THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No.
128089. February 13, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINADOR
VELASCO alias “ADOR,” accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG, J.:
An inglorious case of marital altercation
eventually led to the unanticipated death of an alleged unfaithful spouse. Was it an impassioned shame that spurred the
victim to take her own life, or was it because of a belief of his wife’s
infidelity that might have moved the accused to perpetrate the condemnable
deed?
The accused was indicted for
parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code in an information that
read:
"That on or about October 27, 1990, in the Municipality of
Sto. Tomas, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation, that is having
conceived and deliberated to kill his wife, Prescilla B. Velasco, with whom he
was united in lawful wedlock, armed with a wood and attack, assault, clubbed
his wife repeatedly, and with treachery by employing means, manner and form in
the execution thereof, which tended directly and specially to insure its
commission without danger to the person of said accused, the result of which
attack was that the said Prescilla B. Velasco received several mortal wounds in
her body which directly caused her death.”[1]
Assisted by counsel de parte,
the accused pled "not guilty" at his arraignment.
Accused Dominador Velasco and
victim Priscila Velasco were married way back on 24 July 1976.[2] The union begot seven children.
In the morning of 27 October 1990,
between 10 o'clock and 11 o'clock, Noel Basco, the then incumbent barangay captain
of Ambitacay, Santo Tomas, La Union, was occupied with planting watermelon in
his farm when Ped Velasco, a brother of the accused, came by and mentioned an
on-going quarrel between the accused and the victim.
In the afternoon of the same day,
Crisanto Boado, a thirteen-year old country lad, was on his way to a nearby
store in Patac, Sto. Tomas, La Union, to buy a bag of sugar when from a
distance of ninety to one hundred meters, he saw the accused, armed with a
piece of wood of about 2 feet in length and 3 inches in diameter, aggressively
pursuing the victim who was just about two-and-a-half meters away from
him. The scene was plain enough for
Crisanto to see being way up at the top of the hill overlooking the clashing
couple. Crisanto, however, could not
tell whether the accused was finally able to catch up with the victim because
the two eventually reached a place covered by tall grasses that obscured his
view. Crisanto did hear the accused
shouting at the top of his voice.
"I will kill you now, I will kill you now" while the victim
was desperately calling for help.
Later that afternoon, Priscilla
Velasco was found dead. Rumors quickly
spread that she had killed herself by drinking poison. Dr. David Villanueva, Jr., the physician
detailed at the Rural Health Unit (RHU), Sto. Tomas, La Union, examined the
remains of the victim and prepared the certificate of death stating that the
deceased had died of poisoning. He
confessed, however, that he did not perform an autopsy on the cadaver and that
he had come up with his conclusion only after noticing a small amount of
brownish fluid oozing from the victim's mouth with the characteristic smell of
insecticide. Although he did not notice
any injury or external manifestation of abrasion or hematoma, Dr. Villanueva
admitted, in any case, that his findings were inconclusive.
With the nagging doubt as to what
really could have caused his daughter's death, as well as particularly aware
that the accused had often maltreated his wife, Veronico Basco decided to have
the body undergo an autopsy. Dr. Arturo
Llavore, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), Regional Office, responded favorably to the request and the body was
exhumed following the issuance of a permit therefor from the Department of
Health.
The autopsy, conducted on 16
November 1990, revealed that the victim had suffered from abrasions on the
right side of the face, including the jaw; hematoma on the back portion of the
head at the left posterior portion; hematoma on the skull; contusions on the
left side of the back portion of the body and on the back portion of the left
upper extremities; contused abrasion on the arm and forearm; and contusion on
the right forearm. Dr. Llavore
concluded that the victim died of shock, secondary to multiple traumatic
injuries, and opined that the wounds could have likely been caused by physical
contact with a hard object like a piece of wood or wooden club. Samples of the victim's brain, heart,
kidney, spleen, lungs, liver, and pancreas were taken to the Medico Legal
Laboratory in Manila for histopathological and toxicological examinations. Dr. Nieto M. Salvador, a medical specialist
of the NBI, conducted the histopathological examination and arrived at the
finding that the victim had died of congestion and edema of the visceral
organs. Toxicology Report No. T-90-3324[3] prepared by NBI Forensic Biologist II, Dr. Beverly A.
Vidanez, indicated that no trace of poisonous substances was detected in the
body of the victim.
