THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 116905-908. August 6, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EDUARDO BALLESTEROS, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the
Decision[1] dated July 6, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121321,
93-121322, 93-121323 and 93-121324, convicting appellant Eduardo Ballesteros (“Appellant”
for brevity) of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large-scale and estafa.
The trial court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment plus three
indeterminate penalties ranging from two years, eleven months and ten days of prision
correccional as minimum to nine years, eight months and one day of prision
mayor as maximum.
The Charge
On May 26, 1993, the Assistant
City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information[2] charging appellant with the
crime of illegal recruitment in large-scale,[3] docketed as Criminal Case
No. 93-121321, as follows:
“That on or about May 23, 1992, November 27, 1992 and January 3, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment job placement in Japan to the following persons: Arnel Viloria y Viloria, Santiago Ricamonte y Leocario and Nenita Sorita y Ramos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the Department of Labor.
Contrary to law.”
The Assistant City Prosecutor also
charged appellant, based on the same incident, of three counts of estafa
committed on each of the private complainants under Criminal Cases Nos.
93-121322,[4] 93-121323[5] and 93-121324.[6] The Informations were
identical, except for the name of the private complainants, as follows:
“That on or about May 23, 1992, the accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which he/they/she made to said ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA to the effect that he had the power and capacity to recruit and employ ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P50,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact he did obtain the amount of P50,000.00 which amount once in his possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law.”
Arraignment and Plea
Upon arraignment on June 18, 1983
for each of the charges, appellant, assisted by counsel de parte,
entered a plea of “Not Guilty” to all the charges. Trial then followed.
The Trial
The prosecution presented as its
witnesses the three private complainants, Arnel Viloria (“Viloria” for
brevity), Santiago Ricamonte (“Ricamonte” for brevity), and Nenita Sorita
(“Sorita” for brevity), as well as SPO4 Benjamin Lotivio. The defense presented
appellant as its lone witness.
Version of the
Prosecution
The facts[7] of the case are as follows:
Santiago Ricamonte, Arnel Viloria and
Nenita Sorita all dreamt of seeking “greener pastures” in foreign shores. It was most unfortunate for them to have
fallen into the deceptive acts and machinations of the appellant who lured them
into a false sense of security with promises of foreign employment in Japan.
Santiago Ricamonte was a driver at
the Monte Merchandizing when he thought of applying as a construction worker in
Japan. Ricky de la Torre (hereinafter “dela Torre”), who was a cousin of
Ricamonte’s friend, introduced him to Engineer Jose Mendoza, a recruiter of
workers to Japan. On November, 1992, dela Torre and Mendoza brought Ricamonte
to an office in the Army and Navy Club, located at T. M. Kalaw St., Manila, and
introduced him to appellant, Cecilia Legarbes Zabala (hereinafter “Zabala”) and
Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. (hereinafter “Hunsayan”). When inside the office, Ricamonte saw, on one of the tables, a
name plate bearing the name of ‘Judge Cornejo’. He found out that the office belonged to a former fiscal named
Crisanto Cornejo, who was on vacation at that time, and who allowed the
appellant to hold office there while he was away.
Once introduced, Ricamonte was
informed of each of the person’s duties in that office. He found out that Zabala was in charge of
arranging papers of recruits to Japan while Hunsayan was the one who had
contacts in Japan and that both of them were associated in the business of
recruiting workers for employment in Japan.
The appellant told Ricamonte that there was a job offer in Japan and
that Zabala knew everything about the recruitment. The appellant also impressed upon Ricamonte that the recruitment
of persons for employment in Japan was a transaction of people with money so
that if he did not have any money, he might as well forget setting foot in
Japan. The appellant added that
Ricamonte needed to prepare P80,000.00 for the processing of his employment
papers and his plane ticket.
On November 23, 1992, in the
office of the appellant, Ricamonte gave P20,000.00, as the first installment of
his payment, to de la Torre who counted the money and thereafter gave it to
Zabala who then issued a receipt for the amount (Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘3’). The appellant and Mendoza were present and
witnessed the transaction. Ricamonte
thereafter signed an application for employment which would be allegedly sent
by Zabala to his prospective employer in Japan.
