EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133005.
April 11, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PONCIANO BALUYA @ NONONG, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN,
J.:
Before us for automatic
review is the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City, Branch 15, promulgated on February 26, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 10077-SP
finding accused-appellant, Ponciano Baluya alias Nonong guilty of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the maximum penalty of death.
The Information reads as follows:
That on or about June 7, 1996, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named, with lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rape and have sexual knowledge with undersigned complainant EMILY MARTINEZ VDA. DE VALLON, by undressing her and then had sexual intercourse with said offended party against the will of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on
September 17, 1996, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel pleaded “not
guilty.” [3] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
The victim, Emily
Martinez was 24 years old at the time of the rape. She was a widow and a resident of Sitio Mabilog, Brgy. Sta.
Catalina, San Pablo City. She has two (2) children, Jimmy Boy, who is seven
years old and a daughter, aged three years old. The accused-appellant, Ponciano Baluya was the common-law husband
of her eldest sister, Marilyn.
On June 7, 1996 at around
ten o’clock in the evening, Emily and her two children were already sleeping,
when she heard the accused-appellant calling and asking her to open the door on
the pretext that there was somebody outside with him.[4] As soon as Emily opened the door, the
accused-appellant suddenly grabbed her, poked a knife on her neck and
threatened to kill her if she shouted.
Thereafter, the accused-appellant kissed her several times, undressed
her by removing her duster and panty. While naked, she fearfully sat on the
floor with her children on her lap.[5] Then the accused-appellant pulled her
children away from her and pushed down Emily on the floor. He swiftly removed his shorts, twisted
Emily’s arms and mounted on her. He forced
her legs apart and forced himself on her while kissing her on the mouth,
sucking her tongue and mashing her nipples.[6] She shouted for help but the
accused-appellant covered her mouth with his hands.[7] Unfortunately, the victim’s mother,
Marcelina Martinez, who just lived next door adjacent to her house was not
around at that time as she was attending the wake of a dead sister in Quezon
Province. The houses of their other
neighbors were quite far from them.
Emily pleaded with the
accused-appellant not to continue with his bestial act because it was painful.[8] Even the children pleaded to him but he was
unmindful of them. After the sexual
assault, the accused-appellant pushed away the children, threatened to kill all
of them if the matter was reported and then left.[9]
Fearful of their safety
and the thought that the accused-appellant might return to their house, Emily
decided to leave the house that night.
Together with her children, they went to their nearest neighbor,
Felomina Gutierrez. In getting there,
they had to pass a creek and climb a hill.
She did not tell Felomina of what had transpired because of the
accused-appellant’s threat on their lives once they reported the incident. They stayed in Felomina’s house that night.[10]
Emily and her children
returned to their house the next day.
Upon her mother’s arrival from Quezon, Emily confided to her about the sexual violation committed by the
accused-appellant. Her mother told her
to leave their house at Mabilog and go to the house of her younger sister,
Myrna at Brgy. Sandig, San Pablo City.
She obeyed, and they stayed in her sister’s house for three months. Upon her sister’s advice, the matter was
reported to the barangay authorities and then she gave her statement before the
police authorities.[11]
Jimmy Boy, the seven year
old son of the victim corroborated the testimony of his mother and pointed to
his “Tiyo Nonong” as the rapist.
According to him, he heard the voice of his Tiyo Nonong calling from the
outside and knocking at their door. The
light coming from the gas lamp enabled him to recognize the
accused-appellant. He testified that
Tiyo Nonong pointed a bolo at the neck of her mother, stretched her legs and
laid on top of her. The accused-appellant
removed the underwear of her mother (“hinubuan”) and he was also naked when
he mounted on her. At that time, he and
his younger sister were on her mother’s lap when they were thrown near the wall
by the accused-appellant. Her mother
tried to fight him but the accused-appellant was just too big. He saw the private organ of his Tiyo Nonong
being inserted into the vagina of his
mother for one hour. He saw him also
doing the sexual act (“kinanyog”).
