EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137024.
August 7, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELOY MICLAT, JR. y SANCHEZ, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
This is an automatic review of the
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Marikina,
Branch 272 in Criminal Case No. 97-1871-MK finding accused-appellant Eloy
Miclat, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing
upon him the supreme penalty of death.
The Information filed against
accused-appellant reads:
That on or about the 07th day of July, 1997 in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Mary Rose Bondoc y Sanchez, a girl of 11 years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.”[2]
When arraigned, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial
ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Mary Rose Bondoc was born on
December 20, 1985 to Corazon S. Bondoc,[3] the sister of appellant Eloy Miclat.[4] Mary Rose had not seen her father since birth and,
with her mother living in Pampanga, she was shuttled from one relative to
another.[5]
On July 7, 1997, when Mary Rose
was eleven (11) years old, she was living with her maternal grandmother
Vivencia Pascual at No. 16, Bantayog St., Concepcion, Marikina City. On that day, while she was playing outside
their house, her uncle, appellant Eloy Miclat, called her. At first, she was hesitant to go near him
for fear of being sexually molested again,[6] and so she continued playing. Moments later, appellant shouted at
her. Afraid of him, Mary Rose
approached appellant who lost no time in closing the door and window of the
house and in telling her to lie down.
He removed her panty. Mary Rose
tried to put it on again but, with appellant preventing her from doing so,
failed. Appellant put down his pants
and masturbated in front of her. Right
after a white substance came out of appellant’s penis,[7] he pressed his sex organ against hers (“idinikit
niya sa ari ko”). She felt his penis being inserted into her vagina after
which he did the push and pull motion of a “struggling horse” (“nangangabayo”).[8] Mary Rose did not shout for help for fear of being
hurt by appellant the way he did in Tabon and Mabalacat, Pampanga where, as he
was doing that “thing” to her then and she was noisy, he punched her stomach.[9] She told appellant to stop what he was doing; he did
so only after she said that her grandmother might arrive.[10]
Mary Rose told her grandmother,
Vivencia Pascual, that appellant raped her.
Unfortunately, Vivencia did not believe her. Instead, Vivencia asked
Mary Rose to buy cigarettes for appellant.
When Mary Rose returned, Vivencia told her not to be too close to
appellant; otherwise, she would send her away.
When Mary Rose heard this, she cried.[11]
After July 7, 1997, appellant once
again “invited” Mary Rose. As she was near the door then, she ran towards the
place where a bingo session was being held.[12]
On or about July 17, 1997, Mary
Rose revealed the incident to her schoolmate who accompanied her to the house
of her (schoolmate’s) aunt somewhere in La Colina, Parang, Marikina City. Her
revelation of the sexual abuse she experienced in the hands of her uncle
disturbed her friend’s aunt. Afraid of getting involved, her friend’s aunt
called up Bantay Bata of ABS CBN Foundation Inc.[13] where her report was received by a social worker,
Evelyn Valencia. At 8:30 in the evening, Sylvia Tolentino, another Bantay Bata
social worker, went to the residence of the caller in La Colina. The caller
introduced Sylvia to Mary Rose who agreed to go with Sylvia. From there, they
went to the Marikina Police Substation II to register in the police blotter the
fact that Mary Rose ran away from home and that Bantay Bata took her from the
telephone caller. At around 10:25 in the evening, Marikina City policemen
referred Mary Rose to the PNP Crime Laboratory Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City
for a medical examination.[14] However, it was only on July 19, 1997 when
Medico-Legal Officer Dennis D. Bellin examined Mary Rose. The Medico-Legal Report revealed the
following findings:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts are conical with pinkish brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed laceration at 3 o’clock and shallow healed lacerations at 6, 7 and 11 o’clock positions. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in non-virgin state physically. There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative
diplococci and for spermatozoa.[15]
On July 21, 1997, the Bantay Bata
Rescue Team went back to the Marikina City police station where Mary Rose
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[16] before
P/INSP Ricardo N. Sto. Domingo, Jr. The team also requested police assistance
in the verification of the reported rape incident. With Mary Rose in tow, the
police and the Bantay Bata Rescue Team went to No. 16 Bantayog St., Concepcion,
Marikina City at around 6:30 in the evening. They found appellant and his
mother at home. Informed of the reported rape incident, appellant voluntarily
went with the police. Along with his
mother, appellant was brought to the barangay hall of Concepcion I where
Enrique Cruz, the barangay tanod executive officer, gathered information
about the complaint from appellant. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) of Marikina City to which the police turned over
the person of appellant.[17] Notably, during the inquest, social worker Evelyn
Valencia heard appellant pleading with Mary Rose, “Patawarin mo na ako sa
lahat ng nagawa ko."[18]
The following day, July 22, 1997,
the Bantay Bata Rescue Team turned over the custody of Mary Rose to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) Crisis Center in Marillac
Hills, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Cindy Mativo,[19] a social worker at the DSWD Crisis Center who was
assigned to study the case of Mary Rose, referred her to their physician to
monitor her activities and assess her physical condition. Mary Rose complained
of vaginal itchiness that she surmised was due to appellant’s insertion of his
fingers into her vagina. Mary Rose narrated all the sexual abuses she suffered
from appellant from the time she was still living in Pampanga until the day she
was raped in Marikina City on 7 July 1997.
