FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134534.
August 29, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1
RAFAEL TRAPANE, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On August 16, 1993, at 11:30 p.m.,
Barangay Captain Constantino Rebanal and Barangay Tanod Angel Almazan, both of
Talongog, Oas, Albay, went to the Fernando’s Hideaway beerhouse. Almazan ordered drinks and was joined at the
table by one of the lady entertainers.
Rebanal stayed outside on the porch of the beer house where he talked
with Loreto Sotto and Pedio Rex. At
1:00 a.m., one of the lady entertainers at the table of a group of policemen
inside the beerhouse went outside and approached Rebanal. She told him that she and the other ladies
were getting intimidated by the policemen, who were drunk and displaying their
firearms. Later, one of the policemen
in the group, PO2 Arnulfo Valencia, stepped out on the porch. Rebanal introduced himself and politely told
him that the lady entertainers were getting apprehensive over the public
display of their firearms. Valencia
retorted that Rebanal had no business meddling with their affairs since he was
only a barangay captain. Then, Valencia
hit Rebanal on the chest and kicked him in the lower abdomen. Since Valencia was tipsy, he fell off the
porch. He tried to get up but fell down
again.
At that moment, Rebanal looked
inside the beerhouse and saw a man in a vest, later identified as
accused-appellant SPO1 Rafael Trapane, approach Almazan while the latter was
paying for his bill at the cashier’s counter.
Accused-appellant drew a gun from his waist and shot Almazan on the
back. Although badly wounded, Almazan
managed to run towards the road but fell down.
Rebanal, on the other hand, ran towards the police station of Oas,
Albay, which was 60 meters away from the beerhouse, to seek assistance.
When the police arrived at the
scene, they found Almazan lying prostrate on the road. He was rushed to the Emergency Hospital of
Ligao, Albay but unfortunately, he died
upon reaching the hospital.[1]
Dr. Emma Fuentabella-Rebato,
Municipal Health Officer of Oas, Albay, who conducted the post-mortem
examination on Almazan, found that he suffered two gunshot wounds. She opined that the assailant was most
probably positioned behind the victim since the point of entry of the gunshot
wound was at the back of the body. She
placed the cause of death as acute hypovolemic shock due to severe hemorrhage
resulting in severe loss of blood.[2]
The defense, on the other hand,
sought to establish that on the night of the shooting, accused-appellant went
to Fernando’s Hideaway beerhouse with PO2 Arnulfo Valencia and SPO3 Rodrigo
Ramos to conduct a surveillance on certain armed men sighted in the beerhouse,
pursuant to an agent’s report. The
police officers wore civilian clothes, and when they arrived at the beerhouse
they ordered beer and engaged the company of lady entertainers. After some time, team leader SPO3 Ramos
decided to return to camp, but instructed SPO1 Trapane and PO2 Valencia that
they should leave one at a time. PO2
Valencia was to go out first, followed by SPO1 Trapane.[3]
When PO2 Valencia got out of the
beerhouse, three men suddenly attacked him.
Valencia allegedly fell to the ground, while the three unidentified men
tried to get his service pistol. He
tried to prevent them from wresting the pistol from him by rolling on the
ground until he reached the other side of the road. One of the aggressors tried to stab him with a knife. Suddenly two gunshots rang out, followed by
another.[4]
It turned out that the shots came
from accused-appellant SPO1 Trapane who affirmed that he fired warning shots
because he saw PO2 Valencia being mauled by three unidentified men. However, no one seemed to heed the warning
shots. When he saw one of the
aggressors trying to stab Valencia, accused-appellant decided to shoot the aggressor
on the lower portion of the body. After
that, the aggressors fled.[5]
Defense witness Rosemarie Dionson
corroborated the testimonies of accused-appellant, SPO3 Rodrigo Ramos and PO2
Arnulfo Valencia. She stated that she
saw PO2 Valencia being mauled by three men, two of whom she identified as
Rebanal and Almazan. She also saw that
Almazan was holding a knife. She got
scared and ran back into the beerhouse.[6]
SPO1 Trapane, SPO3 Ramos and PO3
Valencia were charged with the murder of Angel Almazan.[7] After preliminary investigation, Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia
of the Municipal Circuit Trial of Ligao-Oas, recommended the indictment of
accused-appellant SPO1 Rafael Trapane only.[8] On November 26, 1993, an
information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, Branch 12
against SPO1 Rafael Trapane, to wit:
That on or about 1:30 o’clock in the morning of August 17, 1993, at Brgy. Iraya Norte, Municipality of Oas, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with treachery attack and shoot ANGEL ALMAZAN Y SIAL to death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
ALL ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
On May 21, 1998, the
accused-appellant was convicted of murder in a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused, Rafael B. Trapane, beyond reasonable doubt, this court finds him GUILTY as charged for the crime of MURDER. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced, to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law. Further, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00) as actual damages and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, the instant appeal, based
on the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VALID SELF-DEFENSE OR IN NOT CONSIDERING IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE (DEFENSE OF A STRANGER).
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF KILLING THE VICTIM, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME AS CHARGED,
INSTEAD OF THE CRIME OF CONSUMMATED HOMICIDE ONLY, CONSIDERING THE CLEAR
ABSENCE OF THE MODIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY IN THE COMMISSION THEREOF.[11]
Accused-appellant argues that in
shooting Almazan, he merely acted in defense of a stranger. Further, he claims that, if at all, he can
only be convicted of homicide since there was no treachery in the killing of
the victim.
