EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133888. March 1, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO NARDO y ROSALES, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
This case is before this
Court on automatic review from the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Albay,
Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty for rape in Criminal
Case No. 7170.
The victim, Lorielyn R.
Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born on September
11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen ( 14) years old.[1]
On February 24, 1996,
around noon, Lorielyn was in their house located in Barangay 3, Camalig, Albay,
together with her father, accused- appellant Alfredo Nardo, two younger
brothers, Leonel and Louie, and maternal grandfather, Vicente Remot. At 1 :30
o'clock in the afternoon, after they had lunch, Vicente left for work. Alfredo
told his sons, Leonel and Louie, to go out. He then ordered Lorielyn to get his
cigarettes in his bedroom. When Lorielyn went inside the bedroom, her father
followed her. He embraced Lorielyn from behind and began mashing her breasts.
Lorielyn pleaded, "Papa, please stop it. Have mercy. " Her
father ignored her. Instead, he undressed her and pushed her to the bed.
Lorielyn started to cry , while Alfredo took off his clothes. Then, he lay on
top of her and had sexual intercourse with her. He kissed her from the neck
down. She tried to free herself but Alfredo took hold of a knife from a nearby
cabinet and pointed it at her right ear. He threatened to kill their whole
family if Lorielyn told anyone what he did. When he was finished, Alfredo left
the house. During all this time, Lorielyn's mother, Elizabeth Nardo, was
washing clothes about five houses away.[2]
Elizabeth returned home
at about 3:00 o'clock p.m. She saw Lorielyn crying while washing the dishes.
She asked Lorielyn why she was crying, but her daughter said nothing.[3]
On March 19, 1996,
Lorielyn was washing clothes when her father approached her and whispered, "We
will play tonight near the river. " Lorielyn understood this to mean
that her father wanted to have sexual intercourse with her again. She finished
the laundry and left the house. She took a passenger jeepney to Barangay Libod,
Camalig, Albay and proceeded to the house of her aunt, Carol Navera. She stayed
there until her aunt arrived at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. When it
became late, Carol told Lorielyn to go home, but she decided to spend the night
at her aunt's house because she was afraid to undergo the ordeal from her
father again.[4]
The next day, Lorielyn's
brother, Leone, was sent by her father to fetch her, but she refused to go with
him. Her aunt asked her again why she did not want to go home. She merely said
she had a problem. She slept at her aunt's house again that night. The
following day, her mother came to fetch her. Lorielyn told her mother she did
not want to go home. She said, "Mama, do you want me to become pregnant
in that house? " Her mother asked, "Who will impregnate you
there? " Lorielyn replied, "Your husband. " Her
mother retorted that Alfredo could not do that to her, then left.[5]
Lorielyn stayed at her
aunt's house until March 22, 1996. On that date, Carol again asked Lorielyn
what her problem was. Finally, she told her aunt that her father raped her.
Immediately, Carol went to report the matter to the police. She later returned
home with two policemen, and together they brought Lorielyn to the Camalig Police
Station. The rape was entered in the police blotter.[6] The policemen then brought Lorielyn to the
Municipal Health Office of Camalig, Albay, where she was examined by Dr. Melvyn
F . Orbe, the Municipal Health Officer.[7] From there Lorielyn was brought to the
Municipal Trial Court of Camalig-Albay to file a formal complaint for rape
against her father, Alfredo Nardo.[8]
On May 29, 1996, an
Information for rape was filed against Alfredo Nardo, charging as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of February 1996, at more or less 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at Brgy. No.3, Municipality of Camalig, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of the herein victim, with lewd and unchaste design, by means of violence, force and intimidation, armed with a knife, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with her (sic) own daughter, LORIELYN R. NARDO, a 14 year old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW[9]
At the arraignment on
August 8, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[10]
The prosecution presented
Dr. Melvyn Orbe, who testified on the following findings as a result of his
examination of the victim, Lorielyn Nardo:
Pelvic Examination:
.:. whitish to yellowish discharge
.:. irritation lateral aspect of the posterior vulva at 3 o ' clock .