Mary Rose was crying as she narrated her sexual ordeal. On 14 November 1997, Cindy Mativo prepared a
Social Case Study Report[20] which is part of the records of this case. The report
states:
V. Observations on Minor while at Marillac Hills:
Upon admission, minor used to cry. She is unresponsive who only nod when ask of querries (sic). She had the difficulty for (sic) dealing with her co-wards and has no initiative to do her assignment. As days go by, minor has changed. She has new found friends in the cottage. She can now do her assignment with less supervision of the houseparent.
x x x
She has complain (sic) of vaginal itchiness since admission. Medication is being administered up to the
present.[21]
According to Mary Rose, even
before 7 July 1997, while she was still living with her maternal aunt, Erlinda
Miclat, in Mabalacat, Pampanga, she already experienced the sexual abuses of
her uncle, appellant Miclat.[22] There were times when her uncle would touch her
genitalia, mash her breast or even insert his finger inside her vagina.[23] Mary Rose left the house of her maternal aunt and
went to her mother who was then living with her second family somewhere in
Pampanga, intending to live with her. However, her mother did not allow Mary
Rose to do so.[24] Mary Rose thus took a ride to Dau where she roamed
around. There was a time when she lived
with a relative, Ermi da Ramirez, and another time, with her Tita Rouella and
Tito Ogie in Montalban. One night, when she was asleep in her Tita Rouella’s
house, she was awakened by the embrace and touch of appellant. She stood up and
left the room and when her Tita Rouella asked her why, she confessed everything
to her, but not to her Tito Ogie, as she was ashamed to relate to him what had
happened to her.[25] Sometime in 1996, Mary Rose started living with her
maternal grandmother, Vivencia Pascual, at No. 16 Bantayog St., Concepcion,
Marikina.[26] Thereafter, appellant joined his mother, Vivencia,
his stepfather, and Mary Rose in that house. Their cohabitation in one tiny
house culminated in the rape incident on 7 July 1997.
The defense interposed denial and
alibi. Appellant asserted that Mary Rose concocted the charge of rape against
him because he got mad at her on 15 July 1997 after his stepfather asked her to
buy sardines and she sent somebody else to do the errand. Because not only he
but also his mother and stepfather got mad at Mary Rose, the latter left his
mother’s house in Bantayog St., Concepcion, Marikina City.[27]
Appellant emphasized the
improbability of his raping Mary Rose because their house was only a small
room; when its door was opened, everything inside could be seen. In support of his claim, appellant presented
four (4) photographs[28] of the house’s interior.
