SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112092. March 1, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT
NUÑEZ y LAGASCA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
On appeal is the decision[1] dated May 26,
1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48,
convicting appellant of the crime of qualified illegal possession of firearms,
sentencing him to life imprisonment, and ordering him to pay the costs.
The facts are as follows:
On March 6, 1992, at
around 2:00 to 3:00 P.M., in Palina Sur, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, four (4)
persons, namely Teofilo Pacquing, Calixto Pacorza,[2] Marlito Pariñas
and Roy Tolentino were riding a tricycle driven by Jerry Almendrez.[3] When they passed
by the gate of appellant’s family compound, appellant fired at them from a
distance of about twenty (20) meters, hitting Pacquing on the right toe,
Almendrez on the left breast, and Pacorza resulting to his death. The records
do not indicate the injuries sustained by Pacorza, but merely state that he
died as a result of the shooting incident.[4]
The victims were brought
to the Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital for treatment. Teofilo Pacquing[5] reported the
incident to the police. SPO1 Ernesto C. Ganceña, a member of the Investigation
and Intelligence Operations of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
investigated the incident. Teofilo
Pacquing informed him that it was appellant who fired at them. Thereafter, SPO1 Ganceña, accompanied by PO3
Asterio Dismaya, and SPO1 Henry R. Kang proceeded to the scene of the
incident. When they arrived at
appellant’s house, SPO1 Ganceña talked to appellant who readily admitted that
he was the one who shot Pacorza. SPO1
Kang recovered a caliber .22, long rifle, “Squibman,” model 116 MK with serial
no. A-320554 with telescope from appellant.
When asked for the permit for the firearm, appellant could not produce
any. Appellant was thereafter brought
to the Urdaneta Police Station for investigation. He refused to give any statement to the police. The incident was entered in the police
blotter by desk officer Romulo Dutong.[6]
For the shooting of
Almendrez and Pacquing and the death of Pacorza, appellant was charged under
four (4) separate Informations for (1) homicide, (2) frustrated homicide, (3)
frustrated homicide and (4) illegal possession of firearms docketed as Criminal
Case No. U-6449. The cases were raffled
to the different branches. Only the
Illegal Possession of Firearms case is before us.
The Information for
Illegal Possession of Firearms reads:[7]
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1992, at barangay Palina Sur, municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and custody one (1) Caliber .22 Rifle 116MK, bearing Serial No. A320554, with trademark “Kassnar Squibman” and with magazine and nine (9) live ammunitions, without first securing the necessary permit or license from lawful authorities, which said firearm was used by the accused in the commission of the crime of homicide and double frustrated homicide against the persons of Calixto Pacursa (sic), Jerry Armendez (sic) and Teofilo Pacquing.
CONTRARY to Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, June 16, 1992.
On September 10, 1992,
upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty.[8] Pre-trial
conference was waived. Trial then
commenced.
The prosecution presented
the four (4) members of the PNP, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, who were involved in the
investigation, and one of the victims, Teofilo Pacquing.
SPO1 Ernesto C. Ganceña
testified that he conducted the investigation and that appellant admitted to
him that he shot the victim, Pacorza.[9] PO2 Asterio
Dismaya, corroborated the testimony of SPO1 Ganceña.[10] SPO1 Henry R.
Kang, testified that he was the one who recovered the firearm from appellant.[11] SPO1 Nestor G.
Manongsong, responding to a subpoena duces tecum, testified that he
could not bring the police blotter, but presented the complaint/assignment
sheet,[12] and the spot
report[13] pertaining to the
incident.[14] Teofilo Pacquing
testified on the circumstances surrounding the attack, and identified appellant
as the assailant.[15]
On the other hand, the
defense presented five (5) witnesses, namely: (1) appellant, (2) Salvador Paz,
a carpenter working in the house of Alvaro Nuñez; (3) Eugene Nuñez, a neighbor
of the aunt of appellant who allegedly witnessed the shooting incident; (4)
Cesar Nuñez Celeste, a cousin of appellant and the owner of the subject firearm
and (5) SPO4 Benito Opguar, of the Provincial Headquarters, PNP Command,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, who testified that Cesar Celeste had a temporary license
to possess the subject firearm, but at the time of the shooting incident, the
temporary license had already lapsed.[16]
The defense claims that
the shooting incident did not happen on the road, but inside the living room of
the house of appellant’s aunt, Magdalena Celeste. Appellant claims that he shot at the victims in self-defense. He narrates his version of the incident as
follows:[17]
That on March 6, 1992, the accused-appellant was busy sticking tobacco leaves when six (6) armed men namely: Calixto Pacursa, Gerry Almendrez, Teofilo Tolentino, Teofilo Pacquing, Nick Gascon and Carlito Parnas, arrived in their compound and went inside their compound and stoned the houses of his grandmother, Maxima Nuñez, his uncle Mariano Nuñez and his aunt Magdalena Celeste. When the six (6) men noticed him, they shouted at him so the accused-appellant ran towards the north and since they ran after him, the accused-appellant hid behind the santol tree, then the six men left the place boarding on the same tricycle and proceeded towards the west. In the afternoon between 3:00 and 4:00 o’clock of the same date, while he is unloading tobacco leaves, Gerry Almendrez and his companions came back and they shouted at him and he heard one gunshot so he ran inside the compound where his grandfather’s house were being constructed and that was then the time that Cesar Celeste and Juanito Nuñez went to town to report the said incident.
