THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322.
October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien
may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner.
However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026–AF.
The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J.
Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City
as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable
laws to any and/or both parties.”[3]
The assailed Order denied
reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of Australian
Citizenship” issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were
married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.[7] In their application for a marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”[8]
Starting October 22, 1995,
petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution
of their marriage. While the two were
still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy --
respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her
on January 12, 1994. She claimed that
she learned of respondent’s marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred
that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and
its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian
citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner
in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five
years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage ha[d] irretrievably
broken down.”[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer
that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the
case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court
rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial
Court
The trial court declared the
marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid
and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondent’s alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it
based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following
issues for our consideration:
“1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.
“2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent
“3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
“4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
“5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce
decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated
the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment
granting the divorce decree before our courts.”[19]
The Petition raises five issues,
but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones:
(1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on
these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is partly
meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving
the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial
court’s recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon
proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2)
the alleged divorce decree itself. She
adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the
first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad
are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex
loci celebrationis). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the
following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not
provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.”[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and
divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that
“aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.”[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a
divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
“ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
x x x x x x x x x
“(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
x x x x x x x x x”
“ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
“ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.
“ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.”
Respondent, on the other hand,
argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written
official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due
execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of
himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or
(2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance
with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent’s
cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact
that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject
to petitioner’s qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed,
petitioner’s failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted
articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no
longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien
and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the
burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is
the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied
with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws
of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce
law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial
notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with “the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or
defense of an action.”[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.
It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative.
Second Issue: Respondent’s
Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view
of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated
to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the
Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately
established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent’s contention is
untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce
means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1)
absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind
terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in
full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of
divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi
or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of
divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after
the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes
absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in
a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a
remarriage only after proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian
divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to
a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”[48]
This quotation bolsters our
contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely
establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of
the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso
facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of
respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no
proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained
under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the
certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not
submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that
respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract
marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of
the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of
respondent, had he duly presented it in court.
A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of
legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage
license.[50]
As it is, however, there is
absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records
before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before
the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit “A” – Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit “B” – Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on
January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit “C” – Certificate of Marriage Between
Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987
in Malabon, Metro Manila;[53] (d) Exhibit “D” – Office of the City Registrar of
Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick
A. Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit “E” – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit “1” -- Amended
Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit “2” – Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit “3” – Certificate of Australian
Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit “4” – Decree Nisi of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;[59] and Exhibit “5” -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal
Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October
22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we
cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen,
was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioner’s contention that
the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his
status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the
second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner’s
prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that
under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to
marry petitioner. Failing in that, then
the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the
ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon,
Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated
January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of
receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties’ marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge
Feliciano V. Buenaventura; rollo, pp. 7-9.
[2] Rollo, p. 10.
[3] Ibid., p. 9.
[4] Rollo, p. 37.
[5] Ibid., p. 47.
[6] Id., p. 44.
[7] Id., p. 36.
[8] Annex “1”; temporary
rollo, p. 9.
[9] The couple
secured an Australian “Statutory Declaration” of their legal separation and
division of conjugal assets.
See Annexes “3” and “4” of Respondent’s Comment; rollo,
p. 48.
[10] Id., pp.
33-35.
[11] Id., p. 39.
[12] Amended Answer, p.
2; rollo, p. 39.
[13] Id., pp.
77-78.
[14] Id., p. 43.
[15] Rollo, pp.
48-51.
[16] TSN, December 16,
1998, pp. 1-8; records, pp. 172-179.
[17] RTC Order of
December 16, 1998; ibid., p. 203.
[18] The case was deemed
submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon this Court’s receipt of the Memorandum
for petitioner, signed by Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba. The Memorandum for respondent, signed by
Atty. Gloria V. Gomez of Gomez and Associates, had been filed on December 10,
1999.
[19] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 242-243.
[20] 43 Phil. 43, 49,
March 3, 1922.
[21] Ruben F. Balane,
“Family Courts and Significant Jurisprudence in Family Law,” Journal of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1st & 2nd
Quarters, 2001, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, p. 25.
[22] “ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties,
or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”
[23] “ART.
17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.
x x x x x x x x x
“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.”
[24] Tenchaves v.
Escano 15 SCRA 355, 362, November 29, 1965; Barretto Gonzalez v.
Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67, 71-72, March 7, 1933.
[25] “Art.
26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5), and (6), 36, 37, and
38. (71a)
“Where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.” (As amended by EO 227, prom. July 27, 1987)
[26] Cf. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr., 139 SCRA 139, 143-144, October 8, 1985; and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 663, June 30, 1989.
[27] Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr., supra.
[28] Ibid., p.
143.
[29] For a detailed discussion
of Van Dorn, see Salonga, Private International Law, 1995 ed. pp.
295-300. See also Jose C. Vitug,
Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 16;
[30] “SEC.
19. Classes of documents.—For
the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
“Public documents are:
“(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.”
[31] Burr W. Jones, Commentaries
on the Law of Evidence in Civil Cases, Vol. IV, 1926 ed., p. 3511; §3, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence provides that “when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.”
[32] “SEC.
19. Classes of documents.— For
the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether in the Philippines, or of a foreign country.
x x x x x x x x x.”
[33] “Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever
a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official
seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.”
[34] “Sec.
24. Proof of official record.—The
record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate
that such officer has the custody. If
the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate
may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.”
See also Asiavest Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA
539, 550-551, September 25, 1998; Pacific Asia Overseas Shipping Corp. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 161 SCRA 122, 133-134, May 6, 1988.
[35] The transcript of
stenographic notes states that the original copies of the divorce decrees were
presented in court (TSN, December 16, 1998, p. 5; records, p. 176), but only
photocopies of the same documents were attached to the records (Records, Index
of Exhibits, p. 1.).
[36] TSN, December 15,
1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[37] TSN, December 16,
1998, p. 7; records, p. 178.
[38] People v. Yatco, 97
Phil. 941, 945, November 28, 1955; Marella v. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1, 3,
November 10, 1908; People v. Diaz, 271 SCRA 504, 516, April 18, 1997; De
la Torre v. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 203-204, August 14, 1998; Maunlad
Savings & Loan Asso., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 114942, November
27, 2000, pp. 8-9.
[39] Art. 15, Civil Code.
[40] Joaquin Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996
ed., p. 566.
[41] Ricardo J.
Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines, second edition,
p. 382.
[42] Ibid., p.
384.
[43] Wildvalley Shipping
Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 119602, October 6, 2000, p. 7.
[44] Francisco, p. 29,
citing De los Angeles v. Cabahug, 106 Phil. 839, December 29, 1959.
[45] 27A CJS,
15-17, §1.
[46] Ibid., p.
611-613, §161.
[47] 27A CJS, 625,
§162.
[48] Rollo, p. 36.
[49] “SEC.
48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
“(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
“In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.”
[50] In
passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an
irregularity in complying with the formal requirement for procuring a
marriage license. Under Article 4 of
the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the validity of a marriage
celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that
certificate. (Vitug, Compendium,
pp. 120-126; Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines,
1997 reprint, p. 17; Rufus Rodriguez, The Family Code of the Philippines
Annotated, 1990 ed., p. 42; Melencio Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family
Relations Law, 1999 ed., p. 146.)
[51] Records, pp. 1-3.
[52] Ibid., p. 4.
[53] Id., p. 5.
[54] Id., p. 180.
[55] Id., pp.
170-171.
[56] Id., pp.
84-89.
[57] Id., pp.
181-182.
[58] Id., pp.
40-41.
[59] Id., p. 183.
[60] Id., pp.
184-187.