The justifying circumstance of
self-defense or defense of stranger, like alibi, is a defense which can easily
be fabricated.[12] Hence, it is inherently
weak, and in order that it may be successfully invoked, accused-appellant must
prove the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person
defending was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.[13] Moreover, he cannot rely on
the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, for
even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved
after the accused himself admitted the killing.[14]
Hence, while it is a cardinal
principle in criminal law that the prosecution has the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused, the rule is reversed where the accused admits committing
the crime but only in his or another’s defense.[15] Ei incumbit probatio qui
dicit, non que negat – he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.[16]
Defense, whether of one’s self, a
relative or a stranger, as a justifying or mitigating circumstance requires as
a condition sine qua non the element of unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim.[17] Unlawful aggression
presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof. The person defending himself
must have been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of
weapon.[18]
In the case at bar, the element of
unlawful aggression is absent. Aside
from accused-appellant’s self-serving statement, there is nothing to
corroborate his statement that the victim attempted to stab PO2 Valencia. Defense witness Rosemarie Dionson testified
that she saw the victim holding a knife, then out of fear she retreated into
the beerhouse and hid behind the counter.[19] She did not categorically
state that she saw the victim thrust the knife towards PO2 Valencia.
Even assuming that the victim,
Rebanal and an unidentified person ganged up and mauled PO2 Valencia,
accused-appellant’s act of firing his gun at them was not a reasonable means to
repel the attack. We are not convinced
that the victim attempted to stab PO2 Valencia. Hence, the latter was in no real danger.
In any event, we sustain the trial
court’s evaluation of the evidence. It
found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Constantino
Rebanal, straightforward and credible.
On the contrary, the trial court noted that the version of the defense
was inconsistent with the normal course of things. It also disbelieved the testimony of defense witness Rosemarie
Dionson.
After a careful review of the
transcripts and evidence on record, we agree with the trial court’s finding
that the testimony of Constantino Rebanal was forthright and more worthy of
faith and credence. He declared that
from a distance of three meters, he saw accused-appellant shoot Almazan point
blank at the back. He also testified
that it was PO2 Valencia who was the unlawful aggressor.[20] It is hornbook doctrine
that the trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses is accorded
great respect by the appellate courts by reason of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses on the stand and to determine whether they are telling
the truth or not.[21] This Court will generally
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked and if
considered would affect the outcome of the case.[22] None exist in the case at
bar. Besides, there appears no reason
for Rebanal to falsely impute such a serious crime on accused-appellant. Absent any proof thereof, the presumption is
that witnesses were not actuated by improper motive.[23] We believe that Rebanal was
impelled by a genuine desire to see that justice is dispensed.
However, we do not agree with the
trial court that treachery attended the killing. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof,
tending directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[24] Thus, to appreciate
treachery, two requisites must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution
that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate;
and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution.[25] In the case at bar, the
events which led to the shooting were so spontaneous that it cannot be said
that accused-appellant deliberated on the means of execution. Hence, the crime committed is only Homicide.
Under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. Considering that there are neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in this case, the penalty shall be
imposed in its medium period.
Accused-appellant shall likewise be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, he
shall be sentenced to a penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The damages awarded by the trial
court needs modification. The amount of
actual damages must be substantiated.
To justify an award of actual damages, it is necessary to prove the
actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.[26] In the case at bar, only
the amount of P15,000.00 can be awarded as funeral expenses, since these were
the only damages duly receipted.[27]
Likewise, the award by the trial
court of moral and exemplary damages of P50,000.00 must be modified. Moral and exemplary damages rest on
different jural foundations and cannot be lumped together as one. Exemplary damages are awarded in criminal
offenses only when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[28] Since there were no
aggravating circumstances in this case, exemplary damages may not be awarded. However, considering the pain and anguish of
the victim’s family brought about by his death, the award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages is justified.[29] Finally, civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 should be awarded, the same being mandatory upon the finding of the
fact of killing.[30]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of
Ligao, Albay, Branch
12, is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant SPO1 Rafael Trapane is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased,
Angel Almazan, the amounts of P15,000.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
[1] TSN, November 29, 1995, pp. 2-17.
[2] TSN, October 17, 1995, pp. 4-21.
[3] TSN, February 20, 1997, p. 14.
[4] TSN, February 05, 1997, pp. 15-17.
[5] TSN, April 10, 1997, p. 12.
[6] TSN, July 17, 1997, pp. 6-9.
[7] Records, p. 5.
[8] Records, pp. 70-76.
[9] Rollo, p. 11.
[10] Ibid., pp. 26-36.
[11] Rollo, p. 48.
[12] People v.
Bantiling, G.R. No. 136017, November 15, 2001.
[13] People v.
Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 130397, January 17, 2002.
[14] People v.
Bonifacio, G.R. No. 133799, February 5, 2002.
[15] People v. Magaro, 291 SCRA 681, 686 [1998].
[16] People v. Masakit, 300 SCRA 147, 156 [1998].
[17] People v.
Gaspar, 318 SCRA 649 [1999].
[18] People v.
Saure, G.R. No. 135848, March 12, 2002.
[19] TSN, July 17, 1997, p. 9.
[20] TSN, November 29, 1995, pp. 9-11.
[21] People v.
Ubaldo, G.R. No. 129389, October 17, 2001.
[22] People v.
Tahop, 315 SCRA 465, 473 [1999] .
[23] Naval v.
Panday, 321 SCRA 290, 308 [1999].
[24] Section 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code.
[25] People v. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451, 461 [1998].
[26] People v.
Discalsota, G.R. No. 136892, April 11, 2002.
[27] Exhibit “D”, Records, p. 280.
[28] People v.
Galvez, G.R. No. 136790, March 26, 2001.
[29] People v.
Villamor, G.R. No. 141908-09, January 15, 2002.
[30] People v.
Peña, G.R. No. 133964, February 13, 2002.