SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117434. February 9, 2001]
BENGUET EXPLORATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, SWITZERLAND GENERAL INSURANCE, CO., LTD., and SEAWOOD SHIPPING, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari of the decision, dated June 30, 1994, and resolution, dated
September 29, 1994, of the Court of Appeals[1] which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149,
Makati, dismissing the complaints filed by petitioner against herein private
respondents, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, respectively.
The background of this case is as
follows:
On November 29, 1985, petitioner
Benguet Exploration, Inc. (Benguet) filed a complaint for damages against
Seawood Shipping, Inc. (Seawood Shipping) with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 12394 and assigned to Branch 149.[2] On March 4, 1986,
petitioner Benguet filed another complaint for damages against respondent
Switzerland General Insurance, Co., Ltd. (Switzerland Insurance), which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 13085[3] and assigned to Branch 148
of the court.
The two cases were
consolidated. Switzerland Insurance
filed a third-party complaint against Seawood Shipping, praying that the latter
be ordered to indemnify it for whatever might be adjudged against it in favor
of petitioner.[4] Thereafter, the cases were
jointly tried, during which petitioner Benguet presented its employees, Rogelio
Lumibao and Ernesto Cayabyab, as witnesses.
Rogelio Lumibao, marketing
assistant of Benguet, was in charge of exportation. His responsibilities included the documentation of export
products, presentations with banks, and other duties connected with the export
of products. He explained that private
respondent Seawood Shipping was chartered by petitioner Benguet to transport
copper concentrates. The bill of lading
(Exh. A) stated that the cargo, consisting of 2,243.496 wet metric tons of
copper concentrates, was loaded on board Sangkulirang No. 3 at Poro
Point, San Fernando, La Union. It was
insured by Switzerland Insurance (marine insurance policy was marked Exh.
C). When the cargo was unloaded in
Japan, however, Rogelio Lumibao received a report (Exh. B), dated August 19, 1985,
from a surveyor in Japan stating that the cargo was 355 metric tons short of
the amount stated in the bill of lading.
For this reason, petitioner Benguet made a claim of the loss to Seawood
Shipping and Switzerland Insurance. In its letter, dated August 21, 1985 (Exh.
D), petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the alleged
shortage. As both Seawood Shipping and
Switzerland Insurance refused the demand, petitioner Benguet brought these
cases against Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance.[5]
On cross-examination, Lumibao
admitted that he did not see the actual loading of the cargo at Poro Point and
that his knowledge was limited to what was contained in the bill of lading
which he received about two days after the loading. Lumibao testified that at Camp 6, Kennon Road, Baguio, the copper
concentrates were weighed prior to being transported to Poro Point, where they
were once more weighed before being loaded on the vessel. But again he admitted
that he had not seen the actual weighing and loading of the copper concentrates
because he was not the one in charge of the operation. Nor was he in Japan when the cargo was
unloaded. He also did not know how to
perform the procedure for weighing cargo.
Thus, he could not determine the truth or falsity of the contents of the
draft survey. He only knew that there
was in fact a shortage based on his reading of the draft report.[6] Further, Lumibao testified
that, although he prepared the export declaration, he did not prepare the bill
of lading. The bill of lading was made
on the basis of the draft survey conducted by the Overseas Merchandise
Inspection Co., Ltd. or OMIC.[7] Some other person undertook
the weighing of the cargo, and Lumibao was only informed by telephone of the
cargo’s weight during its loading and unloading.
Lumibao had nothing to do with the
preparation of the bill of lading, the weighing of the copper concentrates, and
the shipment of the cargo. He did not
accompany the trucks which transferred the cargo from Baguio to Poro Point. He was not on the ship when the cargo was
loaded at Poro Point. Nor did he know
if spillage occurred during the loading or unloading of the copper
concentrates.
