SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133790.
August 1, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO CAÑAVERAL, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental in Dumaguete City, Branch 43, in Criminal Case No. 12134, promulgated
on February 2, 1998, finding appellant Fernando Cañaveral y Martinez alias
“Ando” guilty of rape and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
In an information dated August 7,
1995, the city prosecutor charged Cañaveral with rape allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1995, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of th[is] Honorable Court, the accused, with force and intimidation and with abuse of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloneously (sic) have sexual intercourse with one Ellen Ortez Navaja in the following manner, to wit: the accused taking advantage of superior strength and nighttime, pulled her to a nearby house, with threat to (sic) bodily harm, laid her on the floor, removed her worn short pants and underwear, placed himself on top of her, inserted his sexual organ into her vagina, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with the said Ellen Ortez Navaja, a mental retardate, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]
When arraigned, Cañaveral pleaded
not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution’s evidence shows
that:
The victim, Ellen[3] Navaja, suffers from an alleged mild mental
retardation. At the time of the incident, she was 15 years old and residing in
Looc, Dumaguete City with her mother, Erlinda Navaja. Although already a teenager then, Ellen could neither take a bath
nor dress herself. She depended on her
mother for her hygiene and cleanliness. In school, she never got past Grade 4.[4]
At around 9:00 P.M., August 4,
1995, Erlinda sent her daughter to buy a mosquito repellent coil at a nearby
store. Although the store was only five
houses away, it took over an hour for Ellen to run her errand. Upon reaching home, Ellen immediately went
to sleep and Erlinda, who was already in bed, did not bother to ask her why she
took so long. Ellen, after all, had the
habit of watching video shows at neighboring houses.
When Erlinda woke up the next
morning, she noticed that her daughter had no underwear. After making her drink
a glass of milk, Erlinda asked Ellen why she stayed out so long last night and where
she went. Ellen told her that a certain
man, who frequented the residence of their neighbor, Lucy Kitane, pulled her
and touched her vagina. Ellen said he
was tall and had a high-bridged nose. Erlinda immediately went to see
Lucy. She learned that the person she
was looking for was a certain “Joel” who resided in Colon Extension, Dumaguete
City. Erlinda and Ellen then went to Colon Extension where they sought the
assistance of the Philippine National Police Maritime Unit. Accompanied by two policemen, they proceeded
to “Joel’s” house and upon seeing “Joel,” Ellen told her mother that he was the
man who had sex with her the previous night.
“Joel” was then arrested and brought to the police station, where he identified
himself as Fernando Cañaveral.
Erlinda next brought her daughter
to the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital to have her examined. Dr. Weanchi
Baldado Villegas, an obstetrician-gynecologist, found that Ellen’s hymen had
fresh lacerations at the 1, 5, and 7 o’clock positions. The laceration at the 1 o’clock position was
still slightly bleeding. Her vagina was positive for spermatozoa.[5] Dr. Villegas declared that Ellen was no longer a
virgin at the time she was examined.
On the witness stand, Ellen
testified that she knew “Joel” who frequented their neighborhood. She pointed
to appellant as “Joel.” She said that
on the night in question, her mother sent her to buy mosquito repellent. She ran into appellant who covered her mouth
with his hand, grabbed her right arm, and forcefully pulled her towards the
house of Lucy Kitane. Lucy was not in her house at that time. Appellant then choked her and threatened to
kill her. He undressed her and
succeeded in having sexual congress with her.
She could not shout because appellant covered her mouth. She felt pain when appellant’s penis entered
her vagina.[6]
Dr. Perpetuo S. Lozada, a medical
doctor and a consultant psychiatrist of the Philippine Mental Health
Association, Inc., Negros Oriental Chapter, conducted a clinical and mental
examination of the victim. His
evaluation showed that Ellen was malnourished and sickly, with an organic brain
problem. She suffered severe pneumonia
when she was two months, as a result of which her growth and development were
delayed. She only learned to walk at
two years and to talk at three years old.
She had difficulty in balancing and hearing. She also drooled. In
school, she had learning difficulties.
