SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127086.
August 22, 2002]
ARC-MEN FOOD INDUSTRIES CORPORATION and ARCADIO P. MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIFTH DIVISION), NICOLAS FAMOR, JR.,
JACQUELINE DOMEN, HELEN VERDIDA, MARIA TERESA VILLAFLORES, RODERICK
MACANSANTOS, GEORGE DELA GENTE, JOSE GERRY VILLAFLORES, JEREMIAS TAYROS, OSCAR
FAMOR, NOLI PAGLINAWAN, LUZ MINGLANA, MARY JANE ALMERO, MA. NESCIA OLOBAN,
NARCISA VITUALLA, MARIVIC GERMAN, MARIQUITA SULLA, HILARIO CALAPIZ, ALICIA
LICO, JOSE O. CIMAFRANCA, JR., DANILO PARUNGAO, ROSALINDA HUERBANA, EVELYN
ELLAMIL, JUDITH MAHUSAY, PRECIOSISIMA U. BINGTAN, NORBERTO M. ENAD, and VIVIAN
VERDIDA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks
to nullify two resolutions by public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. M-001097, entitled Nicolas Famor, Jr.,
et. al vs. Arc-Men Food Industries Corporation, et. al. One was issued on June 29, 1994,[1] while the other was dated October 11, 1996.[2] Both modified the decision[3] of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB-11-01-00115-92.
The facts of the case are as
follows:
Petitioner Arc-Men Food Industries
Corporation (or AMFIC) is a Philippine corporation engaged in the production
and processing of banana chips for export. Arcadio P. Mendoza, the
co-petitioner, is its President.
AMFIC operated a processing plant
located at Cagangohan, Panabo, Davao, Philippines, where private respondents
were hired by petitioners on various dates and for different positions and wage
rates.[4]
On January 15, 1992, a
letter-complaint[5] for
violation of the Labor Standards Law was originally filed before the Regional
Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) by forty-seven (47)
employees of AMFIC. The twenty-six (26) private respondents herein were among
the complainants below.
On January 27, 1992, a
representative from the DOLE was sent to conduct an inspection on the premises
of the company to ascertain whether the alleged violations were being
committed. The employees alleged[6] that
they were immediately ordered to stop working to avoid being interviewed by the
DOLE representative. Thereafter, none of the employees were allowed to enter the
company premises unless they signed waivers and withdrew their complaint. Of the original 47 complainants, twenty-one
(21) signed waivers and retractions. As a result, they were allowed to go back
to work. The remaining twenty-six (26) employees, herein private respondents,
were barred from entering company premises and doing their work. Thus, as of January 28, 1992, private
respondents considered themselves constructively dismissed from their
employment.[7]
Petitioner AMFIC had its own
version of what took place. It
contended that the employees were not dismissed since at the time they were
allegedly not allowed to work, AMFIC’s plant operation was temporarily shut
down due to lack of raw materials.
There was no supply of bananas from independent suppliers and whenever
there was no supply, the processing plant temporarily ceased operations. Moreover, the plant equipment and machinery
required repairs. Lastly, AMFIC claimed
there was unfair competition in the industry, which made AMFIC’s operations unprofitable.[8]
Further, AMFIC denied having
threatened private respondents or barring them from performing their work. It explained that the only reason they were
not allowed to enter the premises was that there was simply no work to be done
at the time. AMFIC further alleged that
when the plant was ready to resume operations in February 21, 1992,
respondent-employees were given formal written notices directing them to report
for work on the third shift of operations for said date.[9] But, said employees ignored these notices and did not
report for duty as directed, leading the petitioner company to conclude that
they had lost interest in their jobs and/or have abandoned their work in AMFIC.
On January 31, 1992, herein
private respondents lodged a complaint[10] against petitioners before the Regional Arbitration
Branch XI, Davao, City, for illegal constructive dismissal, underpayment of
wages, non-payment of holiday pay and service incentive leave pay. On April 29,
1992,[11] the complaint was amended to include non-payment of
overtime pay, premiums for holidays and rest days, 13th month
pay, night shift differential, allowances and separation pay.
In her Decision[12] dated September 30, 1992, the Executive Labor
Arbiter, Conchita J. Martinez, found no basis for the claim of illegal/
constructive dismissal. She agreed with AMFIC that since the company was
engaged in a temporary shut down, allowed under the Labor Code,[13] the charge of illegal dismissal was premature.[14] She added that it was not AMFIC’s fault that
respondent-employees failed to report for work when they were asked to. She concluded that since there was no
illegal termination and it was the employees themselves who lost interest in
their jobs, they were not entitled to separation pay.