According to appellant, Mary Rose
just wanted to be independent. This was shown by her living with whoever would
take care of her but not with her mother.[29] Mary Rose was a liar; there was a time when she made
up stories that caused a rift between himself and his sister-in-law, Erlinda
Miclat.[30] Notwithstanding that Mary Rose concocted the charge
of rape against him, appellant was confident that the truth would come out in
the end. Hence, there was no need for him to file a counter charge against Mary
Rose.[31]
Raising the defense of alibi,
appellant claimed that on July 7, 1997, he reported for work at the Governor’s
Place in Shaw Boulevard as a stay-in painter. He was then painting a basement
traffic sign.[32] In support of his claim, he presented a copy of his
pay slip for the period 5-11 July 1997 with the following notations: (1) number
of working days - six (6), and (2) net pay
– seven hundred fifty six pesos
and twenty five centavos (P756.25) with
a handwritten notation of “plus pondo July 12–150.”[33] Appellant further claimed that he stayed in said
workplace even during weekends; that he went
to his mother’s house in Bantayog St., Concepcion, Marikina City on July
15, 1997 to give his mother money to redeem their Karaoke unit; that he reported
for work at Coring Supermarket on July 16 to 17, 1997; and that he went to his
mother’s house on July 21, 1997 to get some news from her.[34] His alibi was supported by the testimonies of Jimmy
Navarro, the project-in-charge of the painting works at Bill Sanchez and
Associates, Inc., and Henry Padilla, a foreman of the same company.
In substance, Navarro testified
that appellant worked as a stay-in painter of Bill Sanchez and Associates, Inc.
at the Governor’s Place in Shaw Boulevard from January 13, 1997 until July 12,
1997;[35] that Miclat reported for work on July 7, 1997 as
substantiated by Miclat’s signature[36] on the
photocopy of the company’s daily time record[37] that its timekeeper, Ryan Cecil, prepared;[38] and that it was impossible for him to leave his
workplace because three foremen, namely, Henry Padilla, Greg Tan and Eddie
Danganan, were supervising him, and he risked dismissal from employment should
the paint dry up.
One of the three foremen, Henry
Padilla, testified that he saw appellant six (6) times on that fateful day,
particularly at 8:00 o’clock in the morning when he told him to make the sample
traffic sign; at 10:00 o’clock in the morning during break time; at noon; at
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon; at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon when appellant
took his snack, and at 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon when appellant was about
to log out. Moreover, it would take
approximately three hours to travel from Marikina to Shaw Boulevard.[39]
Appellant’s stepfather, Mariano
Pascual,[40] and his mother, Vivencia Pascual,[41] were united in testifying that they did not see
appellant in their house at No. 16 Bantayog St., Concepcion, Marikina City on 7
July 1997, the alleged date when Mary Rose was raped, and that it was
impossible for appellant to rape Mary Rose in their house on account of its
small area.
On November 24, 1998, the trial
court rendered a Decision against the appellant, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, accused ELOY MICLAT, JR. y SANCHEZ is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape penalized under Paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH.
The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of PhP 50,000.00 as civil indemnity in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence (PP Vs. Obejas, 229 SCRA 549; PP vs. Ibay, 233 SCRA 15, PP V. Malunes, GR #114692, 14 Aug. 95) and to indemnify the private complainant the amount of PhP 20,000.00 as exemplary damages so as to serve as deterrent to this disturbing trend, and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[42]
Appellant ascribes to the trial
court the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE, THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION SHOWS THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED ATTEMPTED RAPE ONLY;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PENALIZING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITH THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH, RA 7659 IS NOT APPLICABLE
TO HIM INASMUCH AS HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT BEEN ALLEGED
IN THE INFORMATION.[43]
Appellant insists that there are
inconsistencies in the testimony of Mary Rose during the direct and
cross-examinations. Mary Rose testified
that after he allegedly removed her panty, he waited for a white substance to
come out before he pressed his organ against hers.[44] This contravenes her testimony on cross-examination
that “the penis itself turns soft” after the white substance comes out of it.[45] Appellant posits that “it is a natural fact that
after man’s masturbation, his penis becomes soft and small.” Logically, it
follows that a penis cannot become erect immediately after masturbation. Thus,
at most, his penis only touched her vagina and, with no erection, penetration
is impossible. On account of these, he
should be guilty only of attempted rape.[46]
On the other hand, the Office of
the Solicitor General insists that appellant is liable for consummated
statutory rape as the briefest of contact of the male and female sex organs
under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even without the
rupture of hymen, constitutes consummated rape. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ
within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ, a situation firmly
testified to by Mary Rose.[47]
We agree with the trial
court and the Solicitor General that appellant is guilty of consummated
statutory rape.
Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Since the private complainant was
only eleven (11) years old at the time
the crime was committed, only carnal knowledge has to be proved to
establish rape.[48] Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man
having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connection with a woman.[49] Well-entrenched is the doctrine which is founded on
reason and experience that when the victim testifies that she has been raped,
and her testimony is credible, such testimony may be the sole basis of
conviction.[50] The trial court observed that Mary Rose testified in a “detailed and straightforward
manner” that it was convinced that she passed the test of credibility.[51] The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses when they testified in court, found
private complainant’s testimony, and not appellant’s version, credible and
trustworthy. The trial courts findings
on the credibility of the witnesses carry great weight and respect, and will be
sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case.[52] After a careful review of the records of the case, we
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
Mary Rose consistently testified
that appellant raped her on 7 July 1997, thus:
Q: On the afternoon of July 7, 1997, was your uncle able to ask you to go near him?
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Q: After you have approached him, what happened next?
A: He closed the door and the window and he told me to lie down.
Q: What is this place where you said your uncle locked the door and the windows?
A: In No. 16 Bantayog St., Concepcion, Marikina.
ATTY. BAUTISTA
Q: I understand that is your lola’s house, what part of the house is this?
A: There was a divider which is used for clothes.
Q: After your uncle closed the door and the windows, what happened next?
A: He told me to lie down and he removed my panty.
Q: What did you do when he was removing your panty?
A: I was trying to put it on again but he was trying to pull it down.
Q: Did he succeed in removing your panty?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: After your panty had been removed, what happened next?
A: At first he waited for the white substance to come out before he “idikit niya sa ari ko.”
ATTY. BAUTISTA
We would like to manifest that while witness was testifying [that] he was waiting for a white substance to come out, she was demonstrating an act similar to a male masturbation.
ATTY. BAUTISTA
Q: After the white substance came out of the penis of your uncle, what did he do next?
A: He place it on top of my vagina, genital and I felt something was inserted in me.
Q: What was [it] that
you felt [was] inserted inside your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: What was it?
A: His penis, ma’am.
Q: Will you please describe to this court the movements of your uncle when he was inserting his organ to your organ?
A: After he masturbated and right after the white substance went out, he placed it on top of my vagina.
Q: What was he doing?
A: None, ma’am. He was “nangangabayo.”
Q: You mean to say he would place himself on top of you and would perform an act similar to that of struggling a horse?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And all this time his penis was inserted in your vagina?
A: Yes, ma’am.
ATTY. LARRACAS
Objection, there was no mention that the private organ of the accused was inserted.
COURT
There was.
After the white substance came out from him, he suddenly inserted it.”[53]
When the defense tried to destroy
the credibility of Mary Rose by asking repetitive questions on
cross-examination, still, she consistently stated that there was penetration of
her vagina. She testified emphatically
in this wise:
Q: Now you claim that on July 7, 1997, you have seen that white substance coming out from the penis of your uncle. Now my question is, at that time that white substance came out of his penis, the penis is still outside your vagina, is it not?
WITNESS:
When something was coming out, he
pressed it on my vagina.
ATTY. LARRACAS
Q: At that time, he was masturbating, what was your position?
A: I was on the bed with the pillow.
Q: You were just lying down?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: How about your uncle, where was he at that time he was masturbating in relation to you?
A: In front of me, he was
lying face down and when something started to come out from his penis, he
pressed it against me.”[54]
Based on the above testimony,
appellant inserted his penis into private complainant’s vagina right after a
white substance came out from his sex organ.
It is well-settled that penetration, no matter how slight, or the mere
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum constitutes
carnal knowledge.[55] “Carnal knowledge,” unlike its ordinary connotation
of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be
penetrated or that the hymen be ruptured.[56] In most cases of statutory rape where total
penetration of the victim’s organ is improbable due to the smallness of the
vaginal opening, it has been held that actual penetration of the victim’s organ
or the rupture of the hymen is not required.[57] The mere touching by the male organ or an instrument
of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private parts is sufficient
to consummate rape.[58] In People v. Monfero,[59] the
appellant was convicted of rape on a mere finding that complainant felt
appellant’s penis touch her vagina although she was unsure whether there was
penetration or not. Significantly, in
this case, Mary Rose’s testimony that she was raped by appellant is supported
by the medical evidence.[60] On record showing her non-virgin state.