Lumibao said that the buyer of the
copper concentrates was the Brandeis Intsel Co., Inc. Upon receipt of the cargo, Brandeis Intsel Co., Inc. paid for the
cargo based on its weight in dry metric tons, or 90 percent more or less of the
price of 2,243.496 tons, the weight of the cargo in wet metric tons. With regard to the insurance policy, he testified
that petitioner Benguet made no objection to any of the terms stated on the
face of the policy.[8]
Ernesto Cayabyab next testified
for petitioner. He had been with
Benguet for 13 years and, at the time of his testimony, he was secretary of Nil
Alejandre, manager of Benguet.
According to Cayabyab, on July 28, 1985, he was sent to the warehouse (bodega)
at Poro Point, La Union to assist in the loading of the copper
concentrates. These copper concentrates
were to be loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3. Cayabyab said he was
present when the cargo was loaded on the ship, as evidenced by the Certificate
of Loading (Exh. E), Certificate of Weight (Exh. F), and the Mate’s Receipt
(Exh. G), all dated July 28, 1985. According
to Cayabyab, the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate would go around the boat to
determine how much was loaded on the ship.
Cayabyab stated that he saw petitioner Benguet’s representative and his
immediate superior, Mr. Alejandre, and the Inspector of Customs, Mr. Cardenas,
sign the Certificate of Weight.
Cayabyab also witnessed the ship captain sign the Certificate of Weight,[9] which stated therein that
2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship.[10] Cayabyab likewise confirmed
the authenticity of the Mate’s Receipt, saying that he witnessed the Chief Mate
sign the document.[11]
When cross-examined, Cayabyab said
that, as a secretary, his duties included computing the company’s daily main
production in the mine site and accompanying his superior, Mr. Alejandre,
during shipments. He explained that the
copper concentrates were transported by dump trucks from the mining site to
Poro Point for over a month, possibly even three to six months. Cayabyab went to Poro Point on July 27, 1985
to witness the loading of the copper concentrates on the vessel Sangkulirang
No. 3. But the copper concentrates
had already been delivered and stored in a bodega when he arrived. These concentrates were placed on the
cemented ground inside the bodega after their weight was recorded. Describing the procedure for weighing, he
said that the trucks, without the copper concentrates, were weighed. Then, after they had been loaded with copper
concentrates, the trucks were placed in the bodega and weighed
again. To determine the weight of the
copper concentrates, the weight of the trucks was deducted from the weight of
the trucks loaded with copper concentrates. The copper concentrates were then
loaded on the ship by means of a conveyor at the average rate of 400 tons an
hour. Cayabyab did not know, however,
how many trucks were used to load the entire cargo of the copper concentrates
nor did he know exactly how many hours were spent loading the copper
concentrates to the ship. He could only remember that he reported for work in
the morning and that he worked overtime because he had to wait until the
loading of the cargo was finished before he could leave. During the loading, he moved from place to
place, and his attention was sometimes distracted. Thus, he could not tell with certainty that no spillage took
place during the loading. The figure of 2,243.496 wet metric tons was computed
by the Marine Surveyor and the Chief Mate.[12]
Respondent Switzerland Insurance
then presented its evidence. Three
witnesses, Eduardo Pantoja, Anastacio Fabian, and Edgardo Diño, testified for
it.
Eduardo Pantoja, assistant branch
manager of respondent Switzerland Insurance in the Philippines, testified that
he prepared the data and conditions of the marine insurance policy of
petitioner Benguet using information furnished by the latter, although some of
the conditions attached to the policy were conditions Switzerland Insurance
attached to all the marine policies issued by it. Pantoja stated that the
figure of 2,243.496 wet metric tons contained in the policy of Benguet was
taken from the latter’s declaration. Switzerland Insurance relied on the value
of the cargo declared by the insured on the basis of the principle of uberrimae
fidei, i.e., the insured must act in the utmost good faith.[13] One of the conditions set forth in the marine policy
(Exh. 8) was that the “[w]arranted vessel is equipped with steel centerline
bulk head.” According to Pantoja, this condition was specifically included in
the policy because the nature of the cargo warranted the same, and Switzerland
Insurance would not have accepted the policy had such condition not been
attached. The purpose of the centerline
bulkhead was to prevent the copper concentrates from shifting while being
transported on the ship. Upon
verification by Certified Adjusters, Inc., adjusters of Switzerland Insurance,
it was found that the vessel Sangkulirang No. 3 did not have a steel
centerline bulkhead. Pantoja identified
a letter, dated February 13, 1986, sent by his company to petitioner Benguet
canceling its insurance contract because the carrying vessel was not equipped
with a steel centerline bulkhead as warranted under the policy (Exh. 7-a).
