FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137306. March 12, 2001]
VIRGINIA AVISADO AND JOCELYN AVISADO GARGARITA, petitioners, vs. AMOR RUMBAUA, VICTORIA C. RUMBAUA and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO,
J.:
The Case
The case before this
Court is a petition[1] assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals[2] reversing and setting aside the order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City[3] dismissing respondents’ complaint for
being barred by prior judgment.
The Facts
Respondents Abelardo
“Amor” Rumbaua and Victoria Consengco-Rumbaua (hereafter “Amor” and “Victoria’)
are husband and wife, Filipinos, residents of Jacksonville, Florida, U.S.A.[4]
On July 1, 1971, Victoria
became the registered owner of a parcel of land measuring two hundred thirty
five square meters and sixty square decimeters (235.60), located on Maayusin
St., U.P. Village, Diliman, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 166065 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, described as follows:
“A parcel of land (lot 30-A of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd-142482,
being a portion of Lot 30, Blk. 26-A, described on plan Psd-74130, LRC Rec. No.
7681), situated in the Dist. of Diliman, Q. City, Is. of Luzon, Bounded on the
NE., pts. 2-3, by Lot 31, Blk. 26-A, Psd-74139; on the SE., points 3 to 4, by
Lot 12, Block 26, Psd-56573; on the SW., points 4 to 1 by Lot 30-B of the
subdivision plan, and on the NW., points 1 to 2 by Road Lot 1, Psd-74129,
Maayusin Street (12.00 m. wide).
Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being N. 13 deg. 53’E., 1196.78
m., Quezon City; thence S. 62 deg. 26 E. 12.67 m. to point 2; thence S. 46 deg.
23’E. 17.58 m to point 3; thence.”[5]
On June 28, 1971,
respondents Rafael and Aurora Consengco (hereafter “Rafael” and “Aurora”)
became the registered owners of the lot
adjacent to Amor and Victoria’s lot.[6] The lot registered in Rafael and Aurora’s name
measured about two hundred thirty five square meters and fifty square
decimeters (235.50) as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166066 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, described as follows:
“A parcel of land (lot 30-B of the
subdivision plan LRC Psd-142482, being a portion of Lot 30, Block 26-A,
described on plan Psd-74139, LRC Rec. No. 7681), situated in the District of
Diliman, Quezon City, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2, by Lot 30-A of the subdivision plan;
on the SE., points 2 to 3, by Lot 12; points 3 to 4, by Lot 11, Block 26,
Psd-56573; on the SW., points 5 to 6 by Lot 29, of Block 26-A, Psd-74139; and
on the NW., points 6 to 7 and 7 to 1, by Road Lot 1, Psd-74139, Maayusin
Street, (12.00) m wide). xxx”[7]
Amor, Victoria, Rafael
and Aurora contend that on or about the second week of February 1973, they discovered that Abelardo
and petitioner Virginia Avisado (hereafter “the Avisados”) were occupying both
parcels of land described above[8] and had built thereon a bungalow made of
strong materials. Respondents demanded
that the Avisados vacate the lots, to no avail.[9]
On December 3, 1977,
Victoria executed a “special power of attorney” authorizing Rafael to:
“...ask, demand, sue for, recover,
extrajudicially and/or judicially, that certain real property located at
Maayusin St., Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines, covered by and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166065 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, belonging to me solely and exclusively, my title, my title thereto being
evidenced by said Transfer of Certificate Title No. 166065, in connection
thereto, to represent me in the pre-trial and trial of that case which he will
have to institute and file for that purpose, with full power and authority to
enter into any compromise agreement with anybody under any terms and conditions
which he may deem just, proper and equitable under the premises.”[10]
On November 17, 1978,
Amor and Victoria, represented by Rafael (and in his own capacity as
co-plaintiff) and Aurora filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch 16, Quezon City, a complaint for “recovery of possession of realty with
damages” against the Avisados.[11]
In their complaint,
respondents prayed that the Avisados be ordered to vacate the lots, to
surrender possession to respondents and to pay damages.[12]
On April 15, 1980, Rafael
(in his own capacity), Amor and Victoria (through Rafael), and Aurora entered
into a “compromise agreement” with the Avisados, stating: First, the Avisados (vendees) shall
pay Amor and Victoria (vendors) the amount of seventy thousand pesos
(P70,000.00), after which Amor and Victoria
shall execute an “absolute deed of sale” in favor of the Avisados. The total purchase price shall be paid in
installments. The first payment of five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to be paid on April 14, 1980 and the second payment
of the balance of sixty five thousand pesos (P65,000.00) to be paid on or
before September 30, 1980. Second,
within a month from the registration of the absolute deed of sale, the Avisados
shall remove any portion of their residential house located within the
boundaries of the lot belonging to Rafael and Aurora. Third, all expenses for the registration of the lot shall
be borne by the Avisados. Fourth, should the Avisados violate the “compromise
agreement” they shall forfeit five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) in favor of the
vendors and shall vacate the lot within thirty (30) days from the time of
default. In such event, the agreement
to sell shall be ipso facto cancelled.
