FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001]
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch
17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,*
respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case under consideration is a
petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals nullifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928,[2] pertaining to Lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 3389.
Sometime in March 1936, Rafael,
Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, a
Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square
meters, designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City.[3]
However, in 1948, the former
owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the
heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land.[4] The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale
because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of
private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial
land. Rebuffed in the trial court and
the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled
thus:
“… granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to
the vendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that the title remained in
the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he
(vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he has divested himself by
his act in ignoring the prohibition. In
such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty
vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a
consideration, that of pari delicto.”[5]
On July 1, 1968, the same former
owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes,
Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan
filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action for recovery of the
same parcel of land.[6] Citing the case of Philippine Banking Corporation
v. Lui She,[7] they submitted that the sale to Lee Liong was null
and void for being violative of the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong filed with the
trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata.[8] On October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial
court denied the motion.[9] The heirs
of Lee Liong elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for
certiorari. On April 22, 1977, the
Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss
the case, holding that the suit was barred by res judicata.[10]
On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth
Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City a
petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre,
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389 of the Register of
Deeds of Roxas City.[11] Petitioners alleged that they were the widows of the
deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting, who were the heirs of Lee Liong, the
owner of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944. On June 30, 1947,
Lee Liong’s widow, Ang Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho,
executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of Lee Liong, adjudicating
to themselves the subject parcel of land.[12] Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in Lot
No. 398 through an extra-judicial settlement and donation executed in her favor
by her deceased husband Lee Bing Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired her
share in the same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as
evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial settlement.[13]
Previously, on December 9, 1948,
the Register of Deeds, Capiz, Salvador Villaluz, issued a certification that a
transfer certificate of title over the property was issued in the name of Lee Liong.[14] However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas
City were burned during the war. Thus,
as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition for
reconstitution of title.
On June 10, 1994, the Regional
Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the reconstitution of the lost or
destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an
approved plan and technical description.[15] The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision
reads thus:
“WHEREFORE, in reiteration, the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is ordered to reconstitute the lost or destroyed certificate of title in the name of Lee Liong, deceased, of Roxas City, with all the conditions stated in paragraph 2 of this decision. This decision shall become final after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a notice of such judgment without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.
“SO ORDERED.
“Given at Roxas City, Philippines,
“June 10, 1994.
“JOSE O. ALOVERA
“Judge”[16]
On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17 issued an Entry of Judgment.[17]
On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor
General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment in
Reconstitution Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial Court, Roxas
City had no jurisdiction over the case.[18] The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners
were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their
predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he
was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject
land.
On April 30, 1996, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the judgment of reconstitution void.[19]
On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth
Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[20] On February 18, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.[21]
Hence, this petition.[22]
Petitioners submitted that the
Solicitor General was estopped from seeking annulment of the judgment of
reconstitution after failing to object during the reconstitution proceedings
before the trial court, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged that the
Solicitor General merely acted on the request of private and politically
powerful individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the
subject land.
Petitioners emphasized that the
ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme
Court, where the Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee
Liong. Petitioners also pointed out
that they acquired ownership of the land through actual possession of the lot and
their consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.
On the other hand, the Solicitor
General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void;
otherwise, it would amount to circumventing the constitutional proscription
against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.
We grant the petition.
The reconstitution of a
certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of
a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land.[23] The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to
have, after observing the procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in
exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.[24]
In this case, petitioners sought a
reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the transfer
certificate of title issued to him was lost or destroyed during World War
II. All the documents recorded and issued
by the Register of Deeds, Capiz, which include the transfer certificate of
title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all destroyed during the war. The
fact that the original of the transfer certificate of title was not in the
files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer
certificate of title had not been issued.[25] In the trial court proceedings, petitioners presented
evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans to Lee Liong and the
latter’s subsequent possession of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the trial court, after examining all
the evidence before it, ordered the reconstitution of title in the name of Lee
Liong.
However, there is a question as to
whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines.
The sale of the land in question
was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. Under the 1935
Constitution,[26] aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands,
save in cases of hereditary succession.[27] Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, was disqualified
to acquire the land in question.[28]
The fact that the Court did not
annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction, for it
was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring
lands of the public or private domain.