He pleaded to spare his mother from the dastardly act, but the
accused-appellant did not mind him. He
heard his uncle threatening his mother not to tell his grandmother about it,
otherwise, he will kill her.[12] After satisfying his lust, the
accused-appellant left them. They too
left their house and they went to the house of “Na, Pilar,” their neighbor.[13] Jimmy Boy added that his Tiyo Nonong likes
his mother but her mother does not like him.[14]
The defense presented a
different version.
Ponciano Baluya,
testified that on June 7, 1996, at around five o’clock in the afternoon, he was
in their house taking care of his child who was about three months old. His wife Marilyn, was just outside of the
house gathering bananas. After a while,
one of his workers, Rudy Libit came to their house followed by Apolonio Pontiaga. Rudy Libit was requesting for an advance
payment for his work which his wife readily gave him. Later, Marilyn asked the accused-appellant to go to the house of
Emily to inquire about the date of interment of their dead aunt. She, likewise, requested Rudy and Apolonio
to accompany her husband. The three
left the house at around seven o’clock in the evening. Emily’s place was located in Sta. Catalina
which was about two kilometers away from where they lived.[15]
When they were more or
less six (6) meters away from Emily’s house, the accused-appellant noticed a man running away from the side of
her house. Arriving thereat, Emily
invited the group for coffee. She
informed them that for two nights Fernando Gesmundo “Nanding” alias “Bukol” attempted to enter their house. They could not leave immediately after finishing their errand as Emily
prevailed them to stay and help her
check her mother’s house which she feared was robbed. Upon checking the house, Emily could not, however, say which items were missing. They noticed a mat and pillow laid on the
floor. They surmised that Emily had a
lover. The group left the place at
about midnight, and they went to the house of Rudy to sup.
Ponciano Baluya denied
having raped Emily. According to him,
Emily filed the case against him because she was mad at him. He caught her having sexual intercourse with
his “bilas”, one Zosimo Bueno which he reported the matter to his wife and
mother-in-law. Aside from that, she caught Emily thrice stealing fruit crops
from the landholding he was managing for which she was scolded. He denied the allegations of Jimmy Boy that
he likes Emily and that he was the one who raped her.[16]
Marilyn Baluya, the
common-law wife of the appellant for twenty (20) years also testified for the
accused-appellant. She added that her
relationship with her sister was good.
On June 8, 1996, she saw Emily in her house, but they were not able to
talk to each other. She saw her again
on June 22 and this time, they talked and teased each other but nothing was
said about the rape. After June 7,
1996, she also saw her mother but not a word was mentioned about the rape. She only learned about the incident when her husband received the subpoena from
the fiscal’s office.[17]
She surmised that
Emily had filed the case against her
husband because she was angry with
him. The accused-appellant used to
scold Emily every time the latter took crops from the land he was
managing. Otherwise, Marilyn suspected that the case was instigated by
her sister Myrna and her mother for they have an axe to grind against her
husband. Her sister, Myrna and the
accused-appellant were former lovers before she and the accused-appellant
eloped and started living-in together.