.:. healed laceration
hymenal in origin posterior aspect of the fourchet[11]
Dr. Orbe stated that
based on these findings, it is possible that Lorielyn had sexual intercourse.[12]
Carolina Navera, testifying for the prosecution,
corroborated Lorielyn's statement that the latter went to her house on March
20, 1996. Lorielyn cried and told her that she did not want to go home because
she had a problem. Elizabeth, Lorielyn's mother, came to fetch her but she
refused to go home, saying that she was raped by her father. Upon hearing this,
Elizabeth left and told Carolina not to let Lorielyn leave her house. After
Elizabeth was gone, Carolina went to the police station. She returned later
.with two policemen, who then brought Lorielyn to the police headquarters. [13]
Ma. Francia Aguilar, the
social welfare officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
also testified that in the evening of March 22, 1996, she responded to a report
of a rape incident. She met the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, at the house of Cely
Bantog, a social worker, at Camalig, Albay. She interviewed Lorielyn and her
mother, Elizabeth, tor the purpose of preparing a Social Case Study report.[14] Thereafter, she endorsed Lorielyn to the
DSWD Center for Girls in Sorsogon, Sorsogon to undergo therapeutics.[15]
SPO3 Jose Nuylan, a
member of the Camalig police force, testified that he investigated the rape
incident and took the statement of Lorielyn Nardo.[16]
Elizabeth Nardo, the
victim's mother, was called to the witness stand. She testified that she and
Alfredo are not married, but they have been living together. They have seven
children, the eldest of whom is Lorielyn. She stated that Lorielyn was born on
September 11, 1981 at Anei, Claveria, Misamis Oriental; that Lorielyn's birth
certificate was burned in the Municipal Building of Misamis Oriental.[17] However, Elizabeth presented and identified
Lorielyn's baptismal certificate showing that she was born on September
11,1981.[18]
The defense, on the other
hand, presented lawyer Santer G. Gonzales, the employer of accused-appellant.
He testified that accused-appellant worked as a helper at his farm in
Quirangay, Camalig, Albay. On February 24, 1996, accused-appellant arrived at
his farm before 8:00 o'clock in the morning. He was followed by his
father-in-law, Vicente Remot, who lived with him in the same house. It started
to rain hard, so they decided not to work that day. Vicente Remot went home at
around 8:30 or 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Accused-appellant stayed behind.
After a while, Paterno Ramas, a neighbor of Atty. Gonzales, arrived. They
started to drink. None of them left the farmhouse since Atty. Gonzales kept
bottles of gin and cigarettes in stock. They were joined later in thc afternoon
by. Didjo Mujar, another friend of Atty. Gonzales. They drank about five
bottles of gin and sang while Atty. Gonzales played the guitar. The rain
subsided at around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, so they stopped drinking. At
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant left.[19] The farm is located around 400 to 500 meters
away from Barangay 3, where accused-appellant and the victim reside, and can be
reached in 15 minutes.[20]
When asked to comment on
the victim, Lorielyn Nardo, Atty. Gonzales described her as one capable of
telling a lie. He narrated that once, she went to his farm to collect the
amount of P50.00 as daily wage of her grandfather, Vicente Remot, but she gave
only P35.00 to her mother. Elizabeth thus went to Atty. Gonzales' to ask about
the deficiency. They later learned from Lorielyn ' s younger sister that she
spent the missing P15.00 on snacks.[21]
Vicente Remot,
accused-appellant's father-in-law, corroborated Atty. Gonzales' testimony that
he reported for work at the latter's farm in the morning of February 24, 1996,
but he was unable to work because of the rain, so he went home instead, leaving
accused-appellant in the farm. At 1 :00 o ' clock in the afternoon of that day,
he was at home watching television with Elizabeth and his grandchildren,
including Lorielyn. He refuted Lorielyn's claim that he left after lunch to
work, saying that he stayed in the house the whole afternoon since it was raining.[22]
Elizabeth also testified
that on February 24, 1996, she was at home watching television with her father
and children, namely, Lorielyn, Lewcherd, Lailani, Leonel, Louie Boy and Leo
Boy. All her children were at home because it was a Saturday. She claimed that
Lorielyn filed the complaint for rape against her father because he was very
strict with her. She learned from Lorielyn's best friend that she had a problem
with her boyfriend, a certain Erwin Loreno. At one time, Lorielyn asked
permission to attend a holy retreat, but Elizabeth found out from the school
that there was no such retreat. Lorielyn lied on another occasion, when she
told Mrs. Bonifacia "Paz" Nieva that her grandfather was sick so she
can borrow money.[23]
Mrs. Bonifacia Nieva
testified that her daughter was a classmate of Lorielyn. Once, Lorielyn visited
her saying that she was sent by Elizabeth to borrow money because her
grandfather was sick. Mrs. Nieva gave Lorielyn P200.00. Later, when she went to
see Elizabeth to collect payment, she found out that Lorielyn ' s grandfather
did not get sick. Lorielyn admitted to her that she lied about it to be able to
borrow money.[24]
The prosecution recalled
Lorielyn to the witness stand by way of rebuttal evidence. She refuted Atty.
