SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116710. June 25, 2001]
DANILO D. MENDOZA, also doing business under the name and style of ATLANTIC EXCHANGE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, FERNANDO MARAMAG, JR., RICARDO G. DECEPIDA and BAYANI A. BAUTISTA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE
LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] dated August 8, 1994 of the respondent Court
of Appeals (Tenth Division) in CA-G.R. CV No. 38036 reversing the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
dismissing the complaint therein.
Petitioner Danilo D.
Mendoza is engaged in the domestic and international trading of raw materials
and chemicals. He operates under the
business name Atlantic Exchange Philippines (Atlantic), a single proprietorship
registered with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Sometime in 1978 he was granted by
respondent Philippine National Bank
(PNB) a Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) credit line and a One
Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Letter of Credit/Trust Receipt (LC/TR) line.
As security for the
credit accommodations and for those which may thereinafter be granted,
petitioner mortgaged to respondent PNB the following: 1) three (3) parcels of land[3] with improvements in F. Pasco Avenue,
Santolan, Pasig; 2) his house and lot in Quezon City; and 3) several pieces of
machinery and equipment in his Pasig coco-chemical plant.
The real estate mortgage[4] provided the following escalation clause:
(f) The rate of interest charged on the obligation secured by this mortgage as well as the interest on the amount which may have been advanced by the Mortgagee in accordance with paragraph (d) of the conditions herein stipulated shall be subject during the life of this contract to such increase within the rates allowed by law, as the Board of Directors of the Mortgagee may prescribe for its debtors.
Petitioner executed in
favor of respondent PNB three (3) promissory notes covering the Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) credit line, one dated March 8, 1979 for Three
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (P310,000.00); another dated March 30, 1979 for
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00); and the last dated September 27, 1979 for
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). The said 1979 promissory notes uniformly stipulated: "with
interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, until paid, which interest rate
the Bank may, at any time, without notice, raise within the limits allowed by
law xxx."[5]
Petitioner made use of
his LC/TR line to purchase raw materials from foreign importers. He signed a total of eleven (11) documents
denominated as "Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of
Credit,"[6] on various dates from February 8 to
September 11, 1979, which uniformly contained the following clause:
"Interest shall be at the rate of 9% per annum from the date(s) of the
draft(s) to the date(s) of arrival of payment therefor in New York. The Bank, however, reserves the right to
raise the interest charges at any time depending on whatever policy it may
follow in the future."[7]
In a letter dated January
3, 1980 and signed by Branch Manager Fil S. Carreon Jr., respondent PNB advised
petitioner Mendoza that effective December 1, 1979, the bank raised its
interest rates to 14% per annum, in line with Central Bank's Monetary Board
Resolution No. 2126 dated November 29, 1979.
On March 9, 1981, he
wrote a letter to respondent PNB requesting for the restructuring of his past
due accounts into a five-year term loan and for an additional LC/TR line of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).[8] According to the letter, because of the
shut-down of his end-user companies and the huge amount spent for the expansion
of his business, petitioner failed to pay to respondent bank his LC/TR accounts
as they became due and demandable.
Ceferino D. Cura, Branch
Manager of PNB Mandaluyong replied on behalf of the respondent bank and
required petitioner to submit the following documents before the bank would act
on his request: 1) Audited Financial Statements for 1979 and 1980; 2) Projected
cash flow (cash in - cash out) for five (5) years detailed yearly; and 3) List
of additional machinery and equipment and proof of ownership thereof. Cura also suggested that petitioner reduce
his total loan obligations to Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) "to give
us more justification in recommending a plan of payment or restructuring of
your accounts to higher authorities of the Bank."[9]
On September 25, 1981,
petitioner sent another letter addressed to PNB Vice-President Jose Salvador,
regarding his request for restructuring of his loans. He offered respondent PNB the following proposals: 1) the disposal of some of the mortgaged
properties, more particularly, his house and lot and a vacant lot in order to
pay the overdue trust receipts; 2) capitalization and conversion of the balance
into a 5-year term loan payable semi-annually or on annual installments; 3) a
new Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) LC/TR line in order to enable Atlantic
Exchange Philippines to operate at full capacity; 4) assignment of all his
receivables to PNB from all domestic and export sales generated by the LC/TR
line; and 5) maintenance of the existing Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) credit line.
