THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137619. February 6, 2001]
REYNALDO L. LAUREANO, petitioner, vs. BORMAHECO, INC.
and EDGARDO C. CRUZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES,
J.:
This is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
in CA-G.R. SP No. 45908.
The antecedents of this
case are as follows:[3]
On December 11, 1962, the
spouses Reynaldo Laureano and Florencia
Laureano obtained various credit
accommodations from the Philippine National Cooperative Bank (PNCB, for
brevity), and, as a security therefor, constituted a real estate mortgage upon
two (2) lots located at Bel-Air, Makati City, with Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 59664 and 59665. The
Laureano spouses failed to pay their indebtedness. Consequently, PNCB filed a verified application for
extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage with the Office of the
Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
On February 20, 1984, a public auction sale was conducted by the
Sheriff, and the two lots were purchased by the PNCB as the highest
bidder. On the same day, a Certificate
of Sale was issued in favor of the bank and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Makati City.
The Laureano spouses
failed to redeem the two lots within the one-year period. On March 20, 1985, ownership was
consolidated in the name of the PNCB, and new titles with TCT Nos. 136823 and
136824 were issued.
On September 26, 1988,
PNCB sold several properties including the two lots to Bormaheco, Inc.
(Bormaheco, for brevity). Immediately
thereafter, new titles with TCT Nos. 157724 and 157725 were issued in favor of
Bormaheco.
On October 20, 1988,
Bormaheco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati[4] an Ex parte Petition for the Issuance
of Writ of Possession (hereafter ex parte petition) for the two lots, docketed as LRC Case No. M-1530. The RTC of Makati ordered the service of a copy
of the ex parte petition upon the Laureano spouses. Reynaldo Laureano filed a Motion to Dismiss
the ex parte petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC
of Makati over the subject matter of the case.
The RTC of Makati denied the Motion to Dismiss, and this was challenged
by Reynaldo Laureano in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 16284). The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and denied the corresponding Motion
for Reconsideration. The decision of
the Court of Appeals was further challenged by Laureano in a Petition for
Review filed with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 87813), but the High Court
sustained the said decision and denied the petition in a Resolution dated
November 23, 1989. The petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied with finality on January 22, 1990.
On January 18, 1989,
LIDECO Corporation filed a Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached
Complaint in Intervention in LRC Case No. M-1530, alleging that it is the owner
and possessor of two buildings constructed on the two lots subject of the ex
parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession. The complaint for intervention was initially
admitted by the RTC, but was stricken off upon motion by Bormaheco alleging that
LIDECO Corporation was not a duly registered corporation, and hence had no
legal personality. Laureano Investment
and Development Corporation, the majority of the stock of which is held by the
Laureano spouses, filed an Urgent Motion to Substitute Party Intervenor (LIDECO
Corporation) and to Adopt Complaint in Intervention and All Pleadings, but this
was denied by the RTC. Laureano
Investment and Development Corporation assailed the two RTC Orders[5] in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the
Court of Appeals (C.A. G.R. No. 22763).
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, and such dismissal was
questioned by Laureano Investment and Development Corporation in the Petition
for Review filed with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 100468).
In the meantime, on
October 24, 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 141, issued an order granting the ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. On 8 November 1991, Bormaheco, Inc. filed a
motion for execution of the RTC Order.
Three days later, Reynaldo Laureano filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Petition
and To Strike Pleadings Filed by Bormaheco on the ground of lack of legal
capacity of Bormaheco, Inc. to file the ex parte petition. The resolution of these motions was held in
abeyance by the RTC in deference to the case pending with the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. 100468). On May 6, 1997, the Supreme Court denied the
Petition for Review in G.R. 100468.
On September 25, 1997,
the RTC of Makati[6] issued the contested Order directing the
issuance of a Writ of Execution/Possession in favor of Bormaheco, Inc. Reynaldo Laureano filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in the contested Order dated
November 4, 1997.
On November 10, 1997,
Reynaldo Laureano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to
annul the two RTC Orders (dated September 25, 1997 and November 4, 1997).[7] The Petition was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in a Decision promulgated on June 18, 1998. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Laureano was denied on
February 18, 1999. Hence this petition.
The issues, as set forth
by the petitioner in his Memorandum, are as follows:[8]
I.
Did not the Court of
Appeals err as a matter of law when it affirmed the trial court’s Order of
September 25, 1997 and Order of November 4, 1997, and failed to hold as
violative of due process the issuance by the trial court of the Order of
September 25, 1997 (which finally approved and granted Bormaheco, Inc.’s
Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Possession, etc.) when petitioner’s
“Urgent Motion To Dismiss Petition and To Strike Pleadings Filed by Bormaheco,
Inc.” was still pending and unresolved?
II.
Did not the Court of
Appeals err as a matter of law when it did not hold that the trial court had
denied petitioner his right to a hearing?
We rule on both issues in
the negative. The appellate court
committed no error in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
45908, and in affirming the questioned orders of the trial court.