On another occasion, Ricamonte
again went to the office of the appellant to give an additional
P50,000.00. The same process was
followed. The money was given to Zabala
who issued a receipt for the amount while the appellant, Mendoza, dela Torre,
and Hunsayan were present as witnesses. Zabala then told him that his visa
would be released soon and asked him to return on a specified date.
When Ricamonte returned to the
office of the appellant on the specified date, Zabala was nowhere to be
found. He asked the appellant, who was
in the office at that time, where Zabala was, but the appellant told him that
he had nothing to do with Zabala and that it was up to him to look for
her. When Ricamonte returned to the
office of the appellant sometime in December 1992, he found the office already
padlocked.
Nenita Sorita was 56 years old and
had already worked in Bahrain for some time, when she, too, was promised an
employment in Japan.
On April, 1992, Sorita’s nephew
and niece borrowed money from her and asked her to pay the money to a certain
recruitment agency where she met Engineer Mendoza. Mendoza offered Sorita a job in Japan but she initially refused
since she was not yet interested at that time.
However, it was not long after that first conversation when she gave in
to the offer of employment in a garment factory in Japan. Mendoza showed her a letter of invitation
from his contact in Japan for persons to work there and assured her that this
contact person would be responsible for everything.
Convinced, Sorita paid P10,000.00
to Mendoza for the processing of her papers and her visa for which Mendoza
signed a receipt (Exhibits ‘G’ and ‘6’). He was able to get a passport for Sorita
as a tourist but still, after a long wait, failed to send her to Japan. Mendoza
told Sorita that he had a misunderstanding with his Japanese contact so he
could not procure employment for her in Japan but, nevertheless, assured her
that he had friends who could secure employment for her in Japan.
So, on November 20, 1992, Mendoza
brought Sorita to the house of the appellant in Singalong, Manila where she met
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala. The appellant
and Zabala told Sorita that she would have to pay P60,000.00 for the processing
of her employment papers, visa and her plane tickets to and from Japan. However, the P10,000.00 which she had
earlier paid Mendoza would be deducted from the amount. After laying down the
terms and conditions of their agreement, Sorita was asked to deliver the money
to the office of the appellant at the Army and Navy Club.
On January 3, 1993, Sorita went to
the office of the appellant with only P21,500.00. This notwithstanding, the appellant and Mendoza instructed her to
give the money to Zabala. Once inside
the office, Sorita saw the name plate of “Judge Cornejo” on one table and that
of the appellant, “Captain” on another table.
After giving them the P21,000.00, Sorita told the three that she could
not produce the rest of the money because the person who was supposed to buy
her personal properties, the proceeds of which she would use to pay the balance
of her recruitment fee, failed to do so.
Nevertheless, the three told Sorita to bring her personal properties to
the office so that they could buy them from her for P30,000.00.
On the same day, Sorita brought
her personal properties to the office of the appellant consisting of: 1 Ladies’
ring with Tampok; 1 wedding band; a 24 karat necklace; 1 14” colored TV
(Goldmaster brand); and 1 Sony Walkman (Exhibits ‘5’ and ‘H’). The appellant, Zabala and Mendoza were still
there when Sorita arrived. Zabala then gave Sorita a signed receipt for the
cash amount of P21,000.00 and her personal properties (Exhibits ‘H’ and
‘5’). However, Zabala instructed Sorita
to bring her Sony Walkman and television to the house of the appellant where he
himself received the items. Sorita,
however, never got any receipt for the items since Zabala assured her that there
was no more problem. Zabala then told her
that she would procure a tourist visa for her and enable her to work as a ‘TNT’
(tago ng tago) in Japan and guaranteed her that she, together with the others,
would endeavor to bring her to Japan.
However, the day of Sorita’s
departure never came. Like Ricamonte, when she returned to the office of the
appellant, the office was already padlocked.
Arnel Viloria was a 5th year
Engineering student at the Technological Institute of the Philippines when he
fell into the same “employment trap.”
Viloria’s mother and Nenita Sorita
were close friends. On one occasion
when Viloria went to the house of Sorita, he met Engineer Jose Mendoza. About a month thereafter, because of
Mendoza’s incessant efforts, Viloria was convinced to apply for a construction
job in Japan. It was also upon the
prodding of Mendoza that Viloria no longer enrolled for the incoming semester
in school.