The petitioner testified
that respondent PNB Mandaluyong Branch found his proposal favorable and
recommended the implementation of the agreement. However, Fernando Maramag, PNB Executive Vice-President,
disapproved the proposed release of the mortgaged properties and reduced the
proposed new LC/TR line to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).[10] Petitioner claimed he was forced to agree to
these changes and that he was required to submit a new formal proposal and to
sign two (2) blank promissory notes.
In a letter dated July 2,
1982, petitioner offered the following revised proposals to respondent
bank: 1) the restructuring of past due
accounts including interests and penalties into a 5-year term loan, payable
semi-annually with one year grace period on the principal; 2) payment of Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) upon the approval of the proposal; 3)
reduction of penalty from 3% to 1%; 4) capitalization of the interest component
with interest rate at 16% per annum; 5) establishment of a One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) LC/TR line against the mortgaged properties; 6) assignment of
all his export proceeds to respondent bank to guarantee payment of his loans.
According to petitioner,
respondent PNB approved his proposal.
He further claimed that he and his wife were asked to sign two (2) blank
promissory note forms. According to
petitioner, they were made to believe that the blank promissory notes were to
be filled out by respondent PNB to conform with the 5-year restructuring plan
allegedly agreed upon. The first
Promissory Note,[11] No. 127/82, covered the principal while the
second Promissory Note,[12] No. 128/82, represented the accrued
interest.
Petitioner testified that
respondent PNB allegedly contravened their verbal agreement by 1) affixing
dates on the two (2) subject promissory notes to make them mature in two (2)
years instead of five (5) years as supposedly agreed upon; 2) inserting in the
first Promissory Note No. 127/82 an interest rate of 21% instead of 18%; 3)
inserting in the second Promissory Note No. 128/82, the amount stated therein
representing the accrued interest as One Million Five Hundred Thirty Six
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos and Seventy Three Centavos
(P1,536,498.73) when it should only be Seven Hundred Sixty Thousand Three
Hundred Ninety Eight Pesos and Twenty Three Centavos (P760,398.23) and pegging
the interest rate thereon at 18% instead of 12%.
The subject Promissory
Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 both dated December 29, 1982 in the principal
amounts of Two Million Six Hundred Fifty One Thousand One Hundred Eighteen
Pesos and Eighty Six Centavos (P2,651,118.86) and One Million Five Hundred
Thirty Six Thousand Seven Hundred Ninety Eight and Seventy Three Centavos
(P1,536,798.73) respectively and marked Exhibits “BB” and “CC” respectively,
were payable on equal semi-annual amortization and contained the following
escalation clause:
x x x which interest rate the BANK may increase within the limits allowed by law at any time depending on whatever policy it may adopt in the future; Provided, that, the interest rate on this note shall be correspondingly decreased in the event that the applicable maximum interest rate is reduced by law or by the Monetary Board. In either case, the adjustment in the interest rate agreed upon shall take effect on the effectivity date of the increase or decrease in the maximum interest rate. x x x
It appears from the
record that the subject Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 superseded and
novated the three (3) 1979 promissory notes and the eleven (11) 1979
“Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit” which the
petitioner executed in favor of respondent PNB.
According to the
petitioner, sometime in June 1983 the new PNB Mandaluyong Branch Manager Bayani
A. Bautista suggested that he sell the coco-chemical plant so that he could
keep up with the semi-annual amortizations.
On three (3) occasions, Bautista even showed up at the plant with some
unidentified persons who claimed that they were interested in buying the plant.
Petitioner testified that
when he confronted the PNB management about the two (2) Promissory Notes Nos.
127/82 and 128/82 (marked Exhibits “BB” and “CC” respectively) which he claimed
were improperly filled out, Bautista and Maramag assured him that the five-year
restructuring agreement would be implemented on the condition that he assigns
10% of his export earnings to the Bank.[13] In a letter dated August 22, 1983,
petitioner Mendoza consented to assign 10% of the net export proceeds of a
Letter of Credit covering goods amounting to One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
Dollars ($114,000.00).[14] However, petitioner claimed that respondent
PNB subsequently debited 14% instead of 10% from his export proceeds.[15]
Pursuant to the
escalation clauses of the subject two (2) promissory notes, the interest rate
on the principal amount in Promissory Note No. 127/82 was increased from 21% to
29% on May 28, 1984, and to 32% on July 3, 1984 while the interest rate on the
accrued interest per Promissory Note No. 128/82 was increased from 18% to 29%
on May 28, 1984, and to 32% on July 3, 1984.
