FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141122.
April 22, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO
CALAGO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO,
J.:
This is an appeal from
the judgment[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Barili, Cebu,
Branch 60, finding the appellant, ROGELIO CALAGO, guilty of murder in Criminal
Case No. CEB-BRL-214. The appellant was sentenced to suffer reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Arnulfo Lonzaga, the
sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The records show that an
Information dated January 29, 1997, the appellant was accused of stabbing
Arnulfo Lonzaga to death with the use of a sharp bladed weapon (plamingko),
hitting the latter “at the lower portion of his left chest, right chest wall
and left thigh.” The crime was
allegedly committed with treachery and evident premeditation.[2]
The appellant was
arraigned on May 13, 1998. With the assistance of counsel, he pled “not
guilty.”[3]
The prosecution presented
three (3) witnesses: (1) Dr. Octavio
Ortiz, Municipal Health Officer of Dumanjug, Cebu; (2) Sotero Tewan; and (3)
Pedro Durango.
The prosecution evidence
show that on December 20, 1997, at about 3:30 a.m., Sotero Tewan was
awakened by a commotion coming from the road, about thirty (30) to thirty-five
(35) arm’s length from his house in Lamak, Dumanjug, Cebu. He checked out the
source of the commotion. From a distance of about five (5) arm’s length, he saw
the appellant, Rogelio Calago, and the victim, Arnulfo Lonzaga. The appellant
was holding a knife, locally known as plamingko, while the victim was
crying for help. The appellant then stabbed the victim who slumped on the
ground. Thereafter, the appellant
fled. Tewan rushed to the victim and
asked him if he recognized the person who stabbed him to be sure if the victim
could identify his assailant. The victim named the appellant.[4] Tewan recognized the appellant and the
victim as the crime scene was well-lighted by the new moon. He also personally
knew them for a long time as they were residents of adjacent barangays.
Appellant is even his kumpadre.
Pedro Durango, a neighbor of Sotero Tewan and a
brother-in-law of the appellant, also heard the victim’s cry for help. When he
repaired to the crime scene, Tewan was already with the wounded victim, lying on
the ground. He overheard Tewan inquire from the victim who stabbed him. The
victim replied that it was the appellant. By then, some of their neighbors had
gathered at the crime scene. To make
the identification clearer, Durango also asked the victim who stabbed him.
Again, the victim pointed to the appellant. The victim expired five (5) minutes
later.[5]
The victim was autopsied
on December 20, 1997 by Dr. Octavio Ortiz, Municipal Health Officer of
Dumanjug, Cebu. He sustained three (3) stab wounds. Stab wound no. 1 was located at the lower portion of the left
chest wall, wound no. 2 was at the right chest wall and wound no. 3 was at the
posterior lobe mid-portion of the left thigh. Stab wound nos. 1 and 2 were
fatal because they hit the vital organs of the body, namely, the heart and the
upper lobe of lungs. All three (3) wounds caused massive loss of blood that
resulted in the death of the victim.[6]
For its part, the defense
presented the following witnesses: (1) Bernardita Alvios; (2) Bonifacio Durango
Calago; and (3) the appellant, Rogelio Calago.
The appellant denied that
he killed the victim. He claimed that
he was in his house on the material date and time due to stomach ache.
According to him, he had a stomach ache since December 19, 1997. It lingered until the dawn of December 20,
1997. At about 7:00 a.m., that same
day, a younger sister of his wife informed them that he was a suspect in the
killing of Arnulfo Lonzaga. His story
was corroborated by Bernardita Alvios and Bonifacia Calago.
Bernardita Alvios was a neighbor of the Calagos for eight (8)
years. At 5:00 p.m. on December 19, 1997, she claimed that she went to the
appellant’s house to ask for radish (kalamungay). At that time, the
appellant was suffering from a stomach ache and his wife, Bonifacia, was
attending to his needs. Alvios left as
soon as she got the radish from the couple.
She admitted that it was the first and the only time she went to the
Calagos in the eight (8) years that they had been neighbors.
Bonifacia Calago confirmed that the appellant was in their
house in the early dawn of December 20, 1997. Allegedly, he suffered from
stomach ache starting December 19, 1997.
Due to his illness, she hardly slept in the evening of said date to attend
to him. However, she admitted that she fell asleep, albeit very lightly,
between 3:00 a.m. up to 4:00 a.m. of December 20, 1997. She woke up at 4:00
a.m. when the rooster crowed. At 9:00 a.m., her sister arrived in their house
and reported to them that the appellant was a suspect in the killing of Arnulfo
Lonzaga. She cried upon hearing the report. The policemen came to their house
and arrested him.