On November 23, 1992, Viloria,
together with his parents and Sorita, went to the office of the appellant at
the Army and Navy Club to apply as a construction worker in Japan. Once there, Mendoza introduced Viloria to
the appellant and Zabala and informed him that these people were his associates
and that Zabala was the one responsible for the processing and approval of his
employment application. The appellant
informed Viloria that he had to pay P80,000.00 for his employment papers and
plane ticket. Viloria paid the total amount of P50,000.00 in three installments
for which he was given receipts by Zabala (Exhibits M-3, L, M, J) and was also
given the same assurance that he would soon
be leaving for Japan.
However, as the same story goes,
when Viloria returned to the office of the appellant to claim his visa and
employment papers, the office was already closed. Viloria then inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration if the appellant, Zabala and Mendoza were licensed to procure
workers for employment in Japan and was informed that they were not. Upon learning this, Viloria tried to contact
the appellant but, naturally, the latter refused to see him. When Viloria finally managed to talk to the
appellant over the telephone, the appellant got mad at him and told him that he
had nothing to do with his problem.
Finally, Santiago Ricamonte, Arnel
Viloria and Nenita Sorita, after conferring with each other and realizing that
they were defrauded, executed a “Joint Affidavit of Complaint” against the
appellant with the Western Police District (Exhibit ‘D’) on May 11, 1993.
On the same date, members of the
Western Police District arrested the appellant. After the Inquest Investigation, the Investigator recommended
that the appellant be charged of estafa and illegal recruitment
(large-scale) (Exhibit ‘0-2’). Two days
after the appellant was arrested, Cecilia Zabala was also arrested upon
information received by the police that she was staying at the Arevalo Building
in Manila. The police found the
passports of Arnel Viloria and Santiago Ricamonte and the receipts signed by
the appellant (Exhibits ‘E’ and ‘E-2’) in her possession and turned them over
to Viloria and Ricamonte. An Inquest Investigation was conducted on May 14,
1993. However, a month thereafter,
Zabala managed to escape from the Western Police and is, up to now, still at
large.
Version of the Defense
The facts,[8] according to the defense,
are as follows:
Appellant categorically denies
having recruited or having been involved in the recruitment of the offended
parties to Japan. He, however, admits
that he and Mendoza were once close friends, having worked together in a vessel,
appellant as the Captain, and Mendoza, as his Engineer. However, appellant claims that the relations
between them became strained when Mendoza refused to repay appellant for his
expenses in the baptism of Mendoza’s son.
Appellant narrates that he was the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of PSBN Marine Salvage, Inc., a company he
established, with offices at No. 2336 Espiritu St., Singalong, Manila, which
was also his residence at that time.
Appellant claims that his relations with Mendoza became further strained
when he found out that the latter tampered with his company’s Articles of
Incorporation by erasing the name of one of the Directors and replacing it with
his own (Exhibits 19 and 19-B).
Appellant also states that he
transferred his office to the Army and Navy Club upon the permission of a
former Assistant City Fiscal Crisanto Cornejo, who originally rented the
office, and who was on vacation at that time.
Appellant claims that he arranged to pay for the rentals of the office,
in exchange for its use since Cornejo was three months in arrears in its
payment.
Appellant narrates that sometime
in November 1992, Mendoza, Zabala, and Almonte arrived in his office and sought
to rent one table for a monthly rental of P2,000.00. He claims that Mendoza and Zabala were brokers besides being
engaged in the recruitment of workers for employment abroad. However, appellant claims that he never
meddled in their business and tended to his own. Appellant also asserts that Cornejo knew of this arrangement and insisted
that money transactions should not be done inside the office. Accordingly, whenever Mendoza, Zabala and
Almonte had business conferences with their clients, they went to the canteen
inside the club, about 25 meters away from the office.
It was also in November 1992, on
different occasions, that Sorita, Viloria and Ricamonte, who were applicants
for employment abroad, were brought to the office by Mendoza and the other
recruiters. In the process, appellant admitted
that “he advised the three that if they had no money or somebody to finance
their employment abroad they might as well forget any plans of working abroad.”
Appellant says that Mendoza and
the others paid the rent for the use of the table promptly for the first three
months or until January 1993 (Exhibit Q-4). Appellant signed two receipts
acknowledging the payment of the rent.
At one point, one of the applicants, Sorita, delivered to his house a
television set and a Sony walkman.
