FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129644.
September 7, 2001]
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS, PAULINO ROXAS CHUA and KIANG MING CHU CHUA, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Private respondents Paulino Roxas
Chua and Kiang Ming Chu Chua have filed before this Court a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated March 7, 2000, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46735 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction enjoining petitioner, the Sheriff of Manila, the Register of Deeds of San Juan, their officers, representatives, agents and persons acting on their behalf from causing the transfer of possession, ownership and title of the property covered by TCT No. 410603 in favor of petitioner is LIFTED. The Assignment of Rights to Redeem dated November 21, 1988 executed by Alfonso Roxas Chua in favor of Paulino Roxas Chua is ordered RESCINDED. The levy on execution dated February 4, 1991 and the Certificate of Sale dated April 30, 1992 in favor of petitioner are DECLARED VALID against the one-half portion of the subject property.
SO ORDERED.
Briefly, the facts are restated as
follows:
By virtue of the adverse decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, in Civil Case No. 82-14134,
entitled “Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Pacific Multi Commercial
Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua,” the residential land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 410603 in the name of spouses Alfonso Roxas
Chua and Kiang Ming Chu Chua was levied on execution. Kiang Ming Chu Chua filed an action questioning the levy on the
ground that the land was conjugal partnership property. This resulted in a compromise agreement to
the effect that the levy shall be valid only to the extent of the ½ share
pertaining to Alfonso Roxas Chua.
Accordingly, an alias notice of levy was issued affecting the said ½
undivided portion of the property.
After the execution sale, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of
Metrobank, the judgment creditor, and the same was annotated on TCT No. 410603
on December 22, 1987.
Meanwhile, China Banking
Corporation filed a complaint for sum of money against Pacific Multi
Agro-Industrial Corporation and Alfonso Roxas Chua, docketed as Civil Case No.
85-31257 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 29. On November 7, 1985, judgment was rendered
ordering defendants to pay Chinabank the aggregate amount of P2,500,000.00 plus
interests, penalties and attorney’s fees.
Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed
for failure to file appellants’ brief.
Thus, notice of levy on execution was issued on February 4, 1991 against
the right and interest of Alfonso Roxas Chua in TCT No. 410603. The same was later sold at public auction
and a certificate of sale was executed in favor of Chinabank, and inscribed on
TCT 410603 on May 4, 1992.
Previously, however, on November
21, 1988, Alfonso Roxas Chua executed in favor of his son, Paulino Roxas Chua,
an “Assignment of Right to Redeem,” pertaining to his right to redeem the ½
undivided portion of the land sold to Metrobank. On January 11, 1989, Paulino redeemed the property from
Metrobank. On March 14, 1989, the
Assignment of Right to Redeem and the redemption by Paulino Roxas Chua of the
property from Metrobank were annotated on TCT No. 410603.
Private respondents Paulino Roxas
Chua and Kiang Ming Chu Chua filed Civil Case No. 63199 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163, alleging that Paulino has a prior and better
right over Chinabank inasmuch as the assignment to him of the right to redeem
and his redemption of Alfonso’s share in the property were inscribed on the
title on an earlier date than the annotation of the notice of levy and
certificate of sale in favor of Chinabank.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private
respondents and enjoined Chinabank, the Sheriff of Manila and the Register of
Deeds of San Juan from causing the transfer of possession, ownership and
certificate of title, or otherwise disposing of the property covered by TCT No.
410603 in favor of Chinabank or any other person.
On March 7, 2000, we rendered the
now assailed Decision reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
rescinding the Assignment of Right to Redeem executed by Alfonso in favor of
Paulino Roxas Chua, for having been entered into in fraud of creditors.
In their Motion for Reconsideration,
private respondents raise the following grounds:
2.1. The Decision, with due respect, failed to consider vital facts showing that the assignment was indubitably:
[a] for valuable consideration; and
[b] In good faith;
which if considered, would result in a complete reversal.
2.2. The dispositive portion of the decision rescinding the assignment of the right to redeem and validating the levy on execution dated April 30, 1992 in favor of petitioner, with due respect, cannot be enforced because:
[a] rescission is late; and
[b] levy on execution was on the wrong property.
2.3. The Petition
was invalid and failed to vest the Honorable Court with the jurisdiction to
review the decision by the Court of Appeals.[1]
Petitioner filed its Comment,[2] and private respondents filed their Reply with leave
of Court.[3]
Under their first ground, private
respondents argue that there was sufficient evidence to overthrow the
presumption that the assignment of the right to redeem was in fraud of
creditors. After a re-examination of
the evidence, we agree with private respondents.