Calixto Pacursa armed with a .38 caliber met the accused-appellant so he ran towards the house of his aunt Magdalena Celeste and hide (sic) inside the bathroom since Calixto Pacursa continued chasing him. When Calixto Pacursa was about to go the second floor, he saw the .22 caliber that was placed on top of the bed of Cesar Celeste and he got the said firearm and when he went out he was still holding the .38 caliber and at the same time holding the .22 caliber firearm. When the accused-appellant saw Calixto Pacurza tucked his .38 caliber firearm in his waist and loaded the .22 caliber rifle that was the time accused-appellant went out from the bathroom and grappled with Calixto Pacurza and the accused-appellant was able to retrieve the subject firearm from Calixto Pacurza. The accused-appellant move two steps backward but Calixto Pacurza drew his .38 caliber firearm from his waist and that was the time that accused-appellant fired the .22 caliber rifle at Calixto Pacurza. The accused-appellant and Gerry Almendrez had a misunderstanding because the former noticed that some parts of the motorcycle driven by the latter had been replaced.
The testimony of herein accused-appellant were corroborated by Salvador Paz, a laborer in the on-going construction of the house of Alvaro Nuñez, and Eugene Nuñez, who at that time were inside the kitchen of Magdalena Celeste, the former was pouring hot water in a thermos while the latter went inside the kitchen to light his cigarette.
Cesar Celeste declared that he is the owner of the subject firearm and he brought outside the said firearm when Teofilo Pacquing and his companions arrived and stoned the houses in their compound. And before he and Juanito Nuñez went to town to report to the police authorities, he left the licensed firearm on top of his bed. He applied a license to possess the firearm through First Continental Co., Inc., and had paid the firearm bond.
After presentation of
prosecution evidence in the illegal possession case, appellant filed a motion
for consolidation of the four cases.
Upon the opposition of the public prosecutor, the trial court denied the
motion.[18] Subsequently, on
May 26, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] convicting appellant, the dispositive portion of
which provides:
WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty of Illegal possession of firearm resulting to the death of the victim and pursuant to P.D. 1866 in relation to the 1987 Constitution the court sentences the said accused Robert Nuñez to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and with costs.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Appellant now assigns the
following errors:[21]
I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WAS NOT RECOVERED FROM HIS POSSESSION AS TESTIFIED TO ON REBUTTAL BY PROSECUTION WITNESS PO3 HENRY KANG.
II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING GREAT WEIGHT TO THE INCONSISTENT AND UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE CORROBORATED AND CREDIBLE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE WITNESSES.
III. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE ACCUSED APPELLANT.
IV. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COUNSEL AND IN ADMITTING THE FIREARM IN ISSUE WHICH WAS SEARCHED AND SEIZED WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT.
In support of his first
and second assignment of errors, appellant points out major inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
SPO1 Ganceña testified that appellant was inside his house when the
police arrived at the crime scene and the rifle was located “beside” appellant,
and it was SPO1 Kang who got the rifle from appellant. SPO3 Dismaya, however,
testified that appellant was actually in the yard when they arrived and that
appellant was the one who got the rifle from the house and handed it to SPO2
Kang. SPO2 Kang testified during direct
examination that it was appellant who gave him the gun, but during rebuttal, he
said that it was one of appellant’s cousins who handed to him the gun.
In support of his third
assignment of error, appellant claims that it was error for the trial court to
shift the burden of proof to the defense when he invoked self-defense.
In support of his fourth
assignment of error, appellant contends that his alleged “extra-judicial
confession” to SPO1 Ganceña is inadmissible since he was not assisted by
counsel at the time it was made.
Further, the rifle was seized without a search warrant and therefore,
inadmissible in evidence.
The Office of the
Solicitor General, on the other hand, points out that it is of no moment who
among the responding policemen received the fatal weapon. What is important is that he admitted
possession of the firearm at the time the victim was shot. His conviction was based not on his alleged
“extrajudicial confession,” but on his admissions in open court. The rifle was not seized from appellant, but
was surrendered by him to the policemen.
Simply put, the issues
pertain to (1) the assessment of credibility of witnesses, and (2) the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict appellant of the crime charged.
