
this objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the
prosecution passes the test of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this
case, the Court is mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed
by our Constitution to the accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the April 29, 1999 Decision[1] and February 3, 2000
Resolution[2] of the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 18768. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused AUREA MONTEVERDE y RASUELO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Commercial Document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and in default of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she is hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of SIX (6) MONTHS of Arresto Mayor as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional as maximum, to pay a fine of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the cost.
“She shall be credited with the full period of any preventive imprisonment suffered, pursuant to and as mandated by Batas Pambansa Blg. 85.
“The facts from which the civil liability may arise not being indubitable, there is no pronouncement as to the same.
“The bailbond of herein accused is hereby ordered cancelled.”[3]
The assailed resolution denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from the
Information dated February 4, 1993, signed by Special Prosecution Officer
Gualberto J. dela Llana with the approval of then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.
Charging petitioner with estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
the accusatory portion reads thus:
“That on or about January 17, 1991, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Chairman of
Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila with intent
to defraud, and by taking advantage of [her] official position and to liquidate
the funds donated/granted by the Philippine Games and Amusement Corporation
submitted Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the amount of P13,565.00
allegedly issued by Sanford Hardware when in truth and in fact said sales
invoice is falsified and later did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to her personal use
and benefit, to the damage of the Government and which crime was committed in
relation to her office.”[4]
During her arraignment on April 5,
1993, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de parte,[5] pleaded not guilty.[6] After trial on the merits,
the Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of the crime of estafa, but convicted
her of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The Facts
Version
of the Prosecution
The prosecution’s version of the
facts is curtly summarized by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) as
follows:
“Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut, Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). The amount was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she submitted a financial statement (Exhibits ‘1 to 1-A-3’) with copies of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.
“Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra,
Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged Petitioner
and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with Malversation of the
following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the] Barangay General Fund; 2.)
P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda
for the period July 16, to December 1990. The complaints were docketed as
OMB-0-91-12694 and OMB-0-92-0643 (Exhs. A, B and C).”[7]
Version of the
Defense
The foregoing account is
reiterated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its Memorandum.[8] The petitioner did not
submit her own Memorandum, but merely adopted the position of the OSG which
recommended her acquittal.
Version of the
Sandiganbayan
The foregoing narration does not
adequately explain the evidence. In fairness to the Sandiganbayan (“SBN”
hereafter) which is being faulted with reversible errors by petitioner and the
OSG, we deem it prudent to quote the facts and the evidence it relied upon in
its assailed Decision, as follows:
“EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION
In its bid to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the People presented the following documentary evidence:
1. Exhibit A which is a letter complaint addressed to the Ombudsman dated September 2, 1991 signed by Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz, Antonio Araza and Jose Salvatierra;
2. Exhibit B which is a Joint-Affidavit of the said four (4) complainants subscribed and sworn to before a Notary Public on September 8, 1991;
3. Exhibit C which is a letter dated June 13, 1991 signed by complainants Jose Salvatierra and Antonio Araza addressed to Mr. Manuel de la Fuente of the Chief Barangay Bureau, City of Manila;
4. Exhibit D which is the cover of the Booklet of Sales invoice[s]/Receipts of Sanford Hardware.
5. Exhibit D-1 which is the duplicate original copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568 dated July 20, 1981 listing only three (3) items;
6. Exhibit D-1-A which is a genuine machine copy of Exhibit D-1;
7. Exhibit E which is a machine copy of an official receipt with Aurea Monteverde appearing as buyer and listing eleven items as articles purchased;
8. Exhibit E-1 which is a certification of Luz Co, Manager of Sanford Hardware stating that Exhibit E is not a genuine reproduction of the duplicate original;
9. Exhibit F (offered lately) is a xerox copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991;
10. Exhibit G is a machine copy of an undated letter signed by Bella Evangelista authorizing Antonio Araza to verify the authenticity of Invoice No. 21568 dated January 17, 1991 in the sum of P13,565.00
as well as witnesses Luz Co y Tan and Antonio Araza y Reposo.