The trial court found the
prosecution’s version to be more credible and convicted the appellant of
murder. Hence, the appeal.
The appellant contends
that:
“I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROGELIO CALAGO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.”
We find the appellant
guilty of homicide, not murder, for the killing of the victim, Arnulfo Lonzaga.
Eyewitness Sotero Tewan
testified as follows:[7]
“FISCAL NAZARENO:
Q: Now on December 20, 1997, at 3:30 o’clock dawn, can you tell us where were you?
(WITNESS):
A: I was at the house.
Q: What happened while you were at the house at that time?
A: I heard a commotion.
Q: What did you do when you heard a commotion?
A: I went downstair(s) of my house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said that you went downstairs and went nearer to the place where you heard the commotion to verify. What was the result of that verification?
A: I saw Rogelio Calago
and Arnulfo Lonzaga.
Q: What were the two (2), Rogelio Calago and Arnulfo Lonzaga doing at that time?
A: Arnulfo Lonzaga was crying for help.
Q: ...Why was he crying for help?...
A: I saw that Rogelio
Calago was holding a knife on the right hand and he stabbed it toward Arnulfo
Lonzaga.
Q: How far were you when you saw the incident?
A: About five (5) arms
length.
Q: How far were you from your house when you saw Rogelio Calago stabbed (sic) Arnulfo Lonzaga?
A: About thirty (30) arms length more or less.
xxx xx xxx
Q: Was Arnulfo Lonzaga
hit by the stab?
A: Yes.
Q: Where was Arnulfo
Lonzaga hit?
A: At the chest.
Q: What happened to Arnulfo Lonzaga after being hit by the stab of Rogelio Calago?
A: He fell to the ground.
Q: You said that you went nearer to Arnulfo Lonzaga, what did you do when you were near to (sic) him?
A: We then help(ed) him?
Q: Who were with you at that time?
A: I was with Pedro Durango.”
On cross-examination, he
further declared as follows:[8]
“ATTY. DONDOYANO:
Q: You are telling this Honorable Court that you were awakened by the noise or arguments between Arnulfo Lonzaga and Rogelio Calago?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, is it true that it was very dark during that time?
A: It was well-lighted
because it was a new moon at that time.
Q: Do you know that if you are caught telling a lie because you testified under oath, you will be imprisoned with a charge of perjury?
A: Yes, I know that.
Q: Are you sure that at
3:30 o’clock dawn of December 20, 1997, there was still a moon lighting at that
time?
A: Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You said when you woke up at 3:30 o’clock you heard a commotion. Is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And when you were downstairs you heard somebody crying for help? Is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Who was that person crying for help?
A: Arnulfo Lonzaga.
Q: How did Arnulfo Lonzaga express his cry for help?
A: He said he was stabbed by Rogelio Calago.
COURT:
Q: What is the exact word of Arnulfo Lonzaga?
A: He said: ‘please help
me because I was stabbed by Rogelio Calago.’
Q: Do you mean to say that you did not actually see Rogelio Calago stabbing Arnulfo Lonzaga because at that time you were still five arms length away?
A: I saw the actual
stabbing because when I was there in the house I heard a commotion and when I
went downstairs to verify I heard Arnulfo Lonzaga crying for help because he
was stabbed by Rogelio Calago.
Q: And because of that commotion you presumed that it was Rogelio Calago who stabbed Arnulfo Lonzaga.
A: Because Arnulfo Lonzaga told us that he was stabbed by Rogelio Calago.
Q: You said that when you heard Arnulfo Lonzaga crying for help because he was stabbed, it must be that the stabbing was already committed at that time?
A: Yes that is true.
Q: And because the crime was already through, it was already committed and you saw Rogelio Calago holding a knife, therefore, you presumed that Rogelio Calago is the one who stabbed Arnulfo Lonzaga?
A: Yes. Rogelio Calago was holding a knife when I arrived at the scene of the incident.
Q: And because you saw Rogelio Calago holding a knife you presumed(d) that Rogelio Calago was the one who stabbed Arnulfo Lonzaga? Nobody told you?
A: Arnulfo Lonzaga told us that he was stabbed by Rogelio Calago.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. DONDOYANO:
Q: Is it correct Mr. Tewan that when you approached Arnulfo Lonzaga, you asked him who stabbed him?
A: Yes, we asked him that question.
Q: Which means that when you approached Arnulfo Lonzaga and asked him who stabbed him, you did not know who stabbed him actually?
FISCAL NAZARENO:
I does not necessarily follow, Your Honor.
COURT:
That is part of the testimony of the witness, because had he known the one who stabbed Arnulfo Lonzaga he would not have ask(ed).
Witness may answer.
