EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135231-33. February 28, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
BLESIE VELASCO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
Thrice twelve (12)-year
old Raquel Yasas fell prey to the sexual assaults of Blesie Velasco, her
stepfather, who instead of showing remorse for his lechery had the audacity to
claim that he and his stepdaughter were actually lovers mutually driven into
nocturnal trysts and coital adventures.
Invoking this inconceivable and immoral “sweetheart theory” to explain
away his disgraceful misdeeds only strengthens our resolve to expel him
permanently from society.
On 20 May 1997, after a
preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Iloilo,[1] three (3)
Informations for rape were filed against Blesie Velasco. The Informations similarly alleged that
Raquel Yasas,[2] a twelve (12)-year
old minor, was forced and intimidated by Blesie Velasco, her stepfather, to
have sexual intercourse with him.[3] With the same
complaining witness and accused, Crim. Cases Nos. 47746, 47747 and 47748 were
consolidated and tried jointly by Br. 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo.[4]
Raquel Yasas claimed at
the trial that she was formerly residing in Valencia, Bukidnon, with her
biological father Bonifacio Panganiban, her mother Brenda Yasas and a younger
sister.[5] After her father
died, her mother married the accused Blesie Velasco with whom she bore two (2)
daughters.[6] In April 1996
Brenda brought Raquel to live with them in the house of the accused in Barangay
Ban-ag, Alimodian, Iloilo. But sometime
in May 1996 Brenda left for Manila and never returned to Iloilo.[7] That was the last
time Raquel saw her mother.[8] She had no inkling
then what fate awaited her in the hands of her stepfather Blesie Velasco.
On 29 December 1996, at
around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, after watching television at their
neighbor’s place, Raquel went to the house of accused’s mother Enriqueta
Velasco.[9] She was about to
sleep there when the accused arrived at about 9:30 p.m. to fetch her. Upon seeing the accused Raquel began to cry
and refused to go home with him as he appeared drunk and had a gun tucked in
his waist.[10] But her Lola Tita
(Enriqueta Velasco), scolded her for refusing to go home with her
stepfather. Thus, despite her effort to
avoid him, she was forced to go with him.[11]
On their way home, which
was some fifty (50) meters away from Enriqueta Velasco’s place, the accused
picked up a bamboo pole (pusog) and ordered Raquel to sit on one of the
dikes. He then began scolding her for
always wandering away and threatened to beat her with the pole.[12] Suddenly, the
accused dragged Raquel into an abandoned hut where he drew his firearm and
aimed it at her temple. He threatened
to bury her at the nearby creek unless she voluntarily undressed herself.[13] Gripped with fear,
Raquel obeyed and removed her clothes.
The accused then pinned her down on the floor and placed himself on top
of her. She resisted by hitting and
kicking him but to no avail. After the
accused satisfied himself, he told her to dress up and threatened to kill her
mother and her sisters if she ever revealed the incident to anyone.[14]
The second incident
occurred on 7 January 1997. When Raquel
went home at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, the accused told her to bring
some medicine for her younger sister Maria Ve at her Lola Tita’s house. Sensing that the accused might abuse her
again she asked him if one of her sisters could go with her, but he refused and
told her instead that he would accompany her himself. Fearing another sexual assault, Raquel no longer waited for him
and rushed towards her Lola Tita’s house, but the accused soon followed her
there. Upon seeing her he reprimanded
her for going ahead and angrily ordered her to return home. Her previous ordeal still fresh in her mind,
Raquel started to cry and asked her Lola Tita if the latter could send one of
her other sons, or her husband, to escort her home. But the accused retorted that there was no need as he was going
with her any way.[15]
Raquel was unwilling to
go with her stepfather at first, but when she looked out and saw some men
approaching she consented to go home with him thinking that they were his
brothers and that their presence would prevent him from harming her. But the accused was not to be deterred. On their way home he suddenly pointed a
knife at Raquel’s neck and dragged her near a tree beside an abandoned
hut. He ordered her to remove her
clothes and then pushed her on the ground.
