SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128372. March 12, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMEGIO
DELA PEÑA y BAGUIO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
On appeal is the decision
dated December 11, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 49, convicting appellant of the crime of rape and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Appellant Remegio dela
Peña is a 63 year-old farmer residing at Casantiagoan, Laoac, Pangasinan. He stands accused of raping his niece, Vilma
C. Lapeña, then 11 years old and a Grade V student.
The facts, based on the
records, are as follows:
Sometime in February of
1989, in Casantiagoan, Laoac, Pangasinan, Vilma slept in the house of appellant
upon the invitation of his granddaughter, Rochelle. She slept in a room beside Rochelle and appellant’s wife. At around 9:00 to 10:00 P.M., appellant’s
wife went downstairs. Appellant went
inside the room and placed himself on top of Vilma. When she awakened, appellant told her to keep quiet or he would
kill her. She tried to push him away
but she could not budge him. That same
night, she went home and sneaked in without her parents’ knowledge.[1]
Two days later, at around
10:00 P.M., she went to a store to buy some salt upon the order of her
mother. She was alone and there were no
people in the street. On her way home,
appellant blocked her way, pulled her hands, and poked a kitchen knife at her neck. He brought her to the back of his house,
some 30 to 40 meters from her house. He
placed her on the ground while still holding the knife, threatened her not to
shout or he would kill her, removed her shorts and panty and spread her
legs. Appellant opened the fly of his
trousers and brought out his organ and inserted his penis in her vagina. She felt pain and blood on her vagina. Afterwards, he threatened her not to tell
anyone or else he would kill her entire family.[2]
Some two years after the
incident, Vilma went to Manila to work as a househelper. In the meantime,
appellant had a fight with Vilma’s family.
According to Vilma’s mother, Remegio tried to abuse his own
granddaughter, Rochelle, so she wrote a letter to Vilma’s father. This angered appellant. He then tried to evict them from his land
which Vilma’s family occupied, but he failed. One time, while he was drunk, he
shouted “Okin nayo. Linukoc met
laeng ni anak yo nga Vilma!” (“Vulva of your mother, I just made a fool of your
daughter Vilma anyway!”) Alarmed, the victim’s mother replied, Why Manong,
why did you abuse my daughter?” Remegio answered, “Yes. Even if you will
bring this matter to the authorities, I will answer for it.” Vilma’s
parents went to Manila to fetch Vilma in September 1994. When confronted, Vilma admitted that
appellant raped her five years ago. She
explained that she was afraid to tell anyone because appellant threatened to
kill her entire family. Assisted by her
parents, Vilma filed a criminal complaint with the police of Laoac, Pangasinan.[3]
On April 4, 1995, the
following Information[4] for rape was filed
against appellant:
The undersigned, upon sworn complaint previously filed by the complainant duly assisted by her parents, accuses REMEGIO DELA PEÑA y Baguio of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of February, 1989, in the evening, at barangay Casantiagoan Norte, municipality of Laoac, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with the complainant VILMA C. LAPEÑA against her will.
CONTRARY to Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, March 27, 1995.
(SGD.) JORITO C. PERALTA
2nd Asst. Prov’l. Prosecutor
Upon arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[5]
During trial, the
prosecution presented as witnesses (1) the victim, Vilma; (2) her mother, and
(3) Dr. Alexis Mary Arenas Chuson, the physician who examined the victim on
September 20, 1994 or nearly five (5) years after the rape incident. Dr. Chuson testified that the hymen was already
broken, and there were no signs of external physical injuries.[6]
The defense presented the
following witnesses (1) appellant, Remegio dela Peña; (2) his wife, Maria
Rosquita, and (3) his neighbor, Marcelino Aquino.
Appellant’s defense is
denial. He claims the victim never
slept over at his house. He contends
that he was charged with rape because he was evicting the victim’s family from his
land. He got angry at the victim’s
mother because she accused him of abusing his own granddaughter, Rochelle.[7]
Maria Rosquita likewise
testified that the victim never slept over in their house.[8]
Marcelino Aquino
testified that from August to November of 1995, Vilma and he were live-in
partners. He got rid of her because she
brought him bad luck, especially when she lost the necklace he gave her. To his knowledge, the victim never had
sexual intercourse with anyone. He
himself could not have sexual intercourse with her because he just had a
prostate gland operation.[9]
On rebuttal, Vilma
affirmed that she did live-in with Aquino.
However, she claimed that she separated from him because he once pointed
a shotgun at her. They also had an
argument about their joint account.
Eventually, they parted ways when he gave her P5,000.00 from their
savings.[10]
On December 11, 1996, the
trial court rendered a decision[11] convicting
appellant of the crime of rape, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused as charged. Accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present
appeal. Appellant claims that – [12]
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE, HAS BEEN PROVEN BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE VICTIM IN THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES.
In his brief,[13] appellant assails
the credibility of the victim considering that it took her five (5) years to
report the incident to her parents and the authorities. Further, he claims that the victim had a bad
reputation considering that at 17 years old, she lived-in with a 72 year-old
pensioner. He claims that it was not
possible for him to rape the victim at the back of his house. He would have taken her to a much further
place. Lastly, he denies boasting,
while in a fit of drunkenness, that he abused the victim. According to him, no man in his right senses
would admit to raping a niece.
The Office of the
Solicitor General, for the State, contends that the delay in reporting the rape
was due to appellant’s threats on the life of the victim and her family. In fact, the victim had no intention of
revealing the rape had appellant not first revealed it to her parents. In view of the positive allegations of the
victim, the alleged land feud which appellant claims is the motive for the
filing of the case is too shallow to merit consideration. In view of the positive testimony of the
victim and her witnesses, the OSG prays for the affirmance of appellant’s
conviction. In addition, the OSG
recommended the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the victim.