Indeed, private complainant’s
testimony reflects nothing but the truth considering her relationship with the
person who violated her sexually. In a number of cases, this Court has held
that a victim’s testimony is entitled to greater weight when the accusing words
are directed against a close relative.[61] It is highly inconceivable that complainant would
impute a crime as serious as rape against her own maternal uncle, if
this were not the plain truth.[62] No young and decent Filipina would publicly admit
that she was ravished unless that is the truth for it is her natural instinct
to protect her honor.[63] It defies reason why an eleven-year-old girl would
concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts,
publicly disclose that she has been sexually abused if her motive were other
than to fight for her honor and bring to justice the person who defiled her.[64]
Worth noting is the case study,[65] made by a DSWD social worker, which states that “upon
admission Mary Rose used to cry.” The emotional condition of Mary Rose bolsters
the veracity of the sexual ordeal that she experienced and, consequently, the
charge of rape against appellant. Complainant’s spontaneous emotional
breakdowns that could only be occasioned by the forced recollection of the
sexual violations she experienced at such a tender age and quite offensive to
her memory established her credibility beyond reproach.[66]
For lack of probative value, this
Court rejects appellant’s allegations that private complainant was merely
impelled by revenge in filing the case against him because he got mad at her on 15 July 1997 and that
complainant is a liar who would usually cause family disagreements. Family resentment, revenge or feud have
never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a rape
complainant, especially a minor, who remained steadfast throughout her direct
and cross-examinations[67] that she was sexually abused.
Appellant also alleged that private complainant filed the charge against him because she was
no longer a virgin. His sister Veronica
Maglalang, a former DSWD social worker, told him that Mary Rose was raped by
the brother of her classmate.[68] However, such
allegation is merely hearsay, considering that Veronica Maglalang never
testified as a defense witness.
Testimonial or documentary evidence is hearsay if it is based not on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not
on the witness stand. Consequently,
hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the
proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exception to the hearsay
evidence rule under the Rules of Court.
It is precluded from
admissibility as evidence because the party against whom it is presented
is deprived of his right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom
the statements or writings are attributed.[69]
Moreover, whether the victim was a
virgin or not at the time of the rape is irrelevant. Virginity is not an
element of rape.[70] Any prior sexual encounter (other than that with the
alleged rapist), which could have resulted in hymenal lacerations or
obliterations of the vaginal rugosities, is entirely immaterial.[71] Even a prostitute or a married woman can be a victim
of rape.
Further, appellant’s assertion
that rape could not have been committed in their very small abode does not persuade. Rape has been committed regardless of the
possibility of being observed as the brutish act is being committed. Thus, in People
v. Escala,[72] where the appellant raised “environmental
circumstances” that allegedly deterred the commission of rape, the Court said:
x x x The crime of rape, unfortunately for appellant, has been known to be possible of commission even when the rapist and the victim are not alone considering that, given the concomitant anxiety, the act can take only a short time to consummate. The Court has thus held that a conviction for rape could still be proper despite the fact that it is alleged to have been perpetrated in the same room with the rapist’s spouse or where other family members also sleep. Somehow, copulation does not seem to be a problem even when living in cramp quarters. Lust, it has been said before, is apparently no respecter of time and place.
Appellant’s defense of alibi must
also fail. Alibi is one of the weakest
defenses, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove.[73] For alibi to prosper, the accused-appellant must
prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but he
must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[74]
In the case at bar, defense
witness Henry Padilla testified that the work place at Shaw Boulevard is only
about three (3) hours away from Marikina, the scene of the crime.[75] Due to the short distance and travel time from the
scene of the crime to appellant’s workplace, it is highly probable and still
possible for him to have committed the crime of rape on 07 July 1997 at
Marikina and thereafter leave the said place for Shaw Boulevard. Considering the available means of
transportation in the metropolis, there is no physical impossibility for
appellant to be at the locus criminis; hence, the second requisite for
alibi to prosper is absent.
