SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131812.
August 22, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL
YLANAN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated April 15, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 14, in Criminal Case No. CBU-41810, finding accused-appellant
Manuel Ylanan guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
On August 14, 1996, a complaint
was filed by Rosemarie Monopolio[2] accusing appellant of rape. The complaint reads:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1996, at about 3:00 A.M., more or less, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, entered the room of the undersigned, and by means of force and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did lie and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of said Rosemarie Monopolio.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
On arraignment, assisted by
counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty.
During trial, the prosecution
presented complaining witness ROSEMARIE MONOPOLIO, a 15-year-old maiden from
Zamboanga. She testified that she had
worked for about a week as an all-around helper in the kitchenette of appellant
Manuel Ylanan located at Mabolo Street, Cebu City. On August 13, 1996, at around 3:00 A.M., she said she was raped
by appellant. While in the makeshift
room in the kitchenette where she and her sister slept, according to her, she
was awakened when appellant entered the room and clamped his hand on her mouth,
then placed a pillow against her face. She slapped appellant and pleaded for
him to stop his advances. However,
appellant persisted and succeeded to mount her from behind. He locked her arms
and neck in a “full nelson hold,” rendering her immobile and unable to resist.
While mounting her, appellant threatened to kill her. He then inserted his penis inside her vagina. Rosemarie reported the rape to her aunt
Leticia Agustin,[4] who came to the kitchenette that morning. This was
around 9:00 A.M. Together, they reported the incident to the barangay and to
the Mabolo police station. Rosemarie
was then brought to the Cebu City Hospital where she was medically examined.[5]
Dr. ESTERLITA FIEL, resident
physician of Cebu City Medical Center, testified that she examined Rosemarie
Monopolio on August 13, 1996 at around 10:30 A.M. and found fresh lacerations
on her hymen at 2:00 o’clock and 10:00 o’clock positions. She opined that these lacerations could have
been caused by sexual intercourse, bicycle riding, ballet dancing, horseback
riding, and masturbation.[6]
SPO1 ELBERT FLORES, SR. testified
that he was assigned at Precinct No. 4 of Mabolo, Cebu City. He stated that he was one of those who
invited appellant to their station for investigation.[7]
LETICIA AGUSTIN, Rosemarie’s
maternal aunt, testified that she accompanied Rosemarie to the barangay and
the police station, as well as to the hospital after Rosemarie told her that
Manuel raped her. She also testified
that Manuel and Rosemarie were sweethearts, and that she did not understand the
affidavit she signed at the police station.[8]
The first defense witness was
appellant MANUEL YLANAN. He admitted
having copulated with private complainant, but denied raping her. For according to him, she consented to the
sexual intercourse on August 13, 1996.
He alleged that he was a widower and that he was attracted to Rosemarie
and courted her. He even had plans of
marrying Rosemarie.[9]
A son of Manuel, MANOLINE CINCO
FLORES, 10 years old, was also presented as witness for the defense. He testified that Rosemarie was introduced
to him and his siblings by their father as their new mother. He also alleged that Rosemarie even took
them out to a mall to win their affection.
He said Rosemarie slept on the same bed with Manuel in the kitchenette.[10]
On February 13, 1997, the
prosecution presented JULIE FE MONOPOLIO as rebuttal witness. She denied that her sister Rosemarie and
appellant Manuel were lovers. She claimed they were not close to their aunt
Leticia.
After Julie’s testimony, the court
required that Rosemarie be placed again on the witness stand, to the
consternation and objection of the prosecution. She reiterated her testimony that she was raped by appellant. She denied that they were lovers.[11]
AVELINA BOHOL was presented by the
defense as sur-rebuttal witness. She
testified that she was a housekeeper/helper of Manuel Ylanan. According to her,
Rosemarie and Manuel were sweethearts as she would see Manuel kiss Rosemarie
and the latter would not resist.[12]
The last witness presented was
BERNARDITA FAMUDULAN of the Institute of Religion and Culture (IRC) in Cebu
City. She was identified as the
custodian or guardian of Rosemarie. She
testified that she works for the IRC as a seminar house staff. According to
her, the IRC is a religious organization that aids abused victims. She testified that Rosemarie and her family
were under IRC’s custody while her case was pending trial. Aside from IRC,
LIHOK FILIPINA also helped Rosemarie.[13]
On April 15, 1997, the trial court
rendered its assailed decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused Manuel Ylanan guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the rape and violation of the complainant Rosemarie Miaga Monopolio that evening of August 13, 1996 at Mabolo District in this city. He is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) in concept of moral and exemplary damages.