Indeed, Article 1387 of the Civil
Code provides that alienations made by a debtor by gratuitous title are
presumed fraudulent when the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay
his outstanding debts. Likewise,
alienations by onerous title are presumed fraudulent when made by persons
against whom some judgment has been rendered or some writ of attachment has
been issued. These, however, are mere
presumptions which are in no way conclusive.
The presumption of fraud can be overthrown by evidence showing that the
conveyance was made in good faith and for a sufficient and valuable
consideration.[4]
In the case at bar, private
respondents sufficiently established that the conveyance was made in good faith
and for valuable consideration. Paulino
maintains that he had no knowledge of his father Alfonso’s financial problem
with petitioner Chinabank until he was about to cause the cancellation of TCT
No. 410603.[5] Furthermore, he paid the sum of P100,000.00 to
Alfonso for the right to redeem,[6] and paid the redemption amount of P1,463,375.39 to
Metrobank.[7]
Expectedly, petitioner refutes
these, saying that the amounts paid by Paulino were grossly disproportionate to
the right to redeem the property, which is a residential house and lot located
in North Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
But as correctly pointed out by private respondents, the amount of
P100,000.00 paid by Paulino to Alfonso was not for the property itself, but
merely for the right to redeem the same.
As a matter of fact, Paulino still had to pay Metrobank the redemption
price of P1,463,375.39. Whether or not
the latter amount was adequate is beyond the scope of this inquiry. Suffice it to state that Metrobank accepted
the same and reconveyed the property to Paulino. Moreover, only Alfonso’s conjugal share in the property was
affected, and the determination of its value was still subject to liquidation
of debts and charges against the conjugal partnership.
It must be emphasized that the reconsideration
of our earlier Decision on this score does not depart from well-settled
doctrines and jurisprudence. Rather, it
entailed merely a re-evaluation of the evidence on record.
Going now to the second ground,
private respondent points out that the dispositive portion of our Decision can
not be executed without affecting the rights of Metrobank inasmuch as Alfonso’s
right of redemption, which he assigned to Paulino, only had a lifetime of
twelve months from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in favor
of Metrobank. The rescission of the
assignment of the right to redeem would have had the effect of allowing the
twelve-month period of redemption to lapse, and thus confer on Metrobank the
right to consolidate ownership over the property and to the execution of the
sheriff’s final deed of sale.
The certificate of sale in favor
of Metrobank was registered on December 22, 1987. Under the 1964 Rules of Court which were in effect at that time,
the judgment debtor or redemptioner had the right to redeem the property from
Metrobank within twelve months[8] from the date of registration of the certificate of
sale.[9] Chinabank was a redemptioner, being then a creditor
with a lien by judgment on the property sold, subsequent to the judgment under
which the property was sold.[10]
Upon the expiration of the
twelve-month period of redemption and no such redemption is made, the purchaser
shall be entitled to the final deed of sale over the property sold on
execution.
Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period. By whom executed or given. --- If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed, whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment debtor shall have the entire period of twelve (12) months from the date of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity, as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the execution and delivery of said deed, the purchaser, or
redemptioner, or his assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire all the
right, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property as of
the time of the levy, except as against the judgment debtor in possession, in
which case the substitution shall be effective as of the date of the deed. The possession of the property shall be given
to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party
is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.[11]
Hence, at the time Chinabank
levied on Alfonso Roxas Chua’s share in TCT No. 410603 on February 4, 1991, the
said property was no longer his. The
same had already been acquired by Metrobank and, later, redeemed by Paulino
Roxas Chua. Even without the assignment
of the right to redeem to Paulino, the subject ½ share in the property would
pertain to Metrobank. Either way,
Chinabank would not stand to acquire the same.
It is an established doctrine that a judgment creditor only acquires at
an execution sale the identical interest possessed by the judgment debtor in
the property which is the subject of the sale.
It follows that if, at the time of the execution sale, the judgment
debtor had no more right to or interest in the property because he had already
sold it to another, then the purchaser acquires nothing.[12]
Otherwise stated, the rescission
of the assignment of the right to redeem would have nullified Paulino’s
redemption of the property. Thus,
Metrobank’s inchoate right to the property would have become complete as of
December 1988, when the twelve-month redemption period expired without the
right of redemption having been exercised.
As stated above, Chinabank was a
redemptioner that could redeem the property from Metrobank. It was a judgment creditor with a lien on
the property sold subsequent to the judgment under which the property was sold. Hence, what Chinabank could have done was to
redeem the property ahead of Paulino.
In the alternative, it could have moved for the rescission of the
assignment to Paulino of the right to redeem, but within the twelve-month
period of redemption. Beyond that,
there would be no more right of redemption and, thus, no more assignment to
rescind.