Petitioner failed to pay
the subject two (2) Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 (Exhibits “BB” and
“CC”) as they fell due. Respondent PNB
extra-judicially foreclosed the real and chattel mortgages, and the mortgaged
properties were sold at public auction to respondent PNB, as highest bidder,
for a total of Three Million Seven Hundred Ninety Eight Thousand Seven Hundred
Nineteen Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P3,798,719.50).
The petitioner filed in
the RTC in Pasig, Rizal a complaint for specific performance, nullification of
the extra-judicial foreclosure and damages against respondents PNB, Fernando
Maramag Jr., Ricardo C. Decepida, Vice-President for Metropolitan Branches, and
Bayani A. Bautista. He alleged that the
Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale of the mortgaged properties was null and void
since his loans were restructured to a five-year term loan; hence, it was not
yet due and demandable; that the escalation clauses in the subject two (2)
Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 were null and void, that the total
amount presented by PNB as basis of the foreclosure sale did not reflect the
actual loan obligations of the plaintiff to PNB; that Bautista purposely
delayed payments on his exports and caused delays in the shipment of materials;
that PNB withheld certain personal properties not covered by the chattel
mortgage; and that the foreclosure of his mortgages was premature so that he
was unable to service his foreign clients, resulting in actual damages
amounting to Two Million Four Thousand Four Hundred Sixty One Pesos (P2,004,461.00).
On March 16, 1992, the
trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and ordered the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the
Sheriff’s sale of the mortgaged real properties by virtue of consolidation
thereof and the cancellation of the new titles issued to PNB; that PNB vacate
the subject premises in Pasig and turn the same over to the petitioner; and
also the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and sheriff's sale of
the mortgaged chattels, and that the chattels be returned to petitioner Mendoza
if they were removed from his Pasig premises or be paid for if they were lost
or rendered unserviceable.
The trial court also
ordered respondent PNB to restructure to five-years petitioner's principal loan
of Two Million Six Hundred Fifty One Thousand One Hundred Eighteen Pesos and
Eighty Six Centavos (P2,651,118.86) and the accumulated capitalized interest on
the same in the amount of Seven Hundred Sixty Thousand Three Hundred Eighty
Nine Pesos and Twenty Three Centavos (P760,389.23) as of December 1982, and
that respondent PNB should compute the additional interest from January 1983 up
to October 15, 1984 only when respondent PNB took possession of the said
properties, at the rate of 12% and 9% respectively.
The trial court also
ordered respondent PNB to grant petitioner Mendoza an additional Two Million
Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan in order for him to have the necessary capital to
resume operation. It also ordered respondents
PNB, Bayani A. Bautista and Ricardo C. Decepida to pay to petitioner actual
damages in the amount of Two Million One Hundred Thirteen Thousand Nine Hundred
Sixty One Pesos (P2,113,961.00) and the peso equivalent of Six Thousand Two
Hundred Fifteen Dollars ($6,215.00) at the prevailing foreign exchange rate on
October 11, 1983; and exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000.00).
Respondent PNB appealed
this decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. And the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this petition.
It is the petitioner’s
contention that the PNB management restructured his existing loan obligations
to a five-year term loan and granted him another Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00)
LC/TR line; that the Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 evidencing a
2-year restructuring period or with the due maturity date “December 29, 1984”
were filled out fraudulently by respondent PNB, and contrary to his verbal
agreement with respondent PNB; hence, his indebtedness to respondent PNB was
not yet due and the extrajudicial foreclosure of his real estate and chattel
mortgages was premature. On the other
hand, respondent PNB denies that petitioner's loan obligations were
restructured to five (5) years and maintains that the subject two (2)
Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 were filled out regularly and became
due as of December 29, 1984 as shown on the face thereof.
Respondent Court of
Appeals held that there is no evidence of a promise from respondent PNB,
admittedly a banking corporation, that it had accepted the proposals of the
petitioner to have a five-year restructuring of his overdue loan
obligations. It found and held, on the
basis of the evidence adduced, that "appellee's (Mendoza) communications
were mere proposals while the bank's responses were not categorical that the
appellee's request had been favorably accepted by the bank."
