Sigre vs CA : 109568 : August 8, 2002 : J. Austria-Martinez : First Division

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109568. August 8, 2002]

ROLANDO SIGRE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, respondents.

[G.R. No. 113454. August 8, 2002]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a not-so-novel attempt to challenge the long-settled constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27, private respondent Lilia Y. Gonzales, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, filed with the Court of Appeals on September 15, 1992, a petition for prohibition and mandamus docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28906, seeking to prohibit the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) from accepting the leasehold rentals from Ernesto Sigre (predecessor of petitioner Rolando Sigre), and for LBP to turn over to private respondent the rentals previously remitted to it by Sigre. It appears that Ernesto Sigre was private respondent’s tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of sixteen (16) cavans per crop or thirty-two (32) cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reform’s Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, which set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27. The pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 reads:

“A. Where the value of the land has already been established.

“The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary or his authorized representative has finally approved the average gross production data established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and tenant farmers concerned heretofore authorized.

“Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents: provided that in case where the value of the land is established during the month the crop is to be harvested, the cut-off period shall take effect on the next harvest season. With respect to cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of the land, the tenant-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such rental, but it shall be his duty to notify the landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned of such fact who shall ascertain immediately the veracity of the information and thereafter resolve the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner shall insist after positive ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him, the amount equivalent to the rental insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer with the LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his account to be withdrawn only upon proper written authorization of the DAR District Officer based on the result of ascertainment or investigation.”[1] (Emphasis ours)

According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per hectare,[2] and the value of the land was pegged at Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Five Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P13,405.67).[3] Thus, the petition filed before the Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6, but also the constitutionality of P.D. 27.

The appellate court, in its decision dated March 22, 1993, gave due course to the petition and declared Memorandum Circular No. 6 null and void.[4] The LBP was directed to return to private respondent the lease rentals paid by Sigre, while Sigre was directed to pay the rentals directly to private respondent.[5] In declaring Memorandum Circular No. 6 as null and void, the appellate court ruled that there is nothing in P.D. 27 which sanctions the contested provision of the circular;[6] that said circular is in conflict with P.D. 816 which provides that payments of lease rentals shall be made to the landowner, and the latter, being a statute, must prevail over the circular;[7] that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional in laying down the formula for determining the cost of the land as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation;[8] and that it is no longer applicable, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657.[9]

Hence, this present recourse, which is a consolidation of the separate petitions for review filed by Rolando Sigre (who substituted his predecessor Ernesto Sigre), docketed as G.R. No. 109568 and the LBP, docketed as G.R. No. 113454.

Petitioner Sigre, in G.R. No. 109568, alleges that:

“PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING THAT DAR MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 6, SERIES OF 1978 RUNS COUNTER TO PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 816.

“II

“PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT DAR MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 6, SERIES OF 1978 AMENDS OR EXPANDS PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27.

“III

“PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT PROVISION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 ON THE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING THE COST OF THE LAND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

“IV

“PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROVISION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27 ON FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND HAS BEEN REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657.”[10]

Petitioner LBP, in G.R.No. 113454, claims that:

“A

“THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT MAR CIRCULAR NO. 6 IS A VALID PIECE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATION COVERING A SUBJECT GERMANE TO THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 27, CONFORMING TO THE STANDARDS OF SAID LAW AND RELATING SOLELY TO CARRYING INTO EFFECT THE GENERAL PROVISIONS OF SAID LAW.

“B

“THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT MAR CIRCULAR NO. 6 IS INVALID IN THAT IT SUFFERS ‘IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT’ WITH PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 816, THUS GROSSLY DISREGARDING THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT THERE IS NO ‘INCONSISTENCY OR INCOMPATIBILITY’ BETWEEN MAR CIRCULAR NO. 6 AND P.D. 816.

“C

“THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT P.D. 27, INSOFAR AS IT SETS FORT (sic) THE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE RICE/CORN LAND, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THUS GROSSLY DISREGARDING THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE THAT CONSISTENTLY RULED THAT P.D. 27 IS SUSTAINED AGAINST ALL CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS RAISED AGAINST IT.

“D

“THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT P.D. 27 HAS BEEN IMPLIEDLY REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657.”[11]

Presidential Decree No. 27,[12] issued on October 21, 1972 by then Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos, proclaimed the entire country as a “land reform area” and decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions.[13] It was pursuant to said decree that the DAR issued Memorandum Circular No. 6, series of 1978.

The Court of Appeals held that P.D. No. 27 does not sanction said Circular, particularly, the provision stating that payment of lease rentals to landowners shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established, after which the tenant-farmer shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents.

We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.[14] One such administrative regulation is DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. As emphasized in De Chavez v. Zobel,[15] emancipation is the goal of P.D. 27., i.e., freedom from the bondage of the soil by transferring to the tenant-farmers the ownership of the land they’re tilling. As noted, however, in the whereas clauses of the Circular, problems have been encountered in the expeditious implementation of the land reform program, thus necessitating its promulgation, viz.:

“1. Continued payment of lease rentals directly to landowners by tenant-farmers may result to situations wherein payments made may even exceed the actual value of the land. x x x

“2. There is difficulty in recording lease rental payments made by tenant-farmers to landowners specifically in cases where landowners concerned refuse to issue acknowledgment/official receipts for payments made;

“3. Payments made by tenant-farmers to landowners after the establishment of Farmer Amortization Schedule (FAS) through the National Computer Center were found to be ineffectively captured or accounted for. x x x

“4. The prolonged disagreement between parties concerned on the total payments made by the tenant-farmers has delayed program implementations.”