After a careful
examination of the records of the proceedings of this case, we fail to see any
violation of due process by the regional trial court. A second look at the antecedents is in order.
The Philippine National
Cooperative Bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage executed by the Laureano
spouses on the two lots. For failure of
the said spouses to redeem the properties during the one-year period, ownership
of the lots was consolidated in the name of the PNCB, the purchaser in the
foreclosure sale. New titles with TCT
Nos. 136823 and 136824 were issued under PNCB’s name.
As the purchaser of the
properties in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, the PNCB is entitled to a
writ of possession therefor. The law on
extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage[9] provides that a purchaser in an
extra-judicial foreclosure sale may take possession of the foreclosed property
even before the expiration of the redemption period, provided he furnishes the
necessary bond. Possession of the
property may be obtained by filing an ex parte motion with the regional
trial court of the province or place where the property or part thereof is
situated.[10] Upon filing of the motion and the required
bond, it becomes a ministerial duty of the court to order the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of the purchaser.[11] After the expiration of the one-year period
without redemption being effected by the property owner, the right of the
purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis of this right to possession is the
purchaser’s ownership of the property.[12] Mere filing of an ex parte motion for
the issuance of the writ of possession would suffice,[13] and no bond is required.[14]
Instead of seeking the
issuance of a writ of possession, however, PNCB sold the two lots to private
respondent Bormaheco, Inc. By virtue of
the sale, Bormaheco became the new owner of the lots, entitled to all rights
and interests its predecessor PNCB had therein, including the right to a writ
of possession.
On October 20, 1988,
Bormaheco, Inc. filed an Ex-parte Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. By the nature of the
petition[15], no notice needed to be served upon persons
interested in the subject property.
Hence, there was no necessity of giving notice to the Laureano spouses,
especially since they already lost all their interests in the properties when
they failed to redeem the same.
Nonetheless, the RTC of Makati ordered the service of a copy of the
petition upon the Laureano spouses.[16] Reynaldo Laureano, as an oppositor, even
moved to dismiss the ex parte petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the case. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss, so
Laureano went up to the Court of Appeals on Certiorari. The petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
16284) was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and the Petition for Review of
the dismissal was denied by this Court for lack of merit (G.R. No. 87813).
On October 24, 1990, the ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was granted by the
RTC of Makati. Subsequently, Bormaheco,
Inc. filed a Motion for Execution thereof.
On September, 11, 1991, Reynaldo Laureano filed another motion to
dismiss, this time denominated as an Urgent Motion to Dismiss Petition and to
Strike Pleadings Filed by Bormaheco, on the ground of lack of legal capacity of
Bormaheco, Inc. to file the petition.
The proceedings of the ex
parte petition were even held in abeyance when an intervention sought by
LIDECO corporation and a subsequent motion to substitute LIDECO as intervenor
filed by Laureano Investment and Development Corporation were both denied by
the RTC of Makati, and the latter corporation, again, went up to the Court of
Appeals on certiorari. The Petition for
Certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 22763) was dismissed by the Court of Appeals, and the corresponding Petition for
Review (G.R. No. 100468) filed with this Court was denied.
A few months thereafter,
the RTC of Makati issued the questioned order dated September 25, 1997, which
resolved the motions pending before the said court, including the motion for
execution filed by Bormaheco and the supplemental motion to dismiss the ex
parte petition filed by Reynaldo Laureano.
The Urgent Motion to Dismiss earlier filed by Laureano was not among the
motions listed to be resolved in the Order.
Nevertheless, the ground raised in the Urgent Motion to Dismiss, i.e.
the lack of legal personality of Bormaheco, Inc., and hence, lack of legal
capacity to file the ex parte petition, was addressed by the RTC, to
wit:
xxx To put the issues in their proper perspective, it is best that the motions filed by the oppositor Reynaldo Laureano be first resolved. The motions adverted to above sought the dismissal of the petition on the sole ground that BORMAHECO, Inc. was not yet in existence as [a] corporation at the time of the filing of the petition on 21 October 1988. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
It is now too late in the day to question the legal personality of the petitioner. Such legal infirmity had been cured by the formal registration of BORMAHECO, INC. as a corporate name with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 13 March 1991. Its predecessor was Border Machinery and Heavy Equipment Co., Inc. which used BORMAHECO, INC. as an acronym. Thus, on 1 October 1950, the articles of incorporation of Border Machinery and Heavy Equipment Co., Inc. was amended and it specifically used BORMAHECO, INC. as its acronym. In said amended articles of incorporation, it was certified:
“FIRST. That the name [of] said corporation shall be BORDER MACHINERY AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT CO., INC. (BORMAHECO, INC.)”