Contending that
respondent PNB had allegedly approved his proposed five-year restructuring plan,
petitioner presented three (3) documents executed by respondent PNB
officials. The first document is a
letter dated March 16, 1981 addressed to the petitioner and signed by Ceferino
D. Cura, Branch Manager of PNB Mandaluyong, which states:
x x x In order to study intelligently the feasibility of your above request, please submit the following documents/papers within thirty (30) days from the date thereof, viz:
1. Audited Financial Statements for 1979 and 1980;
2. Projected cash flow (cash in - cash out) for five years detailed yearly; and
3. List of additional machinery and equipment and proof of ownership thereof.
We would strongly suggest, however, that you reduce your total obligations to at least P3 million (principal and interest and other charges) to give us more justification in recommending a plan of payment or restructuring of your accounts to higher authorities of this bank.
The second document is a
letter dated May 11, 1981 addressed to Mr. S. Pe Benito, Jr., Managing Director
of the Technological Resources Center and signed by said PNB Branch Manager,
Ceferino D. Cura. According to
petitioner, this letter showed that respondent PNB seriously considered the
restructuring of his loan obligations to a five-year term loan, to wit:
x x x
At the request of our client, we would like to furnish you with the following information pertinent to his accounts with us:
x x x
We are currently evaluating the proposal of the client to re-structure his accounts with us into a five-year plan.
We hope that the above information will guide you in evaluating the proposals of Mr. Danilo Mendoza.
x x x
The third document is a
letter dated July 8, 1981 addressed to petitioner and signed by PNB Assistant
Vice-President Apolonio B. Francisco.
x x x
Considering that your accounts/accommodations were granted and carried in the books of our Mandaluyong Branch, we would suggest that your requests and proposals be directed to Ceferino Cura, Manager of our said Branch.
We feel certain that Mr. Cura will be pleased to discuss matters of mutual interest with you.
x x x
Petitioner also presented
a letter which he addressed to Mr. Jose Salvador, Vice-President of the
Metropolitan Branches of PNB, dated September 24, 1981, which reads:
Re: Restructuring of our Account into a 5-year Term Loan and Request for the Establishment of a P2.0 Million LC/TR Line
Dear Sir:
In compliance with our discussion last September 17, we would like to formalize our proposal to support our above requested assistance from the Philippine National Bank.
x x x
Again we wish to express our sincere appreciation for your open-minded approach towards the solution of this problem which we know and will be beneficial and to the best interest of the bank and mutually advantageous to your client.
x x x
Petitioner argues that he
submitted the requirements according to the instructions given to him
and that upon submission thereof, his proposed five-year restructuring
plan was deemed automatically approved by respondent PNB.
We disagree.
Nowhere in those letters
is there a categorical statement that respondent PNB had approved the
petitioner’s proposed five-year restructuring plan. It is stretching the imagination to construe them as evidence
that his proposed five-year restructuring plan has been approved by the respondent
PNB which is admittedly a banking corporation. Only an absolute and unqualified
acceptance of a definite offer manifests the consent necessary to perfect a
contract.[16] If anything, those correspondences only
prove that the parties had not gone beyond the preparation stage, which is the
period from the start of the negotiations until the moment just before the
agreement of the parties.[17]
There is nothing in the
record that even suggests that respondent PNB assented to the alleged five-year
restructure of petitioner’s overdue loan obligations to PNB. However, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner Mendoza, holding that since petitioner has complied with the
conditions of the alleged oral contract, the latter may not renege on its
obligation to honor the five-year restructuring period, under the rule of
promissory estoppel. Citing Ramos v.
Central Bank,[18] the trial court said:
The broad general rule to the effect that a promise to do or not to do something in the future does not work an estoppel must be qualified, since there are numerous cases in which an estoppel has been predicated on promises or assurances as to future conduct. The doctrine of ‘promissory estoppel’ is by no means new, although the name has been adopted only in comparatively recent years. According to that doctrine, an estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if it was intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result in other injustice. In this respect, the reliance by the promisee is generally evidenced by action or forbearance on his part, and the idea has been expressed that such action or forbearance would reasonably have been expected by the promissor. xxx
The doctrine of
promissory estoppel is an exception to the general rule that a promise of
future conduct does not constitute an estoppel. In some jurisdictions, in order to make out a claim of promissory
estoppel, a party bears the burden of establishing the following elements: (1)
a promise reasonably expected to induce action or forebearance; (2) such
promise did in fact induce such action or forebearance, and (3) the party
suffered detriment as a result.[19]
It is clear from the
forgoing that the doctrine of promissory estoppel presupposes the existence of
a promise on the part of one against whom estoppel is claimed. The promise must be plain and unambiguous
and sufficiently specific so that the Judiciary can understand the obligation
assumed and enforce the promise according to its terms.[20] For petitioner to claim that respondent PNB
is estopped to deny the five-year restructuring plan, he must first prove that
respondent PNB had promised to approve the plan in exchange for the submission
of the proposal. As discussed earlier,
no such promise was proven, therefore, the doctrine does not apply to the case
at bar. A cause of action for
promissory estoppel does not lie where an alleged oral promise was conditional,
so that reliance upon it was not reasonable.[21] It does not operate to create liability
where it does not otherwise exist.[22]
Since there is no basis
to rule that petitioner's overdue loan obligations were restructured to mature
in a period of five (5) years, we see no other option but to respect the
two-year period as contained in the two (2) subject Promissory Notes Nos.