On the other hand, her mother was angry at her because she refused to
marry the man whom her stepfather wanted for her,[18] and when
she brought to her attention that her
stepfather attempted to rape her.[19]
Another witness presented
by the defense was Rudy Libit who worked as a grass cutter in the land being
leased by the accused-appellant. He
corroborated what the accused-appellant testified.[20]
Norilyn Baluya, the
daughter of the accused-appellant was likewise presented. She testified that the victim was her
aunt. On June 8, 1996 at around nine
o’clock, she saw her aunt gathering coconuts that fell on the ground. They talked for awhile and during their
conversation, Emily manifested her dislike for Norilyn’s father because he was
very talkative and “pakialamero sa kanilang pamilya.” Emily allegedly
told her that she will do something to stop her father from meddling into her
affairs.[21]
Norilyn learned of the
rape charge against her father when they received the subpoena on June
17,1996. It was not true that her
father raped her aunt. Her cousin, Jimmy Boy’s testimony should not be believed
because he might just be following the dictates of her mother who is cruel to
her children and who is used to spank them.[22]
The last witness
presented by the defense was Apolonio Pontigas who affirmed the contents of the
affidavit he executed which merely corroborated the testimony of Rudy Libit.[23]
On February 26, 1998, the
trial court rendered a judgment of conviction.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused PONCIANO BALUYA @ NONONG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH AND TO INDEMNIFY THE VICTIM EMILY MARTINEZ VDA. DE BALLON the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Dissatisfied
with the judgment, the appellant interposed the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCORDING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY, WHICH IS NOT ONLY INCREDIBLE PER SE BUT ALSO INCONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE SECOND PROSECUTION WITNESS.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME OF RAPE HAD BEEN COMMITTED IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF CARNAL KNOWLEDGE AS WELL AS THE EXISTENCE OF FORCE, THREAT OR INTIMIDATION IN OBTAINING SEXUAL CONGRESS.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DEATH IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY ALLEGATION OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF “IN THE PRESENCE OF
CHILDREN” IN THE INFORMATION.[25]
In the main, the
accused-appellant questions the credibility of the complainant and the sufficiency
of evidence to convict him of the crime charged.
As in most criminal
cases, this Court is confronted with the issue of credibility in view of the
opposing facts established by the prosecution and the defense. This Court however is bound by the prevailing
principle founded on a host of jurisprudential rulings that the findings of the
trial court on credibility are entitled to the highest degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal, absent any clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance
which could have affected the result of the case.[26] We find no cogent reason to depart from this
principle.
In rape cases, the
essential element that the prosecution must prove is the absence of the
victim’s consent to the sexual congress.
The gravamen of the crime of rape is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent.[27] Force in rape is relative, depending on the
age, size and strength of the parties.
In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the
victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule.[28]
The act of holding a
knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation and
threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a woman to
submission.[29] Even assuming arguendo that Emily did
not repel the physical aggression of accused-appellant, this does not preclude
a finding that she was raped. It is
well-settled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon a victim and the latter submits herself, against
her will, to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal
safety.[30]
Accused-appellant
capitalizes on the failure of the victim to escape at the time that he was
removing his clothes and not holding any part of the victim’s body. This circumstance cannot be taken against
her. Not every victim of a crime can be
expected to act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of
mankind. Different people react to
similar situations dissimilarly. While
the normal response of a woman about to be defiled may be to shout and put up a
wild struggle, others become catatonic because of the mental shock they
experience and the fear engendered by the unexpected occurrence. Yet it can never be successfully argued that
the latter are any less sexual victims than the former.[31]
Accused-appellant in an
effort to discredit the victim pointed out the absurdity of her account that
she was undressed while seated and was holding her children, with appellant
poking a knife at her neck and covering her mouth at the same time. Accused-appellant argues that he could not
have done all of those things at the same time since he only has two
hands. We agree with the Solicitor
General’s observation on this point:
The testimony of the complainant as to how she was undressed, at
what point she was carrying her child when the knife was poked at her, and the
instance when the appellant covered her mouth, must be taken according to the
particular stage or sequence of the incident to which they relate. The unprejudiced or unbiased mind could
readily make out the following sequence of events from the complainant’s
testimony both on direct and cross-examination.[32]
It is not the first time
that the Court is faced with the argument as to the presence of a third
hand. In People v. Lamberte,[33] the Court considered the defense as
sophistic and untenable. Emily in the
instant case, did not claim that the accused-appellant pointed a knife on her
neck, while undressing her and covered her mouth at the same time. It may be reasonably inferred from her
testimony that the series of events took place consequentially.