However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction
was not the parties to the transaction.[29] “In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of
holding title thereto by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the
vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional violation
and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to
either party.”[30] The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor
General. This was what was done in this
case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment
of reconstitution of title. While it
took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from
initiating such action. Prescription
never lies against the State.[31]
Although ownership of the land
cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari
delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or
escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set
forth.[32]
In this case, subsequent
circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in
the hands of Filipinos. The original
vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs
and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino
citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on
alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to
protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no
more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos
qualified to acquire and own such land. “If land is invalidly transferred to an
alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw
in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee
is rendered valid.”[33] Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to
qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of
the initial transfer.[34] The objective of the constitutional provision to keep
our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
Incidentally, it must be mentioned
that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an
owner’s duplicate, secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the
title to be reconstituted.[35] In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan
and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.[36] This renders the order of reconstitution void for
lack of factual support.[37] A judgment with absolutely nothing to support it is
void.[38]
As earlier mentioned, a
reconstitution of title is the re-issuance of a new certificate of title lost
or destroyed in its original form and condition.[39] It does not pass upon the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title.[40] Any change in the ownership of the property must be
the subject of a separate suit.[41] Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the
land, a separate proceeding is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership
of the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274.
In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title
in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, and
dismisses the petition, without prejudice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman),
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
* Neither the judge nor the Court of Appeals is a proper party as petitioner or respondent (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Revised Rules of Court).
* Neither the judge nor the Court of Appeals is a proper party as petitioner or respondent (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Revised Rules of Court).
[1] In CA-G. R. SP No.
36274, promulgated on April 30, 1996. Salas, J., ponente,
Cañizares-Nye and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concurring.
[2] Dated June 10, 1994.
[3] Dinglasan v.
Lee Bun Ting, 99 Phil. 427, 429 [1956].
[4] Ibid., at p.
432.
[5] Dinglasan v.
Lee Bun Ting, supra, Note 3, p. 431.
[6] Civil Case No.
V-3064.
[7] 21 SCRA 52 [1967].
[8] Lee Bun Ting v.
Aligaen, 76 SCRA 416, 420 [1977].
[9] Ibid., at pp.
421-422.
[10] Ibid., at p.
425.
[11] Comment, Rollo, pp.
148-160, at p. 149; Memorandum, Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 199-211,
at p. 199-200.
[12] CA Decision, Rollo,
p. 82.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Petition, Annex “E”
(Annex “2”), Rollo, p. 66.
[15] In Reconstitution
Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, Judge Jose O.
Alovera, presiding.
[16] Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[17] Petition, Annex “B”,
Rollo, p. 38.
[18] Docketed as CA-G. R.
SP No. 36274. CA Rollo, pp. 1-11.
On February 17, 1995, the Republic filed an amended complaint, impleading
the Administrator, Land Registration Authority, as plaintiff (Docketed as CA-G.
R. SP No. 36517, CA Rollo, pp. 57-65).
[19] CA Decision, CA Rollo,
pp. 148-157.
[20] Petition, Annex “H”,
Rollo, pp. 90-100.
[21] Rollo, p.
117.
[22] Filed on April 3,
1997, Rollo, pp. 12-35.
On July 12, 1999, we gave due course to the petition (Rollo, pp.
182-183). The case was considered
submitted for decision on December 13, 1999 upon the filing of petitioner’s
memorandum (Rollo, pp. 216-226).
[23] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 110, 118 [1999]; Rivera v. Court of Appeals,
314 Phil. 57 [1995].
[24] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Note 23; Heirs of Pinote v. Dulay, 187
SCRA 12, 19-20 [1990].
[25] Alipoon v.
Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 591, 597 [1999].
[26] Article XIII, Section
5, 1935 Constitution.
[27] Krivenko v. Register
of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 [1947]; Halili v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil.
906, 914-915 [1998].
[28] Ong Ching Po v.
Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341, 346 [1994].
[29] Lee Bun Ting v.
Aligaen, supra, Note 8.
Dinglasan v. Lee Bun Ting, supra, Note 3.
[30] Vasquez v. Li
Seng Giap, 96 Phil. 447, 451 [1955].
[31] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 95533, November 20, 2000, citing Reyes v.
Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 606, 624 (1998); Republic v. Court of Appeals,
171 SCRA 721, 734 (1989); de la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898,
905 [1998].
[32] Rellosa v.
Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827 [1953].
[33] United Church Board
of World Ministries v. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, 451-452 [1988].
[34] Halili v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Note 27, at p. 917.
[35] Heirs of Eulalio
Ragua v. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 7 [2000].
[36] Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 36-37.
[37] Heirs of Eulalio
Ragua v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 35.
[38] Yangco v.
Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 191 [1915].
[39] Heirs of Eulalio
Ragua v. Court of Appeals, supra, Note 35, at p. 23 [2000],
citing Strait Times Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 230 [1998];
Stilianopulos v. The City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523, 538 [1999].
[40] Strait Times Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, supra, Note 39.
[41] Bunagan v.
CFI of Cebu, Branch VI, 97 SCRA 72, 76 [1980].