Again, the accused succeeded in having sexual contact with Raquel and
thereafter threatened to kill her and her mother and sisters if she would tell
anyone what happened.[16]
Raquel’s sordid tales did
not end there. On 17 January 1997 at
around 8:00 o’clock in the evening Raquel and her sisters asked the accused if
they could watch television at their neighbor’s place. While he allowed her sisters to go, he told
Raquel to stay as he wanted to talk to her.
After her sisters left, the accused asked Raquel if she already had a
boyfriend. When she answered in the
affirmative, he berated her and ordered her to leave their house, which drove
her to tears. Moments later, the
accused ordered Raquel to fetch her sisters.
On her way to their neighbor’s place, she noticed the accused trailing
her. She tried to outrun him but he
eventually caught up with her. He
threatened her with a gun and dragged her near a rice paddy. For the third time the accused ravished her
against her will.[17]
Five (5) days later
Raquel ran away and went to her mother’s relative by the name of Gloria
Tayong. Gloria immediately sent Raquel
to Esther Tayong, Gloria’s niece, in New Lucena. At the Municipal Hall of New Lucena, Raquel was introduced to
Delia Juanico, Senior Social Worker of the DSWD to whom she unraveled her
ordeal. Delia Juanico then brought her
to Dr. Owen Lebaquin, Medico Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, at Camp
Delgado for examination.[18]
Dr. Owen Lebaquin
testified that after receiving a request from the DSWD he examined Raquel Yasas
on 3 February 1997. According to his
medico-legal report, the hymen of Raquel had shallow healed lacerations at 2 o’clock
position and deep healed lacerations at 5 o’clock, 9 o’clock and 10
o’clock. The external vaginal orifice
offered no resistance to the examiner’s index finger and the vaginal speculum,
thus concluding that she was in a non-virgin state. However, there were no external signs of the application of any
form of violence. There were no traces
either of spermatozoa.[19]
Gloria Tayong, a cousin
of Raquel’s maternal great grandfather, testified that on 22 January 1997
Fabiola Lamiloho[20] brought Raquel to
Gloria’s place to protect her from her stepfather.[21] Gloria then told her son Rolando Tayong to bring the
girl to Esther Tayong in New Lucena.
Esther Tayong narrated
that she first saw Raquel when she was brought by a cousin to her house in New
Lucena. Later, a DSWD representative
summoned Raquel to appear at the Municipal Hall. Esther accompanied her there.
After her interview, Raquel was allowed to stay first with Esther but
after a few days the DSWD took her into custody.[22]
Delia Juanico testified
that sometime in the last week of January 1997 she received a referral letter
from Agnes Hermo, the Social Worker of New Lucena.[23] On 31 January 1997
she went to the Municipal Hall of New Lucena to interview Raquel Yasas, the
reported victim. At the interview,
Raquel disclosed that her stepfather raped her on three (3) separate occasions.[24] Thereafter, Delia
Juanico brought her to Dr. Owen Labaquin at the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination.
Accused Blesie Velasco
denied that he forced and intimidated Raquel to have sex with him. He claimed instead that their sexual
liaisons stemmed from their mutual love and passion. Being lovers they regularly engaged in sex from September of 1996
to January of 1997.[25] According to him,
after receiving a letter from Brenda Yasas that she would not return to him
anymore, he began courting Raquel and that, after two (2) weeks, she accepted
him.[26] He offered to
marry her but she spurned his offer as she wanted to finish her studies.[27] Their relationship
afterwards blossomed until it was abruptly ended on 19 January 1997 when
Fabiola Lamiloho fetched her from school and brought her to the house of Gloria
Tayong. Raquel still went home that
night to the house of the accused but after going back to the house of Gloria
Tayong the following day but she never returned. When the accused looked for her at Gloria's house the latter
refused to let Raquel go with him as she was afraid he would violate Raquel
again. He explained that they were
lovers but Gloria refused to believe him.[28]
On 20 March 1997 the
accused Blesie Velasco was arrested.[29]
Enriqueta Velasco
confirmed her son’s “sweetheart theory.”