Accused-appellant further
attacks the affirmative answer of Jimmy Boy to the question as to the legs of
his mother being intertwined into the hips of the accused-appellant during the
sexual violation. This condition was
suggested to him and was posed after the lengthy cross-examination. What Jimmy Boy testified was, that his
mother was not embracing the accused-appellant nor holding on to his private
part. She was all the time trying not
to let his Tiyo Nonong’s private part enter hers. Jimmy Boy was consistent in testifying that his mother objected
to the sexual act.
The accused-appellant may
not successfully impugn the credibility of the private complainant based on
minor inconsistencies in her testimony that does not even touch on the
essential elements of the crime. The
credibility of a rape victim is not destroyed by the few minor inconsistencies
in her testimony. Paradoxically they
may be badges of spontaneity, as they
indicate that the witness was unrehearsed.[34] Minor lapses of a victim’s testimony should
be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and
so painful to recall as rape.[35] These lapses do not detract from the
overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the
malefactor.[36] Furthermore, the testimony of a witness must
be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions
thereof or isolated passages therein.[37]
The prosecution witnesses
were categorical and consistent in saying that the accused-appellant raped
Emily. Their positive declarations
prevail over the negative assertions of the accused-appellant and his
witnesses. Moreover, they could not
have been mistaken about the identity of the accused-appellant considering that
he is the common-law husband of Emily’s sister.
While denial is a
legitimate defense in rape cases, bare denials cannot overcome the categorical
testimony of the victim.[38]
The defense of alibi by
the accused-appellant is unavailing.
The same was not corroborated by
disinterested and credible witnesses.
This Court has consistently held that where the accused-appellant is
positively identified by the victim herself who harbored no ill motive against
the accused-appellant, such as in the present case the defense of alibi must
fail.[39] Besides, to establish such, the
accused-appellant must show that he was in some other place for such period of
time, and that it was impossible for him to have been at the locus criminis
or its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime.[40] In this case, accused-appellant, while
denying the rape charge, testified that he together with two companions went to
complainant’s house on that date to inquire about the interment of the aunt of
his common-law wife. It was therefore
not impossible for the accused-appellant to have been at the place where the
crime was committed.
Accused-appellant also
failed to impute any improper motive on the part of the complainant except to
surmise that she might be having an affair and she was hiding it from them, or
that it might be due to his scolding her when she was caught taking crops from
his tenanted land. Apart from being a
mere speculation, the same is far too shallow to deserve even a scant
consideration by this Court. Even granting
that the complainant was a woman of loose morals, she could still be the victim
of rape. Even a prostitute may be a
victim of rape.[41] The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge
of a woman against her consent. The
victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case it is
shown that intimidation was used to force the victim to have sex with the
appellant. Settled is the rule that
when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper
motive in making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled
to full faith and credence.[42]
Jurisprudence holds that
when a woman says she had been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that the rape has been committed and if her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused-appellant may be convicted on the basis thereof.[43]
If Emily cried rape to
save her reputation, why would she pinpoint to the accused-appellant as the
rapist? Absent any circumstance
indicating the contrary, she brought the charge against the accused-appellant
for she wanted to obtain justice. Her
zeal in prosecuting the case evinces the truth that she merely seeks justice
for her honor that has been debased.
We cannot, however,
impose the death penalty on accused-appellant even if it was claimed that the
crime of rape was committed in full view of the son of the victim.
Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or victim;
2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities;
3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity;
4. When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling or a child below seven (7) years old;
5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease;
6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency;
7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
While Republic Act No.
7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of
the seven new circumstances introduced in Art. 335, Revised Penal Code, we have
already referred to such crime as qualified rape.[44] The seven attendant circumstances are in the
nature of special qualifying circumstances which, unlike generic aggravating
circumstances which may be appreciated and proved even if not alleged, cannot
be considered as such unless so alleged in the information even if proved.