The accused disclaimed
responsibility for his wife’s death. He
recalled that on 27 October 1990, at or about 7 o'clock in the morning, he was
on his way to work when he was abruptly taken by utter shock. From a distance of about seventy to eighty
meters, he saw his wife having sexual intercourse with a certain Mariano
Erquiza, both starkly naked, at the edge of a tobacco seedlings area. He stood motionless as he watched the
adulterous interlude. After satisfying
their carnal desires, the paramour put on his clothes and began descending
towards the east. It was then when the
accused started to chase him that lasted for two hours. Unsuccessful, and deciding to instead go
home, he came across his brother Romeo Velasco and recounted to him what had
happened. He stayed in the house of
Romeo, with the latter's wife to keep him company, until 4 o'clock in the
afternoon when he unexpectedly heard people shouting. The accused and his brother rushed out only to learn of his
wife's unexpected demise.
The defense presented, next and
last, witness Elpidio Eisma who testified that on 27 October 1990, about 3
o'clock in the afternoon, while he was about to unwind the rope attached to his
carabao, he heard somebody yell from the hilltop. He hurriedly proceeded to the place, and there he saw Rosita
Eisma and another neighbor massaging the victim's stomach. Rosita told him that
the victim had poisoned herself.
From the web of circumstantial
evidence, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, of Agoo, La Union, rendered a
judgment of conviction; it held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this
Honorable Court hereby finds the accused DOMINADOR VELASCO alias
"ADOR" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide
contrary to Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, indemnify the heirs of
the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the cost of the proceedings.”[4]
Elevating the case to this Court,
the accused ascribed to the court a quo a sole assigned error; viz:
“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM COMMITTED
SUICIDE BY POISONING HERSELF AND WAS NOT KILLED BY THE ACCUSED.”[5]
Accused-appellant denied having
pounced upon the victim, claiming that he never left his brother's house from
10 o'clock in the morning up until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the fateful
day, and suggesting that the victim might have opted to take her own life
because of the scandal and shame she had put herself into.
But not a trace of poison was
detected in any part of the victim's body.
Even Dr. Villanueva acknowledged the inconclusiveness of his cursory
finding that the victim must have taken her own life, his opinion being based
mainly on the speculation in the neighborhood that the victim drunk some
poisonous substance. He might have
actually smelled insecticide in the victim’s mouth the day she died; however,
he himself conceded that it could have been possible that the substance was
just poured through the victim’s mouth soon after she breathed her last.
Suicide, in any event, was finally ruled out following the results of the
histopathological and toxicological examinations on the body of the victim
conducted by NBI experts. The body
itself had borne witness to the deadly torment it went through which exposed
several abrasions and contusions that would completely negate the suicide
theory.[6]
It should bear to underscore that
the individual qualifications of the medico legal officer and forensic
biologist, the expert witnesses presented, remained unassailed.
Interestingly, the defense failed
to place at the witness stand the brother or the sister-in-law of the accused
who could have corroborated his alibi, a fatal omission if, indeed, his
claim should deserve any weight. No
undue bias or ill motive had been attributed to the prosecution witnesses that
would have impelled them to falsely testify against the accused and to
implicate him in so despicable a deed as parricide. The paucity of such an evidence hardly could support any
proposition other than that the witnesses had testified on untarnished truth.[7]
Innately, there appears to be
great incredulity in the version of the accused. How could a husband merely stand still and endure the illicit
sexual congress between his wife and her supposed paramour from beginning to
end? How could he just go after his
wife's lover when the latter is through with his lovemaking and only after he
would have put on his clothes and started to flee? This kind of attitude defies human nature. So, also, it would seem unlikely that the
wife and her alleged lover would completely undress themselves and consummate
the demands of their flesh in an open field and in broad daylight. Truly, there is no real test of truth in the
testimony of a witness except to gauge it consonantly with human knowledge,
observation, and experience. There
should be wisdom in the statement that whatever is repugnant to these teachings
belongs to the miraculous and must thereby be held outside normal judicial
cognizance.[8]
The bundle of circumstantial
evidence has sufficiently established the malefactor, destroyed the presumption
of innocence, and fulfilled the standard of moral certainty to sustain a
conviction. Even in the absence of direct
evidence linking an accused to the crime, circumstantial evidence can suffice
to convict when (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences can be derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[9]
The prosecution successfully came
up with several pieces of evidence; to wit: (1) Barangay captain Noel Basco was
advised by Ped Velasco, a brother of the accused, of the squabble between the
accused and the victim in the early morning of 27 October 1990; (2) Crisanto Boado, while out on an errand
in the afternoon of that day, saw the accused chasing the victim, holding a
piece of wood in his hand and yelling that he was going to kill the victim; (3) the victim was found dead later that
same afternoon; (4) the autopsy report revealed abrasions and contusions all
over the victim's body; (5) the toxicological examinations of the specimens
from the victim's visceral organs yielded negative indications of volatile,
non-volatile, or metallic poisons, including insecticides; and (6) the accused
was not without propensity in maltreating his wife. He himself thusly testified:
“PROSECUTOR HIPOL:
May we just request that the Exhibits be brought out so that we can confront him with his signature.