She claimed that although she sternly opposed the plan of the accused to
court his stepdaughter, he assured her that he would settle things with his
wife.[30] Upon learning that he wanted to marry Raquel, she
again expressed her serious disapproval.[31] However, he and
Raquel never listened to her. They even
shamelessly displayed their affection for each other like husband and wife.[32]
In its joint decision of
4 May 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, giving full credence to
Raquel’s testimony, convicted the accused Blesie Velasco of three (3) counts of
rape under Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code as amended. He was sentenced to death for each count and
ordered to pay complaining witness Raquel Yasas P50,000.00 as indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, or a total of
P360,000.00, plus the costs.[33]
Hence this automatic
review.
In his brief the accused
Blesie Velasco contends that the trial court erred in believing the testimony
of Raquel Yasas on the ground that it was allegedly highly incredible,
contradictory and improbable.
First. The
assertion of complainant Raquel Yasas that the accused threatened to kill her
mother Brenda Yasas who was no longer with them when the rapes were allegedly
committed, is highly doubtful. It would
have been absurd for the accused to threaten to kill someone whose whereabouts
were unknown to him for, according to him, only a deranged person would make
such a threat.[34]
Second. Although the complainant was consistent in
stating that the accused used a gun on 29 December 1996 and a knife on 7
January 1997 to threaten her, she was uncertain as to what weapon he used on 17
January 1997. In her direct examination she testified –
Q: Were you able to go to the house of Hachero to watch T.V.?
A: Yes, sir xxxx Afterwards, he held my neck and pointed a knife
at me xxxx[35]
Q: Did you not shout for help?
A: I did not shout or ask for help because he was pointing a gun at
me.[36]
On cross examination she
said –
Q: During the dates that you were raped by the accused, he was always armed with a knife?
A: On December 29, he was armed with a gun, on January 7, a knife;
on January 17 a gun.[37]
The accused insists that
the type of weapon used for intimidation is an extremely significant fact which
a real rape victim would not surely forget.[38]
Third. The
complainant testified that each time she was ravished by the accused he dragged
her and forcibly pinned her down while she resisted by kicking and punching
him. However, a perusal of the
medico-legal examination shows no evidence of any physical injuries which
complainant would have surely sustained had she really been manhandled by her
abuser. The absence of any external
injuries therefore creates a doubt on the veracity of her allegations.[39]
Fourth. The
complainant also testified that she revealed her harrowing experience to Delia
Juanico sometime on 27 January 1997. If
complainant was indeed raped, then why did it take her so long to tell anyone
about her misfortune? This failure to disclose her ordeal creates further doubt
on the truthfulness of her narration.[40]
Fifth.
From the complainant’s own testimony it can be gleaned that she had
several opportunities to escape from her stepfather yet she never did. This proves that the sexual encounters were
indeed consensual, for surely a ravished woman would flee from her abuser to
safer grounds as soon as the opportunity presented itself.[41]
Sixth. The complainant’s contradicting claims as
to when she had her menstrual cycle impugns her credibility. In narrating the rape which occurred on 29
December 1996 she said –
Q: You were not menstruating that time?
A: I had already menstruated that time, but that particular time I do (sic) not have menstruation.
Q: How many days before you were sexually assaulted by the accused that you menstruated?
A: Two weeks before.[42]
But in testifying about
the rape which occurred on 7 January 1997 she said –
Q: That was your second experience. How did you feel upon insertion of his penis (into) your vagina?
A: Painful still. I still
felt pain. At that time, I had
menstruation.[43]
According to the accused,
if the complainant had her menstruation two (2) weeks prior to 29 December
1996, or on 14 December 1996, it would have been impossible for her to again
have her menstruation on 7 January 1997 since the menstrual cycle of females
occurs on a twenty-eight (28)-day basis. The complainant's testimony suggests
that her menstrual cycle was only twenty-five (25) days, which is obviously
contrary to human physiology thus making her testimony highly improbable and
unbelievable.[44]
These grounds enumerated
by the accused do not diminish the complainant's credibility.
While it may be true that
the threats the accused made against the life of complainant's mother may
appear to be futile as her whereabouts were then unknown, considering the
tender age of the victim and the moral ascendancy of the accused over her, she
would have been easily intimidated by any threat he uttered. Besides, not only
were the threats directed against her mother but also against herself and her
sisters, which explains why she was forced to submit to his lustful advances
and then cowed into silence.