Enclosed was Check No. HSBC 419463 for P98,174.43 representing the
refund by Switzerland Insurance of the premium payments, documentary stamps,
and premium taxes paid by petitioner Benguet (Exh. 7). He testified that Switzerland Insurance paid
its legal counsel P40,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus appearance fees.[14]
On cross-examination, Pantoja explained
that the company had its own system of determining various rates of
insurance. Several factors were taken
into consideration, such as the nature of the goods, the manner by which they
were packed, and the destination of the cargo.
For example, Switzerland Insurance would anticipate pilferages if the
cargo involved household goods or, in the case of chemicals, it would consider
the possibility of spillage. Pantoja,
however, stated that he did not make any investigation in this case but used
only his previous experience and project knowledge in dealing with similar
cases. He admitted that Switzerland
Insurance checked whether the ship had a steel centerline bulkhead only after a
claim had been made by petitioner Benguet.
He explained, however, that it was impossible for them to make the
investigation before the execution of the marine policy because they had only
one day to check whether the ship had a steel centerline bulkhead and the ship
at that time was not in Manila but in Poro Point. He reiterated that good faith dealing with the insured included
relying on the truth of the latter’s representations. There was little risk involved in relying on the insured’s
representations because the company would not have accepted the risk if it
found that the conditions in the policy had not been complied with. Switzerland
Insurance refused Benguet’s demand because non-compliance with the condition
that the ship be equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead rendered the marine
insurance policy null and void from the beginning. This is why Switzerland Insurance refunded the premium paid by
petitioner Benguet. Pantoja stated that
petitioner Benguet did not claim that the loss was caused by the shipping of
the cargo because it did not know the cause of the shortage.[15]
Another witness for Switzerland
Insurance was Anastacio Fabian, the marine manager of Certified Adjusters,
Inc. He testified that he went to Poro
Point where the shipment was loaded for transport to Japan. It took him almost two months to finish his
investigation and to come up with a written report (Exh. 12). He prepared a letter, dated January 31,
1986, seeking a certification from Capt. Jae Jang of Sangkulirang No. 3
on whether the ship was equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead (Exh. 5). In response thereto, respondent Seawood
Shipping sent a letter, dated February 1, 1986, stating therein that the vessel
was not equipped with a steel centerline bulkhead (Exh. 6). This steel centerline bulkhead was a steel
separation of a vessel for the purpose of preventing the vessel from sinking,
especially in heavy weather. Pictures
of the ship were taken by Wise Insurance showing that the vessel did not have a
steel centerline bulkhead (Exhs. 15 to 15-H).
Fabian also identified petitioner
Benguet’s export declaration (Exh. 11) which provides therein that the cargo
loaded on the ship weighed 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons.[16] On further direct
examination, he testified that Certified Adjusters, Inc.’s president, Mr.
Edgardo Diño, wrote a letter, dated January 13, 1986, to the shipping company
inquiring as to the circumstances surrounding the loss of the cargo (Exh.
17). Seawood Shipping responded to
Certified Adjusters, Inc. in a letter, dated January 16, 1986, explaining that
the weight of the cargo might have been increased by the rains which occurred
during the loading, and that the shortage upon unloading might be due to the
moisture which evaporated during the voyage from the Philippines to Japan. Fabian testified that the moisture on the
copper concentrates increased the weight of the cargo.
Fabian said that during his
investigation he asked how and when the shipment was loaded in the vessel and
where it was loaded. He also checked
records of the loading of the cargo.