The costs of these proceedings shall also be taxed against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[14]
In this appeal, appellant alleges
that the trial court erred,
I. … IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II. … IN NOT GIVING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE CHILD WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT.[15]
Essentially, the issue is one of
witnesses’ credibility.
Appellant contends that the
testimony of Rosemarie does not deserve credence. For one, appellant points out that Rosemarie did not even attempt
to shout to get the attention of her sister who was sleeping nearby, although
there were opportunities for her to do so. He casts doubts on her allegations,
that (1) she slapped him despite her arms being locked by him; (2) she watched
him rest and put on his clothes right after the alleged rape, which is not a
normal response of a woman who had just been raped; and, (3) appellant was able
to enter her from behind. He says this
was incredible since it would be difficult for a man to enter a woman from
behind, sexually, without her cooperation and consent.
Appellant also assails the trial
court’s failure to appreciate the testimonies of the following witnesses: (1) Leticia, Rosemarie’s own aunt who
testified that Rosemarie and appellant were sweethearts; (2) Dr. Fiel, the
doctor who said that there were no hematomas on any part of Rosemarie’s body,
indicating that there was no force inflicted upon her; and, (3) Manoline, a
young and naïve witness, whose testimony in court deserves full credence.[16]
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), for the appellee, argues that the trial court did not commit any
error in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The OSG avers that the seemingly unnatural
response of Rosemarie after the rape should not affect her credibility as there
is no standard set of behavior when one is confronted by a startling
experience. It also emphasizes that the
absence of any hematoma or any external sign of injury does not necessarily
negate rape. It dismisses appellant’s contention that Rosemarie and he were
sweethearts and even if they were indeed sweethearts, this does not necessarily
mean appellant did not rape her. There are such things as marital and date
rapes. Finally, the OSG argues that
penetration from behind was not sexually impossible.[17]
Time and again, the Court has
consistently followed three guiding principles in reviewing rape cases: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, although
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only
two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.[18] These are the guidelines that we utilized, and we are
convinced that the present appeal has no merit.
On the issue concerning the
credibility of witnesses, we have also consistently ruled that it is best left
to the trial courts’ determination since, more often than not, they are in the
unique position to physically observe closely the witnesses while testifying,
an opportunity denied the appellate courts which usually rely on the cold pages
of the mute records of the case.[19] In this case, after observing the complainant, the
appellant, and their respective witnesses as to their demeanor, gestures, their
voices and their conduct on the witness stand, the trial judge arrived at a
favorable assessment of Rosemarie’s testimony.
Judge Renato Dacudao found her version of the incident to be more
credible than that of the appellant. On
review, we find nothing on record to show that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated certain facts and circumstances, which if
considered would have altered the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court’s ruling on the
issue of credibility worth savoring:
The cold and barren words of the pertinent stenographic records, heretofore quoted, can hardly present in faithful and genuine perspective, the pain, suffering and anguish that were written over the face and form of complainant as she related on the witness box, at times in halting tones that reek with pathos and anger, the heart-rendering story of her ravishment and despoliation by the accused that evening of August 13, 1996. Indeed, as the poet says, they breathe truth who breathe their words in pain. For throughout her testimony the complainant was sobbing and wailing in pain (which, in the perception of the Court could not have been a sham or made-up act) when she narrated how the accused that evening in question, with his ungovernable libido, tiptoed into her makeshift bed, pushed her face down on the bed with his powerful hands, and when she slapped him, threatened to kill her and told her to shut up, then clamped his hand on her mouth; and then proceeded to lock his arms around her neck totally immobilizing her, and rendering her hors de combat; after which he pushed down with his feet and legs her shorts and panties, and then proceeded to penetrate her from behind with his male member.