The fact that complainant
could not accurately recall the weapon used to intimidate her on the night of
17 January 1997 does not destroy her credibility. This Court has held countless times that a rape victim cannot be
expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience.[45] It is not
unnatural for inconsistencies to creep into the testimony of a rape victim,
especially one who is of tender age as the witness, in narrating the details of
a harrowing experience.[46] What is essential
is that Raquel clearly recalled that her stepfather threatened her with a
weapon on three (3) separate occasions to force her to have sex with him.
As to the absence of any
evidence of injury on Raquel's body in the medico-legal examination, it should
be noted that she was examined by Dr. Owen Lebaquin on 3 February 1997, or
almost seventeen (17) days after the last incident. Any bruise or scratch which
she might have sustained on the night of 17 January 1997 could have already healed
and hence no longer visible. More importantly, in rape cases, absence of bodily
injuries does not matter where there is an existing relationship between the
accused and the victim resulting in the moral ascendancy of the former over the
latter. The accused being the stepfather of the victim certainly exercised
moral and physical ascendancy over her, which would suffice to make her submit
to his bestial desires.[47]
As for the delay in
reporting the incident, suffice it to state that the failure of complainant to
report the incident at once to the immediate members of her family or to the
police did not detract from her credibility, her timidity and hesitation being
attributable to her age, the moral ascendancy of the accused over her, and his
threats against her and her family.[48]
The complainant indeed
may have failed to escape at the earliest opportunity, and even stayed with the
accused after thrice suffering her nightmares, but different people react
differently to different situations, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a frightful experience. The
victim's mien, rather than composure, could mean resignation, considering her
continuing suffering, or apoplexy and numbness as the aftermath of her ordeal.[49] Thus, the fact
that complainant failed to run away immediately from the accused and avoid his
clutches should not be taken against her.
As regards the
complainant's testimony on her menstrual cycle, we fail to see how her
credibility can be affected by her assertion that her menstrual period came
three (3) days prior to the accused's calculation. Such matter is too trivial to overturn her positive and straightforward
allegation that her stepfather ravaged her.
If at all, this insignificant and petty contention only illustrates
accused's desperate attempt to point out inconsistencies in her testimony to
make her narration appear questionable.
We therefore see no
cogent reason to doubt the complainant's credibility. It has long been established that the testimony of a rape
victims, especially a child of tender years, is given full weight and credit.[50] A rape victim who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and
remains consistent, is a credible witness.[51] Furthermore, this
Court has repeatedly ruled that matters affecting credibility are best left to
the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment on the stand while
testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate courts which usually rely only
on the cold pages of the mute records of the case.[52]
In a final attempt to
impute ill motive on complaining witness, the accused claims that she only
concocted the rape charges to get back at him for beating up her mother when
they were still living together. He
cites her testimony -
Q: Now, did you have any ill feeling or grudge against the accused aside from the fact that he allegedly raped you?
A: Yes there is.
Q: What is that grudge?
A: When we were still in Mindanao he hurt my mother.
Q: After that, was there any incident that your mother was hurt by the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When and where did that happen?
A: Many times when we were still in Mindanao. In fact there was a time when my mother became crazy because of his beatings.
Far from aiding the cause
of the accused, his claim of complainant's pent-up anger and ill motive only
shows the absurdity of his defense. He
asserts on one hand that complainant wanted revenge against him for previously
maltreating her mother, yet on the other, he claims that he and complainant
were “sweethearts” who regularly engaged in consensual sex from September of
1996 to January of 1997. If the
complainant despised the accused to the point of seeking vengeance for the
alleged maltreatment of her mother, then why would she accept his proposal of
love and even have repeated consensual sex with him? The accused apparently suggests that twelve (12)-year old Raquel
Yasas diabolically plotted to first have sex with him and then framed him up
with fabricated rape charges to avenge her mother's supposed sufferings. Such a
thought is simply preposterous, for no woman, especially of tender age, would
conjure a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and
thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial if she was not
motivated solely by a desire to have the culprit apprehended and brought to
justice.[53]
From the facts of this
case, we are all the more convinced that the imputation of ill motive on the
part of the complainant is but an afterthought. This is shown by the accused’s own testimony -
Q: Last question, up to now, you can not tell us of any reason why Rachel Yasas would charge you for rape in these three cases?