Gonzales' statement that she did not turn over in full the salary of her
grandfather in the amount of P50.00. She denied that she lied to her mother
about a holy retreat held by her school. Anent the amount of P200.00 she
borrowed from Mrs. Nieva, she asserted that it was her father who ordered her
to do that, and that she gave the whole sum of P200.00 to him.[25]
On clarificatory
questioning by the presiding judge, Lorielyn maintained that her grandfather,
Vicente Remot, indeed came home in the morning of February 24, 1996, but he
left again to go to Atty. Gonzales' farm after lunch. That afternoon, her
mother was at the public faucet located far away from their house washing
clothes. The judge wondered aloud why she was doing the laundry in the
afternoon when this is usually done in the morning. Lorielyn replied that her
mother had started doing the laundry in the morning but that she was not able
to finish it, so she returned in the afternoon to continue her chore. She
denied having any male friends, saying all her friends are girls. When asked
once more by the judge, Lorielyn reiterated that her father had sexual
intercourse with her.[26]
Carolina Nieva and
Elizabeth Nardo were presented as sur-rebuttal witnesses. They testified in sum that Lorielyn had a
boyfriend.[27]
Accused-appellant was
presented as the last witness. He
denied that he raped his daughter on February 24, 1997, saying that he was at
the farm of Atty. Gonzales. He scolded
Lorielyn when he learned from her sister and brother that she was always going
around with a boy. He also stated that
Lorielyn got mad at him
because he did not permit her to leave the house whenever she wanted to.[28]
On March 3, 1998, the
trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this court finds the accused ALFREDO NARDO Y ROSALES GUlLTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of RAPE and sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The said accused in likewise ordered to pay Lorielyn Nardo the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages.
For humanitarian reasons, however, it is recommended that the DEATH penalty be commuted to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Accused-appellant raises
the following assignment of errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM LORIELYN AND DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
REFUSING TO RECITE THE REASONS WHY IT WAS RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY FOR
THE ACCUSED.[30]
Accused-appellant assails
the trial court's finding that Atty. Gonzales was his employer and therefore
was likely to testify in his favor; and that he could not have noticed
accused-appellant leave the farm in the afternoon of February 24, 1996 because
he had one drink too many.
Accused-appellant contends that the court should not have been too quick
to condemn him when his witness was a lawyer.
Furthermore, he argues that Lorielyn's conduct after the alleged rape,
specifically from February 25 to March 19, 1996, during which she stayed in the
house with her father and continued to do her daily chores, creates a doubt on
the veracity of the charge.
In the Reply Brief for
accused-appellant,[31] defense counsel reveals that Lorielyn wrote
her the following letter:
7-13-99
Dear Atty. De Guzman:
Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na
nakabinbin pa sa ngayon sa Maximum Security Compound NBP I-D Muntinlupa
City. Sumulat po ako sa inyo upang
humingi ng tulong na gawin po sana ang lahat, wala po talagang kasalanan ang
aking ama ako na po mismong nag-akusa ang nagsasabi na walang katotohanan ang
lahat ng mga sinabi ko na pinagsamantalahan niya ako. Nagawa ko lang po yon
dahil masyado po kasi siyang mahigpit sa aming magkakapatid. Atty. tulungan ninyo sana ako, nalaman ko
nga po pala ang inyong address dahil dumalaw po ang mama ko noon sa papa ko at
hiningi ko naman po para masulatan ko po kayo.