127/82 and 128/82, marked as Exhibits “BB” and “CC” respectively which
superseded and novated all prior loan documents signed by petitioner in favor
of respondent PNB. Petitioner argues,
in his memorandum, that "respondent Court of Appeals had no basis in
saying that the acceptance of the five-year restructuring is totally absent
from the record."[23] On the contrary, the subject Promissory
Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 are clear on their face that they were due on
December 29, 1984 or two (2) years from the date of the signing of the said
notes on December 29, 1982.
Petitioner claims that
the two (2) subject Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 were signed by him
in blank with the understanding that they were to be subsequently filled out to
conform with his alleged oral agreements with PNB officials, among which is
that they were to become due only after five (5) years. If petitioner were to be believed, the PNB
officials concerned committed a fraudulent act in filling out the subject two
(2) promissory notes in question.
Private transactions are presumed to be fair and regular.[24] The burden of presenting evidence to
overcome this presumption falls upon petitioner. Considering that petitioner imputes a serious act of fraud on
respondent PNB, which is a banking corporation, this court will not be
satisfied with anything but the most convincing evidence. However, apart from petitioner's
self-serving verbal declarations, we find no sufficient proof that the subject
two (2) Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 were completed
irregularly. Therefore, we rule that
the presumption has not been rebutted.
Besides, it could be
gleaned from the record that the petitioner is an astute businessman who took
care to reduce in writing his business proposals to the respondent bank. It is unthinkable that the same person would
commit the careless mistake of leaving his subject two (2) promissory notes in
blank in the hands of other persons. As
the respondent Court of Appeals correctly pointed out:
Surely, plaintiff-appellee who is a C.P.A and a Tax Consultant (p. 3 TSN, January 9, 1990) will insist that the details of the two promissory notes he and his wife executed in 1982 should be specific to enable them to make the precise computation in the event of default as in the case at bench. In fact, his alleged omission as a C.P.A. and a Tax Consultant to insist that the two promissory notes be filled up on important details like the rates of interest is inconsistent with the legal presumption of a person who takes ordinary care of his concerns (Section 3 (c), Rule 131, Revised Rules on Evidence).
As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Orlando Montecillo, Chief, Loans and
Discounts, PNB Mandaluyong Branch, testified that the said Promissory Notes
Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 were completely filled out when Danilo Mendoza signed
them (Rollo, p. 14).
In a last-ditch effort to
save his five-year loan restructuring theory, petitioner contends that
respondent PNB's action of withholding 10% from his export proceeds is proof
that his proposal had been accepted and the contract had been partially
executed. He claims that he would not
have consented to the additional burden if there were no corresponding
benefit. This contention is not well
taken. There is no credible proof that
the 10% assignment of his export proceeds was not part of the conditions of the
two-year restructuring deal.
Considering that the resulting amount obtained from this assignment of
export proceeds was not even enough to cover the interest for the corresponding
month,[25] we are hard-pressed to construe it as the
required proof that respondent PNB allegedly approved the proposed five-year
restructuring of petitioner’s overdue loan obligations.
It is interesting to note
that in his Complaint, petitioner made no mention that the assignment of his
export proceeds was a condition for the alleged approval of his proposed
five-year loan restructuring plan. The
Complaint merely alleged that "plaintiff in a sincere effort to make
payments on his obligations agreed to assign 10% of his export proceeds to
defendant PNB." This curious omission leads the court to believe that the
alleged link between the petitioner’s assignment of export proceeds and the
alleged five-year restructuring of his overdue loans was more contrived than
real.