A: No, sir.[54]
It is basic that where
there is no showing that the complainant was impelled by any improper motive in
making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full
faith and credit.[55] We therefore
affirm his conviction.
We now discuss the
penalty imposed by the court a quo. In
qualified rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender must both be alleged and proved with certainty,
otherwise the death penalty cannot be imposed.[56] In the instant
case, the three (3) Informations alleged that the victim was a twelve (12)-year
old minor who was raped by her stepfather.
But were these circumstances proved with certainty?
The records reveal that
the prosecution never presented any birth certificate or any other official
document to prove the allegation in the Informations that the complainant was
only twelve (12) years old when the rapes were committed. Instead, her age was established only by her
own testimony -
Q: You are the same Rachel Yasas, the complainant in these three criminal cases 47746, 47747 and 47748 against the accused Blesie Velasco?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Now you gave your age as 13 years old. Can you tell us your date of birth?
A: 14 August, 1984.[57]
Is this testimony of the
complaining witness as to her age sufficient to confirm her minority for the
purpose of imposing the death penalty in qualified rape? In recent cases we have applied a rigid rule
in determining the age of a rape victim where we refused to impose the death
penalty due to the prosecution's inability to present independent evidence to
substantiate the victim's minority. In People
v. Javier[58] we held -
However, it is significant to note that the prosecution failed to present the birth certificate of the complainant. Although the victim's age was not contested by the defense, proof of the age of the victim is particularly necessary in this case considering that the victim's age was then 16 years old which is just 2 years below the majority age of 18. In this day of modernism there is hardly a difference between a 16 year old girl and an 18 year old one insofar as physical features and attributes are concerned. A physically developed 16 year old lass may be mistaken for an 18 year old young woman in the same manner that a frail looking 18 year old lady may pass as a 16 year old minor. Thus, it is in this context that independent proof of the actual age of the rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the victim is indeed under 18 years of age as to fall under the qualifying circumstances enumerated in R.A. 7659.
In People v. Cula[59] we also ruled -
At all events, it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with
certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was
committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the case is bereft of any
independent evidence, such as the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live
Birth, accurately showing private complainant's age. The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the
allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime
was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge
its burden in this regard. Because of
this lapse, as well as the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a
categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we hold that the
qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No.7659 cannot be
appreciated in this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed.
In People v. Tipay[60] we further declared
-
This does not mean however, that the presentation of the
certificate of live birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a victim of tender age who
may be below 10 is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice
thereof. The crucial years pertain to
the ages of 15 to 17 where minority may seem dubitable due to
one's physical appearance. In this
situation, the prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact
that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape case was
committed to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above cited
provision,
The record of the case at bar is bereft of any independent
evidence which would accurately show complainant's age. That complainant's age was alleged in the
information and/or complaint as under 16 years is not sufficient. Nor does the lack of denial on the part of
the accused-appellant excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden in
this regard.
In People v. Brigildo[61] we held that the
testimony of the victim was not sufficient to establish her minority even if
her alleged age was far from the crucial ages of fifteen (15) to seventeen (17)
years. We said -
The separate Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 4591-0 and
4607-0 alleged that the offended party in the two rape cases was the
appellant's step-daughter who is 11 years old. It is undisputed that the victim in the instant case is a
minor. However, the records are unclear
as to her exact age. The prosecution
failed to present her birth certificate or any other evidence to prove just how
old she really is. The separate Information
filed alleged that the victim was 11 years old when she was raped in
March and October 1994. Yet,
testifying a year later, complainant claimed she was only 11 years
old. Her mother's testimony on cross
examination, by contrast would seem to indicate that she was around 15 years
old at the time of the rapes complained of x x x x
Thus, we are faced with the uncertainty regarding private
complainant's exact age, not only because of the prosecution failed to present
her birth certificate or other equally acceptable official document concerning
her date of birth.
