THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142877.
October 2, 2001]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,
minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners, vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of
two illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be
the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective
shares in the latter’s estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August
1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners,
were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07
June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March
1992, leaving behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in
various corporations and some real property.
It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners
filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for “Partition with Inventory and Accounting”
of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse
and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of
the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one for
partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from
being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de
Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased
Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due
to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for
reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said
motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate
court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should
be threshed out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented
by respondents appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners’
allegation of illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after
submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents
filed an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on
the ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan
G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once
petitioners would have been able to establish their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine, that an action
for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the question
of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an
independent suit or proceeding.
Finding credence in the argument
of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of
petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being improper.[1] It decreed that the declaration of heirship could
only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing
order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners maintain that their
recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an
authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such
and does not require a separate action for judicial approval following the
doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents
submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is
inapplicable to the case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate
filiation in Divinagracia. In
praying for the affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on
the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,[3] which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be
seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally addressing the issue.
The controversy between the
parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter
draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate
children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.[4] The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required.[5] In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that
does not require a separate action for judicial approval.[6] Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside
of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an
authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations
is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would
show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live birth would also
identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of
the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.[8] This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband
and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse.[9] Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods
set forth in Article 170,[10] and in proper cases Article 171,[11] of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August
1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be
legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to
establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners,
in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This
step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father,[13] or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs,[14] can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. Thus, it is only when the
legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.
Respondents correctly argued that
petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an
illegitimate child who had claimed to be an acknowledged spurious child by
virtue of a private document, signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing
such recognition. It was not a case of
legitimate children asserting to be somebody else’s illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it
was not for them, given the attendant circumstances particularly, to declare
that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly opposed to the
entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de
Jesus.
The rule that the written
acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners’
alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be
of any relevance in this instance. This
issue, i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action
having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the
children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,[15] one that can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose.[16] Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.[17]
WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant
petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Regional Trial Court
Decision, 08 February 2000.
[2] 143 SCRA 356.
[3] 205 SCRA 321.
[4] Article 172, Family
Code.
[5] Gono-Javier vs.
Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 593.
[6] See Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356.
[7] Gono-Javier vs.
Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 593.
[8] Tison
vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 582; Article 164 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial
insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or
both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided,
that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the
civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
[9] Article
166 of the Family Code provides:
“ART. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was
obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.”
[10] Art.
170. The action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of
the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a
proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where
the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his
heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or
where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in
the Philippines; and three years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the
husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said
birth, whichever is earlier.
[11] Art.
171. The heirs of the husband may
impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding
article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
[12] Tison vs. Court of
Appeals, 276 SCRA 582.
[13] See Article 170.
[14] See Article 171.
[15] Tison vs. Court of
Appeals, 276 SCRA 582.
[16] La-Ducasse vs.
Ducasse, 45 So. 565, 120 La. 731; Saloy’s Succ. 10 So. 782, 44 La. Ann., cited
in 10 C.J.S. 77.
[17] Article 167, Family
Code; Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73.