SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 121039-45. October 18, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.
R E S O L U T I O N
MELO, J.:
Before us is a motion for
reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by Justice Antonio M.
Martinez, affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by
Branch 70 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellants
Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis
Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Pepito Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide, and additionally, ordering each of them to pay the
amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) to the heirs of the two
victims as additional indemnity. While
accused-appellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit
seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration, it was only on
December 6, 1999 that the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment
thereto. And since Justice Martinez had
retired earlier on February 2, 1999, in accordance with A.M. No. 99-8-09
promulgated by the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for reconsideration
filed by accused-appellants was assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001
to herein ponente for study and preparation of the appropriate action.
In his motion for reconsideration,
Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by
publicity and that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio
Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking in credibility. He likewise contends that the testimony of
his 13-year old daughter vis-à-vis his whereabouts on the night of the
felony should have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of
Centeno and Malabanan. Lastly, Mayor
Sanchez seeks the reconsideration of the amount of the “gargantuan” damages
awarded on the ground that the same have no factual and legal bases.
In the same vein,
accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their motion
for reconsideration, maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan
have been sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements allegedly
pertaining to material and crucial points of the events at issue. Not only that, they assert that independent
and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s version of events.
Preliminarily, it may be observed
that, except for the issue of civil damages raised by Mayor Sanchez,
accused-appellants have not presented any issue new or different from that
which they had previously raised before the trial court and this Court. Moreover, the issues they have raised have
been discussed at length and passed upon by both the court a quo and by
this Court. Thus, on the charge that
accused-appellant Sanchez is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity, in
our January 25, 1999 decision, citing People vs. Teehankee, Jr.
(249 SCRA 54), we declared:
We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, “a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field… The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality… Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
This failure to present proof of
actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez, having failed, in his
motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the
part of the trial judge. Not only that,
accused-appellant’s case has been exhaustively and painstakingly reviewed by
the Court itself. Accused-appellant
Sanchez has not shown by an iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of
his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in affirming the sentence of
conviction imposed by the trial court.
The charge of conviction by publicity leveled by accused-appellant has
thus no ground to stand on.
As to the claim that witnesses
Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility and that they were sufficiently
impeached by prior inconsistent statements, the same is old hat, to say the
least. It is hornbook doctrine in
criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses,
appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court and the
appellate courts will respect these findings considering that trial courts are
in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial (People vs. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485 [2000]). In the instant case, then Judge Harriet Demetriou
found both Centeno and Malabanan to have testified in a frank, spontaneous, and
straightforward manner; and that despite gruelling cross-examination by a
battery of defense lawyers, their testimony never wavered on the substantial
matters in issue.
As to the alleged inconsistencies
in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to say that the points
raised have all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the trial
court but also by the Court itself, and that the inconsistencies were found to
refer to minor and collateral matters.
It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses’ declarations agree on
substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions
dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor the verity of their testimony (People
vs. Agomo-o, 334 SCRA 279 [2000]).
Accused-appellants have not shown in their motions for reconsideration
new evidence to warrant disregard for the above-rule, nor have they shown that
the Court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and
circumstance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case.
Accused-appellant Sanchez’s
argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave Marie Sanchez, as
to his whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith and
credence is likewise unavailing. While
it is true that statements of children are accorded great probative value, it
is likewise true that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. Where nothing supports the alibi except the
testimony of a relative, it deserves but scant consideration (People vs.
Waggay, 218 SCRA 742 [1993]).
Moreover, accused-appellant Sanchez’s alibi cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecution that he was at Erais Farm that fateful
night. The alibis of accused-appellants
Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit are even worse, not having been
corroborated by any other evidence. The
assertions of these accused-appellants as to their innocence are thus entitled short
shrift from this Court.
Accused-appellant Sanchez’s
asseverations as to the amount of damages awarded is, however,
meritorious. The trial court awarded
the Sarmenta family P50,000.00 as civil liability for the wrongful death of
Eileen Sarmenta, P106,650.00 for the funeral expenses they incurred, and
P3,276,000.00 for the loss of Eileen Sarmenta’s earning capacity; or a total of
P3,432,650.00 as actual damages. On the
other hand, the Gomez family was awarded by the trial court a total of
P3,484,000.00 as actual damages, broken down as follows: P50,000.00 for the
wrongful death of Allan Gomez, P74,000.00 for the latter’s funeral, and
P3,360,000.00 for the loss of the latter’s earning capacity.
Similarly, the trial court ordered
accused-appellants to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 to the Sarmenta family and
another P2,000,000.00 to the Gomez family as moral damages. Lastly, the trial court ordered
accused-appellants to pay the Sarmenta and Gomez families the sum of
P164,250.00 and 191,000.00, respectively, for litigation expenses incurred.
The Court, in its decision dated
January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. However, we also ordered each
accused-appellant to pay the respective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez
an additional indemnity of P350,000.00 each, stating that since each
accused-appellant had been found guilty of seven counts of rape with homicide,
jurisprudence dictated that for each count, each accused-appellant is liable
for civil indemnity of P50,000.00, or a total of P350,000.00.