She was nervous, with childlike gestures, and her mother had to
accompany her at all times. The
victim’s memory, math skills, abstract reasoning, judgment, and insight were
all slightly impaired.[7]
Testifying on the psychiatric
evaluation, Dr. Lozada averred that the victim could not freely give full
consent or full resistance to events happening to her. She was like a five to ten-year-old child
who needed the full care and attention of her parents.[8] However, her ability to identify a person and relate
to a time frame was unimpaired.[9]
Appellant Fernando Cañaveral was
the sole witness for the defense. He
admitted being with Ellen from 8:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on the night in
question, but denied raping her.[10] He said that they had spent their time together at
the side of a house of Ellen’s neighbor talking about their courtship and
romance. He claimed that he first met Ellen at the dance hall in Looc sometime
in 1994. He courted her and they became
sweethearts in August 1994.[11] He did not know that Ellen had a mental problem since
her manner of talking was straightforward.
He did not notice any unusual behavior on Ellen’s part that night. He caressed her but his caresses never went
beyond her head and shoulders.[12]
The trial court found appellant’s
defense neither credible nor convincing.
He was adjudged guilty of the offense charged. The court’s fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, after considering the foregoing premises, the Court
finds accused Fernando Cañaveral alias “Ando” guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape defined in and punished under Article 335, No. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659 and hereby imposes upon said accused
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the victim Ellen Navaja in the
amount of P50,000.00.[13]
On appeal before this Court,
appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE FIFTEEN (15) YEAR OLD ELLEN NAVAJA TO BE A RETARDATE OR A DEMENTED PERSON DESPITE HER SHOWING IN COURT THAT SHE IS A COMPETENT WITNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE SEXUAL TRYST OF ELLEN NAVAJA AND ACCUSED-APPELLANT FERNANDO CAÑAVERAL AS RAPE DESPITE THEIR MUTUAL CONSENT TO DO SAID INTIMATE ACT.
The issue before us is whether the
trial court erred in holding that appellant is guilty of rape beyond reasonable
doubt and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided by law.
Appellant’s first assigned
error dwells on the mental competence of the rape victim. He argues that
when Ellen was called to testify, she gave competent and responsive
answers. Appellant submits that a
review of her testimony clearly negates the claim that she is a mild mental
retardate. Appellant further points to
what he perceives as inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony. On direct examination, she claimed appellant
raped her,[14] but she nonetheless admitted on cross-examination
that she voluntarily went with appellant to the house of Lucy Kitane.[15]
In dealing with the question of
the rape victim’s mental retardation, the trial court observed that “[a]s
boundaries between normality and retardation are difficult to delineate, proper
identification requires competent clinical evaluation of psychometric
parameters in conjunction with medical and laboratory tests.”[16] It then pointed out that Dr. Perpetuo S. Lozada, a
medical doctor and psychiatrist, subjected private complainant to a clinical
evaluation and mental status examination to determine if her mental faculties
were impaired. The qualifications and
expertise of Dr. Lozada were admitted by the defense.[17] Relying upon his diagnosis, the trial court concluded
that private complainant was suffering from organic mental retardation caused
by a history of illness and malnutrition.
She was “just like a 5 to 10 years old child” who “could not freely give
full consent or full resistance as to what is happening to her.”[18]
Examining the evidence on record,
we are convinced that private complainant in this case is a mental
retardate. First, there is nothing on
record that would cast doubt on the knowledge and integrity of the examining
psychiatrist as an expert witness. Second, we fail to discern anything from the psychiatric
evaluation report that would show that the trial court erred in its
appreciation that the victim is suffering from mild mental retardation. Third, our careful scrutiny of Ellen’s
testimony shows that her answers were neither as responsive nor as competent as
appellant insists them to be. There were several instances when she had a
difficult time answering or comprehending simple questions. A closer reading of the stenographic notes
of her testimony during direct examination on how she was raped is most
revealing, thus:
(PROSECUTOR) TROPEZADO:
Q: Why do you know Joel?
A: He frequently went to Looc.
Q: Aside from that, is there any other reason why you know Joel?
A: Yes.
Q: What is this reason
why you know Joel?
NOTE:
Witness cannot answer the question.
Q: What did this Joel do to you?
(ATTY.) MASAGCA:
Leading, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A: He raped me.
Q: What do you
mean he raped you?
A: He threatened to kill
me.
Q: You said that Joel raped
you. How did he raped you?
A: I was choked by Joel.
Q: When you said rape, do you know the meaning of rape?
A: I was fucked.
x x x
Q: How did Joel rape
you? What did he do to you?
A: I was choked.
Q: What else did he do
aside from choking you?
A: None.
Q: What about your dress, what did Joel do to your dress?
A: I was undressed.
Q: What else was
undressed by Joel?
A: My dress.