Appellant was surprised by this act, but claims, that on the same day,
Zabala took the said items. Sorita told
him that Zabala had already signed the receipt for the said goods.
Sometime in January or February of
1993, the office of the appellant was padlocked for non-payment of rent for 6
months. Subsequently, appellant entered
into a contract for shipping services with a new company.
On May 3, 1993, appellant claims
that police operatives of the Western Police District sought his help in locating
Mendoza, Zabala, and Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr., for defrauding Sorita, Viloria and
Ricamonte. Appellant agreed to help and
informed them where Zabala could be found.
After two days, Zabala was arrested by the police but managed to escape
after a month. Appellant, however,
claims that, in spite of the help he gave to the police, he was still placed
under arrest and charged for the crime of illegal recruitment (large-scale) and
estafa.
Ruling of the Trial
Court
The trial court accorded full
faith and credence to the testimony of the private complainants. The trial court was “convinced, beyond a
shadow of doubt, that they testified in a spontaneous, straight-forward and
sincere manner, bereft of the affectations and tell-tale signs of perjured
and/or rehearsed witnesses.”[9] The trial court held that
appellant was in cahoots with Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla
Almonte, Ricky de la Torre and Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. in recruiting private
complainants for employment in Japan.
The trial court found that appellant received various sums of money and
personal properties from the private complainants as placement fees, expenses
for processing of employment papers, issuance of visas to Japan and for
purchase of plane tickets.
After trial on the merits, the
trial court convicted appellant of illegal recruitment in large-scale and three
counts of estafa, stating that:[10]
“In view of the foregoing disquisitions of the Court, judgment is hereby rendered against the Accused as follows:
1. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case No. 93-121321’, the Accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment defined in Article 13 (b) in relation to Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended and hereby meted the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case No. 93-121322’, the Accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined in Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days of Prision Correccional as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as Maximum, and ordered to refund to Arnel Viloria the amount of P50,000.00, with interests thereon, at the legal rate from November 23, 1992 until the said amount is paid in full;
3. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case Number 93-121323’, the Accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined in Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby meted an indeterminate penalty of from Two (2) Years, Eleven (11) Months and Ten (10) Days of Prision Correccional as Minimum, to Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as Maximum and ordered to refund to Santiago Ricamonte the amount of P50,000.00 plus interests thereon at the legal rate from November 27, 1992, until the said amount is paid in full;
4. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case Number 93-121324’, the Court found the Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined in Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the Accused to an indeterminate penalty of from Two (2) Years, Eleven Months and Ten (10) Days of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Nine (9) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as Maximum, and to refund to Nenita Sorita the amount of P31,000.00 and to return to her the following described properties:
1 Ladies ring with tampok
1 Wedding band
1 Necklace – 24 karat
1 TV colored 14” Goldmaster brand
1 Sony Walkman
and if he is unable to do so, or refuses to do so, to pay to her the value thereof in the amount of P30,000.00, said amounts with interests thereon at the legal rate from January 3, 1993, up to the time the said amounts are paid in full.
The Accused shall be entitled to the full credit of his detention at the City Jail of Manila provided that he agreed to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the said Jail. With costs against the Accused.
SO ORDERED.”
In view of the penalty of life
imprisonment, the appellant filed his appeal directly with this Court.