However, in People v.
dela Cruz[62] we accepted the
testimony of the mother of the victim to prove her minority even without the
presentation of the birth certificate or any other official document. We discussed how it differed from the cases
of People v. Javier, People v. Cula, People v. Tipay, and People v.
Brigildo. Thus -
The burden to prove the minority age of the victim is on the
prosecution. As minority age is
qualifying circumstance, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Using this unbending yardstick, the death
penalty was not imposed by this Court in cases where there is no evidence at
all of the minority age of the victim or where the evidence was weak,
unreliable and insufficient.
In People vs. Javier, the victim was alleged to be 16
years old. The Court observed that
there is not much difference between a 16 and an 18 year old woman. Thus,
we held that there is need to present independent proof of her actual
age. We required the presentation of the minor's birth certificate but rightly,
we did not rule out the presentation of the testimony of the victim's mother
to prove minority in future cases. As minority was not proved by the
prosecution we did not impose the death penalty.
In People vs. Tipay, the victim was alleged to be 15
years old. Once more, the Court
observed that it was difficult to differentiate a 16 from an 18 year-old
girl. We stressed that the crucial
years were between 15 to 17 years and we held that, in this situation,
the prosecution's proof of minority age of the victim must be given the
strictest scrutiny. We examined the
record of the case and found that there was no "independent"
evidence that would prove the minority age. The victim's age was merely alleged in the Information. Again we did not impose the death penalty.
In People vs. Cula, the Court again did not appreciate
the qualifying circumstance of minority.
We held that there was absolutely no evidence at all on record to
prove the victim's age. We even noted
that the trial court failed to make a categorical finding regarding the
minority of the victim. For failure
of proof, we saved the accused-appellant from the death penalty.
In People vs. Brigildo, the prosecution again faltered in
its task of proving the minority of the victim. We rejected the testimony of the victim's mother as to the
victim's age as it contradicted the testimony of the victim herself. The
Information in said case even alleged a different age.
"Faced with uncertainty regarding private complainant's age, we declined
to penalize the accused-appellant with death.
In the case at bar, however, the prosecution proved the
minority age of the victim beyond reasonable doubt. Delia the
victims' mother, categorically testified in the hearing of October 9,
1996 that her daughters were both (14) years of age at the time
the rape incidents complained of x x x x
There is no reason to doubt Delia's testimony. As a mother, she has personal knowledge of the ages of her children. Her testimony was never challenged by the accused who could have presented the victim's birth certificate. Delia's testimony stood unrebutted by any other evidence (emphasis theirs).
Thus, it can be seen that
a birth certificate or any other official document is no longer necessary to
establish minority when the rape victim's mother, who has personal knowledge of
her child's age, gives an unchallenged testimony as to her daughter's age. But is the complainant herself a competent
witness in ascertaining her age? In
People v. Silvano[63] we held -
The testimony of a person as to her age is admissible although
hearsay, for she can have no personal knowledge of the date of her birth, as
knowledge as to one's age is acquired from whatever is told by the parents or
relative - and such testimony constitutes an assertion of family tradition.
This principle was
affirmed in People v. Bali-balita[64] where the victim's
age was verified by her own testimony as to when she was born. We ruled -
In the case before us the victim herself testified that she was
born on April 12, 1987 and that she was raped by the accused on August
26, 1997. She was only ten years and
four months old at the time of the rape.
We note that the victim testified in court in December 1997 or
about four months after the rape, and it would not have been difficult for the
trial court to take judicial notice that the victim is under 18 years of
age.
In the case at bar, the
complainant testified that she was born on 14 August 1984 and was repeatedly
raped from December 1996 to January 1997.
Thus, as in People v. Bali-balita, it can be sufficiently
established that she was barely twelve (12) years and five (5) months old when
the rapes occurred. Furthermore, as
required in the cited case of People v. Cula, the victim's age was also
affirmed by the trial court's categorical finding that complainant was "a
minor of a little over 12 years, naive and innocent to the ways of the world
and slender in physical built."[65]
Even the accused himself
openly admitted throughout his testimony that the complainant was a twelve
(12)-year old minor when he allegedly had consensual sex with her. He said -
Q: April 1996 was five years from 1991, so Rachel must be 12 years old when she came to you in Bgy. Ban-ag?