Fifth, the “compromise agreement” shall have the effect of a
mutual quit-claim of all claims for damages and reimbursement set up in the complaint
and the answer that the parties may have against each other.[13] The “compromise agreement” was submitted to
the trial court for approval.[14]
On April 15, 1980, the
trial court[15] approved the “compromise agreement”, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, finding the above-quoted Compromise Agreement not contrary to law, good morals, public policy, the Court hereby fenders (sic) judgment approving en toto the said compromise agreement and hereby enjoins the parties therein to abide by and comply with the terms and conditions thereof, without pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.”[16]
On October 3, 1980, Amor
and Victoria (through Rafael), Rafael (in his own capacity) and Aurora filed
with the trial court a “manifestation” stating that the “compromise agreement”
was violated by the Avisado’s refusal to pay the amount of sixty five thousand
pesos in cash on or before September 30, 1980.[17]
On October 17, 1980, the
trial court noted the “manifestation”.[18]
On August 18, 1981,
Aurora, Rafael, in his own capacity and on behalf of his co-plaintiffs, Amor
and Victoria filed with the trial court a “motion for execution of judgment,”
praying that given that the Avisados breached the “compromise agreement”, a
writ of execution be issued ordering them to vacate the lots.[19]
On February 12, 1982, the
trial court denied the “motion for execution of judgment” reasoning that the
“compromise agreement” involved reciprocal obligations of the parties (i.e.,
the vendees to pay the purchase price and for the vendors to execute the
absolute deed of sale).[20]
On July 12, 1985, the
Avisados filed with the trial court a “motion for execution” of the April 15,
1980 decision.[21]
On July 19, 1985, the
trial court granted the “motion for execution.”[22]
On August 14, 1985, the
trial court,[23] through branch clerk of court Virginia M.
Pagoron, issued a “writ of execution” addressed to the ex-officio sheriff of
Manila. We quote:
“WHEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to order the plaintiffs to
execute the Deed of Sale over TCT No. 166065 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City in favor of the defendant spouses Amado Avisado and Virginia Avisado, free
from any liens and encumbrances and upon payment by the said defendants to the
said plaintiffs the sum of P65,000.00, and make a return of your proceedings
with this writ within sixty (60) days from date of receipt hereof.”[24]
On October 29, 1993, Amor
and Victoria (through their new attorney-in-fact, Noemi Candido Natividad)[25] filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
77, Quezon City a complaint for “recovery of real property with damages”
against the Avisados.[26] The complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-93-18138. Essentially, the
complaint alleged that the “compromise agreement” of April 15, 1980 resulting
in the sale of Victoria and Amor’s lot to the Avisados was invalid as the
“special power of attorney” executed by Victoria in Rafael’s favor never
authorized him to sell the lot in question.
Thus, the judgment of the
trial court of April 15, 1980, approving the compromise agreement “has since
become a stale judgment that can no longer be enforced, either by motion or
action.”[27] Amor and Victoria then prayed that the
Avisados peacefully vacate the lots in question, surrender possession to them
and pay damages.[28]
On April 23, 1994,
Abelardo Avisado died.[29]
On February 12, 1996, the
trial court[30] dismissed the complaint for being barred by
prior judgment.[31]
On March 12, 1996, Amor
and Victoria interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.[32]
On June 17, 1998, upon
motion of Virginia Avisado, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution allowing
the deceased, Abelardo Avisado to be substituted by his heir, Jocelyn Avisado
Gargarita.[33]
On October 27, 1998, the
Court of Appeals decided that the causes of action in Civil Case No. Q-26392
and Civil Case No. Q-93-18138 were different. The former case is an accion publiciana for the recovery
of possession of realty and damages, while the latter case is based on the
violation of the compromise agreement. Res
judicata does not apply.[34] Hence, it ruled:
“WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE and the above case is hereby remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.