The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that “(T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmer’s lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price.”[16] Since the assailed Circular essentially sought to accomplish the noble purpose of P.D. 27, it is therefore valid.[17] Such being the case, it has the force of law and is entitled to great respect.[18]

The Court cannot see any “irreconcilable conflict” between P.D. No. 816[19] and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. On the other hand, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6, implemented in 1978, mandates that the tenant-farmer shall pay to LBP the lease rental after the value of the land has been determined.

In Curso v. Court of Appeals,[20] involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there is no incompatibility between these two. Thus:

“Actually, we find no inconsistency nor incompatibility between them. Of significance are the two ‘whereas’ clauses of P.D. 816 quoted hereunder:

x x x

Clearly, under P.D. No. 816, rentals are to be paid to the landowner by the agricultural lessee until and after the valuation of the property shall have been determined.

In the same vein, the MAR Circular provides:

x x x

In other words, the MAR Circular merely provides guidelines in the payment of lease rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and the MAR Circular, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank (LBP). The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers.”[21]

Private respondent, however, “splits hairs,” so to speak, and contends that the Curso case is premised on the assumption that the Circular implements P.D. 816, whereas it is expressly stated in the Circular that it was issued in implementation of P.D. 27.[22] Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6.[23] Clearly, there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property.

Further, that P.D. 27 does not suffer any constitutional infirmity is a judicial fact that has been repeatedly emphasized by this Court in a number of cases. As early as 1974, in the aforecited case of De Chavez v. Zobel,[24] P.D. 27 was assumed to be constitutional, and upheld as part and parcel of the law of the land, viz.:

“There is no doubt then, as set forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the land according to the revised Constitution itself. Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting fundamental policy goals.”[25]

Thereafter, in Gonzales v. Estrella,[26] which incidentally involves private respondent and counsel in the case at bench, the Court emphatically declared that “Presidential Decree No. 27 has survived the test of constitutionality.”[27]

Then, in 1982, P.D. 27, once again, was stamped with judicial imprimatur in Association of Rice & Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National Land Reform Council,[28] to wit:

“x x x If as pointed out in the opening paragraph, the validity of Presidential Decree No. 27 was assumed as early as 1974, on the first anniversary of the present constitution, in De Chavez v. Zobel and specifically upheld in Gonzales v. Estrella five years later, there cannot be any justification for holding that it is unconstitutional on its face without any factual foundation.”[29]

Further, in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[30] involving the constitutionality of P.D. 27, E.O. Nos. 228[31] and 229,[32] and R.A. 6657,[33] any other assault on the validity of P.D. 27 was ultimately foreclosed when it was declared therein that “R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petition.” [34]

The objection that P.D. 27 is unconstitutional as it sets limitations on the judicial prerogative of determining just compensation is bereft of merit. P.D. 27 provides:

“For the purpose of determining the cost of the land to be transferred to the tenant-farmer pursuant to this Decree, the value of the land shall be equivalent to two and one half (2 ½) times the average harvest of three normal crop years immediately preceding the promulgation of this Decree;”

E.O. 228 supplemented such provision, viz.:

“SEC. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall be based on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973 and related issuances and regulation of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average gross production per hectare shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which shall be multiplied by Thirty Five Pesos (P35.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty One Pesos (P31.00), the government support price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner.”

The determination of just compensation under P.D. No. 27, like in Section 16 (d) of R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law, is not final or conclusive.[35] This is evident from the succeeding paragraph of Section 2 of E.O. 228:

“x x x In the event of dispute with the landowner regarding the amount of lease rental paid by the farmer beneficiary, the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Barangay Committee on Land Production concerned shall resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days from its submission pursuant to Department of Agrarian Reform Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973, and other pertinent issuances. In the event a party questions in court the resolution of the dispute, the landowner’s compensation shall still be processed for payment and the proceeds shall be held in trust by the Trust Department of the Land Bank in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 hereof, pending the resolution of the dispute before the court.”

Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court.

Finally, the Court need not belabor the fact that R.A. 6657 or the CARP Law operates distinctly from P.D. 27. R.A. 6657 covers all public and private agricultural land including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture as provided for in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229;[36] while, P.D. 27 covers rice and corn lands. On this score, E.O. 229, which provides for the mechanism of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically states: “(P)residential Decree No. 27, as amended, shall continue to operate with respect to rice and corn lands, covered thereunder. x x x”[37] It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that R.A. 6657 did not repeal or supersede, in any way, P.D. 27. And whatever provisions of P.D. 27 that are not inconsistent with R.A. 6657 shall be suppletory to the latter,[38] and all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. 27 are retained even with the passage of R.A. 6657.[39]

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions filed by Rolando Sigre and the Land Bank of the Philippines are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 28906 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., no part.