A: Yes, twelve x x x x
Q: And you courted her despite the fact that she is (sic) only twelve (12) years old and you cannot (sic) marry her?
A: Yes, I just courted her x x x x
Q: Despite your awareness that she was only (12) years of age, you came out with the decision that she was to be your wife or to become your wife?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT: Proceed.
Q: At the time you courted her, this Rachel Yasas was studying in the elementary school and she was only grade 6?
A: Yes, sir.[66]
Since the allegation of
minority (twelve [12] years old) in the Informations was established by the
complainant herself, who is considered competent to testify on her age as it
constitutes an Assertion of family tradition,[67] and by the open
admission of accused as well as the categorical finding of the trial court,
then such fact is deemed established with certainty. In this case, the birth certificate or any other official
document proving minority serves no other purpose than to corroborate the
testimonies of the competent witnesses and the categorical finding of the trial
court.
The second circumstance
to be established is the relationship of the accused to the complaining
witness. The relationship of stepfather
presupposes a legitimate relationship.
A stepfather is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage
subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring.[68] In this case, such
a relationship was also shown by the testimonies of witnesses.
Raquel Yasas testified
that after Bonifacio Panganiban, her biological father, passed away her mother
Brenda Yasas remarried -
Q: How about you, what is your relation with Blessie Velasco?
A: Stepfather.
Q: Why is it that this Blessie Velasco is your stepfather?
A: Because he married mother.
Q: When?
A: In September 1996.[69]
Q: Where?
A: In Valencia, Bukidnon.
Q: So there was a marriage ceremony between your mother and the accused, Blessie Velasco in Valencia, Bukidnon?
A: They were married in a civil ceremony.
Q: You were present when this ceremony was have (sic)?
A: Yes, Sir.[70]
The accused himself
confirmed the existence of this marriage when he said -
Q: When did you married (sic) Brenda Yasas x x x x
A: In 1991 September 13.[71]
Even the mother of the
accused affirmed her son' s marriage to Brenda Yasas -
Q: These three (3) younger sisters of Raquel are they children of your son?
A: No. Of the three (3) younger sisters of Raquel only two (2) of them are children of my son.
Q: You mean that Blessie Velasco is married with another woman?
A: Married to the mother of Raquel x x x x
Q: So, your son is married to the mother of Raquel who is also the mother of her younger sisters?
A: Yes, sir.[72]
Undoubtedly, such
testimonies of Raquel, the accused and his mother are sufficient to establish
that the accused married Raquel's mother proving the stepfather-stepdaughter
relationship alleged in the Informations.
The trial court was therefore correct in imposing the death penalty for
each count of rape.
With regard to the civil
liability of the accused, we affirm the trial court's award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages in each count of rape. In
this jurisdiction, moral damages in rape cases may be awarded to the victim in
such amount as the court deems just, without the need for pleading or proof of
the basis thereof.[73] We also affirm the
lower court's award of exemplary damages of P20,000.00 for each count of
rape. However, in line with recent
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00 in each case since the commission of each rape was qualified by
circumstances under which the death penalty is imposable in accordance with RA
7659.[74]
Four (4) members of the
Court maintain their position that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional. Nevertheless
they submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is
constitutional and that the death penalty should be accordingly imposed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo convicting the accused Blesie Velasco of three (3) counts of RAPE under
Art. 335 of The Revised Penal Code and sentencing him to DEATH for each
count of rape and to pay complaining witness Raquel Yasas P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of rape is AFFIRMED,
with the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is increased to
P75,000.00 for each count of rape.
Let the records of this
case, upon finality of this Decision, be forwarded to the President for the
possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Preliminary
Investigation conducted by Judge Loida J. Diestro-Maputol, MCTC-Br. 14, Iloilo
City, Records, pp. 11-17.
[2] In the TSN Raquel
Yasas is sometimes referred to as “Rachel Yasas.”
[3] Rollo, pp.
8-10.
[4] Presided by Judge
Bartolome M. Fanuñal; Records, p. 18.
[5] TSN, 16 October
1997, p. 6.