Issues
The appeal is anchored on the
following assigned errors:
“I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED CONSPIRED WITH CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA, ENGINEER JOSE MENDOZA, PERLA ALMONTE, RICKY DE LA TORRE AND ALFREDO HUNSAYAN, JR., THE ALLEGED RECRUITERS, IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD ADDUCED BY THE ACCUSED THAT PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS ARNEL VILORIA, SANTIAGO RICAMONTE AND NENITA SORITA, HAD ANY DEVIOUS OR ILL-MOTIVE TO FABRICATE THE CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE COMPLAINTS BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS BROUGHT AGAINST THE ACCUSED WERE MERELY AN AFTERTHOUGHT, AND THAT THE COMPLAINANTS’ TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE SAME WERE UNCONVINCING AND IMPLAUSIBLE AND FALL SHORT OF THE REQUIRED PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO ACCUSED’S CLAIM THAT THE FACT THAT THE GROUP OF CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA HAD SUBLEASED A PORTION OF THE OFFICE AT THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB FROM THE ACCUSED AS CARETAKER OF THE OFFICE DOES NOT MEAN THAT ACCUSED HAD KNOWLEDGE OR PARTICIPATION IN THEIR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AS THEIR TRANSACTIONS WERE NOT DONE IN THE OFFICE BUT IN THE CANTEEN OF THE CLUB.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING HEAVY RELIANCE ON THE RECEIPTS, EXHIBITS ‘E’ AND ‘E-2’, SHOWING THAT ACCUSED RECEIVED COMMISSIONS FROM CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA AND OTHERS, AND IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE SAID RECEIPTS WERE NOT FOR COMMISSIONS AS INDICATED IN THE RECEIPTS BUT WERE ACTUALLY RECEIPTS OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS OF THE SAID PERSONS OF A PORTION OF THE OFFICE FOR ABOUT THREE (3) MONTHS.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING, WITHOUT VALID, SUFFICIENT, CONVINCING AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED RECEIPTS, EXHIBITS ‘E’ AND ‘E-2’, CONFIRMED THE PROSECUTION’S CLAIM THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE SAID CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA AND OTHERS CONSIDERING THAT ACCUSED HAD NEVER ENGAGED AND HAD NOT ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS NOT GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (LARGE-SCALE) CONSIDERING ITS ADMISSION THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT ADDUCED ANY EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED RECEIVED FROM CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA ANY CASH AMOUNT FROM THE PAYMENTS OF PLACEMENT FEES BY PRIVATE COMPLAINANT NENITA SORITA. MOREOVER, FURTHER PROOF THAT ACCUSED HAD NEVER ENGAGED AND HAS NOT ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IS PLAIN AND EVIDENT FROM THE UNIFORM TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINANTS THAT ACCUSED HAD NEVER RECEIVED MONEY AS ALLEGED PLACEMENT FEES PERSONALLY FROM THE SAID COMPLAINING WITNESSES.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS NOT GUILTY OF ESTAFA.
X
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIMES OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (LARGE-SCALE) AND THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.”[11]
The thrust of the appeal is
twofold. First, the trial court erred
in finding appellant responsible for the illegal recruitment of the complaining
witnesses and in finding that there was conspiracy between appellant and his
alleged cohorts. Second, the trial
court erred in convicting appellant of estafa despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
We find no reason to reverse
appellant’s conviction. Hence, we affirm but with modification.
Illegal
Recruitment In Large-Scale
Article 13, par. (b), of the Labor
Code defines recruitment and placement as:
“(b) ‘Recruitment and placement’ refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”
Illegal recruitment is
specifically defined in Article 38 of the same Code thus:
“Article 38. Illegal Recruitment:
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large-scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large-scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.”
We have held that to constitute
illegal recruitment in large-scale, three elements must concur:
1. The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13 (b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
2. He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
3. He committed the same against three or
more persons, individually or as a group.[12]
The prosecution sufficiently
established the foregoing elements in the instant case. First, as found
by the trial court:
“The Accused represented to and assured Santiago Ricamonte that,
indeed, there was a job offer for a construction worker in Japan and even told
the latter to prepare and pay the amount of P80,000.00, payable in installments
for the processing of his papers for his employment in Japan and his plane ticket to Japan. The Accused even impressed on Santiago
Ricamonte that the matter of employment of workers in Japan was a transaction
only of people with money and unless the applicant has the amount demanded of
him, he could not possibly procure employment in Japan. Santiago Ricamonte gave and paid to Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala the amount of P20,000.00 on November 23, 1992, and the amount
of P30,000.00 on December 3, 1992, in the presence of the Accused in the
latter’s office at the Army and Navy Club where Cecilia Legarbes Zabala signed
the Receipts (Exhibits “A” and “B”).
Santiago Ricamonte relied on the assurances and representations of the
Accused and his cohorts and was impressed by the office of the Accused. After all, on one of the tables was the name
plate of ‘Judge Cornejo’. The
Court cannot then begrudge Santiago
Ricamonte into trusting the Accused and his cohorts and in believing that they
would not deceive and defraud him.”[13]
Second, there is no need to show that appellant represented
himself as a licensed recruiter since it is enough to show that he did not
possess the requisite authority or license to undertake recruitment activities.[14] The prosecution established
that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) did not authorize
or license appellant and his cohorts to engage in recruitment Activities.[15] Despite the absence of such
authority or license, appellant recruited the complainants.