Q: Aside from your dress, what else was removed from your body?
A: My panty.
x x x
Q: After he was able to remove your panty what did he do next?
A: I was fucked.
Q: When you said you were fucked, what did you feel?
A: I felt pain.
Q: When you said you were fucked and you felt pain, why did you feel pain?
A: Because his penis was able to penetrate my vagina.
Q: You said you felt pain
because the penis of Joel penetrated. What part of your body did the penis
of Joel enter?
A: It’s very painful.[19] (Emphasis supplied.)
Neither do Ellen’s responses to
the queries on cross-examination support appellant’s thesis that she is fully a
mentally competent young woman, as shown by the following:
Q: When you said you
frequently saw him at Lucy Kitane’s house, how did you know his name is Joel?
A: Because I was pulled.
x x x
Q: Before you came here did you talk to your lawyer?
A: Yes.
Q: What were the things
you were talking about with your lawyer?
A: Nothing.
Q: Did the lawyer teach
you what to say this morning?
A: Yes.
Q: You were taught what
to say in this court today?
A: No.
Q: What were the things you talked with your lawyer before you took the witness stand?
A: Nothing.
Q: How far is your house from the place (where) you were allegedly raped?
A: Far.
Q: How far?
A: It was near.
x x x
Q: What particular place in the house of Lucy Kitane were you raped?
A: Behind Nora.
Q: Where is that Nora’s place?
A: Near the road.
Q: What road?
A: There.
Q: In other words you were not raped in the house of Lucy Kitane?
A: I was raped.
Q: You said you were allegedly raped in the house of Lucy Kitane. Were you raped outside or inside the house of Lucy Kitane?
A: Inside.
x x x
Q: When you were inside, what happened?
A: Went out.
Q: Both of you?
A: Yes.
Q: Why did you go out of
the house?
NOTE:
Witness had a hard time answering.
TROPEZADO:
I would like to manifest that the witness
has a hard time answering/understanding the question.
COURT:
Make it of record.
Q: After you went outside inside (sic), both of you went out together?
A: Yes.
Q: So nothing happened while you were inside the house of Lucy Kitane?
A: None.[20]
Doctrinally, the findings of fact
of a trial court are not disturbed on appeal, except where it overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case.[21] In the instant case, we find no such oversight,
misunderstanding nor misapplication of facts to compel us to depart from this
rule.
Appellant hammers on the victim’s
statement on cross-examination that she voluntarily went with him to the house
of Lucy Kitane. He vehemently insists
that it clearly proves that she was not raped.
However, we are unable to find
logic behind his insistence. That the
victim had entered the house at her own volition did not mean she had consented
to sexual intercourse. Note that the
victim testified she was ravished inside Lucy Kitane’s house. On re-cross examination, she clarified that
once inside the house, appellant forcibly pulled her arm and covered her
mouth. Appellant’s contention that the
victim consented to having sex with him is obviously self-serving.
In his second assigned error,
appellant insists that he could not have raped the victim since they were
sweethearts and any sexual act that took place between them was purely
consensual. This line of exculpatory
reasoning, known as the sweetheart defense, deserves consideration if only to
expose its falsity.
We note that during trial,
appellant denied having had any carnal knowledge of the victim. Before us now, he claims that their sex act
was consensual. But such a change of theory
hardly adds credit to appellant’s defense.
An issue, point of law or theory not presented before the trial court
ordinarily will not be considered by the appellate court, as such cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.[22] Nonetheless, when an accused appeals, he re-opens the
whole case[23] and if only to serve the interests of substantial
justice, we shall pause to consider appellant’s “sweetheart defense.”
In many a rape case, the defense
that the rapist and the victim are lovers is often raised, but is also often
struck down for want of sufficient and convincing proof. Having invoked the positive defense of a
romantic relationship with the victim, appellant bears the burden of proof to
support his defense.[24] He may substantiate his defense by some documentary
and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures, and the
like.[25] In one case, we upheld such a defense where
testimonial evidence showed that the alleged rapist and his supposed victim
were indeed lovers.[26] In this case, however, the records fail to disclose
any proof whatsoever to support appellant’s claim.