[6] Id., pp. 6-7;
TSN, 5 February 1998, p. 14.
[7] TSN, 5 February
1997, p. 15.
[8] TSN, 16 October
1997, p. 8.
[9] Id., p. 10.
[10] Id., p. 12.
[11] Id., p. 15.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Id., p. 16.
[14] Id., pp.
16-20.
[15] Id., p. 23.
[16] Id., pp.
23-26.
[17] Id., pp.
28-30.
[18] Id.,
pp.36-38.
[19] Medico Legal Report;
Records, p. 7.
[20] In the testimony of
accused-appellant, Fabiola Lamiloho was also referred to as Fabiola Mameloco, a
cousin of complaining witness’ maternal grandmother.
[21] TSN, 14 august 1997,
p. 4.
[22] Id., p. 18.
[23] TSN, 20 November
1997, p. 3.
[24] Id., pp. 4-5.
[25] TSN, 5 February
1998, p. 3.
[26] Id., p. 17.
[27] Id., p. 6.
[28] Id., pp.
9-11.
[29] Ibid.
[30] TSN, 9 December
1997, p. 11.
[31] Id., p. 12.
[32] Id., pp.
12-13.
[33] Decision penned by
Judge Bartolome M. Fanuñal, RTC-Br. 25, Iloilo City.
[34] Rollo, p. 62.
[35] TSN, 16 October
1997, p. 29.
[36] Id., p. 30.
[37] TSN, 7 November
1997, p. 14.
[38] Rollo, p. 64.
[39] Id., p. 65.
[40] Id., p. 66.
[41] Id., p. 48.
[42] TSN, 16 October
1997, p. 20.
[43] Id., p. 26.
[44] Rollo, p.
149.
[45] People v.
Historillo, G.R. No. 130408, 16 June 2000.
[46] People v. Campaner,
G.R. Nos. 130500 and 143834, 26 July 2000, citing People v. Lianda, G.R. No.
134084, 4 May 2000.
[47] People v. Dalafu,
G.R. No. 127156, 31 July 2000.
[48] People v. Abad, G.R.
No. 114144, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 246, People v. Historillo, G.R. No.
130408, 16 June 2000, citing People v. Antipona, G.R. No. 119071, 19 June 1997,
274 SCRA 328.
[49] People v. Rabosa, G.
R. No. 119362, 19 June 1997, 273 SCRA 142.
[50] People v. Diasanta,
G.R. No. 128108, 6 July 2000.
[51] People v. Mosqueda,
G.R. Nos. 131830-34, 3 September 1999, 313 SCRA 694.
[52] People v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 130205, 5 July 2000.
[53] People v. Escober,
G.R. Nos. 122980-81, 6 November 1997, 281 SCRA 498.
[54] TSN, 5 February
1998, p. 22.
[55] People v. Gementiza,
G.R. No. 123151, 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 478.
[56] People v. Alcala,
G.R. Nos. 127023-25, 19 May 1999, 307 SCRA 330.
[57] TSN, 16 October
1997, p. 3.
[58] G.R. No. 126092, 29 July
1999, 311 SCRA 122.
[59] G.R. No. 133146, 28
March 2000.
[60] G.R. No. 131472, 28
March 2000.
[61] G.R. No. 124129, 28
January 2000.
[62] G.R. Nos. 131167-68,
23 August 2000.
[63] G.R. No. 127356, 29
June 1999, 309 SCRA 362.
[64] G.R. No. 134266, 15
September 2000.
[65] See Note 33.
[66] TSN, 5 February
1998, pp. 14-17.
[67] See People v.
Silvano, Note 63.
[68] People v. Torio,
G.R. Nos. 132216 and 133479, 17 November 1999, citing People v.
Dimapilis, G.R. Nos. 128619-21, December 1998, 300 SCRA 279.
[69] 1991 according to
the accused himself.
[70] TSN, 16 October
1997, pp. 6-7.
[71] See Note 69.
[72] TSN, 9 December
1997, pp. 6-7.
[73] People v.
dela Cruz, G.R. Nos. 131167-68, 23 August 2000.
[74] People v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 133859, 24 August 2000.