It appears that
respondent bank increased the interest rates on the two (2) subject Promissory
Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 without the prior consent of the petitioner. The petitioner did not agree to the increase
in the stipulated interest rate of 21% per annum on Promissory Note No. 127/82
and 18% per annum on Promissory Note No. 128/82. As held in several cases, the unilateral determination and
imposition of increased interest rates by respondent bank is violative of the principle
of mutuality of contracts ordained in Article 1308 of the Civil Code.[26] As held in one case:[27]
It is basic that there can be no contract in the true sense in the absence of the element of agreement, or of mutual assent of the parties. If this assent is wanting on the part of one who contracts, his act has no more efficacy than if it had been done under duress or by a person of unsound mind.
Similarly, contract changes must be made with the consent of the contracting parties. The minds of all the parties must meet as to the proposed modification, especially when it affects an important aspect of the agreement. In the case of loan contracts, it cannot be gainsaid that the rate of interest is always a vital component, for it can make or break a capital venture.
It has been held that no
one receiving a proposal to change a contract to which he is a party is obliged
to answer the proposal, and his silence per se cannot be construed as an
acceptance.[28] Estoppel will not lie against the petitioner
regarding the increase in the stipulated interest on the subject Promissory
Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 inasmuch as he was not even informed beforehand by
respondent bank of the change in the stipulated interest rates. However, we also note that the said two (2)
subject Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 expressly provide for a penalty
charge of 3% per annum to be imposed on any unpaid amount when due.
Petitioner prays for the
release of some of his movables[29] being withheld by respondent PNB, alleging
that they were not included among the chattels he mortgaged to respondent
bank. However, petitioner did not
present any proof as to when he acquired the subject movables and hence, we are
not disposed to believe that the same were “after-acquired” chattels not
covered by the chattel and real estate mortgages.
In asserting its rights
over the subject movables, respondent PNB relies on a common provision in the two
(2) subject Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 which states:
In the event that this note is not paid at maturity or when the same becomes due under any of the provisions hereof, we hereby authorized the BANK at its option and without notice, to apply to the payment of this note, any and all moneys, securities and things of value which may be in its hands on deposit or otherwise belonging to me/us and for this purpose. We hereby, jointly and severally, irrevocably constitute and appoint the BANK to be our true Attorney-in-Fact with full power and authority for us in our name and behalf and without prior notice to negotiate, sell and transfer any moneys securities and things of value which it may hold, by public or private sale and apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of this note.
It is clear, however,
from the above-quoted provision of the said promissory notes that respondent
bank is authorized, in case of default, to sell “things of value” belonging to
the mortgagor “which may be on its hands for deposit or otherwise belonging to
me/us and for this purpose.” Besides the petitioner executed not only a chattel
mortgage but also a real estate mortgage to secure his loan obligations to
respondent bank.
A stipulation in the
mortgage, extending its scope and effect to after-acquired property is valid
and binding where the after-acquired property is in renewal of, or in
substitution for, goods on hand when the mortgage was executed, or is purchased
with the proceeds of the sale of such goods.[30] As earlier pointed out, the petitioner did
not present any proof as to when the subject movables were acquired.
More importantly,
respondent bank makes a valid argument for the retention of the subject
movables. Respondent PNB asserts that
those movables were in fact "immovables by destination" under Art.
415 (5) of the Civil Code.[31] It is an established rule that a mortgage
constituted on an immovable includes not only the land but also the buildings,
machinery and accessories installed at the time the mortgage was constituted as
well as the buildings, machinery and accessories belonging to the mortgagor,
installed after the constitution thereof.[32]
Petitioner also contends
that respondent PNB’s bid prices for this foreclosed properties in the total
amount of Three Million Seven Hundred Ninety Eight Thousand Seven Hundred
Nineteen Pesos and Fifty Centavos (P3,798,719.50), were allegedly
“unconscionable and shocking to the conscience of men”. He claims that the fair market appraisal of
his foreclosed plant site together with the improvements thereon located in
Pasig, Metro Manila amounted to Five Million Four Hundred Forty One Thousand
Six Hundred Fifty Pesos (P5,441,650.00) while that of his house and lot in
Quezon City amounted to Seven Hundred Twenty Two Thousand Pesos (P722,000.00)
per the appraisal report dated September 20, 1990 of Cuervo Appraisers, Inc.[33] That contention is not well taken
considering that:
1. The total of the principal amounts alone of petitioner’s subject Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 which are both overdue amounted to Four Million One Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Fifty Nine Centavos (P4,187,917.59).