Since the trial court’s award of
actual damages to the Gomez and Sarmenta families already included civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, to order each accused-appellant to pay
an additional P350,000.00 as civil indemnity would be “double recovery” of
damages on the part of the Gomez and Sarmenta families for the same act or
omission. Thus, the amount of
P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court must each be deducted from the amount of
actual damages due to the Gomez and Sarmenta families.
As for funeral expenses, the Court
had occasion to declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA 577 [1997]) that “burial
expenses, which are by nature actual expenses must be proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was ever
presented in the instant case, its award will not be allowed.” It is a settled
rule that there must be proof that actual or compensatory damages have been
suffered and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 SCRA
784 [1999]). While the funeral expenses
incurred by the Sarmenta family were supported by the appropriate receipts, the
same is not true for the funeral expenses incurred by the Gomez family. Not having been duly receipted, the amount
of P74,000.00 awarded to the Gomez family as funeral expenses must, perforce,
be deleted. However, as the heirs of
Allan Gomez clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal
damages should be awarded. This award
is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or
vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification (see People vs.
Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]).
The award of P3,276,000.00 and
P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning capacity of Sarmenta
and Gomez, respectively, also merit review.
Eileen Sarmenta, at the time of her death, was a graduating student of
the College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines at Los Baños
(UPLB), majoring in Food and Nutrition for Large Animals. Allan Gomez was likewise a senior student of
the College of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in Beef Production. The trial
court, using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged the life
expectancy of Sarmenta, 21 years old at the time of her death, and Gomez, 19
years old at the time of his death, at 39.1 and 40.6 years, respectively. Believing that the victims would have earned
a monthly salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living expenses of P8,000.00 per
month, the trial court awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as the amount
recoverable by the Sarmenta and Gomez families, respectively, for the loss of
the earning capacity of Eileen and Allan.
While accused-appellant Sanchez
contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 are baseless in
fact and law, no evidence having been adduced to prove that the victims had any
actual income at the time of their demise, it is well-settled that to be
compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim,
at the time of injury or death, be gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not
for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money (People vs.
Teehankee, supra). Likewise,
the fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support
its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not
preclude recovery of the same (People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314 [1999]; People
vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 [1999]). On the
part of Eileen Sarmenta, her mother testified that Eileen had an offer for employment
from Monterey Farms. On the other hand,
Allan Gomez’s mother testified that her deceased son planned to work on a
private farm after graduation.
Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs.
LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [1960]), the Court awarded
compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity to Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th
year medical student at UST, stating that while his scholastic record may not
have been first rate, it was, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the
assumption that he could have finished the course, would have passed the board
in due time, and that he could have possibly earned as a medical practitioner
the minimum monthly income of P300.00.
Both Sarmenta and Gomez were
senior agriculture students at UPLB, the country’s leading educational
institution in agriculture. As
reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have graduated in due
course. Undeniably, their untimely
death deprived them of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are
entitled to compensation. Difficulty,
however, arises in measuring the value of Sarmenta’s and Gomez’s lost time and
capacity to earn money in the future, both having been unemployed at the time
of death. While the law is clear that
the deceased has a right to his own time — which right cannot be taken from him
by a tortfeasor without compensation — the law is also clear that damages
cannot be awarded on the speculation, passion, or guess of the judge or the
witnesses. In this case, Eileen Sarmenta’s
mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB, the basic salary was more or
less P15,000.00 per month. Allan
Gomez’s mother, on the other hand, testified that her son could have easily
gotten P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per month.
Clearly, the testimony of said witnesses are speculative, insufficient
to prove that in 1993, Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed earned P15,000.00 a
month had they managed to graduate.
However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due
time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that
in 1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered, the Court believes
that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would
have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00 per month (or P96,000.00/year) and their
deductible living and other incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month (or
P36,000.00/year). Hence, in accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the loss of Sarmenta and Gomez’s
earning capacity is to be computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses)
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 – the age of the deceased)
Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
= 2/3 (80-21) x (96,000 – 36,000)
= 39.353 x 60,000
= P2,361,180.00
Heirs of Allan Gomez:
= 2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 – 36,000)
= 40.687 x 60,000
= P2,441,220.00
As to the award of P2,000,000.00
each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez families, these must also be
reduced, the same being excessive.
While the assessment of moral damages is left to the discretion of the
court according to the circumstances of each case (Article 2216, Civil Code),
the purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, not
punishment or correction. Moral
damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of
a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he
has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. In other words, the award of moral damages
is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted (Dela Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA 325 [1994]). The intensity of the pain experienced by the
relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him
and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of the
offender. The death caused by a beggar
is felt by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by the action
of a wealthy family. The Court, in the
exercise of its discretion, thus reduces the amount of moral damages awarded to
the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to P1,000,000.00 each. As to the award of attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses, the same is reasonable and justified, this case having
dragged on for over eight years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of
accused-appellants for seven counts of rape with homicide and the sentence of reclusion
perpetua imposed upon them for each of said counts, with MODIFICATION that
the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims as follows:
To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
3. Funeral expenses 106,650.00
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,361,180.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation expenses 164,250.00
----------------------
Total P 3,982,080.00
To the heirs of Allan Gomez:
1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
3. Nominal damages 10,000.00
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,441,220.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation expenses 191,000.00
----------------------
Total P 3,992,220.00
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.