It is well-settled that,
generally, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of trial
courts in passing upon the credibility of the witnesses unless there appears in
the record some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which the
trial court has overlooked or the significance of which it has misapprehended
or misinterpreted.[22] After a careful
examination of the records of the case, we are inclined to give credence to the
version of the prosecution. The alleged
inconsistencies as to who recovered the firearm from appellant, in our view, do
not pertain to a material matter. What
is important is that one of the police officers recovered the firearm from
appellant, who does not deny his possession of said firearm. Further, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions, insofar as the policemen are concerned,
has not been overturned. Credence should be given to the narration of an
incident by prosecution witnesses who are police officers and presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.[23]
Anent the second issue,
we have held that in crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and
(b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
license or permit to possess the same.[24] The prosecution
was able to prove both elements. First,
prosecution witness Pacquing categorically stated that he saw appellant fire at
them with a long gun from a distance of 20 meters.[25] Appellant would make us believe that his possession
of the firearm was “transient” possession.
He claims that he merely acquired it during the scuffle with the
victim. Having given credence to the
version presented by the prosecution, this argument deserves scant
consideration. Second, the
defense presented SPO4 Opguar, who testified that a temporary license of the
rifle was issued in the name of Cesar Celeste, the owner thereof, but said
license already lapsed. Clearly, appellant had no license to possess the rifle.
Appellant was convicted
of “illegal possession of firearms resulting to the death of the victim.” At
the time of the commission of the crime, the existing jurisprudence was People
v. Quijada.[26] This Court held
then that the use of an unlicensed firearm in a killing results in two separate
crimes - one for the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and two,
for homicide or murder. In the
meantime, however, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8294,[27] which lowered the
penalties for illegal possession of firearms.
Further, Section 1, third par. of R.A. No. 8294 provides -
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Thus in People v.
Molina, 292 SCRA 742 (1998), this Court held that the use of an unlicensed
weapon in the commission of homicide or murder should now be considered simply
as an aggravating circumstance and no longer a separate offense. The Molina ruling,[28] however, is not
applicable to the present case. In
Molina, separate Informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal
possessions were filed, but the cases were eventually consolidated and jointly
tried and decided. In the present case,
there were four cases filed against appellant which were all separately tried.[29] Hence, the
evidence as to the homicide and frustrated homicide cases were neither adopted
nor presented before the trial court trying the illegal possession case. For this reason, there is a dearth of
evidence on record to support the finding of homicide and/or frustrated
homicide.
Accordingly, appellant
should only be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms. The lowered penalties as provided in R.A.
No. 8294, being favorable to the accused, should be applied retroactively.[30] Under R.A. No.
8294, the penalty for simple illegal possession of a low-powered firearm is prision
correccional in its maximum period, which is four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than P15,000.00. It will not be amiss to point out that R.A.
No. 8294 contains the proviso: “Provided, That no other crime was committed.”
However, as explained earlier, the facts obtaining in this case do not
indubitably prove the frustrated murder cases or the murder case in relation to
the illegal possession case. Hence, we
find it proper to convict appellant only of the crime of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should be sentenced to two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional medium as minimum,
to five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision
correccional maximum as maximum, and ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00.[31]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. U-6449, is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Appellant
is hereby convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to five (5) years, four (4) months, and
twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as maximum, and ordered
to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
18-23.
[2] Also spelled as
“Pacursa,” “Pacurza,” or “Marsoza” in the records.
[3] Also spelled as
Gerry Armendrez in the records.
[4] TSN, December 7,
1992, pp. 3-9.
[5] According to SPO1
Ganceña, it was one Romulo Pacquing, but according to the decision, it was
Teofilo Pacquing.
[6] TSN, October 7,
1992, pp. 2-9; TSN, October 12, 1992, pp. 3-7.
[7] Records, p. 1.
[8] Id. at 70.
[9] TSN, October 7,
1992, pp. 3-5.
[10] Id. at 8-9.
[11] TSN, October 12,
1992, pp. 5-6.
[12] Exhibits “C”, “D”,
and “D-1”, Records, pp. 138, 140.
[13] Exhibit “E” and
“E-1”, Id. at 142.
[14] TSN, October 12,
1992, pp. 17-22.
[15] TSN, December 7,
1992, pp. 4-10.
[16] TSN, February, 10,
1993, p. 27.
[17] Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 5-6; Rollo, p. 41.
[18] Records, pp.
122-129.
[19] Id. at
198-209.
[20] Id. at 203.
[21] Appellant’s Brief,
pp. 1-2; Rollo, p. 41.
[22] People v.
Alao, 322 SCRA 380, 387 (2000).
[23] People v.
Boholst, 152 SCRA 263, 270 (1987).
[24] People v.
Cerveto, 315 SCRA 611, 624 (1999).
[25] TSN, December 7,
1992, pp. 4-5.
[26] 259 SCRA 191 (1996).
[27] An Act Amending the
Provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, entitled “Codifying the
Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or
Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, or instruments used in the
manufacture of firearms, ammunition or explosives; and Imposing Stiffer
Penalties for Certain Violations thereof, and for Relevant Purposes.”
[28] People vs.
Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 783 (1998); People v. Narvasa, 298 SCRA 637
(1998); People v. Feloteo, 290 SCRA 627 (1998).
[29] The records did not
indicate the status of the other cases.
[30] Art. 22, Revised
Penal Code.
[31] See Cadua v.
Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 703, 724-726 (1999).