A: We asked him that
question in order to confirm if Arnulfo Lonzaga could really identify the
assaillant.”
We reject appellant’s
argument that witness Tewan could not have identified him. We are convinced that Tewan did not err in
identifying the appellant. He personally knew the appellant for a number of
years. They are even kumpadres. Tewan saw the latter and the victim at a
close range of five (5) arm’s length. At that time, too, the crime scene was
not completely dark as it was already dawn and the moon was still shining. Thus, Tewan was able to describe the bladed
weapon used by the appellant in attacking the victim. He also related where the
fatal thrust landed.[9] We also examined the testimony of Tewan and
we could not find any reason for him to commit any falsehood as to the identity
of the appellant.
There is another reason
why there can be no doubt that it was appellant who killed the victim. The
victim’s statement as to the identity of the appellant as his assailant is
competent evidence as a dying declaration or at the very least, as part of res
gestae.
A dying declaration pertains
to the declarant’s statements on the cause and surrounding circumstances of his
death made under the consciousness of an impending death.[10] It is admissible because, as a general rule, when the person is at the
point of death, every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced
by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth, and therefore, his
statements, under such circumstances, deserve great weight.[11]
On the other hand, the
declarant’s utterances are considered part of res gestae when made
immediately after a startling occurrence. The admission of such utterances are
based on the well founded belief that words spoken instinctively at the time of
a specific transaction or event, without the opportunity for the speaker to
effectively concoct a fabricated version of the startling event can only be but
credible.[12]
In the case at bar,
Durango corroborated the testimony of Tewan concerning the victim’s declaration
as to the identity of his assailant shortly before he died, thus:[13]
“FISCAL NAZARENO:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What happened while you were at your house on Dec. 20, 1997 at 3:30 o’clock dawn?
A: I heard a cry for help.
Q: Can you tell us what is (sic) the exact words uttered by one crying for help?
A: ‘Help me because I was stabbed.’
Q: When you heard that cry for help, what did you do?
A: I hurriedly went down from the house and proceeded to the place where the cry for help came.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did you see when you arrived at the place where the cried (sic) for help was heard?
A: I saw Arnold (sic) Lonzaga lying on the ground, wounded.
Q: Are you referring to Arnold (sic) Lonzaga the victim in this instant case?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the
situation of Arnold (sic) Lonzaga when you saw him?
A: He was in critical
condition.
Q: Then, what did you do next?
A: I asked Arnulfo
Lonzaga who stabbed him.
Q: And what was his answer?
A: He answered that
Rogelio Calago was the one who stabbed him.”
On cross-examination,
Durango stated as follows:[14]
“ATTY. DONDOYANO:
Q: In your affidavit, Mr. Durango, specifically in paragraph 4, you said and I quote “that when I arrived at the place of the incident, I heard that Sotero Tewan asked (sic) Arnulfo Lonzaga who stabbed him” and Arnulfo Lonzaga answered that it was Rogelio Calago who stabbed him. Now, contrary to what you have said during the direct-examination, it was not actually you who asked that question but it was Sotero Tewan? Am I correct?
A: I also asked personally that question to Arnulfo Lonzaga.
Q: Why was there a need
when you already heard the answer?
A: I wanted to make it
clear.
Q: You mean to tell this Court that the answer was not clear that you want to make it become clearer?
A: Yes, because there
were several neighbors coming at the scene of the incident.
Q: Then why did you not include that in your affidavit, the narration of the event that actually happened at that time?
x x x x x x x x x
WITNESS:
A: It was Durok Lanojan who typed this affidavit and he was in a hurry at that time and the question propounded did not include that question.
ATTY. DONDOYANO:
Q: Now, Mr. Durango, when you approached Arnulfo Lonzaga, what was his condition?
A: He was very critical (sic) at that time.
Q: But he could still talk to you even if his face was facing the ground?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you tell us from
the time you talked to each other, how many hours later did he expire?
A: About five (5)
minutes.”
On re-direct examination,
Durango clarified his statement as follows:[15]
“FISCAL NAZARENO:
Q: You said that when you arrived at the scene of the incident, this Sotero Tewan was already there?
A: Yes.
Q: And when you arrived, Sotero Tewan was already talking to Arnulfo Lonzaga?
A: Yes.
Q: At the time when you asked Arnulfo Lonzaga who stabbed him, were there other persons around?
A: Yes, my neighbors.
Q: Can you please tell us their names?
A: Feliciano Minoza, Fredo Cebel, Ben Minoza and the son of Sotero Tewan, Pabling Tewan.
Q: You mean to say that they also heard what Arnulfo Lonzaga told you?
A: Yes.”