Umaasa po akong lubos na ako'y inyong matutulungan.
Lubos
na umaasa
LORIELYN
NARDO[32]
On May 4, 2000, counsel
for accused-appellant filed a Supplemental Reply Brief,[33] alleging that she received another letter
from Lorielyn Nardo which states:
04-17-2000
Dear Atty. Teresita de Guzman,
Unang-una po sa lahat ay nagpapasalamat po ako sa pag-response
mo sa letter, Ako nga po pala si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Mr. Alfredo Nardo na
nakapiit ngayon sa DORM I-D ng Muntinlupa ako po yung nagpadala ng liham sa
inyo. Attorney, lagi ko pong
ipinagdarasal na nawa’ y matapos na ang paghihirap at pagdurusa ng aking ama sa
loob ng piitan, nawa’y matapos na ang lahat ng problema upang manumbalik muli
ang sigla ng aming pamilya. Nagpapasalamat
nga rin po pala ako sa ginagawa mong pagtulong sa amin, attorney nawa po ay
makamit nyo ang tagumpay.
Hanggang na lamang po ang aking liham, umaasa po ako sa inyong
pang-unawa at tagumpay.
Nagpapasalamat
at umaasa,
Lorielyn
Nardo[34]
In compliance with the
Court's Resolution dated November 14, 2000,[35] the Office of the Solicitor General filed
its comment on the letters of Lorielyn Nardo,[36] contending that there is no mention of her
father's innocence in her letter dated April 17, 2000. Rather, she merely expressed therein her
deep sympathy for her father's situation in prison. The Solicitor General argues that a recantation is not sufficient
to warrant the exoneration of accused-appellant after he has been proven guilty
beyond reasonable doubt based on Lorielyn's candid, categorical and
straightforwarrd testimony before the trial court.
In the meantime, counsel
for accused-appellant, by way of a Manifestation and Motion,[37] submitted two more letters from Lorielyn
Nardo which are hereunder reproduced, viz:
August
10, 2000
Dear Attorney,
Unang-una po sa lahat ay ang taos-puso kong pasasalamat, sa
dahilang pagpapaunlak niyo sa kahilingan kong maipasa sa korte ang isang liham
ng katotohanan, at kahit wala pa po ang isang desisyon mula sa korte ay lubos
po akong umaasa at nagtitiwala sa inyong kakayahan. Attorney, kung alam niyo
lang po ng matanggap at mabasa ang isang letter na nagmula sa’ yo ay
punung-puno po ng kaligayahan ang aking puso dahil kahit papaano ay nabawasan
na ang pag-aalinlangan sa aking isipan. Sa ngayon po ay patuloy na lang akong
umaasa na sana isang araw ay makita kong muling masaya ang aking pamilya.
Attorney, isang pabor po ang nais kong hilingin, na sana bago magpasko ay muli
ko ng makasama ang aking ama, at gusto ko pong maging ninyo 'to sa akin sa
darating na pasko.
Hanggang dito na lamang po ang aking liham, at lubos po akong
nagtitiwala sa inyong kakayahan na mapapawalang sala ang aking ama.
Truly
yours,
Lorielyn
Nardo[38]
January
17, 2001
Dear Atty. Teresita De Guzman,
Ako po muli si Lorielyn Nardo na anak ni Alfredo Nardo na
nakabinbin sa NBP Dorm-I-D Muntinlupa. Kahit hindi po natupad ang hinihiling
kong sana’y makalaya ang aking ama noong nakaraang Disyembre ay patuloy ko pa
rin pong inaasahan at hinihiling ang inyong tulong na sana po ay makalaya na
ang aking ama. Patuloy pong nangingibabaw ang aking konsensiya dahil sa aking
ginawa, umaasa po ako na sana ay lalo pang mapadali ang paglabas niya sa loob
ng kulungan, maniwala po kayo wala siyang kasalanan. Attorney, alam ko po na
ginagawa niyo (po) ang lahat kaya't ngayon pa lang po ay nagpapasalamat ako sa
inyo at patuloy na umaasa ng inyong tulong at sana’y maunawaan niyo ako.