Her ruling reads as follows:[15]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering respondents to pay the total amount of TWENTY ONE THOUSAND FIFTY AND 11/100 (P21,050.11) PESOS to the twenty-three (23) complainants representing their service incentive leave pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay;
2. Ordering the provisional dismissal of the claims for underpayment of wages due to non-implementation of RTWPB-XI Wage Orders Nos. XI-01 and 02 pending the resolution of the appeal before the Hon. Supreme Court;
3. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint of Evelyn Ellamil, Judith Mahusay and Preciosisima U. Bingtan for service incentive leave, holiday pay and 13th month pay for lack of merit; and
4. Dismissing all other claims for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[16]
Private respondents interposed an
appeal to the NLRC’s Fifth Division, in Cagayan de Oro City. The NLRC found “some merit” in the appeal.
On the issue of constructive dismissal, the NLRC found that no constructive
dismissal took place, as there was in fact a temporary shut down. However, the
NLRC disagreed with the finding that respondent-employees have lost interest in
their jobs. On the contrary, it said that the theory of abandonment is negated
by the fact that a complaint was filed by these employees based on their
erroneous impression that they were constructively dismissed.
Thus, NLRC Resolution dated June
29, 1994[17] concluded:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Affirmed with modification in that respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges but without backwages. Complainants are equally urged and accordingly ordered to report for work to the respondent company within the reasonable period of time but not beyond 15 days upon finality of this judgment, otherwise their failure to do so shall be interpreted as abandonment of work. Except for the above modification, the rest of the decision of the Labor Arbiter below shall stand.
SO ORDERED.[18]
AMFIC filed a motion for
reconsideration, assailing the correctness of the order for reinstatement
without backwages. In its motion, AMFIC
asked the NLRC to affirm in toto the Executive Labor Arbiter’s decision.
But the NLRC, in its Resolution
dated October 11, 1996,[19] merely modified the first Resolution, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged Resolution is Modified. In lieu of reinstatement without backwages, respondent is directed to pay complainants their respective separation benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence, this instant petition by
AMFIC and its President, alleging that:
a. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RENDERED ITS RESOLUTIONS IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER;
b. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT MODIFIED THE APPEALED DECISION OF THE EXECUTIVE LABOR ARBITER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE DECISION OF THE LATTER IS IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED;
c. THE CONCLUSION ARRIVED AT BY PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS GROUNDED ON SPECULATION, SURMISES OR CONJECTURES; AND THE INFERENCE MADE IS MANIFESTLY ABSURD, MISTAKEN OR IMPOSSIBLE; and
d. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE PAYMENT TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT.
The Executive Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC are one in finding that no constructive/illegal dismissal took place.
Documentary evidence on record established the truth of the company’s claim
that the company was on a temporary shut down of operations due to lack of raw
materials.[21] Further, the formal notices to return to work were
received by said employees[22] but they refused to comply with those notices.
As consistently held,[23] factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies
like the NLRC are generally accorded not only great respect but at times even
finality when such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The truth or
falsehood of an alleged fact is not for the Supreme Court to re-examine. This
Court steps in and exercises its power of review only when on the basis of
facts the inference or conclusion arrived at is manifestly erroneous.[24]
The finding that there was no
constructive dismissal is factual, and not subject to our review. Now, what remains in issue is whether or not
the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the company to pay
separation benefits, despite the finding that there was no constructive
dismissal.
Petitioners maintain that public
respondent NLRC has concurred with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter that private
respondents were not illegally dismissed.
Thus, there exists no legal basis to hold the company liable for the
payment of separation pay and other benefits.