The main issue here
concerns the credibility of witnesses.
Appellate courts in general will not disturb the findings of the trial
court on this score for the reason that it is in a better position to decide
the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial.[14] An exception is
when the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.[15] In this case, the
trial court found the victim’s testimony candid and consistent even under
grueling cross-examination. After
thorough review of the records of this case including the transcripts of the
stenographic notes, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion reached below.
Delay in making a
criminal accusation does not impair the credibility of a witness if such delay
is satisfactorily explained.[16] Considering that
at the time of the rape, the victim was only eleven (11) years old and
appellant was her uncle, who threatened to kill her and her entire family if
she told anyone of the incident, the delay of five years is
understandable. Delay in reporting rape
does not undermine the charge where it is grounded on death threats by
appellant against the victim and her family.[17] Note that her rape
was only discovered when appellant, in a fit of drunkenness, boasted about it
in public.
Appellant paints the
victim as a young whore, who at the age of 17, already lived-in with a 72
year-old pensioner. Such a fact, albeit
admitted by the victim, is not material in the present case. First, such
cohabitation happened long after the occurrence of the rape in 1989. Second, the rule is that the victim’s
character in rape is immaterial.[18] There is
absolutely no nexus between the reputation of a rape victim and the odious deed
committed against her.[19] As we explained in
People v. Barera –[20]
It may be true that the
offended person had theretofore had relations with other men, but that fact did
not justify the appellant in having illicit relations with her against her will
and consent and by force and violence.
The law punishes those who have carnal knowledge of a woman by force or
intimidation. Virginity is not one of
the elements of the crime of rape.
The fact that the rape
was committed at the back of appellant’s house and not in some distant isolated
place does not negate the commission of the rape. Rape can be committed in many different places which may be
considered as unlikely or inappropriate, and that the scene of the rape is not
always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or
place.[21]
At the time of its
commission, the prevailing law on rape was Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides –
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. …
Carnal knowledge clearly
took place between appellant and the victim.
The victim testified that after appellant removed her undergarments, he
inserted his penis in her vagina and she felt pain and blood came out of her
vagina.[22] However, we cannot
accept the trial court’s finding that it was statutory rape. Although the prosecution presented the
victim’s birth certificate that she was under 12 or 11 years old at the time of
the rape, such fact was not alleged in the Information. Absent such allegation
of age in the charge, it would be a violation of due process to hold appellant
liable for statutory rape, simply because he could validly claim lack of
sufficient information to defend himself for this grievous offense, if so
qualified.
However, the Information
sufficiently alleged the element of force and intimidation, and such fact was
proven during trial. The act of holding
a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and
threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring her into submission.[23] This element
suffices to hold appellant answerable for simple rape.
While the prosecution
presented the physician who examined the victim five years after the rape,
considering the length of time that lapsed, his testimony, has little probative
value. Nonetheless, it is
well-established that a medical examination of the victim, as well as the
medical certificate, is merely corroborative in character and is not an
indispensable element in rape.[24] What is important
is that the testimony of private complainant about the incident is clear,
unequivocal and credible.[25]
The penalty for rape at
the time of its commission is reclusion perpetua, an indivisible
penalty, which should be imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.[26]
As to damages, the trial
court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, without need
of proof.[27] In addition, we
find it proper to award the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, pursuant
to existing jurisprudence.[28]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 49, in Criminal Case No. U-8381, finding appellant
REMEGIO DELA PEÑA Y BAGUIO guilty of the crime of RAPE is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to damages.
Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] TSN, June 4, 1996,
pp. 2-8.
[2] Id. at 8-15.
[3] TSN, July 23, 1996,
pp. 8-23.
[4] Records, p. 1.
[5] Records, pp. 45, 47.
[6] TSN, April 30, 1996,
pp. 5-10.
[7] TSN, August 13,
1996, pp. 3-12.
[8] TSN, August 26,
1996, pp. 2-3.
[9] TSN, August, 26,
1996, pp. 4-8.
[10] TSN, September 2,
1996, pp. 2-7.
[11] Records, pp.
181-190.
[12] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo,
p. 51.
[13] Id. at 54-58.
[14] People v.
Dizon, 312 SCRA 811, 818 (1999).
[15] Ibid.
[16] People v.
Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384, 398 (1997).
[17] People v.
Javier, 311 SCRA 122, 133 (1999).
[18] People v.
Bacalzo, 195 SCRA 557, 566 (1991).
[19] People v.
Soriano, 272 SCRA 760, 768 (1997).
[20] 262 SCRA 63, 77
(1996), citing People v. Lomibao, 55 Phil. 616, 620 (1931) and People
v. Garcia, G.R. No. 26150, January 15, 1927; See also People v.
Poculan, 167 SCRA 176, 198 (1988).
[21] People v. Villar,
G.R. No. 127572, January 19, 2000, pp. 10-11; People v. Geromo, G.R. No.
126169, December 21, 1999, p. 6; People v. Sandico, 307 SCRA 204,
214-215 (1999); People v. Sangil, Sr., 276 SCRA 532, 540 (1997).
[22] TSN, May 22, 1996,
pp.12, 14-15.
[23] People v. Baltazar,
G.R. No. 115990, March 31, 2000, p. 11.
[24] People v.
Brandares, 311 SCRA 159, 165 (1999).
[25] Ibid.
[26] Article 63, first
par., Revised Penal Code.
[27] People v.
Prades, 293 SCRA 411, 431 (1998).
[28] People v. Panique,
G.R. No. 125763, October 13, 1999, p. 11.