“LUZ CO y TAN declared that she is the manager of Sanford Hardware since 1976, that Exhibit D-1 which is [a] duplicate copy of Invoice No. 21568 dated July 2, 1981 where the amount of purchase is only P157.00 is the invoice used by her firm in the conduct of its business; that Exhibit E was not her receipt and that she executed a certification to that effect (Exhibit E-1) when required by a male person; that she does not know the entries appearing in Exhibit E but the entries in Exhibit D-1 are of her business; that Sanford Hardware is owned by [her] sister-in-law Delia Co; that there are three copies of the sales invoice her business is issuing, and the third copy or last copy is the one left in the store, and that the one who approached her and asked about Exhibit E is one Narciso Cruz and when she answered that she did not issue Exhibit E she was requested to execute an affidavit; that she does not know accused Aurea Monteverde and that she had no delivery of hardware materials to the Barangay on January 17, 1991 (TSN May 14, 1993).
“It was the testimony of ANTONIO ARAZA that he is a resident of 2256 Malaya St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and that he secured a copy of Exhibits E and F from the Barangay Treasurer; that he brought the same to the owner of the Sanford Hardware for verification; that Luz Co to whom he talked x x x in said store manifested that said Exhibits E and F are not issued by the firm; and for which he requested Luz Co to issue a certification (Exhibit E-1); that after realizing that the receipts used by the accused are falsified receipts, he signed letter complaints and [a] Joint-Affidavit together with Santos Lopez, Narciso Cruz and Jose Salvatierra, and charged the accused before the Ombudsman; that the money involved in this case are barangay funds because it was donated by the PAGCOR to the Barangay and he was able to secure a copy from the PAGCOR evidencing that it was donated to the Barangay but the copy was submitted to the Ombudsman; that the Barangay Treasurer lent to him the receipts with the advice to verify it from the proprietor of [the] Hardware and she even gave a letter of authorization to him (Exhibit G); that the P13,565.00 appearing in Exhibits E and F was not used to buy electrical materials or lightings, and the bulbs in the Meralco post were donated by Councilor Rene Jose (TSN March 18, 1994).
“EVIDENCE FOR THE ACCUSED
“The defense presented eighty-one (81) Exhibits with Exhibits 35 to 80 dealing with certificates of commendation in favor of the accused during her stint as Barangay Chairman from 1991 to 1993 and even prior to her being a Barangay Chairman. Exhibits 1 with its submarkings (Exhibits 1-A to Exhibits 1-A-3) is a letter of the accused addressed to Alice LI Reyes of the PAGCOR with attachment she captioned Financial Statement; Exhibits 2 to 15 are Sales Invoices/Receipts from different hardware stores and individuals while Exhibits 16 and 17 are pictures depicting a basketball court portion thereof being sub-marked, and Exhibits 18 to 32 are fifteen (15) pictures depicting different alleys at Barangay 124. Exhibit 33 is a turn-over certificate/record of the Barangay properties signed by the incoming Barangay Chairman with the third page submarked as Exhibits 33-A to 33-b-2; and Exhibit 34 is the counter-affidavit of the accused sworn to before a Notary Public on September 5, 1991. Exhibit 81 is a Joint-Affidavit of Alfonso Cua Jr. and Joel Magbanua.
“Aside from her, the accused presented ALFONSO CUA, JR. whose testimony is as follows: that he knows the accused to be the Chairman of Barangay 124 from 1991 up to 1992 while he was a Barangay Tanod in the said Barangay; that one project of the accused was the installation of lights or lighting the streets and playgrounds in the Barangay; that in January 1991 materials were delivered to the house of the Barangay Chairman (accused) and around three (3) days thereafter, he helped in the installation of the electrical materials consisting of electrical wirings, electrical tapes, bulbs, lamps and lamp covers, and it took them (he and the husband of the accused) about three Sundays in doing so; that he executed a Joint-Affidavit together with one Joel Magbanua in connection with the incident (Exhibit 81) (TSN April 2, 1997).