“SO ORDERED.”[35]
On January 12, 1999,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration with
the Court of Appeals.[36]
On January 25, 1999, the
Court of Appeals denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.[37]
Hence, this appeal.[38]
The Issue
The issue is whether or
not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider Civil Case No.
Q-26392 as a bar to Civil Case No. Q-93-18138 on the ground of res
judicata.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is
meritorious.
Finality of Judgment
When Amor and Victoria
filed Civil Case No. Q-93-18138,
and argued that Rafael did not have the authority to enter into the “compromise
agreement,” they collaterally attacked the judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-26392 which approved the “compromise agreement.” This cannot be done.
The judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-26392 has become final and executory. What Amor and Victoria should have done was to either timely
appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, or to seasonably file a “petition for relief from judgment” under
Rule 38.[39] A party who fails to acquire complete relief
from a decision of a court has various remedies to correct it. A party may move for a correction or
clarification of judgment, or even seek its modification through ordinary
appeal.[40] This they did not do. There must, therefore, be an end to
litigation.[41]
In Bustos v. Court of
Appeals,[42] we held that once a decision becomes final
and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution. Execution can be suspended
when suspension is warranted by the higher interest of justice[43] and when certain facts and circumstances transpired
after the finality of the judgment which would render the execution of
judgment unjust.[44] Neither circumstance obtains in the present
case.
Res Judicata
Furthermore, even if we
limit ourselves to the issue of whether or not res judicata applies,
still the Court of Appeals decision must be reversed.
Res judicata exists when the following elements are
present:
“(a) the former judgment must be final;
“(b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
“(c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
“(d) and there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.”[45]
There is no question with
respect to the existence of the first three elements of res judicata.
As to the last issue,
specifically with respect to “identity of causes of action,” we find that
contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the causes of action in Civil
Case No. Q-26392 and Civil Case No. Q-93-18138 are one and the same.
A cause of action has the
following elements: (1) the legal right
of plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.[46]
In Civil Case No.
Q-26392, the cause of action was the illegal occupation of the lots by the
Avisados, to the prejudice of Amor, Victoria, Rafael and Aurora. In Civil Case No. Q-93-18138. Amor and Victoria likewise complained
that the Avisados occupied their lot, “through strategy and stealth, and
without (their) knowledge and consent.”[47]
Assuming the Causes of Action were Different
Even if we assume, as
respondents insist, that in Civil Case No. Q-93-18138, the causes of
action were:
(1) the invalidity of the compromise agreement; and
(2) the Avisados’ breach of the
“compromise agreement,”[48]
still, we note that
these issues were settled and passed upon in Civil Case No. Q-26392.
First, the validity of the “compromise agreement”
was passed upon by the lower court when it categorically stated on April 15,
1980 that the “Compromise Agreement (is) not contrary to law, good morals,
public policy.” [49] By such action, the trial court made a
finding of law and fact. If such was in
error, the proper recourse was appeal or a petition for relief, and not a
separate action filed thirteen years later.
Second, the fact that the “compromise agreement”
was not breached by the Avisados was also ruled upon by the lower court when it
declared on February 12, 1982, that the “compromise agreement” involved
reciprocal obligations of the parties.[50] This
factual finding of the trial court is buttressed by its order dated July
19, 1985, granting the Avisados’ motion for execution[51] and its writ of execution dated August 14,
1985, which commanded the ex-officio sheriff of Manila to order Amor and
Victoria to execute the deed of sale in favor of the Avisados upon their
payment of the sum of sixty five thousand pesos (P65,000.00).[52]
Individuals should not be
vexed twice for the same cause, memo debet bis vexari et eadem causa.[53]
When Amor and Victoria
filed Civil Case No. Q-93-18138 they were seeking the same relief--that
the Avisados peacefully surrender the lot to them. They merely raised a different theory. They adopted a different stance, relying on the purported
invalidity of the “compromise agreement” and alternatively, on its alleged
breach.
Material facts or
questions which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted or
judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein
become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent
action between the same parties or their privies. The rule is true regardless of the form the issue may take in the
subsequent action. It does not matter
if the subsequent action involves the same or a different form of proceeding,
or whether the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action,
subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. It is also immaterial that the two actions
are based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or instituted
for different purposes, and seek different reliefs.[54]
Laches
Our ruling against Amor
and Victoria is justified all the more by the fact that they are filed Civil
Case No. Q-93-18138 assailing the “compromise agreement” on October 29,
1993. Thirteen years have lapsed.
There is “laches” when
there is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. When there is laches, the presumption arises
that the party entitled to assert a right has either abandoned it or has
declined to assert it. Even a
registered owner may be barred from recovering possession of land by virtue of
laches.[55] Its elements are:
“(1) conduct on the part of defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
“(2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
“(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and
“(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.”[56]
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the Court
of Appeals promulgated on October 27, 1988, in CA-G. R. CV No. 53361 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, dated February 12,
1996, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18138 is REVIVED and AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Under Rule 45, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[2] In CA-G.R. CV No.