More importantly, the appellant’s
defense of denial and alibi, even if supported by the testimonies of his
relatives, friends and superiors, deserves the barest consideration, and cannot
prevail over his positive identification by the private complainant, who is
found to have no untoward motive to falsely testify against him.[76]
The trial court, however, erred in
imposing the death penalty on the appellant. Republic Act No. 7659 has
introduced in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code seven other special
qualifying circumstances,[77] the attendance of which in the commission of the
crime of rape would warrant the imposition of the death penalty. One of
the seven qualifying circumstances is when the rape victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.[78] The concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender constitutes one special qualifying circumstance
which must be both alleged and proved with certainty otherwise the death
penalty cannot be imposed.[79] Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may
be proved even if not alleged, a qualifying circumstance cannot be proved as
such unless alleged in the information although it may be proved as a generic aggravating
circumstance if so included among those enumerated in the Code. [80]
In the case at bar, the
prosecution successfully proved that appellant is the maternal uncle of the
private complainant, which relationship falls within the purview of the qualifying
circumstance of “relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the
victim.” By a twist of fate, appellant
is fortunate that the relationship he abused was the very same relationship
that would save him from the death penalty simply because of a prosecutorial
lapse – the prosecution failed to allege the same in the information. The
prosecution alleged in the information only the minority of the victim[81] notwithstanding that the law requires allegation
therein of both the victim’s age and her relationship with appellant,
and proof of both circumstances beyond reasonable doubt at the trial. Hence, appellant can only be held liable for
simple rape and the death penalty imposed by the trial court must be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.[82]
The trial court correctly awarded
private complainant civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). Civil Indemnity, which is
actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is mandatory upon a
finding of the fact of rape. The award
of civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is in
accordance with the latest jurisprudence for rape not effectively qualified by
any circumstance under which death penalty is authorized by the present amended
law.[83] Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases as
part of civil liability if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[84] Considering that private complainant was sexually
abused by her own uncle, relationship should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance prescribed by Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.[85] Parenthetically, although the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship warrants the award of exemplary
damages, it may not alter the single indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed for the crime of simple rape. Where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall
be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.[86]
However, the trial court erred in
not awarding moral damages, which is separate and distinct from the civil
indemnity awarded to rape victims.[87] Private complainant is entitled to recover moral
damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code[88] without the necessity of additional pleading or proof
other than the fact of rape.[89] Moral damages is granted in recognition of the victim’s
injury as being inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the
odious crime of rape, especially where the rape victim is an innocent child
whose life is forever taunted by a foul and traumatic experience. [90]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Marikina City, Branch 272 in Criminal Case No. 97-1871-MK finding appellant
ELOY S. MICLAT guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and ordering
him to pay to the offended party, MARY ROSE BONDOC, the amounts of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) as exemplary damages is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua, and appellant is
further ordered to pay the offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages. Costs
against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Reuben P. De la Cruz, Rollo, pp. 127-174.
[2] Id.,
at 5.
[3] Exhs. “F” and
“F-1,” Folder of Exhibits,
p. 6.
[4] TSN, 17 August 1998, pp. 32-33.
[5] TSN, 11 November 1997, p. 28.
[6] Id., at
6.
[7] Id., at
8-9.
[8] Id., at 1-10.
[9] Id., at 10-11.
[10] Id., at
10.
[11] Id., at 13-15.
[12] Id., at 16.
[13] Id., at
16-18.
[14] TSN, 5 November 1997, pp. 30-31.
[15] Exh. “D,” Folder of Documentary Exhibits, p. 5.
[16] Id., at 7.
[17] TSN, 13 October 1997, pp. 8-13.
[18] TSN, 5 November 1997, p. 24.
[19] Referred to as “Cindy Matugo” in the TSN of 17
November 1997.
[20] Exhs. “H,” “H-1,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 8-10.
[21] Id., Exh. “H,” p. 9.
[22] Id.,
at 8.
[23] TSN, 11 November 1997, p. 7.
[24] Id., at
11.
[25] Id., at 12-13.
[26] Exh. “H,”
Folder of Exhibits, p. 8.
[27] TSN, 17 June 1998, pp. 5-6.
[28] Exhs. “11 to 11-C,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 35-37.
[29] TSN, 17 June 1998, p. 5-9.
[30] Id., at
6-7.
[31] Id.,
at 10-11.
[32] Id., at 3-6; TSN, March 19, 1998, p. 5.
[33] Exh.” 2,”
Folder of Exhibits, p. 14.
