FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127227. February 28, 2001]
PAZ S. LIM for herself and as an attorney-in-fact of ANTONIO S. LIM, JR., petitioner, vs. VICTORIA K. CHAN and CHRISTOPHER C. CHAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an
appeal via certiorari from the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal on the
ground that the trial court did not commit any reversible error when the latter
dismissed the complaint in the case[2] below on the ground of prescription, estoppel and
lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise.
On October 1, 1973, petitioner Paz
Lim and her husband Dr. Antonio T. Lim (now deceased) executed a special power
of attorney before a notary public of Thurston County, Nebraska, U.S.A. They appointed petitioner’s brother Carlos
Chan, as their attorney in fact, empowering him with full power and
authority to transfer, convey or lease, pledge, mortgage or hypothecate, sell,
assign and dispose of all the petitioner’s property, their fruits, any interest
in or title thereon upon such terms and conditions as their attorney in fact
shall deem fit and proper.[3] The property involved nine (9) lots belonging to
petitioner including those covered by TCT No. T-11681 and TCT No. T-11150 of
the Register of Deeds, Davao City.
On October 3, 1973, petitioner and
her husband also appointed Carlos K. Chan and Victor San as their
attorneys-in-fact[4] granting them the same powers as that given Carlos on
October 1, 1973, over two (2) lots, including TCT No. 13007 of the Register of
Deeds, Davao City.
On the strength of the two powers
of attorney, Carlos Chan and Victor San executed three (3) deeds of sale in
favor of Victoria K. San, the first on November 18, 1975, and both second and
third deeds on September 25, 1978.[5]
Consequently –
TCT No. 13007 was cancelled and
TCT No. 70414 was issued on August 30, 1979;
TCT No. 11681 was cancelled and
TCT No. 70381 was issued on August 29, 1979; and
TCT No. 11150 was cancelled and
TCT No. 48802 was issued on January 5, 1976.
On April 28, 1993, petitioner and
her son, Antonio Lim, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City an
action to annul the sale and to reconvey the property transferred in
respondents’ name. Petitioner claimed
that she executed special powers of attorney designating Victoria K. San,
Victor San and Carlos Chan to exercise control and supervision over the
property. However, Victoria K. San registered in her name the three parcels of
land entrusted to her, through the execution of deeds of sale. Thereafter, Victoria sold one of the three
lots to respondent Christopher C. Chan.
Petitioner contended that Victoria employed fraud in executing the deeds
of sale in her favor. As an agent, she
was prohibited from acquiring the assets of her principal. And the right to recover the property held
in trust is imprescriptible.[6]
After petitioner presented her
evidence on the application of preliminary injunction on May 24, 1993,
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on prescription,
laches, estoppel, and failure to comply with Rule 16 (j) of the Rules of
Court. On June 17, 1993, the trial
court dismissed the complaint, thus:
“From the foregoing consideration, the court finds the motion to dismiss on the grounds of prescription, estoppel and lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise before the filing of this case to be well-grounded, the same is GRANTED. Herein complaint is ordered DISMISSED.
“SO ORDERED.
“Given this 17th day of June 1993, at Davao City, Philippines.
“ROMEO D. MARASIGAN
“Judge”[7]
On July 2, 1993, petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals.[8]
On May 10, 1996, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the appeal as follows:
“Since there is no allegation that the signature of plaintiffs-appellants’ attorneys-in-fact in the deeds of sale were forged, or that the SPAs had been revoked at the time of the sale, the allegations in the complaint do not suffice to maintain the cause of action against Victoria and her successor-in-interest-co-defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
“WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
“SO ORDERED.”[9]
On May 21, 1996, petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal;[10] however, on October 30, 1996, the appellate Court
denied the motion.[11]
Hence, this appeal.[12]
We have held repeatedly that
judges and arbiters must draw up their decisions and resolutions with due care,
and make certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions and
final dispositions.[13] Decisions must faithfully comply with the
Constitution. “No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.”[14]
We have ruled that the factual
findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial
evidence[15] and carries more weight when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.[16] However, this rule admits of a few exceptions.[17] Among the exceptions are “when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference
made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case
or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when
the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are premised
on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record.”[18]
The instant case falls within the
exceptions. For one, conclusions made
were not founded on substantial evidence.