Patuloy
na umaasa,
Lorielyn
Nardo
(anak)[39]
Accused-appellant relies
on these letters to obtain a reversal of the trial court's judgment of his
conviction. However, the said letters
were not subscribed and sworn to by Lorielyn.
Be that as it may,
recantations are frowned upon by the courts.
A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is
always the probability that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated.
Courts look with disfavor upon retractions, because they can easily be obtained
from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction
does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration.[40] Especially, recantations made after the
conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration.[41]
Moreover, any recantation
or affidavit of desistance, by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the
so-called "private crimes,"
is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been
instituted.[42] The pardon to justify the dismissal of the
complaint should be made prior to the institution of the criminal action.[43] Parenthetically, the crime in the case at
bar was committed in 1996, i.e., prior to the passage of the R.A. 8353,
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a crime against persons.
Even if it were sworn,
Lorielyn's recantation could hardly suffice to overturn the finding of guilt by
the trial court which was based on her own clear and convincing testimony,
given during a full-blown trial. An
affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be
considered inferior to the testimony given in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the
testimony taken before a court of justice simply because the witness who gave
it later on changed his/her mind for one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a
mockery, and place the proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.[44]
As stated, the trial
court arrived at its finding of guilt after a careful assessment of the evidence
presented, foremost of which was the testimony of the victim in open court,
where the trial judge was able to personally evaluate her manner of testifying,
and from there reach a studied opinion as to her credibility. As a rule, we do not disturb the findings by
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, for the trial court is in a
better position to pass upon the same.[45]
"The trial judge is in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying.
He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a witness was
telling the truth or lying. Truth does
not always stalk boldly forth naked; she often hides in nooks and crannies
visible only to the mind‘s eye of the judge who tried the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness,
the yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of
the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien."[46]
We find nothing in the
records which would indicate that the findings of fact of the trial court are
not supported by the evidence or were arrived at in manifest or palpable
error, such as to warrant a departure
from the foregoing rule. The trial
court was correct in lending credibility to the testimony of Lorielyn. The sole testimony of Lorielyn was
sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-appellant. It is settled that a person accused of rape
can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim if the trial court finds
said testimony to be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human
nature and the course of things.[47]
Indeed, a daughter,
especially one in her minority, would not accuse her own father of such an
unspeakable crime as incestuous rape had she really not been aggrieved.[48] More importantly, Lorielyn withstood all the
rigors of the case, starting from the initial police interrogation, the medical
examination, the formal charge, the public trial, to the
cross-examination. She went through the
court hearings, where she came face to face with her father. If it was true that she merely made up the
charge, she should have been bothered by her conscience at the sight of her
father in prison garb and upon the realization of his sorry state while in
detention. The fact that she maintained
her story during her testimony-in-chief
all the way up to her rebuttal testimony only serves to substantiate the
veracity of her claim.
Well settled is the rule
that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to
public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not
true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.[49] A young girl‘s revelation that she has been
raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and her
willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out
the details of an assault on her dignity by, as in this case, her own father,
cannot be so easily dismissed as a mere concoction.[50] Courts usually give credence to the testimony
of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, particularly if it constitutes
incestuous rape because, normally, no person would be willing to undergo the
humiliation of a public trial and to testify on the details of her ordeal were
it not to condemn an injustice.
Needless to say, it is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of
child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman, more so if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed.
Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.[51]
During the trial, the
defense endeavored to portray Lorielyn as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited wherein Lorielyn
supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave
the house. However, Rule 130, Section
34, of the Rules of Court provides that: “Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do
the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a
specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. “While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the
falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the moment to be true, are
petty and inconsequential. They are not
as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all
of its serious repercussions.
Accused-appellant argues
that the trial court should have given credence to his witness, Atty. Santer
G. Gonzales, because he is a member of
the bar. Atty. Gonzales, however, took the witness stand not as a lawyer but
as an ordinary person. He testified in
his capacity as accused-appellant's employer.