It is of course true that the accused’s system is not exactly the normal way to copulate with a girl, even in a rape. But then truth is sometimes stranger than fiction, just as there is method even in madness. And, in the case at bench, the Court wishes to point this out, indeed the Court must will out with this, that the accused herein was literally smirking and smacking, with more than a dash of mischief in his eyes, as he sought to regale and tantalize the Court (and the people at the gallery, too) with his unusual sexual exhibition, evidently relishing and savoring every bit and morsel of his perverted and twisted machismo. (Rollo, pp. 133-134).
Appellant’s main defense is the
trite “sweetheart theory”. In People
vs. Domended,[20] we said that:
“…we cannot imagine that a countrified lass, barely in her teens, will have the courage to engage in sexual intercourse with her middle-aged employer a week after commencing with her employment.”
Similarities of this case to Domended
are striking. First, both complainants were 15-year-old girls who hailed
from a distant rural area. They went to
the city, wanting to try their luck and earn a living. Second, complainants were ravished by their
middle-aged employers barely a week after they commenced their employment. Third, appellants in each case averred that
the sexual encounters were borne out of mutual lust and desire, if not
love. In Domended, we struck
down appellant’s “sweetheart theory”.
We can do no less in this case.
For, the contention of appellant
that he and Rosemarie were lovers does not square with the facts. It is a worn-out concoction which we find
all too often in analogous cases. It is
aimed to be a cover-up for what is now patent sexual harassment and abuse in
the workplace. In People vs. Cambi[21] we said:
Also of additional significance is the fact that the appellant was Margie’s employer. Thus, appellant’s contention that there was no intimidation prior to the commission of the alleged carnal act is simply not true. Time and again this Court has held that intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. This Court is not blind to Margie’s unfortunate predicament of having been subjected to the unbridled lust of one who provided her and her siblings with a much needed source of livelihood. That appellant took advantage of his moral influence over his fifteen-year old worker cannot be denied. We more than understand, we sympathize with the plight of this poverty stricken barrio lass who must have agonized over the loss of her innocence but also feared the very thought of losing the hand that feeds her.
Moreover, even if arguendo Rosemarie
and appellant were indeed lovers, such a relationship does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape. The gravamen of the crime of rape is sexual
congress of a man with a woman without her consent.[22] Love is not a license for carnal intercourse through
force or intimidation. A sweetheart
cannot be forced to have sex against her will.[23]
Appellant’s reliance on Leticia’s
and Avelina’s testimonies as well as that of his son, Manoline, does not serve
him well. On Leticia’s testimony, the trial court keenly observed:
To be sure, the Court had taken stock of the rather unfavorable [to
the complainant] testimony of Leticia Agustin.
But Leticia Agustin is definitely not a loyal aunt, one who is expected
to root for Rosemarie or to be protective of her. For in her very straitened circumstances (Julie Fe Monopolio told
the Court that during their brief sojourn with Leticia, she and Rosemarie were
given food but once a day), it is quite understandable that Leticia would wish
to rid herself of two additional mouths to feed and two free lodgers in her
shanty, whilst pining for a slice of the cake which a settlement of the rape
case would fetch (The evidence shows that she went with the accused’s son,
“Boy” to Zamboanga to work out some kind of settlement of the rape case with
Rosemarie’s parents, offering to that end the sum of P50,000.00). At the same time, the Court can not be
unaware of the fact that Leticia was a former employee of the accused, and that
she must owe him gratitude. In any event, the Court noticed that Rosemarie’s
mother and Leticia, who are virtual look-alikes, traded baleful glances after
Leticia stepped down from the witness box.
Obviously there was no love lost
between the two sisters.[24]
Needless to stress, in Manoline’s
testimony we see a young son trying to protect his father and keep him away
from jail. How and why in so short time
as one week, with long working hours, the private complainant would find time
to ingratiate herself as a new “mother” to appellant’s children had been left
unexplained. This tale is unworthy of
belief.
Appellant asserts that the absence
of any physical injury on the victim meant that no force or intimidation was
employed on Rosemarie. However, force
and intimidation depend on perception.