For another, the court may have arrived at a different outcome if
certain facts were taken into consideration.
The findings of the trial court
were based on evidence presented during the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Had the court proceeded with the trial of
the case, the parties would have the opportunity to present all their available
evidence and the trial court the opportunity to carefully scrutinize them.
Without conducting trial on the
merits, the trial court cannot peremptorily find the existence of estoppel,
laches, fraud or prescription of actions.
These matters require presentation of evidence and determination of
facts; they can be best resolved after trial on the merits.[19]
Sadly, what happened was a cursory
termination of the case when the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. 22,
024-93 after a period of only a month and a half (1½) from the date the
case was actually filed in court.
The trial court summarily ruled
that petitioner was estopped from filing the case without considering all the
antecedents.
The trial court disregarded the
law that if Victoria Chan was in fact the assignee, she was prohibited from
acquiring the property of the principal[20]and the action to recover the property is
imprescriptible.[21]
It was, therefore, premature to
dismiss the case in the absence of evidence showing when the basis thereof
could be determined only after trial of the merits.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 43302.
Let the case be REMANDED to
the court of origin for trial on the merits.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] In
CA-GR CV No. 43302, promulgated on May 10, 1996, Carpio-Morales, J., ponente,
de Pano, Jr. and Martin, Jr., JJ., concurring; Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo,
pp. 20-26.
[2] Civil
Case No. 22, 024-93.
[3] Regional Trial Court Order dated June 17, 1993, Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[4] Before
a notary public in Milwaukee County,
Wisconsin, U. S. A.
[5] All
the deeds were executed before Notary Public Rodolfo B. Quiachon of Davao City.
[6] Order,
Regional Trial Court, June 17, 1993, Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[7] Decision,
Regional Trial Court, Davao City, Branch 16, Rollo, pp. 30-36.
[8] Notice
of Appeal, RTC Record, p. 103. Docketed
as CA-GR CV No. 43302.
[9] Petition, Annex “A”,
Rollo, pp. 20-26, Carpio
Morales, J., ponente, de Pano,
Jr. and Martin, Jr., JJ., concurring.
[10] CA
Rollo, pp. 85-89.
[11] CA
Rollo, pp. 101-103.
[12] Petition
filed by registered mail posted on November 18, 1996, Rollo, pp.
3-19. On March 29, 2000, we gave due course to the petition (Rollo, pp. 76-77).
[13] Caltex
Refinery Employees Association (CREA) vs. Brillantes, 344 Phil. 624
[1997]; Saballa vs. NLRC, 329 Phil. 511 [1996], citing LBC Aircargo,
Inc. vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA 274, 279 [1990].
[14] Article
VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution; Saballa vs. NLRC, supra, Note 13; Yao vs.
Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 132428,
October 24, 2000.
[15] Valgoson’s
Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 449 [1998], citing Tan Chun
Suy vs. Court of
Appeals, 229 SCRA 151 [1994] and
Guinsanato vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 708 [1993].
[16] Ibid.,
citing Catapusan vs. Court of Appeals, 332 Phil. 586 [1996], Meneses vs. Court of Appeals, 316
Phil. 210 [1995]; Baylon vs. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 502
[1999],citing Fortune Motors Phils. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,
335 Phil. 315 [1997]; Tan Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, supra,
Note 15.
[17] Baylon vs. Court of Appeals, supra Note 14, citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs.
Embroidery and Garments Industries, 305 SCRA 70 [1999]; Mangahas vs.
Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 375 [1999]; Diaz
vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 118 [1999].
[18] Halili
vs. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 465, 270
[1998], citing Fuentes vs. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163
[1997]; Geronimo vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 494 [1993]. See also Lacanilao vs. Court of
Appeals, 330 Phil. 1074 [1996]; Verendia vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 417, [1993].
[19] Parañaque
Kings Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1124 [1997].
[20] Article
1491 [2], Civil Code; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992
ed., 1997 Reprint, p. 42.
[21] Article
1410, in relation to Article 1403 [1], Civil Code; Santiago vs. Court of
Appeals, 343 Phil. 612 [1997]; Nool vs. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. 106 [1997].