Assuming that there was no valid
assignment of the right to redeem, Paulino, as the son and compulsory heir of
Alfonso, could still redeem his father’s ½ share in the property from
Metrobank. Under Rule 39, Section 29
(a) of the 1964 Rules of Court, the judgment debtor or his successor in
interest may redeem real property sold on execution. Paulino is included within the term “successor in interest.”
The “successor-in-interest”
contemplated by the above provisions includes a person to whom the judgment
debtor has transferred his right of redemption, or one to whom he has conveyed
his interests in the property for purposes of redemption, or one who succeeds
to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the
property, or his spouse or heirs. A
compulsory heir to the judgment debtor qualifies as a successor-in-interest who
can redeem property sold on execution.[13]
In Director of Lands v.
Lagniton,[14] we held that “the right of a son, with respect to the
property of a father or mother, is an inchoate or contingent interest, because
upon the death of the father or the mother or both, he will have a right to
inherit said conjugal property. If any
holder of an inchoate interest is a successor in interest with right to redeem
a property sold on execution, then the son is such a successor in interest, as
he has an inchoate right to the property of his father.”
Thus, Paulino’s redemption on
January 11, 1989 from Metrobank of the ½ share of Alfonso Roxas Chua in the
property covered by TCT No. 410603, with or without the execution of the
“Assignment of Right to Redeem”, was valid.
Necessarily, therefore, the said property no longer belonged to Alfonso
Roxas Chua on February 4, 1991, when notice of levy was made against him
pursuant to the judgment in Civil Case No. 85-31257 in favor of Chinabank. Petitioner should have levied on other
properties of Alfonso Roxas Chua.
Finally, it is not disputed that
the property covered by TCT No. 410603 is a family home occupied by Kiang Ming
Chu Chua and her children. The levy and
execution sale in favor of Metrobank affected the ½ undivided share
thereof. In the instant petition,
Chinabank prays that the assignment to Paulino of Alfonso’s right to redeem be
declared null and void and that the levy in its favor on the ½ undivided
portion of the property be declared valid.
Ultimately, petitioner Chinabank’s objective is to acquire ownership of
the ½ undivided portion of the property.
However, the acquisition by Chinabank, or Metrobank for that matter, of
the said portion will create an absurd co-ownership between a bank, on the one
hand, and a family, on the other hand, of the latter’s family home.
The rigid and technical
application of the Rules may be relaxed in order to avoid an absurd
result. After all, the Rules of Court
mandates that a liberal construction of the Rules be adopted in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. This rule of construction is especially
useful in the present case where adherence to the letter of the law would
result in absurdity and manifest injustice.[15]
Therefore, we affirm the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46735, except the awards of moral and
exemplary damages, which are deleted.
There is no proof of private respondents’ physical or mental suffering
as a result of petitioner’s acts. Likewise,
petitioner does not appear to have acted in a malevolent or oppressive manner
towards private respondents. However,
petitioner should be liable for the attorney’s fees incurred by private
respondents, since its act of resisting private respondents’ causes of action
compelled private respondents to litigate.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, our Decision dated March
7, 2000 is RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46735 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondents the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees
and to pay the costs. Petitioner China
Banking Corporation, the Sheriff of Manila, and the Register of Deeds of San
Juan, Metro Manila, their officers, representatives, agents or persons acting
on their behalf, are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from causing the transfer of
possession, ownership and title, or from otherwise disposing, of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 410603 in favor of petitioner
China Banking Corporation or to any other person acting on its behalf. The Register of Deeds of San Juan, Metro
Manila is ordered to CANCEL all annotations on TCT No. 410603 in favor of China
Banking Corporation pursuant to Civil Case No. 85-31257.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p.
222.
[2] Ibid., pp.
307-325.
[3] Ibid., pp.
328-341.
[4] IV Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, 592 [1991]; citing cases.
[5] TSN, January 14,
1994, p. 11.
[6] Exh. “E”.
[7] Exh. “F”.
[8] One (1) year, under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 39, Section 28.
[9] 1964 RULES OF COURT,
Rule 39, Section 30; Villanueva v. Malaya, 330 SCRA 278, 292 [2000]; Republic
of the Philippines v. National Labor Relations Commission, 318 SCRA 459, 463-64
[1999].
[10] 1964 RULES OF COURT,
Rule 39, Section 29 (b).
[11] 1964 RULES OF COURT,
Rule 39, Section 35.
[12] II Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, 413 [1996 Ed.].
[13] Villanueva v.
Malaya, supra, at 290; Palicte v. Ramolete, 154 SCRA 132, 138-39 [1987].
[14] 103 Phil. 889, 892
[1958].
[15] Camacho v. Court of
Appeals, 287 SCRA 611, 617 [1998].