What may constitute force or intimidation differs from person to
person. Rosemarie categorically
testified that she resisted appellant, but he was just too strong. He also rendered her immobile. No doubt he enjoyed moral ascendancy as
employer over his new employee. Aside
from this, he threatened to kill her. These circumstances more than suffice to
sustain a finding that force and intimidation existed in this case. Besides,
the absence of any hematoma or marks on Rosemarie’s body does not mean that she
consented to the sexual act. Much less
could one draw from that negative fact the conclusion that no force or
intimidation was used against her. Proof of injuries is not indispensable in
prosecutions for rape.[25] In People
vs. Dreu,[26] we held:
It is of no moment either that the medical certificate fails to show that Josephine suffered any contusion or abrasion. Although the results of a medical examination may be considered strong evidence to prove that the victim was raped, such evidence is not indispensable in establishing accused-appellant’s guilt or innocence…
Rosemarie’s inability to scream to
get the attention of her sister did not positively indicate willingness on her
part to have sex with appellant. As she
claimed, appellant was nearly suffocating her with a pillow and she was
stricken with fear, which paralyzed and silenced her to suffer rather than risk
more harm.
Appellant further claims that
Rosemarie’s silence after the rape was unnatural and indicated her consent to
the sexual act. Nothing is farther from the truth. Rosemarie’s reactions could indicate shock and fear. But note that immediately thereafter she
reported the incident to her aunt. The
very same day, they reported the rape to the barangay officials and to
the police. She also willingly
subjected herself to a medical examination. That she remained motionless after
the rape and watched appellant dress did not mean consent. After having just
undergone a traumatic experience she was naturally unnerved, even shocked to
inaction. We have noted in a number of cases that there is no uniform reaction
for persons subjected to sexual assault. Some may shout, some may faint, some
may be shocked into insensibility, while others may openly welcome the intrusion.[27]
We cannot likewise give any merit
to appellant’s contention that Rosemarie’s testimony is inconsistent and
incredible. We find her testimony
straightforward, spontaneous and consistent even in the face of a long and
grueling interrogation from the defense counsel. The rule is that when a rape victim’s testimony is
straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, it must be given full
faith and credit.[28]
Appellant’s assertion that it is
impossible for Rosemarie to have slapped him after he had held her hands is
misleading. What she said is that she slapped him after she was awakened by his
unwanted touch and before she was rendered immobile.[29]
Contrary to appellant’s defense,
having carnal knowledge of a woman from behind without the latter’s consent is
not impossible. Complainant testified
that appellant mounted her and held her in such a way as to render her
immobile, removed her shorts and undergarments and forcefully spread her legs
with the use of his feet and proceeded to insert his penis into her private
parts from behind. She testified that she was penetrated for she felt stinging
pain on that part of her anatomy.[30] Moreover, the prosecution presented Dr. Fiel, who
testified that the victim suffered several lacerations on her private
parts. They show that she had indeed
been sexually abused, but more important, that she struggled against forcible coitus. These facts were not successfully rebutted
by appellant.
Appellant’s contention that it
would have been impossible for him to rape Rosemarie without waking up Julie Fe
who was sleeping nearby also deserves scant consideration. Julie Fe explained
she was in a deep slumber due to lack of sleep and fatigue the previous days.
We also note that even appellant admits that it was possible for him and
Rosemarie to engage in sex without disturbing Julie Fe. The smallness of the
make-shift room did not mean that rape was impossible. Lust is no respecter of time or place.[31] Rape may be committed in the most unlikely places
such as a small room where other family members also slept.[32]
In sum, we agree with the trial
court in giving credence to the testimony of Rosemarie and the prosecution
witnesses. Given the natural modesty and shyness of a 15-year-old barrio lass,
in our view, Rosemarie would not fabricate a rape charge, expose herself to the
rigors and intrusions of a medical examination, as well as the scandal of a
public trial, if said charge were not true.[33] Appellant also failed to establish any reason or
motive why Rosemarie would falsely testify against him. Absent any showing of ill motive on her
part, Rosemarie’s testimony deserves utmost weight and credence.[34] And considering all the evidence on record, we agree
that the appellant is guilty as charged.