53361, promulgated on October 27, 1998,
Imperial, J., ponente, Hofilena and Amin, JJ., concurring.
[3] In Civil Case No.
Q-93-18138, dated February 12, 1996, Judge Ignacio L. Salvador, presiding.
[4] Complaint, RTC
Record, p. 1.
[5] Complaint, Annex
“B”, RTC Record, p. 11.
[6] Petition, Annex “C”,
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Complaint, RTC
Record, p. 3.
[9] Ibid., pp.
2-3; Petition, Annex “C”, Rollo, p. 45.
[10] RTC Record, p. 97.
[11] Petition, Annex “C”,
Complaint, Rollo, p. 43. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-26392.
[12] Ibid., p. 48.
[13] Petition, Annex “E”,
Compromise Agreement, Rollo, pp. 58-61.
[14] Ibid., p. 61.
[15] Judge Sergio A. F.
Apostol, presiding.
[16] Petition, Annex “F”,
RTC Decision, Civil Case No. Q-26392, Rollo, pp. 62-64.
[17] Petition, Annex “G”,
Motion for Execution of Judgment, Rollo, pp. 65-69, at pp. 67-68.
[18] Ibid., p. 68.
[19] Ibid., pp.
65-69 at pp. 67-68.
[20] Petition, Order, Rollo,
pp. 103-104.
[21] Petition, Writ of
Execution, Rollo, p. 106.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Judge Antonio P.
Solano, presiding.
[24] Writ of Execution, Rollo,
p. 106.
[25] Petition, Annex “I”,
Rollo, p. 81.
[26] Complaint, Civil
Case No. Q 93-18138, Rollo, pp. 73-80; RTC Record, pp. 1-8.
[27] Rollo, pp.
76-77.
[28] Rollo, p. 78.
[29] CA Rollo, pp.
76, 78.
[30] Judge Ignacio L.
Salvador, presiding.
[31] Petition, Annex “L”,
RTC Order, Civil Case No. Q-93-18138, Rollo, pp. 115-119.
[32] Notice of Appeal,
RTC Record, pp. 109-110. On May 16,
1996, the trial court granted the appeal, RTC Record, p. 111.
[33] CA Rollo,
docketed as CA-GR CV No. 53361, Rollo, p. 136.
[34] Petition, Annex “A”,
Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[35] Rollo, p. 39.
[36] CA Rollo, p.
147.
[37] Petition, Annex “B”,
Court of Appeals Resolution, Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[38] Notice of Appeal
filed on March 1, 1999. On August 18,
1999, we resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, pp.
180-181).
[39] Rule 38, Section 3,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides that a verified petition
for relief must be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of
the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such
proceeding was taken (Public Estates Authority v. Yujico, G.R. No.
140486, February 6, 2001).
[40] Batingal v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128636, February 1, 2001.
[41] Calusin v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128405, June 21, 2000.
[42] Bustos v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 120784-85, January 24, 2001.
[43] Zarate, Jr. vs.
Olegario, 331 Phil. 278 (1996).
[44] Cabrias v.
Adil, 135 SCRA 354 (1985).
[45] Arenas v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126640, November 23, 2000.
[46] Ibid., Note
45.
[47] Petition, Annex “I”,
Complaint in Civil Case No. Q93-18138, Rollo, p. 74.
[48] Comment, Rollo, pp. 163-165.
[49] Petition, Annex
“F”, Regional Trial Court Decision, Civil Case No. Q-26392, Rollo, pp.
62-64
[50] Petition, Annex “I”,
Complaint, Civil Case No. Q 93-18138, Rollo, pp. 76, 103.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Judge Antonio P.
Solano, presiding.
[53] Madarieta v.
Regional Trial Court, G. R. No. 126443, February 28, 2000.
[54] Veloso, Jr. v.
Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 941, 948-949 (1996).
[55] Villegas v. Court of
Appeals, G. R. No. 129977, February 1, 2001.
[56] Lim Tay v.
Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 634, 659 (1998).