2. While the appraisal of
Cuervo Appraisers, Inc. was undertaken in September 1990, the extrajudicial foreclosure
of petitioner’s real estate and chattel mortgages have been effected way back
on October 15, 1984, October 23, 1984 and December 21, 1984.[34] Common experience shows that real estate
values especially in Metro Manila tend to go upward due to developments in the
locality.
3. In the public auction/foreclosure sales, respondent PNB, as mortgagee, was not obliged to bid more than its claims or more than the amount of petitioner’s loan obligations which are all overdue. The foreclosed real estate and chattel mortgages which petitioner earlier executed are accessory contracts covering the collaterals or security of his loans with respondent PNB. The principal contracts are the Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 which superseded and novated the 1979 promissory notes and the 1979 eleven (11) Applications and Agreements for Commercial Letter of Credit.
Finally, the record shows
that petitioner did not even attempt to tender any redemption price to
respondent PNB, as highest bidder of the said foreclosed real estate
properties, during the one-year redemption period.
In view of all the
foregoing, it is our view and we hold that the extrajudicial foreclosure of
petitioner’s real estate and chattel mortgages was not premature and that it
was in fact legal and valid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38036 is AFFIRMED with modification that the
increase in the stipulated interest rates of 21% per annum and 18% per annum
appearing on Promissory Notes Nos. 127/82 and 128/82 respectively is hereby
declared null and void.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] Decision penned by
Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justice
Emeterio C. Cui and Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin, Jr.
[2] Decision penned by
Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo, RTC-Br. 168, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No.
55331.
[3] Covered by TCT Nos.
5994, 6411 and 7623.
[4] Exh "B",
Original Records, p. 653.
[5] Exhs.
"D"--"F", Original Records, pp. 659-664.
[6] Exhs.
"H"--"S", Original Records, pp. 666-688.
[7] Exhs. "H-2”, --
"S-2", Original Records, pp. 666-688.
[8] Exh.
"T", Original Records, pp.
689-691.
[9] Exh. "V",
Original Records, pp. 701-702.
[10] TSN, 1 February
1990, pp. 30-31.
[11] Exh. "BB",
Original Records, p. 727.
[12] Exh. "CC",
Original Records, p. 728.
[13] TSN, February 1,
1990, p. 43.
[14] Exh. “DD”, Original
Records, p. 729.
[15] TSN, February 1,
1990. p. 47.
[16] Weldon Construction
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
154 SCRA 618 (1987).
[17] Caguioa, Comments
and Cases on Civil Law, Vol. IV, (1968), p. 322.
[18] 41 SCRA 565, 588,
636 (1971).
[19] 28 Am Jur 2d 481.
[20] Id., p. 482.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Id., p. 483.
[23] Rollo, p.
281.
[24] Sec. 3 (p), Rule
131, Rules of Court.
[25] TSN, May 22, 1991, p. 10.
[26] Spouses Mariano and
Gilda Florendo v. Court of Appeals, et al. 265 SCRA 678 (1996);
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 536 (1991).
[27] Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 20 (1994).
[28] Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 258 SCRA 549 (1996);
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, et al., 238 SCRA 20 (1994).
[29] Petitioner prayed for the release of the following
items:
1. 1 set glass and chrome executive desk with narra side drawers;
2. 1 set conference table with 12 units swivel chairs with black leather upholstery;
3. 4 units steel cabinets painted black and green with office records, accounting papers, engineering files, and other personal and confidential documents;
4. 5 sets narra executive desks with front and side drawers.
5. 1 lot structural steel;
6. 1 lot laboratory equipment and supplies;
7. 1 lot plant supplies and maintenance equipment;
8. 1 unit electric transformer 50 HP;
9. 1 unit stainless steel tank with motor, agitator and electrical connections;
10. 1 unit centrifugal separator;
11. 3 units Dean Bros. pumps with motors;
12. 1 unit
second hand Vauxhall car.
[30] Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil 141 (1931).
[31] Art. 415. The
following are immovable property: x x x
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works;
[32] See Cu Unjieng e
Hijos v. Mabalacat Sugar Company, 58 Phil 439 (1933); Bischoff v.
Pomar, et al., 12 Phil 690 (1909).
[33] Original Records,
pp. 760-802.
[34] Rollo, p. 19,
Petition, p. 10.