In a larger sense, BORMAHECO, INC. had been registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission upon filing of the said amended articles of incorporation with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1950. This Court therefore denies the oppositor’s motions adverted to above. xxx xxx
A Motion for
Reconsideration (of the September 25, 1997 RTC Order) filed by Laureano was
denied by the lower court in the contested Order dated November 4, 1997. Laureano questioned the two RTC Orders by
way of a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, and the issue set
forth in the Urgent Motion to Dismiss was resolved anew by the appellate court,
to wit:
We are, on the other hand, satisfied that the private respondent was incorporated as early as February 23, 1951 by the SEC as “Border Machinery and Heavy Equipment Company, Inc.” with a corporate life of fifty (50) years. The by-laws of the Border Machinery x x was registered with the SEC on April 21, 1951. The business name of the private respondent, in turn, was registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade in 1978 as BORMAHECO; as BORMAHECO, Inc. in 1983; and as BORMAHECO, Incorporated in 1988. Aside from that, the private respondent was given business permits by the Mayor of Makati, in the name of BORMAHECO, Inc. in 1988 and BORMAHECO, Inc. in 1991.
The amendment or change of corporate name of Border Machinery x x to BORMAHECO, Inc., was approved by the SEC on March 13, 1991.
Certainly, the amendment did not make the private respondent a new corporation, but it just continued its operation and remained as the original corporation of 1951. An authorized change in the name of a corporation has no more effect upon its identity as a change of name of a natural person. The rights of the corporation were not affected and neither were the obligations lessened or added.
xxx xxx xxx
The Petition for
Certiorari was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Still unfazed, the petitioner now comes to us through this
petition for review, alleging lack of due process in the proceedings which
transpired in the courts below.
As aforestated, we fail
to see the lack of due process claimed by the petitioner. On the contrary, the petitioner has been
afforded more than what is due. The
petitioner was given notice despite the petition being ex parte. He was allowed opposition despite his lack
of interest over the subject properties.
He caused the delay of the ex parte petition through legal
maneuverings, and in fact, managed to reach this Court at least three times in
the process. A simple ex parte
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession has become a protracted
litigation and, to date, has been pending for more than twelve (12) years. What is manifest, therefore, is the abuse by
the petitioner of the legal processes, effectively defeating justice which has
long been denied the private respondent.
This Court will not countenance such practice of the petitioner and his
counsel.
Upon the claim of forum
shopping, the private respondent has listed down a number of cases filed by the
spouses Reynaldo and Florencia Laureano, allegedly involving the same
properties, and is asking this Court to declare the Laureano spouses guilty of
forum shopping. This is the second time
that this Court has encountered this long list of cases, the first instance
being in the case of Laureano Investment and Development Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals[17].
Unfortunately, as in the aforecited case, Bormaheco did not go beyond
the enumeration of the cases, leaving its allegation of forum shopping bare and
unsubstantiated. Without any showing
that the cases listed have identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs
sought,[18] neither can we make any valid determination
as to whether the rules on non-forum shopping were violated.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for utter lack of merit, and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. The counsel for
the petitioner, Atty. Eduardo R. Robles, is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in his availment of legal processes, and any future indiscretion
shall be dealt with more severely.
Treble costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., (Chairman),
Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
[1] Promulgated
on June 18, 1998.
[2] Twelfth
Division, composed of J. Bernardo LL. Salas, acting chairperson and ponente,
and JJ. Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Candido V. Rivera, concurring.
[3] Assailed
Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 3 to 4; rollo, pp. 27 to 28; Regional Trial Court Order dated September
25, 1997, pp. 2 to 4; rollo, pp. 56 to 58.
[4]
Raffled off to Branch 141, then presided by Judge Phinney C. Araquil
[5] The
RTC Order granting Bormaheco’s motion to strike off (LIDECO Corporation’s) complaint in intervention, and the RTC
Order denying Laureano Investment and Development Corporation’s urgent motion
for substitution.
[6] Branch
141, presided by Judge Manuel D. Victorio
[7] CA-G.R.
SP No. 45908
[8] Memorandum
of the Petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 167.
[9] Act
3135, particularly Section 7.
[10] Ibid.
[11] A.G.
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 155 (1997), at p.
159, citing Vaca vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 146 (1994) and F. David
Enterprises vs. Insular Bank of America, 191 SCRA 516.
[12] Jus
possidendi is a necessary incident of ownership being among the bundle of
rights enjoyed by an owner of a property under Article 428 of the New Civil
Code.
[13] United
Coconut Planters Bank vs. Reyes, 193 SCRA 756 (1991), at p. 761.
[14] Ibid.,
at pp. 763 to 764.
[15] An
ex parte petition is taken or granted at the instance and for the
benefit of only one party, without notice to, or contestation by any person
adversely interested. [Definition of judicial proceedings ex parte,
Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th
edition (1979), p. 517.]
[16] RTC
Order dated October 24, 1991, p. 1; rollo, p. 206.
[17] 272
SCRA 253 (1997).
[18] The
test in determining the presence of forum shopping is whether in the two (or
more cases) pending, there is identity of (a) parties [or interests
represented], (b) rights or causes of actions, and (c) reliefs sought. [Employee’s Compensation Commission vs.
Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 717 (1996), at pp. 723 to 724.]