They argue that separation pay shall be paid, although the employee was
lawfully dismissed, only when the cause of termination was, without the
employer’s fault, due to: (a) the installation of labor-saving devices, (b)
redundancy, (c) retrenchment, (d) cessation of the employer’s business, or (e)
when the employment is prejudicial to his health and to the health of his
co-employees. According to petitioners,
private respondents are not entitled to separation pay because they had already
abandoned their work or lost interest to report for work. Willful disobedience by the employees of the
lawful orders of the employer or his representative in connection with their
work, as well as abandonment of their assigned jobs, is valid and justifiable
ground for the forfeiture of their security of tenure, according to
petitioners.[25]
In its memorandum for public
respondent NLRC, the Office of the Solicitor General states that failure to
report for work does not mean that private respondents abandoned their
work. It argues that to constitute
abandonment, there must be failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason and a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship. Moreover, the filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal by private respondents is inconsistent with the
allegation of the petitioners that they had abandoned their work. Accordingly, not having abandoned their
work, private respondents were entitled to reinstatement but without
backwages. However, since private
respondents’ former positions were already filled up by petitioners and their
reinstatement is no longer feasible, the NLRC contends they are entitled to
separation pay.[26]
After a review of the records and
weighing the contentions of the parties, we are unable to agree with public
respondent’s conclusion. We find in
favor of petitioners and grant their prayer that the Executive Labor Arbiter’s
decision be reinstated.
Separation pay is given to an
employee in cases under Articles 283[27] and 284[28] of the Labor Code.
Specifically, these involve the installation of labor saving devices,
redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or cessation of operation
of establishment, or in case the employee suffers from a disease such that his
continued employment is prohibited by law.
None of these situations has been found to exist in the case at bar,
hence, we are constrained to set aside the assailed order of the NLRC.
In Peralta vs. Civil Service
Commission,[29] we said that the action of an administrative agency
may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error
of law, or an abuse of power or a lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment
In Lemery Savings and Loan Bank
v. NLRC,[30] we categorically stated that when there is no
dismissal to speak of, an award of separation pay as a form of financial
assistance is not in order.[31] In the present case, however, the NLRC Resolution
awarded separation pay on the ground that, since there was the supervening
event that the company had hired replacements, justice and equity called for
the payment of separation pay[32] to the complaining employees. But that is where the NLRC overstepped its
area of discretion to a point of grave abuse.
For as held in Lemery Savings
and Loan:[33]
It would be an abuse of the avowed principle of “compassionate justice” in favor of the working man, were we to permit a grant of financial assistance to an employee who, from the bare facts and circumstances, was not at all dismissed.
It is true that the Constitution has placed a high regard for the welfare of the labor sector. However, social and compassionate justice does not contemplate a situation whereby the management stands to suffer for certain misconceptions created in the mind of an employee. Where there is no dismissal, legal or illegal, no retribution nor compensation to the employee involved is due from the employer.
Having found that there was no
constructive or illegal dismissal in this case, it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC to order that herein petitioners pay private
respondents their separation benefits.
Said order has no sufficient basis under the law, and considering the
circumstances in this case, neither is it justified by a mere invocation of
equity.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the NLRC
dated June 29, 1994, and October 11, 1996, are declared NULL and VOID, and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the
Executive Labor Arbiter dated September 30, 1992 is hereby REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Acting Chief Justice), (Chairman), Mendoza, and Corona, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[2] Id. at 39-41.
[3] Id. at 44-57.
[4] Id. at 45-46
[5] Records, p. 397.
[6] Rollo, pp. 394-399.
[7] Id. at 395.
[8] Id. at 17, 31-32, 46-48.
[9] Id. at 188-201.
[10] Records, p. 1.
[11] Id. at 83.
[12] Rollo, pp. 44-57.
[13] Section 12, Rule 1, Book 6, Implementing Rules.
[14] Rollo, p. 49.
[15] Id. at 56-57.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[18] Id. at 35. Italics supplied.
[19] Id. at 39-41.
[20] Id. at 41.
Italics supplied.
[21] Records, pp. 152-157.
[22] Rollo, pp. 188-201.
[23] Sunset View Condominium Corporation v. NLRC,
228 SCRA 466, 470 (1993); Travelaire and Tours Corporation v. NLRC 294
SCRA 505, 510 (1998).
[24] Id. at 470-471.
[25] Rollo, pp. 22-24.
[26] Id. at 408-410.
[27] ART. 283.
Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment or prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving
devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one
(1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses
and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least one-half
(1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall
be considered one (1) whole year.
[28] ART. 284.
Disease as ground for termination. - An employer may terminate the
services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health
as well as to the health of his co-employees:
Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1)
month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever
is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1)
whole year.
[29] 212 SCRA 425, 432-433 (1992) citing Sagun vs.
PHHC, 162 SCRA 411 (1988).
[30] 205 SCRA 492 (1992).
[31] Id. at 498 (1992).
[32] Rollo, p. 41.
[33] Sagun vs. PHHC, supra, note 29 at 499.