[34] TSN, 17 June 1998, pp. 23-24.
[35] TSN, 18 March 1998, p.13.
[36] Entry No. 15 marked as Exh. “1-B,” Folder of
Exhibits, p. 12.
[37] Exhs. “1 to 1-A,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 12,
[38] Exh. “1-D,”
Folder of Exhibits, p. 12.
[39] TSN, 30 March 1998, pp. 1-22.
[40] TSN, 17 August 1998, pp. 1-19.
[41] Id., at 20-35.
[42] Original Records, pp. 173-174.
[43] Rollo, pp. 83-84.
[44] TSN, 11 November 1997, pp. 7-9.
[45] Memorandum of Appellant, Rollo, pp. 84-87.
[46] Rollo, pp. 86-87.
[47] Rollo, pp. 164-165.
[48] People v. Domantay,
307 SCRA 1, 21 (1999).
[49] Id.
[50] People v. Bolatete,
303 SCRA 709, 729 (1999); People v. Ambray,
303 SCRA 697, 704-705 (1999); People
v. Vaynaco, 305 SCRA 93, 99 (1999).
[51] Original Records, p. 172.
[52] People v. Banela,
301 SCRA 84, 90-91 (1999).
[53] TSN, 11 November 1997, pp. 7-10.
[54] Id., at
25-26.
[55] People v. Ablog,
309 SCRA 222,230 (1999), citing People v. De la Peña, 276 SCRA 558, 562
(1997).
[56] People v. Quiñanola,
306 SCRA 710, 731 (1999).
[57] People v. Quinagoran,
315 SCRA 508, 517-518 (1999).
[58] People v. Puertollano,
308 SCRA 356, 365 (1999); People v. Monfero,
308 SCRA 396, 409 (1999) and People v.
Ablog, 309 SCRA 222, 230 (1999).
[59] Supra.
[60] Exh. “D,”
Folder of Documentary Exhibits, p. 5.
[61] People v. Sacapaño, 313 SCRA 650, 660 (1999).
[62] Italics supplied, People v. Javier, 311 SCRA 122,
133 (1999).
[63] People v. Silvano,
309 SCRA 362, 395 (1999).
[64] People v. Rosales,
313 SCRA 757, 764 (1999).
[65] Exh. “H,” Folder of Exhibits, p. 9.
[66] People v.
Ramos, 312 SCRA 137, 147
(1999).
[67] People v. Batoon, 317 SCRA 545, 554 (1999).
[68] TSN, 17 June 1998, pp. 9-10.
[69] People v. Sacapaño, supra at 661-662.
[70] People v. Batoon, supra at 554.
[71] People v. Sacapaño, supra at 663.
[72] 292 SCRA 98, 59-60 (1998).
[73] People v.
Reduca, 301 SCRA 516, 534 (1999).
[74] People v. Banela, supra at 93; People v. Baniel, 275 SCRA 472, 483 (1997).
[75] TSN, 30 March 1998, p. 20.
[76] People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393, 404-405 (1997).
[77] R.A. No. 7659, Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby
amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. When by reason or
on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
[78] People v. Carullo,
311 SCRA 680, 692 (1999).
[79] People v.
Acala, 307 SCRA 330, 359-360 (1999); People v. Nuñez, 310 SCRA 168,
183 (1999); People v. Sacapaño, supra
at 665, citing People v. Cantos, Sr.,
305 SCRA 786, 798 (1999).
[80] People v. Poñado,
311 SCRA 529, 545 (1999), citing People v. Dimapilis, 300 SCRA
279, 309 (1998).
[81] “x x x a girl of eleven years old”.
[82] People v. Dimapilis, 300 SCRA 279, 309 (1998).
[83] People v. Dizon, supra at 690.
[84] Art. 2230, Civil Code.
[85] People v. Batoon, supra at 556.
[86] Art. 63, Revised Penal Code.
[87] People v. Bañago,
309 SCRA 417, 423 (1999).
[88] Moral Damages may be recovered in the
following analogous cases:
x x x
(3) seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
x x
x”
[89] People v. Quezada,
G.R. No. 135557-58, January 30, 2002.
[90] People
v. Garcia, 341 SCRA 502, 518 (2000).