“Testifying in her behalf accused took the witness stand and declared:
‘That she was the Barangay Chairman in Brgy. 124 since 1989 to
1994; that in January 1991 she received donation or cash money in the amount of
P44,800.00 from PAGCOR which she used in Barangay projects like lighting, and
cleanliness and beautification; that she reported the matter to PAGCOR and
submitted [a] financial statement (Exhibits 1 to 1-A, 1-A-1); that when she purchased
electrical and hardware items from Sanford Hardware she was issued a receipt
(Exhibit 9) and considering Exhibit D-1 and D-1-A, it would appear that Sanford
Hardware issued two (2) receipts; she denied the charge of Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents, and claimed that with the meager amount
involved, she is not going to sacrifice her good name and reputation; she then
identified x x x several awards she received (Exhibits 35 to 79); that she was
the one who personally purchased the items in Exhibit F, and she actually paid
the same in cash for which she was issued Exhibit 9 (Exhibit F and 9 contain
the same items); that the receipt was issued in her name and the money was in
her possession that was why it was she and not the Barangay Treasurer who
personally made the purchase; that the PAGCOR check was issued in her name and
was directly given to her and so she was the one who encashed the check
accompanied by one of the councilors but she did not turn over the cash to the
treasurer; that even after she came to know of the existence of Exhibit E, she
did not go to Sanford Hardware to inquire about the said document; that the
original of the said exhibit was given to her but she submitted it to PAGCOR.
(TSN September 3, November 5, 1996 and April 1, 1997).’“[9]
Ruling of the
Sandiganbayan
The assailed Decision noted that
petitioner was supposed to have been charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of a commercial document. However, there was no clear
allegation in the Information that the falsification was a necessary means to
commit the estafa.[10] Nevertheless, going along
“with the supposition” that a complex crime had been charged, the SBN held:
“Despite the ambiguity and disquietude, however, the court is
constrained to go with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a
complex crime, otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been
indicted with two crimes - that of Estafa and that of Falsification of
Commercial Document which is not beneficial to her.”[11]
The anti-graft court acquitted
petitioner of estafa, because there was no evidence that funds had been
misappropriated or converted.[12] Neither was there proof
that petitioner had been required to account for the money received.[13] Without these proofs, no
conviction for estafa was possible.[14]
However, the court a quo convicted
her for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted to show that the
P13,565 donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting materials for her
barangay. According to the SBN, the falsification became very clear when the
document was compared with another one purporting to be a duplicate original
presented by the prosecution.[15] While the prosecution did
not present any proof evidencing that it was petitioner who had caused the
falsification, the SBN relied on the presumption that in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation, a person who is found in possession of a forged
document, and who uses it, is the forger.[16]
Nevertheless, petitioner was not
convicted of falsification as defined by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
because there was no proof that she had taken advantage of her position in
committing the crime.[17] Instead, she was convicted
of falsification under Article 172.[18]
Hence, this Petition.[19]
Issues
The OSG’s Memorandum which
recommended acquittal, and which petitioner adopted, raised the following
issues:
“Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in:
[1.] finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed[;]
[2.] holding that Exhibit 9, a sales invoice, was a commercial/public document[; and]
[3.] applying the presumption that
petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she
benefited from it.”[20]
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Nature
of Complex Crimes
Appellant was purportedly charged
with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial
document. However, even if the SBN itself doubted whether the Information had
properly charged a complex crime, it was, as quoted earlier, “constrained to go
along with the supposition that what has been charged is that of a complex
crime, otherwise the logical consequence is that the accused has been indicted
with two crimes -- that of Estafa and that of Falsification of Commercial
Document which is not beneficial to her.”[21]
We clarify. Under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code,[22] a complex crime refers to
(1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both
(or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary
means for committing the other (or others).[23] Negatively put, there is no
complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single
act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the
other (or others) .[24]
Using the above guidelines, the
acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex
crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public
and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were
the two crimes the result of a single act. The OSG correctly observed:
“x x x. The alleged
falsification happened after the money was spent and to explain how it was expended.
Thus there is no complex crime since the falsification is not a necessary means
for committing the estafa (as charged) or malversation (as suggested by
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated February 1, 2000). If at all, it was intended
to conceal the estafa or malversation.”[25]
Well-known is the principle that
an information “must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a
single punishment for various offenses.”[26] When more than one offense
is charged, the accused may move to quash the information.[27]
In the present case, the accused
should have objected to the Information on the ground that more than one
offense was charged therein. For her failure to move to quash the indictments,
she is deemed to have waived her right to be tried for only one crime.[28] Furthermore, she did not
object to the submission of evidence that tended to prove the offenses charged
in the Information -- estafa and falsification. Verily, when two or more
offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, but the accused fail
to object to the defect before trial, the trial court may convict them of as
many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on them the penalty for
each offense, setting out separately the findings of fact and law in each.[29]
On the basis of the foregoing, we
reject the argument of petitioner that since she was acquitted of estafa, she
could no longer be convicted of falsification of a commercial document. Having,
in effect, been charged with two distinct crimes, acquittal in one will not necessarily
lead to acquittal in the other. Each crime will be evaluated based on its own
merits, and conviction will depend on the proof of the elements of each
particular offense.