However, we note that the trial
court awarded P100,000 for moral and exemplary damages. This is not accurate, for the trial court
should have specified which amount referred to what damages. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, as civil
indemnity, P50,000 should be awarded in a rape case, but moral damages should
also be awarded to the victim in the amount of P50,000. To discourage the abuse of young girls,
especially by their elders, such as employers, the amount of P25,000 could also
be awarded as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City in Criminal Case No. CBU-41810, finding accused-appellant MANUEL YLANAN
guilty of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
He is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the
victim, Rosemarie Monopolio, the following: (1) civil indemnity of P50,000; (2)
moral damages fixed at P50,000; and (3) exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000, together with the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Acting Chief Justice), (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 16-48.
[2] Also referred to as “Manopolio” in the records.
[3] Rollo, p. 4.
[4] “Letecia” in some parts of the records.
[5] TSN, November 18, 1996, pp. 4-28.
[6] TSN, January 21, 1997, pp. 3-11.
[7] TSN, January 22, 1997, pp. 2-5.
[8] Id. at 14-18; TSN, January 23, 1997, pp. 3-8.
[9] TSN, February 3, 1997, pp. 3-16.
[10] TSN, February 11, 1997, pp. 3-8.
[11] TSN, February 13, 1997, pp. 5-8, 28-33.
[12] TSN, February 25, 1997, pp. 2, 6.
[13] Id. at 13-18.
[14] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[15] Id. at 82.
[16] Id. at 114-139.
[17] Id. at 201-208.
[18] People vs.
Serrano, G.R. No. 137480, 353
SCRA 161, 169 (2001) citing People vs. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, 284 SCRA
590, 612 (1998); People vs. Barrientos, G.R. No. 119835, 285 SCRA 221,
237-238 (1998); People vs. Balmoria,
G.R. Nos. 120620-21, 287 SCRA 687, 698 (1998); People vs. Sta. Ana, G.R.
Nos. 115657-59, 291 SCRA 188, 202 (1998); People vs. Perez, G.R. No.
118332, 270 SCRA 526, 531 (1997).
[19] People
vs. Velasco, G.R. Nos. 135231-33,
353 SCRA 138 (2001) citing People
vs. Castillo, G.R. No. 130205,
335 SCRA 100, 111-112 (2000).
[20] G.R. No. 137564, March 30, 2001, p. 13.
[21] G.R. No. 127131, 333 SCRA 305, 316-317 (2000).
[22] See People
vs. Yparraguire, G.R. No. 124391,
335 SCRA 69, 76 (2000).
[23] People vs.
Jimenez, G.R. No. 128364, 302
SCRA 607, 618 (1999) citing People vs. Gecomo, G.R. Nos. 115035-36, 254
SCRA 82, 110 (1996).
[24] Rollo, p. 46.
[25] See People
vs. Docena, G.R. Nos. 131894-98,
322 SCRA 820, 829 (2000).
[26] G.R. No. 126282, 334 SCRA 62, 70 (2000).
[27] People vs. Cambi, supra at 315, citing People vs. Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, 309 SCRA 362, 392 (1999).
[28] People vs.
Baway, G.R. No. 130406, 350 SCRA
29 (2001) citing People vs. Caratay, G.R. Nos. 119418, 119436-37, 316
SCRA 251, 267 (1999); People vs.
Bonghanoy, G.R. No. 124097, 308
SCRA 383, 390 (1999); People vs. Perez, G.R. No. 122764, 296 SCRA 17, 27
(1998).
[29] See TSN, November 18, 1996, p. 38. Underline
supplied.
[30] TSN, November 18, 1996, pp. 19-20.
[31] People
vs. Alcartado, G.R. Nos. 132379-82,
334 SCRA 701, 717 (2000).
[32] See People
vs. Baybado, G.R. No. 132136,
335 SCRA 712, 720-721 (2000).
[33] See People
vs. Taño,
G.R. No. 133872, 331 SCRA 449, 461 & 462 (2000)
[34] See People vs. Velasco, supra at 15,
citing People vs. Gementiza, G.R. No. 123151, 285 SCRA 478, 486 (1998).