“Q Mr. Witness, before the recess you were saying that you were not summoned to a confrontation with your wife before Barangay Captain Junior Lachica. You also denied that you never physically maltreated your wife. Of course, you were here when your very own father-in-law testified that he has personal knowledge of the fact and you maltreated your wife. Can you tell us any reason why he testified against you?
“A I do not know of any reason sir.
“Q By the way, are you very familiar with the signature of your late wife Priscilla?
“A I remember now that it is true that I have also maltreated my wife but there is a valid reason for doing that so.
“Q What is that valid reason?
“A Because of my reputation being dismerged (sic).
“Q That was before the incident subject matter of this case occurred?
“A People in our place has been spreading the rumor regarding the unfaithfulness of my wife but I was only merely suspecting that it was on that particular day that I caught her in flagranti delicto.
“Q The incident subject matter of this case occurred on October 27, 1990, can you recall that?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q When was that occasion admittedly to led your hands to your wife in relation to October 27, 1990?
“A That was long before October 27.
“Q Could that have been in September 1983?
“A I am not very sure of that date.
“Q Anyway, was there more than one occasion when you actually maltreated your wife?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q About how many times?
“A I can no longer recall sir.
“Q And during those occasions, did you have the same reason for maltreating your wife or there were some other reason?
“A Only for that particular reason.
“Q That you have heard rumors to the effect that your wife is unfaithful to you?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Had you actually confronted your wife about that matter?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And what was her comment?
“A She did not want to reveal the truth.
“Q And when she did not reveal the truth, you then maltreated her?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Up to the extent that your wife even filed a case before the Barangay Captain in Patac?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And you were even summoned by the Barangay Captain to appear before him to confront with your wife?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q And before the Barangay Captain, you even promised not to repeat and not to maltreat your wife again?
“A Yes, sir.”[10]
The chain of events, perhaps
insignificant when taken separately and independently, could, nevertheless,
produce the effect of conviction beyond reasonable doubt when considered
cumulatively. Verily, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the circumstances
established would lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as being the author of the crime.[11]
Bearing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, the crime of parricide is committed when: (1) a person
is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is
the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.[12] The key element in parricide is the relationship of
the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate.[13] The testimony of the accused of being married to the
victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission against penal interest.[14]
There being neither aggravating
nor mitigating circumstance shown, the lower of the two indivisible penalties
was correctly imposed by the trial court.
The civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded to the heirs of the victim was
likewise proper.[15]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Cost against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 5.
[2] Exhibit K, Folder of
Exhibits.
[3] Exh. G-2, Folder of
Exhibits.
[4] Rollo, pp.
51-52.
[5] Rollo, p.
103.
[6] People vs. Nepomuceno,
Jr., 298 SCRA 450; People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198; People vs.
Cloud, 265 SCRA 472.
[7] People vs.
Dela Pena, 232 SCRA 72.
[8] See People vs.
Escalante, 238 SCRA 554.
[9] People vs.
Estrellanes, Jr., 239 SCRA 235.
[10] TSN, 02 August 1993,
pp. 7-9.
[11] People vs.
Genobia, 234 SCRA 699; People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA 720.
[12] Article 246, Revised
Penal Code; People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198.
[13] Exhibit K, supra;
see People vs. Malabago, 265 SCRA 198.
[14] See People vs.
Malabago, 265 SCRA 198; TSN p. 326 July 1993.
[15] People vs.
Malabago, 265 SCRA 198; People vs. Lacson, G.R. No. 132512, 15 December 1999.