EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 138358-59. November 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLAUDIO
DELA PEÑA y BORDOMEO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Claudio dela
Peña was charged by his daughter Mary dela Peña with two (2) counts of rape in
two separate Informations which read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4449-96:
That on or about the 25th day of February 1996, at Barangay Burol I, Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation and taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter, Mary dela Peña, and without the latter’s consent and against her will, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of said Mary dela Peña, to her damage and prejudice.
Criminal Case No. 4450-96:
That on or about the 27th day of February 1996, at Barangay Burol I, Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, by means of force, violence and intimidation and taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Mary dela Peña against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
The said cases were filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20. At the arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of “not
guilty.” Thereafter, the cases were jointly tried.
The trial court found that on the
day of the supposed rapes on February 25, 1996 and February 27, 1996,
seventeen-year old Mary was living with her widower father in Dasmariñas,
Cavite. Both incidents happened at
around 7:00 o’clock in the evening. On
each occasion, accused-appellant summoned his daughter to massage his body. Thereafter, he fondled his daughter’s
breasts then forced himself on her. Mary’s
efforts to escape from her father’s evil design proved futile as the latter
punched her into submission and threatened her with a knife.
Mary narrated that her ordeal in
the hands of her father started as early as 1991 when they were still living in
Cebu. Mary disclosed that she gave
birth to her daughter, Mary Jean, when she was only thirteen years old and to
her son, Elboy, when she was fifteen.
Both her children were sired by her own father.
Accused-appellant denied the
charges against him. He averred that
since he reached fifty years old in 1984, he has been unable to have an
erection. He also claimed that he lost
interest in sex since his wife died in 1984.
The trial court disbelieved
accused-appellant, ratiocinating thus:
In the case at bar, the testimony of the victim was not only
consistent but is convincingly impressed with truth and purity of
intentions. She testified with
naturalness and spontaneity and has shown no ill motive to testify falsely against
her own father. It was held in the case
People v. Saballe, 236 SCRA 365, that “when the testimony of the witness
of rape is simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination
and unflawed by any inconsistency and contradiction, the same must be given
full faith and credit.”[1]
The trial court thus found
accused-appellant guilty of two (2) counts of rape and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of death for each count and to indemnify his victim the amount of
P100,000.00 by way of moral damages.[2] In imposing the penalty of death, the trial court
took into account the minority of the victim at the time of the rapes and her
relationship with accused-appellant.
The death penalty having been
imposed upon accused-appellant, the case is now before this Court on automatic
review wherein accused-appellant assigns a lone error, thus:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN METING OUT THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY OF THE VICTIM WAS NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.
Notably, accused-appellant is no
longer disputing the factual findings of the trial court. Nevertheless, this Court has the duty to
review the records of the case to ensure that the trial court did not err in
convicting accused-appellant of two counts of rape and that none of the rights
of accused-appellant was violated. This
Court has scrutinized the testimony of complainant Mary dela Peña and has found
that she testified in a frank, spontaneous and straightforward manner, unshaken
even during cross-examination. On the
other hand, accused-appellant raised the defense of impotence. On this score, we agree with the trial court
when it ruled that:
The defense of impotency raised by accused was not supported by any
medical findings at all. His claim that
since the death of his wife in 1984 he did not have any erection anymore is but
a bare assertion. Impotency as a
defense in rape cases must be proven with certainty to overcome the presumption
in favor of potency (People v. Bahuyan, 238 SCRA 330).[3]
Accused-appellant argues that
inasmuch as the minority of the victim was not specifically alleged in the
Informations, he can only be convicted of simple rape and not qualified rape,
minority being a qualifying circumstance.
The Solicitor General concedes
that, indeed, the minority of the victim was not specifically alleged in the
Informations and, consequently, the omission downgrades the crimes committed to
simple rape. He claims, however, that
since accused-appellant used a knife in perpetrating his evil designs on both
occasions, then the aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly weapon should
be appreciated in upgrading the crime to qualified rape thus justifying the
imposition of the death penalty.
The contention of
accused-appellant is well-taken.
The trial court convicted
accused-appellant on the basis of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which was in force at the time of
commission of the crimes. The said law
provides that “[t]he death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances, i.e., when
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.”
(Italics ours)
In People v. Feralino,[4] this Court held that the seven attendant
circumstances, among which are minority and relationship, given that they alter
the nature of the crime of rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty,
are in the nature of qualifying circumstances.
Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not
ordinary aggravating circumstances, which merely increase the period of the
penalty. These are special qualifying
circumstances which must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in
the information.
The above rule was further
clarified in the case of People v. Arillas,[5] where this Court stressed that in order for a crime
to be elevated in its qualified form, the circumstance that qualifies it should
be alleged in the information. If the
qualifying aggravating circumstance is not alleged but proved, it shall only be
considered as an aggravating circumstance since the latter may be proven even
if not alleged. It follows that in such
cases, the accused can not be convicted of the crime in its qualified
form. It is fundamental that every
element of an offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The purpose of the rule is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.
He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. The conviction
of an accused of a crime in its qualified form, where the information failed to
specify the circumstance that qualified the crime, is a denial of his right to
be informed of the nature of the accusation against him and, consequently, a
denial of due process.
In the case at bar, the qualifying
circumstance of minority should have been alleged with specificity in the
information. Inasmuch as the
prosecution failed to allege the concurrence of minority, accused-appellant can
only be convicted of simple rape, not qualified rape. As such, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The same rule applies in the case
of deadly weapon. Rape with the use of
a deadly weapon was introduced in Article 335 by Republic Act No. 4111 on June
20, 1964, and the rape of a minor by a relative was introduced by Republic Act
No. 7659 on December 31, 1993. Both types
of rape were recognized as qualified rape in People v. Tabugoca.[6]
Under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. When the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon, i.e., when a deadly weapon is used to make the victim
submit to the will of the offender, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. This circumstance must however
be alleged in the information because it is also in the nature of a qualifying
circumstance which increases the range of the penalty to include death. Therefore, even if the same was proved, it
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. The same can only be treated as a generic aggravating
circumstance, which cannot affect the penalty to be imposed, i.e., reclusion
perpetua.[7]
In this case, the use of a deadly
weapon was, likewise, not specifically alleged in the two Informations. There was, therefore, no basis for the trial
court to convict accused-appellant of the crime of qualified rape and sentence
him to suffer the death penalty.
The trial court awarded civil
indemnity to the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 and also by way of moral
damages. This Court ruled in People
v. Nava[8] that civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of
the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite, in Criminal Cases Nos. 4449-96 and 4450-96 is AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of simple
rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
each count, to indemnify his victim the amount of:
a) P50,000.00
as moral damages;
b) P50,000.00
as civil indemnity; and
c) P25,000.00
as exemplary damages
for each count of rape.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, De
Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.