Moreover, assuming arguendo
that appellant could prove an amorous relationship with the victim, this fact
is not tantamount to consent to rape. A
sweetheart cannot be carnally embraced against her will, for love is not a
license for lust.[27] We are inclined to agree that appellant’s shift of
theory, from outright denial to “sweetheart defense,” is a clear indication
that these defenses are nothing but mere concoctions.[28]
While we agree that private
complainant had shown mental limitations, we also note that she had coherently
and categorically testified that appellant had carnal relations with her. Her account of forcible intercourse is buttressed
by medico-legal findings of fresh lacerations on her hymen and the presence of
sperm cells in her vaginal canal. When
a rape victim’s account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by
the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is sufficient to
support a conviction for rape.[29]
In rape, the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will, or without her
consent.[30] Additionally, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
includes a victim who is suffering from some form of mental abnormality or deficiency,
including feeble-mindedness and retardation, in the term “deprived of reason”
such that the victim is deemed incapable of consenting intelligently to coitus. Settled is the rule that sexual intercourse
with a mentally deficient woman constitutes rape.[31] Although we find that here such mental deficiency is
only mild or slight in Ellen Navaja’s case, still we see no sufficient merit in
appellant’s second assigned error.
We note, however, that in ruling
upon appellant’s civil liability, the trial court only awarded indemnity ex
delicto of P50,000. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence, moral damages may be awarded to rape victims, in
addition to civil indemnity.[32] Such damages are currently set at P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo
finding appellant FERNANDO CAÑAVERAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall pay to the
victim, Ellen Navaja, the amount of P50,000 as moral damages, in addition to
the amount of P50,000 awarded by the trial court as civil indemnity. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 20-29.
[2] Records, p. 4.
[3] Sometimes “Elaine.” TSN, April 11, 1997, pp. 2-3.
[4] TSN, March 4, 1997, pp. 6-10.
[5] Records, pp. 25, 166; TSN, November 26, 1996, pp.
7-9.
[6] TSN, April 11, 1997, pp. 3-6.
[7] Records, p. 198; TSN, September 24, 1996, pp. 10-13.
[8] TSN, September 24, 1996, pp. 15-18.
[9] Id. at 12-13, 19.
[10] TSN, August 5, 1997, pp. 4-6, 8.
[11] Id. at 3-5, 9.
[12] Id. at 8.
[13] Rollo, p. 29.
[14] TSN, April 11, 1997, pp. 4-5.
[15] Id. at 9.
[16] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[17] TSN, September 24, 1996, p. 5.
[18] Rollo, p. 27.
[19] TSN, April 11, 1997, pp. 4-5.
[20] Id. at 7-10.
[21] People
v. Ratunil, G.R. No. 137270, 334
SCRA 721, 730 (2000), citing People v. Atuel, G.R. No. 106962, 261 SCRA
339 (1996), People v. Malunes, G.R. No. 114692, 247 SCRA 317 (1995) and People
v. Cura, G.R. No. 112529, 240 SCRA 234 (1995).
[22] Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108947,
279 SCRA 647, 678-679 (1997).
[23] People v. Llaguno, G.R. No. 91262, 285 SCRA 124,
147 (1998).
[24] People v.
Dreu, G.R. No. 126282, 334 SCRA
62, 69 (2000), citing People v.
Barcelona, G.R. No. 125341, 325
SCRA 168 (2000); People v. Cepeda, G.R. No. 124832, 324 SCRA 290, 297
(2000), citing People v. Monfero, G.R. No. 126367, 308 SCRA 396
(1999).
[25] People v.
Garces, Jr., G.R. No. 132368,
322 SCRA 834, 835 (2000).
[26] People v. Ratunil, supra at 736.
[27] People v. Barcelona, supra at 180,
citing People v. Manahan, G.R. No. 128157, 315 SCRA 476 (1999).
[28] People v.
Pambid, G.R. No. 124453, 328
SCRA 158, 181 (2000), citing People
v. Balgos, G.R. No. 126115, 323
SCRA 372 (2000); People v. Amamangpang, G.R. No. 108491, 291 SCRA 638
(1998).
[29] People v.
Arillas, G.R. No. 130593, 333
SCRA 765, 772 (2000).
[30] People v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 113781, 315 SCRA
563, 577 (1999), citing People v. Igat, G.R. No. 122097, 291 SCRA 100
(1998). (Stress supplied).
[31] People v.
Lubong, G.R. No. 132295, 332
SCRA 672, 692 (2000); People v.
Omar, G.R. No. 120656, 327 SCRA
221, 229 (2000).
[32] People v.
Penaso, G.R. No. 121980, 326
SCRA 311, 323 (2000), citing People v.
Batoon, G.R. No. 134194, 317
SCRA 545 (1999).