The appellant need not have
expressly represented that he had authority or license from POEA. It is sufficient that appellant gave the
impression that he could find jobs for complainants in Japan, inducing
complainants to agree to pay him recruitment fees.[16] On several occasions, this
Court has held that there is illegal recruitment when one, without authority or
license to do so, represents to others that he could send workers abroad for
employment.[17]
Assuming arguendo that
appellant did not actually receive any fee, his representations that he had the
capacity to secure employment for private complainants made him liable for
illegal recruitment since he had no authority or license from the POEA.[18] In the recent case of People v. Arabia,[19] we held that:
“While it may be true that complainants herein were not able to present receipts to prove that they in fact paid the placement fee of P16,000.00 each to accused Arabia with accused Tomas witnessing the payment, it has been ruled that the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant acquittal of the accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as the witnesses had positively shown through their respective testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite absence of receipts. (People v. Goce 247 SCRA 780; People v. Senden 228 SCRA 489; People v. Naparan 225 SCRA 714; People v. Pabala 262 SCRA 553).” (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the actual receipt of a
fee is not an element of the crime.
Third, since there are at least three victims in this case,
appellant thus committed large-scale illegal recruitment.
Appellant also argues that the
prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with the others in the commission
of the crime of illegal recruitment and estafa. We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the lower court that there was conspiracy among appellant, Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla Almonte, Ricky de la Torre and Alfredo
Hunsayan, Jr. The evidence on record
indubitably shows that there was a delineation of roles among the appellant and
his cohorts, but with a common design and a unity of purpose. As aptly pointed
out by the trial court:
“The Accused was at the forefront, not merely as a passive onlooker
as the Accused wanted the Court to believe in the recruitment of the Private
Complainants. xxx In November, 1992, the Accused, Cecilia Legarbes Zabala and
Jose Mendoza, agreed to the use the office (sic) of former Assistant City
Fiscal of Pasay City as their base of operations or office in their recruitment
activities. Jose Mendoza and Ricky de la Torre looked for applicants who sought
employment in Japan, Cecilia Legarbes Zabala was the one tasked to receive the
sums of money paid by the recruits signed and issued Receipts for said amounts.
The Accused, on the other hand, fixed the amounts to be paid by the recruits
and directly negotiated and transacted with them and received his commissions
from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala from the payments of the recruits. All the
actuations of the Accused, Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla Almonte
and Ricky de la Torre, were geared and designed to achieve a common purpose or
objective – the recruitment of persons for employment in Japan and eke out sums
of money from them although the Accused was not authorized to recruit workers
for employment abroad. Under the circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the
Accused conspired with Jose Mendoza, Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Perla Almonte,
Ricky de la Torre and Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. and that, therefore, the Accused is
liable for the wrongful acts and its consequences.”[20]
Direct proof of previous agreement
to commit a crime is not necessary. [21] Such previous agreement may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.[22]
In his attempt to exculpate
himself, appellant denies having received money from private complainants.
However, as against the positive assertion of complainants, the appellant’s
denial is worthless and at most self-serving. Private complainants testified
that Cecilia Legarbes Zabala signed and issued receipts for the cash amount and
other personal properties complainants turned over as payment for processing
their employment applications abroad. The documentary evidence of the
prosecution shows that appellant received his commission from recruitment fees
paid by the private complainants.
Exhibits “E” and “E-2”, which bear appellant’s signature, establish this
fact, to wit:
“December 3, 1992
Received the amount of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00)
from Cely Zabala as commission.”[23] (Emphasis supplied)
and
“December 7, 1992
Received the amount of Two Thousand Pesos from Cely Zabala as commission
(P2,000.00).”[24] (Emphasis supplied)
These receipts show no indication
that the amounts were accepted as payment for the rental of the Army and Navy
Club office space as alleged by appellant. On the contrary, the testimonial and
documentary evidence establish beyond any doubt that appellant received the
amounts stated as “commission” for his participation in the
illegal recruitment activities. As correctly observed by the trial court:
“When he testified before the Court, the Accused resolutely claimed that he was issued Receipts for the rentals of Jose Mendoza and Cecilia Legarbes Zabala and the Accused readily referred to the Receipts, Exhibits “E” And “E-2” bearing his signatures. Ironically, instead of buttressing his stance, the Receipts, Exhibits “E” and “E-2”, in fact, belied said claim and placed his defense in a quagmire of inconsistency. For, as can be easily gleaned from said Receipts, the amounts of P4,500.00 and P2,000.00 mentioned therein were the “commissions” of the Accused from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala which he received from her and not rentals xxx.