Although he admitted that the records show that a shortage of the copper
concentrates had occurred when these reached Japan, he attributed it to the
rains which occurred during the loading of the copper concentrates which
increased their weight, although he conceded that it was not possible that the
rains would cause a shortage of around 300 metric tons. He did not know what
could have caused the shortage.[17]
The last witness to testify for
the defense was Edgardo Diño, president and general manager of Certified Adjusters,
Inc. He testified that his company conducted an investigation and found that
the vessel Sangkulirang No. 3 was not equipped with a steel centerline
bulkhead. The main function of the
steel centerline bulkhead was to prevent shifting of the copper concentrates
during transport. If there was no steel
centerline bulkhead, the vessel was liable to sink. He stated that the ship had two holds, one of which was loaded
with petitioner Benguet’s copper concentrates and the other with a Lepanto
shipment. Diño identified photographs
showing that only a wooden partition separated the two cargoes on both holds
(Exhs. 15-A to 15-G). He testified that
his company wrote a letter to the shipping company inquiring about the shortage
which occurred on petitioner Benguet’s copper concentrates. He expressed doubt that the loss of moisture
of the copper concentrates caused the shortage because these were actually
mixed with some water to keep them from heating up or to prevent spontaneous
combustion. According to Diño, it was
possible that some shifting of the cargo occurred as indicated by the
photographs of the ship.[18]
Based on the evidence presented,
the trial court rendered its decision on July 2, 1990 dismissing petitioner’s
complaint as well as Switzerland Insurance’s third-party complaint against
Seawood Shipping.
On appeal, its decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[19] Petitioner Benguet moved for
reconsideration, but its motion was denied.[20] Hence this petition.
Petitioner Benguet contends that
the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that it failed to establish the
loss or shortage of the subject cargo because such loss was sufficiently
established by documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the admissions
of private respondents.[21] Petitioner argues that documents regarding the
tonnage of the copper concentrates have been properly identified and that the
bill of lading (Exh. A), the Certificate of Weight (Exh. F), and the Mate’s
Receipt (Exh. G), all of which stated that 2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper
concentrates were loaded on the ship, create a prima facie presumption
that such amount was indeed what was loaded on the vessel. Petitioner asserts that the Draft Survey
Report of OMIC (Exh. B) was sufficient evidence to prove that the cargo which
arrived in Japan had a shortage of 355 wet metric tons.
We find petitioner’s contentions
to be without merit.
First. It
is settled that only questions of law may be raised on appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45. The trial court, having
heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is in
a better position to decide the question of their credibility. Hence, unless the factual findings
complained of are not supported by the evidence on record or the assailed
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, the findings of the trial
court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court.[22] It is noteworthy that the
Court of Appeals made the same factual findings as did the trial court.[23]
Contrary to this rule, petitioner
is raising questions of facts as it seeks an evaluation of the evidence
presented by the parties. However, we
find no basis for concluding that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the evidence in this case.
To the contrary, we find that petitioner failed to present evidence to
prove that the weight of the copper concentrates actually loaded on the ship Sangkulirang
No. 3 was 2,243.496 wet metric tons and that there was a shortage of 355
metric tons when the cargo was discharged in Japan.
Petitioner’s own witness, Rogelio
Lumibao, admitted that he was not present at the actual loading of the cargo at
Poro Point, his information being limited to what was contained in the bill of
lading. As he was not in charge of the
operation, he did not see the actual weighing and loading of the copper
concentrates. Nor did he prepare the
bill of lading. He only verified the
weight of the cargo, from the time it was loaded on the ship to the time it was
unloaded in Japan, through the telephone.
Neither was he present when the cargo was discharged in Japan.[24] Thus, Lumibao testified:
Q Now Exhibit A is a bill of lading which you identified?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have anything to do in the preparation of this bill of lading?
A None, sir.
Q In other words, you did not verify if the weight stated in the bill of lading was the actual weight of the copper concentrate loaded in the ship of the defendant Seawood Shipping Inc.?
. . . .
A The bill of lading is prepared on the basis of the draft survey. That is the procedure.
Q And who undertakes the draft survey?
A For that particular shipment we required or hired the services of OMIC.