Let us assume that petitioner has
correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still,
acquittal from a component offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal
from the other (or others).
When a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution
must allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of
all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
We stress that the failure of the
prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising
therefrom will not necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other
crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be
convicted of the others, so long as they are proved.[30]
Second Issue:
Nature
of Sales Invoice
The OSG agrees that the subject
Sales Invoice is a public and/or a commercial document within the meaning of
“falsification” as defined under the Revised Penal Code.
Both the OSG and the OSP agree
that a private document acquires the character of a public document when it
becomes part of an official record and is certified by a public officer duly
authorized by law.[31] The OSP aptly explained
this point as follows:
“x x x, [I]f the document is intended by law to be part of the public or official record, the preparation of which being in accordance with the rules and regulations issued by the government, the falsification of that document, although it was a private document at the time of its falsification, is regarded as falsification of public or official document.
“Prosecution witness Luz Co testified that the duplicate original
of Sales Invoice No. 21568 was submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR). Thus this Sales Invoice is intended to be part of the public records and
the preparation thereof is required by BIR rules and regulations. Moreover,
Sales Invoice No. 21568 formed part of the official records of PAGCOR when it
was submitted by petitioner as one of the supporting papers for the liquidation
of her accountability to PAGCOR.”[32]
Neither can it be denied that the
Sales Invoice is also a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are
those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions.[33] This Court has previously
characterized such documents in this wise:
“x x x. In most cases, these commercial forms [receipts, order
slips and invoices] are not always fully accomplished to contain all the
necessary information describing the whole business transaction. The sales
clerks merely indicate a description and the price of each item sold without
bothering to fill up all the available spaces in the particular receipt or
invoice, and without proper regard for any legal repercussion for such neglect.
Certainly, it would not hurt if businessmen and traders would strive to make
the receipts and invoices they issue complete, as far as practicable, in
material particulars. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of
probative value but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They
are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.”[34] (Italics supplied)
Third Issue:
Proof
of Guilt
The gut issue in this case is
whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
petitioner with regard to the crime of falsification. A determination of this
question will necessarily require an examination of the facts as presented
before the Sandiganbayan.
As a rule, an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises only questions of law.[35] However, this Court, in
exceptional cases, has taken cognizance of questions of fact in order to
resolve legal issues. This is especially true in cases in which a palpable error
or a grave misapprehension of facts was committed by the lower court.[36] Criminal cases elevated by
public officials from the SBN deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court
as criminal cases brought up by ordinary citizens, simply because the constitutional
presumption of innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt in
both instances. Indeed, in a criminal case, a person’s life or liberty is at
stake.[37]
Petitioner asserts that the SBN
erroneously applied the presumption that the possessor of a forged or falsified
document who uses it is the author of the forgery or falsification. The OSG
concurs with her on this point. That is why it recommended that she be
acquitted.