xxx
The Court found the claim of the Accused puerile and preposterous. The Accused is a businessman, a Captain of a vessel no less. If the amounts were, in fact, rental payments, the Accused, for sure, should have refused to sign the Receipt and should have insisted, before he signed the Receipts, that the same be stated therein in unequivocal terms. And then again, the Accused has not enlightened the Court why Cecilia Legarbes Zabala would have the temerity and audacity to place the word “commission” in the Receipts instead of placing the word “rental” or the motive of Cecilia Legarbes Zabala in placing “commission” in the Receipts. After all, the Accused even allowed her and her companions to rent his office.
On the other hand, the Receipts, Exhibits “E” and “E-2”
galvanized the case of the Prosecution and confirmed its claim that, indeed,
the Accused was directly involved in the illegal recruitment activities of
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, more particularly the recruitment of the Private
Complainants to Japan. This is so
because, as the Receipts indubitably show, the Accused received, from Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala, the said amounts of P4,500.00 and P2,000.00 as his commission
for the recruitment of Santiago Ricamonte and Arnel Viloria. Indeed, the evidence of the Prosecution
shows that Cecilia Legarbes Zabala received, from Santiago Ricamonte, the
amount of P30,000.00 on December 3, 1992 (Exhibit “B”). Arnel Viloria paid to Cecilia Legarbes
Zabala, on December 7, 1992, the amount of P10,000.00 (Exhibit “M”). The payments were made in the presence of
the Accused. It was precisely on
December 3, 1992 when the Accused
received P4,500.00 from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala as his commission and on
December 7, 1992, when the Accused received, from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, the
amount of P2,000.00 as his commission.
The only logical conclusion is that the amounts given to the Accused by
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala on those dates must have come from the amounts paid by Santiago
Ricamonte and Arnel Viloria on those dates respectively. The Accused has not adduced a morsel of
evidence that the Accused transacted business with third persons as agent of
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala for which he was entitled to said amounts as commissions
from her.”[25]
We find no reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court, which is in the best position to appreciate
complainants’ truthfulness, honesty and candor.[26] As against the positive and
categorical testimonies of the complainants, appellant’s mere denial cannot
prevail.[27]
In light of these established
facts, appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one count of illegal
recruitment in large-scale. The appellant should suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large-scale under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.[28]
Conviction
for Estafa
The trial court also did not err
in finding appellant guilty of estafa. It is well-settled that a person,
for the same acts, may be charged and convicted separately of the crime of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a)
of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.[29] Illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal
intent of the accused is necessary for conviction.[30] In other words, a person
convicted under the Labor Code may also be convicted of offenses punishable by
other laws for the same acts.
The elements of estafa
are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by
means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.[31] In the instant case, the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and his cohorts
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla Almonte, Ricky de la Torre and
Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. deceived private complainants into believing that they
had the authority and capability to send complainants to Japan for employment.
Because of the assurances given by appellant and his cohorts, private
complainants parted with their hard-earned money in exchange for what they
thought was a promising future abroad. The acts of appellant and his cohorts
constitute estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa
depends on the amount of the defraudation.[32] Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx
We ruled in People v. Gabres[33] that:
“The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.”
In addition, appellant is liable
to indemnify the private complainants in the amounts which they
respectively paid him and his cohorts:
P50,000.00 to Arnel Viloria; P50,000.00 to Santiago Ricamonte; and P31,000.00
to Nenita Sorita plus P30,000.00 as reparation[34] for her unrecovered
personal properties. Hence, pursuant to Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
and our ruling in Gabres, the penalties imposed on appellant for estafa
should be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case Nos. 93-121322
and 93-121323 (which pertain to private complainant Arnel Viloria and Santiago
Ricamonte), the amount involved is P50,000.00.[35] The minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty, as fixed by the trial court, is two (2) years, eleven
(11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, which is within
the lawful range of the allowable minimum period of the indeterminate sentence,
while the maximum term is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
plus a period of two (2) years (an additional of one year for every P10,000.00
in excess of P22,000.00), or a maximum of eight (8) years and one day of prision
mayor.