As such, no special privilege
should be accorded him by the trial court by reason only of his being a member
of the bar. He did not appear in that
case as an officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should be
treated as one.
Likewise, accused-appellant insists that Lorielyn's
conduct after the rape, during which she continued to perform her tasks and
lived with her father in their house,
negates the commission of rape.
Accused-appellant's proposition is derived from Lorielyn's perfunctory
yes-or-no answers to the leading questions propounded to her on
cross-examination. Rather than sustain
this argument, we rely instead on the observations of the Social Welfare
Officer, whom we find to be an impartial witness, in this wise:
Per observation, Lorielyn is a shy and silent type person. She talked in a very small voice and during
the interview she only talks when being asked.
She also appears to be very sad and have been staring blankly
(sic).[52]
Accused-appellant assigns
as error the trial court's failure to give the reasons for recommending the
commutation of his sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the trial court was impelled by humanitarian reason.[53] Moreover,
the commutation of sentence is a prerogative of the Chief
Executive.
As against the positive
and categorical testimony of Lorielyn,
accused-appellant can only proffer the defense of alibi. However, in order to overcome the evidence
of the prosecution with the defense of alibi, he must establish not only that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time it was committed.[54] In the instant case, the testimonies for the
defense sought to establish that accused-appellant was 400 to 500 meters, or 15 minutes, away from the scene of the crime. This hardly qualifies as proof that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Accused-appellant's defense of alibi
must, therefore, necessarily fail.
Carefully sifting through
the entire body of evidence presented in this case, we find nothing which would
destroy the moral certainty of accused-appellant's guilt. While there may be some inconsistencies in
the testimony of Lorielyn, these to our mind are minor inconsistencies which
serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than
indicia of falsehood.[55] Minor inconsistencies do not affect the
credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather than
weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth
of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.[56] Besides, a rape victim can not be expected
to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed against her
virtue.
Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under
eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent
of the victim. xxx.[57]
The concurrence of the
two special qualifying circumstances, namely the victim's minority and the
relationship between the victim and the culprit, increases the penalty of rape
to one (1) degree, thus resulting in the imposition of the death penalty. In order to be appreciated as qualifying
circumstances, however, these must be properly pleaded in the indictment.[58] In addition, the qualifying circumstances
should be duly proved during the trial.[59]
These requirements are
met in this case. The Information
sufficiently alleges that accused-appellant is the father of the victim, and
that the latter was fourteen (14) years old at the time of commission of the
rape. These elements, furthermore, were categorically affirmed by Elizabeth
Nardo, the victim's mother and the most competent witness. She testified that accused-appellant is
Lorielyn's father, and that Lorielyn was born on September 11, 1981,[60] thus placing her age at the time of the rape
at fourteen (14) years. Moreover, the Lorielyn's birth date and her relationship
to accused-appellant are shown by her Certificate of Baptism.[61] This was presented by her mother, Elizabeth,
in lieu of her Certificate of Live Birth,
which was destroyed by fire.[62] The baptismal certificate, coupled by her
mother's testimony, is sufficient to establish Lorielyn's age.[63]
We therefore affirm the
trial court's imposition of the death penalty.
Four justices of the
Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No.
7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to
the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and
that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
We likewise affirm the
award of P50,000.00 for moral damages which is consistent with prevailing
jurisprudence.[64] No proof is required to substantiate the
award of moral damages in rape cases.
In People vs. Prades,[65] we held:
xxx. The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice. Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
In addition to moral
damages, the amount of P75,000.00 is
awarded to the victim as indemnity.
xxx. Indictments for rape
continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of higher
penalties. The Court believes that, on
like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow
the same direction. Hence, starting
with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in
the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity.[66]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City, Albay, Branch III, convicting accused-appellant Alfredo Nardo y
Rosales of the crime of rape, sentencing him to death, and ordering him to pay
the victim, Lorielyn Nardo moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is, further, ordered to
pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00.
In accordance with
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified true copies thereof, as
well as the records of this case, be forwarded without delay to the office of
the President for possible exercise of the clemency or pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Certificate of
Baptism, Exhibit “D”.