We agree. To our mind, the
prosecution’s evidence is not sufficient to convict. As correctly observed by
the OSG, the Decision of the SBN is based on the assumption that there was only
one set of sales invoices issued by Sanford Hardware. On such a premise,
petitioner’s Exhibit 9 thus becomes obviously falsified when compared with
respondent’s Exhibit D-1. But on the premise that the two Exhibits are two
different Sales Invoices, falsification becomes doubtful. The OSG is correct in
observing as follows:
“x x x. For petitioner or anybody acting on her behalf to falsify
the customer’s copy of Sales Invoice No. 21568, she/he would have to erase or
cover with correction fluid the spaces pertaining to the name of the customer,
date, quantity, unit, description of articles, unit price and amount, before
the insertions could be written. Neither the appealed decision nor the
transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) point out various tell-tale signs of
falsification despite opportunity of the prosecution to see the original of
Exh. 9. The only observation the respondent Court mentioned was with respect to
the date: ‘[t]he superimposition of January 17, 1991 is too apparent to be
disregarded, and the alteration of the date has affected both the veracity and
the effects of the said document.’ But the changing of the date was the easiest
to accomplish. The more cumbersome, as they affect wider space, would [have
been] the name of the customer and the purchases. The total absence of any hint
or sign of alteration on these areas is revealing.”[38]
The only logical explanation for
the existence of both Exhibits 9 and D- 1 is that there are two extant
documents. Whether one is the original and the other is falsified depends on
the proof. This the prosecution had to prove, but unfortunately failed to. In
all criminal prosecutions, without regard to the nature of the defense which
the accused may raise, the burden of proof establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt remains with the prosecution.[39] Further, it is the duty of
the prosecution to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information.[40] We repeat that, in this
case, it failed to discharge this duty. We quote with approval the OSG’s
disquisition on these two documents as follows:
“A comparison between Exh. D-1 and Exh. 9 shows that there are two
(2) sets of Sales Invoice No. 21568. While the form is identical in most
respects, there are three (3) telling differences: (1) the type set of the
sales invoice numbers are different, (2) the bottom left of Exh. D-1 indicates
the name of the printing press while no such information is indicated anywhere
in Exh. 9, and (3) the bottom right of Exh. D-1 states the BIR permit which
does not appear in Exh. 9. Who could have printed Exh. 9 is anybody’s guess. It
is possible that petitioner or any person acting on her behalf had a printing
company copy this particular Sanford Hardware invoice so she could use it to
liquidate the PAGCOR funds she received. However, it is equally possible that
Sanford Hardware had printed two (2) sets of the same receipts, one to reflect
the real business transaction, the other one - a sanitized version - for the
consumption of the BIR people. Not one of these possibilities has been actually
proven, but neither was their improbability established.”[41] (Italics supplied)
Indeed, the OSG points out that there
are material differences between Exhibits 9 and D-1. These include: 1) the
discrepancy in the “type set” or fonts
used for the sales invoice numbers in the two Sales Invoices; 2) the presence
of the name of the printing press at the bottom left corner of Exhibit D-1 and
its absence in Exhibit 9; and 3) the presence of the BIR permit in Exhibit D-1
and its absence in Exhibit 9. It is possible that Exhibit 9 was printed by
petitioner or anyone acting on her behalf to facilitate the liquidation of funds.
But it is equally possible, as the OSG points out, that Sanford Hardware caused
the printing of two sets of receipts to serve its own purposes. However, none
of these possibilities was either actually proven or definitely ruled out by
the prosecution. At bottom, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove
that Exhibit 9 was falsified.
The SBN relied on the settled rule
that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of
-- and who used, took advantage of or profited from -- a forged or falsified
document is the author of the falsification and is therefore guilty of
falsification.
To convict petitioner of
falsification would mean that the prosecution was able to establish that
Exhibit 9 was a falsified copy of an original document. But the rule itself
shows that it cannot be applied to the present case, because Exhibit 9 (Sales
Invoice No 21568) was not established beyond reasonable doubt to have been
forged or falsified. At the very least, it may be a second document that may or
may not have been printed by petitioner herself.
Respondent claims that the
original document is Exhibit D-1 but, as adverted to earlier, Exhibit 9 was not
satisfactorily demonstrated to be a copy thereof. In other words, Exhibit 9
being different from Exhibit D-1, the prosecution cannot be deemed to have
presented an original document, of which Exhibit 9 is a falsified copy.
The question is: who made this
second document marked Exhibit 9? Petitioner consistently maintains that
Exhibit 9 was issued to her by Sanford Hardware when she purchased the items
mentioned therein. On the other hand, the manager of Sanford Hardware denies
having issued such document. Indeed, it is a time-honored principle[42] that greater probative value is accorded to a positive than to a
negative testimony. Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by the OSG:
“x x x [Petitioner] denied the accusation and insisted that she
would not sacrifice her name and reputation for the meager amount involved. She
submitted photographs that the lighting of alleys in Barangay 124 was
completed. There was positive testimony by Alfonso Cua, one of the persons who
installed the articles listed in Sales Invoice No. 21568. The prosecution
failed to rebut these.”[43] (Citations omitted)
One final point. The SBN held that
the “accused refused to present the original of Exhibit 9,” and that it would
have been so “easy x x x to ask for a subpoena to direct x x x the PAGCOR to
produce the original copy, and yet the accused satisfied herself in presenting
Exhibit 9 -- a mere xerox copy of the supposed document.” But, as pointed out
by the OSG in its Memorandum,[44] the original of Exhibit 9
was presented in court during the November 5, 1996 hearing after a subpoena duces
tecum had been issued to PAGCOR, and Prosecutor Pimentel “confirmed that
the x x x xerox copies are faithful reproductions of the original.”[45]
In all criminal cases, mere
speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the
accused.[46] Indeed, suspicion no matter
how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the
accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been
established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty,
it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must
be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.[47]
Although the evidence for the
defense may be frail, criminal conviction must come, not from its weakness, but
from the strength of that for the prosecution.[48]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
[1] Annex “A” of the Petition; rollo, pp. 20-37.