In Criminal Case No. 93-121324
(pertaining to private complainant Nenita Sorita), the total amount involved is
P61,000.00. The minimum term of the indeterminate penalty is two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional (which is
within the lawful range of the allowable minimum period of the indeterminate
sentence) while the maximum term is nine (9) years and one day of prision
mayor.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 6, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, finding appellant EDUARDO
BALLESTEROS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal
Recruitment in Large-Scale in Criminal Case No. 93-121321 and of Estafa
in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121322 to 93-121324, is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. In Criminal Case No. 93-121322 (for estafa involving P50,000.00), appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered to refund Arnel Viloria the sum of P50,000.00 with legal interest from November 23, 1992 until the amount is fully paid.
2. In Criminal Case No. 93-121323 (for estafa involving P50,000.00), appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered to refund Santiago Ricamonte the sum of P50,000.00 with legal interest from November 27, 1992 until the amount is fully paid.
3. In Criminal Case No. 93-121324 (for estafa involving a total of P61,000.00), appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered to pay Nenita Sorita the sum of P31,000.00 plus P30,000.00 as reparation for the unrecovered personal properties, all with legal interest from January 3, 1993 until the amount is fully paid.
4. In Criminal Case No. 93-121321 (for illegal recruitment in large-scale), appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Romeo J. Callejo (now a member of the
Court of Appeals).
[2] Rollo, p. 8.
[3] The Information specifically referred to the violation
of Article 38 (a) of PD No. 442, as amended by PD No. 1412 (the New Labor Code
of the Philippines), in relation to Article 13 (b) & (c) of the Labor Code,
as further amended by PD No. 1693, 1920 and 2018. Illegal recruitment for overseas employment is now punished under
RA No. 8042, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
[4] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[5] Ibid., pp. 12-13.
[6] Ibid., pp. 14-15.
[7] Based on the Decision of the trial court, pp. 4-11; Rollo,
pp. 176-183.
[8] Ibid., pp.11-14; Rollo, pp. 183-186.
[9] Rollo, p. 40.
[10] Decision, pp. 29-30; Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[11] Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 76-78.
[12] People v.
Gamboa, 341 SCRA 451 (2000) citing People
v. Enriquez, 306 SCRA 739 (1999); People v. Reyes, 282 SCRA
105 (1997); People v. Diaz, 259 SCRA 441 (1996); People v.
Calonzo, 262 SCRA 535 (1996); People v. Bautista, 241 SCRA 216 (1995);
People v. Cabacang, 246 SCRA 530 (1995).
[13] Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 36.
[14] People v. Cabacang, 246 SCRA 530 (1995).
[15] Records of Criminal Case Nos. 93-121321 to 93-121324,
p. 24 and p. 58.
[16] People v.
Gomez, 325 SCRA 61 (2000) citing People v. Villas, 277 SCRA 391
(1997).
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] G.R. Nos. 138431-36, September 12, 2001.
[20] Decision, p. 19; Rollo, p. 39.
[21] People v.
Gamboa, 341 SCRA 451 (2000) citing People v. Benemerito, 264 SCRA
677 (1996).
[22] Ibid.
[23] Records of Criminal Case Nos. 93-121321 to 93-121324,
p. 59.
[24] Ibid., p. 60.
[25] Decision, pp. 23 & 25; Rollo, pp. 42 &
44.
[26] People v.
Cabais, G.R. No. 129070, March 16, 2001, citing People v. Yabut, 316 SCRA 237
(1999).
[27] Ibid., citing People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38
(2000).
[28] People v.
Logan, G.R. Nos. 135030-33, July 20, 2001; People v. Tan Tiong Meng,
271 SCRA 125 (1997); People v. Benemerito, 246 SCRA 677; People v.
Turla, 233 SCRA 705 (1994).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid.
[31] People v.
Pascua, G.R. No. 125081, October 3, 2001.
[32] Ibid.
[33] 267 SCRA 581 (1997); also cited in People v. Logan, G.R. Nos.
135030-33, July 20, 2001.
[34] People v. Iligan, 369 Phil 1005 (1999).
[35] Supra, see note 32.