The requisites for the
admissibility of a dying declaration are: (1) the death is imminent and the
declarant is conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to
facts which the victim is competent to testify; (4) the declarant thereafter
dies; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the
declarant’s death is the subject of inquiry.[16]
It appears that no direct
statement was made by the victim to prove that he was conscious of his
impending death. Nonetheless, apart from the statements of the declarant, his
consciousness of impending death can be proved by surrounding circumstances,
such as the nature of injury or by his conduct.[17]
We can glean from the
circumstances that the victim was aware of his impending death when he named
the appellant as his assailant. The
victim was in critical condition. He
sustained severe injuries in the vital organs, such as the heart and the lungs. He bled profusely and due to massive
hemorrhage secondary to the stab wounds, he died within minutes after he named
the appellant.
Parenthetically, as in
the case of Tewan, there is no showing that Pedro Durango was motivated by ill
will in testifying against the appellant.
Indeed, they are brothers-in-law, i.e., the appellant’s wife,
Bonifacia Calago, is his sister. Thus, it would be unlikely for Durango to
fabricate the victim’s declaration pointing to the appellant as the assailant.
His testimony deserves full faith and credit.
We now consider whether
the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation should be rightly
appreciated against the appellant. The appellant contends that the prosecution
failed to prove the presence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation. The Solicitor General agrees.
We sustain the appellant.
There is treachery when
the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime
which tends directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[18]
In the case at bar,
witness Tewan did not give any testimony on how the attack started. He only
related that when he arrived at the crime scene, he saw the appellant stab the
victim. Before that, he recalled that he was awakened because he heard a commotion
and when he went outside his house to check it out, he heard the victim
shouting for help. There was no testimony on his part whether the attack was
sudden and unexpected that it afforded the victim no chance to defend himself.
We have held that for
treachery to exist, there must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was
consciously or deliberately adopted by the culprit to make it impossible or
difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate.[19] Considering that the eyewitness did not see
the onset of the assault, it cannot be said that the appellant had deliberately
adopted a method or mode that deprived the victim of an opportunity to
retaliate. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence as clearly
as the crime itself. Otherwise, it cannot be appreciated.[20]
The trial court also
erred in appreciating the circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly
indicating that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of
time between the decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. None
of these elements has been established in the case at bar.
In the absence of any
circumstance that would qualify the crime at bar to murder, the appellant could
only be held accountable for homicide as defined and penalized under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The prescribed penalty for said crime is
reclusion temporal. Considering
that there was neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance present in the
commission of the crime, the penalty has to be imposed in the medium period,
ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. The appellant, however, is entitled to avail
of the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Thus, he should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which would be within the
range of prision mayor and the maximum thereof would be within the range
of reclusion temporal in its medium period.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment in Criminal Case No.
CEB-BRL-214 is MODIFIED. The appellant is declared guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. He is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
The civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 awarded in favor of the heirs of the late
Arnulfo Lonzaga is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez**, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., on
official leave.
[1] Dated July 10, 1999,
see Rollo, pp. 17-24.
[2] Original Records, p.
1.
[3] Id., p. 34.
[4] TSN, Sotero Tewan,
September 1, 1998, pp. 3-5, 8, 10-12.
[5] TSN, Pedro Durango,
September 2, 1998, pp. 2-3.
[6] TSN, Dr. Octavio
Ortiz, August 11, 1998, pp. 5-6; Exh. “A”, Original Records, pp. 10-11.
[7] TSN, Sotero Tewan,
September 1, 1998, pp. 3-5.
[8] Id., pp. 8,
10-12.
[9] Exh. “B”, Original
Records, pp. 8-9.
[10] People vs. Preciados,
et al., G.R. No.122934, January 5, 2001.
[11] People vs.
Bacunawa, et al., G.R. No. 136859, April 16, 2001.
[12] People vs.
Mosende, G.R. No. 137001, December 5, 2001.
[13] TSN, Pedro Durango,
September 2, 1998, pp. 2-3.
[14] Id., pp. 7-8.
[15] Id., p. 9.
[16] People vs.
Bergante, 286 SCRA 629, 638 (1997).
[17] People vs.
Bautista, 278 SCRA 613, 624 (1997) citing People vs. Devaras, 37 SCRA
697, 705 (1971) and People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil. 182, 191 (1927);
People vs. Calixtro, 208 Phil 317, 330 (1983).
[18] Article 14 (16),
Revised Penal Code.
[19] People vs.
Herida, et al., G.R. No. 127158, March 5, 2001.
[20] See People vs.
Mationg, et al., G.R. No. 137989, March 27, 2001.
** Per Special Order No. 220, dated April 22, 2002.