Penned by Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Division chairman) with the
concurrence of Justices Godofredo L. Legaspi and Alfredo J. Gustilo (members).
[2] Rollo, pp. 46-49; Justice Gregory S. Ong
replaced Justice Gustilo.
[3] Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp.
35-36.
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] Atty. Eduard C. Castañeda.
[6] Sandiganbayan Order dated April 5, 1993; records, p.
29.
[7] OSP’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 143-144.
[8] OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 121-122.
[9] Sandiganbayan Decision, pp. 3-7; rollo, pp.
22-26.
[10] Ibid., pp. 8 & 27.
[11] Id., pp. 9 & 28.
[12] Id., pp. 11 & 30.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Id., pp. 12 & 31.
[16] Id., pp. 15 & 34.
[17] Id., pp. 16&35.
[18] Ibid.
[19] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on
September 17, 2001, upon this Court’s receipt of petitioner’s Manifestation
signed by Atty. Vicente C. Angeles, adopting as her own the Memorandum filed by
the OSG which in turn had been signed by Assistant Solicitor General Carlos N.
Ortega and Solicitor Maria Belen P. Montes-Nera and received by this Court on
August 15, 2001. The Memorandum of the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), signed by Atty. Rodrigo V. Coquia, was
received on September 14, 2001.
[20] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 6; rollo, p. 126.
[21] Sandiganbayan Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 28.
[22] Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
[23] Cf. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I, 1998 ed.,
p. 645.
[24] People v.
Honra, 341 SCRA 110, September 26, 2000.
[25] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 128.
[26] Section 13, Rule 110, 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
[27] Section 3 (f), Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
[28] Section 9, Rule 117, 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
[29] Section 3, Rule 120, 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
[30] People v. Taboga,
GR Nos. 144086-87, February 6, 2002; People v. Nanas, GR No.
137299, August 21, 2001; People
v. Calabroso, 340 SCRA 332, September 14, 2000; People v. Gallarde,
February 17, 2000; People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292, April
29, 1987; US v. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 38 Phil 330, July 15,
1918.
[31] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 1998
ed., p. 244.
[32] OSP’s Memorandum, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 148-149.
[33] Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book II, supra,
p. 235.
[34] Lagon v. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc., 349 SCRA
363, 379, January 17, 2001, per Bellosillo, J.
[35] Section 1, Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Court.
[36] Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222,
October 16, 1996.
[37] Ibid.
[38] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 133.
[39] People v. Caiñgat,
GR No. 137963, February 6, 2002.
[40] Ibid.; Timbol
v. CA, GR No. 136487, December 14, 2001; People v. Benoza, GR No.
139470, November 29, 2001.
[41] OSG’s Memorandum, pp. 14-15; rollo, pp.
134-135.
[42] People v.
Parcia, GR No. 141136, January 28, 2002; People
v. Gonzales Jr., GR Nos. 143143-44, January 15, 2002; People v. Dela Torre, GR No. 98431,
January 15, 2002; People v.
Reynes, GR No. 134607, December 12, 2001; Batiquin v. CA, 258 SCRA
334, July 5, 1996.
[43] OSG’s Memorandum, p. 15; rollo, p. 135.
[44] Page 14; rollo, p. 134.
[45] TSN, November 5, 1996, p. 3.
[46] Fernandez v.
People, 341 SCRA 277, September 28, 2000.
[47] Id., p. 299.
[48] Layug v.
Sandiganbayan, 338 SCRA 156, August 16, 2000.