[2] TSN, April 2, 1997,
pp. 5-9; p. 28.
[3] Ibid., p. 11.
[4] Id., pp.
14-16.
[5] Id., pp.
17-19.
[6] Exh. “C”.
[7] Exh. “A”.
[8] Exh. “E”.
[9] Record, p. 2.
[10] Ibid., p. 47.
[11] Exh. “A”.
[12] TSN, November 5,
1996, p. 8.
[13] TSN, November 6,
1996, pp. 5-10.
[14] Exh. “B”.
[15] TSN, November 6,
1996, pp. 13-16.
[16] TSN, December 16,
1996, p. 6.
[17] TSN, February 11,
1997, pp. 3-4.
[18] Exh. “D”.
[19] TSN, June 9, 1997,
pp. 3-7, 12; Exh. “5”.
[20] Ibid., p. 8.
[21] Id., p. 7.
[22] Id., pp.
14-16.
[23] TSN, July 10, 1997,
pp. 4-10.
[24] TSN, August 11,
1997, pp. 3-5.
[25] TSN, October 7,
1997, pp. 3-6.
[26] Ibid., pp.
9-13.
[27] TSN, November 24,
1997, pp. 3-11.
[28] Ibid., pp.
13-16.
[29] Record, p. 149.
[30] Appellant’s Brief; Rollo,
p. 53.
[31] Rollo, pp.
117-129.
[32] Ibid., pp.
118-119.
[33] Id., pp.
134-136.
[34] Id., p. 137.
[35] Id., p. 141.
[36] Id., pp.
154-158.
[37] Id., pp.
144-148.
[38] Id., p. 151.
[39] Id., p. 149.
[40] People v. Navarro,
297 SCRA 331, 348 (1998).
[41] Villanueva v.
People, G.R. No. 135098, April 12, 2000.
[42] Alonte v. Savellano,
Jr., 287 SCRA 245, 266 (1998).
[43] Ibid., citing
People v. Entes, 103 SCRA 162
(1981).
[44] People v. Agbayani,
284 SCRA 315, 342 (1998).
[45] People v. Diasanta,
G.R. No. 128108, July 6, 2000.
[46] People v. Mitra, G.R. No. 130669, March 27, 2000; citing People v. Agbayani, 284 SCRA 315 (1998).
[47] People v. Bacule,
G.R. No. 127568, January 28, 2000; People v. Reyes, 315 SCRA 563, 571-72
(1999).
[48] People v. Antonio,
G.R. No. 122473, June 8, 2000; People
v. Magdato, G.R. No. 134122-27, February 7, 2000.
[49] People v. Taño, G.R.
No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v. Amigable, G.R. No. 133857, March 31, 2000;
People v. Sampior, G.R. No. 117691,
March 1, 2000.
[50] People v. Antipona,
274 SCRA 328, 335 (1997).
[51] People v. Lusa, 288
SCRA 296, 303 (1998).
[52] Social Case Study
Report, p. 2; Exh. “B“ (emphasis ours.)
[53] Brief for the
Appellee, p. 18; Rollo, p. 109.
[54] People v. Dando,
G.R. No. 120646, February 14, 2000; People v. Paraiso, 319 SCRA 422, 433
(1999).
[55] People v. Dreu, G.R.
No. 126282, June 20, 2000.
[56] People v. Flora,
G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000.
[57] R.A. 7659, Sec. 11,
seventh paragraph.
[58] People v. Mendez,
G.R. No. 132546, July 5, 2000.
[59] People v. Alvero,
G.R. No. 134536-38, April 5, 2000; People v. Llamo, G.R. No. 132138, January
28, 2000.
[60] TSN, February 11,
1997, pp. 3-4.
[61] EXH. “D“.
[62] TSN, February 11,
1997, p. 4.
[63] People v.
Rebancos, 172 SCRA 425, 429 (1989).
[64] People v. Mendiola,
G.R. No. 134846, August 8, 2000; People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 130205,
July 5, 2000.
[65] 293 SCRA 411 (1998).
[66] People v. Victor,
292 SCRA 186, 200-201 (1998).