The special qualifying circumstances increase the penalties by degrees
in contrast with aggravating circumstances which affect only the period of
penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree.
Hence, the rape committed
in full view of the child of the victim, even if proved, but was not alleged in
the information will not affect the imposable penalty in this case. As earlier adverted to, appellant can only
be held liable for simple rape, which is punishable by the single indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Corollarily, Article 63 of the Code provides that where the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the offense.
With respect to the civil
liability, in line with current rulings, if in the crime of rape, the death
penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex
delicto for the victim should be in the amount of P75,000.00; if the
death penalty is not decreed by the court, the victim would instead be entitled
to P50,000.00.[45] Civil indemnity is mandatory upon the
finding of the fact of rape. Also, an
additional award of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages is automatically
granted in rape cases, separate and distinct from the indemnity.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
San Pablo City, Branch 15 dated February 26, 1998 convicting accused-appellant,
PONCIANO BALUYA of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
sentence should be reduced from DEATH to reclusion perpetua and aside
from the award of P50,000.00 moral damages, the accused-appellant should
also be ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity[46] to the offended party, Emily Martinez.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge
Marivic T. Balisi-Umali.
[2] Original Record, p.
1.
[3] Id., at 23.
[4] TSN, December 3,
1996, p. 4.
[5] Id., at 6.
[6] TSN, December 17,
1996, pp. 2-5.
[7] TSN, November 11,
1996, pp. 6-8.
[8] TSN, December 17,
1996, p. 4.
[9] TSN, November 11,
1996, p. 8.
[10] Id., at 9-10.
[11] Id., at 9-12.
[12] TSN, January 21,
1997, pp. 2-11.
[13] Id., at 5.
[14] Id., at
12-13.
[15] TSN, July 14,
1997, pp. 3-4.
[16] TSN, July 28, 1997,
pp. 6-8.
[17] TSN, March 4,
1997, pp. 2-6.
[18] Id., at 6-7.
[19] TSN, April 14, 1997,
p. 2.
[20] TSN, June 16, 1997;
June 30, 1997
[21] TSN, August 18,
1997, pp. 3-4.
[22] Id., at 3;
6-8.
[23] TSN, August 25,
1997, pp. 3-4.
[24] Decision, p. 12, Rollo, p. 34.
[25] Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 5-6, Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[26] People v. Pacina,
338 SCRA 195 (2000); People vs. Buendia, 314 SCRA 655 (1999); People
v. Flores, 243 SCRA 374 (1995).
[27] People v. dela
Cruz, 338 SCRA 582 (2000).
[28] People v. Yparraguire, 335 SCRA 69 (2000).
[29] People v. Buendia,
supra note 11.
[30] People v. Rabosa,
273 SCRA 142 (1997).
[31] Supra.
[32] Appellee’s Brief, p.
10, Rollo p. 123.
[33] 142 SCRA 685 (1986).
[34] People v. Guzman,
333 SCRA 269 (2000).
[35] People v. Gementiza,
285 SCRA 478 (1998).
[36] People vs. Baccay,
284 SCRA 296 (1998).
[37] People vs. Natan,
193 SCRA 355 (1991).
[38] People vs. Martinez,
325 SCRA 601 (2000).
[39] People v. Yparriguire,
335 SCRA 69 (2000); People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188, 217.
[40] People v. Avilano,
332 SCRA 19 (2000); People v. de Leon, 332 SCRA 37 (2000).
[41] People v. Rosales,
313 SCRA 757 (1999).
[42] People v. Gementina,
285 SCRA 478, 486.
[43] People v. Gonzales,
338 SCRA 678 (2000); People v. Alcartado, 334 SCRA 701 (2000).
[44] People v. Ramos,
296 SCRA 559 (1998).
[45] People v. Garigadi,
317 SCRA 399 (1999).
[46] Pewople v. Maglantay,
304 SCRA 272 (1999); People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998).