Q In other words, your draft survey is from the point of origin to Poro Point up to the point of destination, Onahama, Japan, was done by OMIC?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you have nothing to do with OMIC?
A None, sir.
Q You are not an employee of OMIC?
A No, sir.
Q Are you connected with it in any way?
A No, sir.
Q In the Bill of Lading, you identified this document a xerox copy of the supposed original Bill of Lading and marked as Exh. A, are the wordings and figures “copper concentrate 2,243.496 WMT” this means weight per metric ton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have it [verified] if this was the actual weight loaded on the ship of the defendant Seawood, Shipping, Inc.?
A We were advised by the OMIC surveyor that the weight was loaded.
Q Did you personally verify if these figures are true?
A Yes, by phone.
Q Did you participate in weighing?
A No, sir. Just by phone.
Q In other words somebody else made the weighing not you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you personally do the verification of the actual weight loaded in the ship?
. . . .
A Yes, sir by phone.
Q So you are informed [of] the weight actually loaded by phone?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you always verify by phone?
A That is only preliminary, while waiting what is the concluding things. (sic) That is after the surveyor has submitted the report to us.
Q So in other words, all the time you have been basing your testimony on reports prepared by other person?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, you have nothing to do with the preparation of the Bill of Lading?
A Yes, sir.
Q You have nothing to do with the weighing of the copper concentrate? . . . . You have nothing to do [with] the transport of the copper concentrate from Camp 6, Baguio to Poro Point?
A None, sir.
Q You did not even accompany the truck?
A No, sir.
Q You were not at the shipside when this copper concentrate was loaded?
A No, sir.
Q You did not know whether there was spillage when or while loading copper concentrates?
A Yes, sir.
Q Neither were you on the ship on its way to Japan, were you?
A No, sir.
Q You were not at Onahama, Japan, the port of destination?
A No, sir.[25]
On the other hand, Ernesto Cayabyab
testified that he was at Poro Point when the copper concentrates were being
loaded on the ship. Although he was
present when the Certificate of Loading (Exh. E), Certificate of Weight (Exh.
F), and the Mate’s Receipt (Exh. G) were signed at the loading site,[26] he admitted that he could
not say for certain that no spillage occurred during the loading of the cargo
on the ship because his attention was not on the cargo at all times.[27]
It is evident that petitioner’s
witnesses had no personal knowledge of the actual weight of copper concentrates
loaded on the vessel and discharged in Japan.
Lumibao had no part in the preparation of the bill of lading (Exh. A)
and the Draft Survey Report prepared by OMIC (Exh. B). Nor was he present when the copper concentrates
were loaded on the vessel or when the cargo was unloaded in Japan. He merely relied on the declarations made by
other persons that 2,243.496 wet metric tons were indeed loaded on Sangkulirang
No. 3 and that the cargo was short by 355 metric tons when unloaded in
Japan. The same may be said of witness
Cayabyab. While present at the loading
site and familiar with the procedure followed in loading the cargo, he admitted
that he could not state for certain that no spillage occurred as his attention
was not at all times focused on the loading operation. Moreover, none of the documents he
identified, i.e., Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and
Mate’s Receipt, were signed by him. He
only witnessed the signing of these documents by other people. Hence, he was in no position to testify as
to the truth or falsity of the figures contained therein. The testimonies of these witnesses were thus
hearsay. It has been held:
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence
falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.[28]
Second. Petitioner
contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented, i.e.,
Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, Mate’s Receipt,
were properly established by the testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab,
and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that their contents
are true.
This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and
genuineness of a document simply means that “the party whose signature it bears
admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly
as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him.”[29] In another case, we held
that “When the law makes use of the phrase ‘genuineness and due execution of
the instrument’ it means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious,
counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed.”[30] It is equally true,
however, that ¾
Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it
cannot involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a
plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot
preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not
contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.[31]
In this case, respondents
presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of these documents. Respondent
Switzerland Insurance presented Export Declaration No. 1131/85 (Exh. 11)[32] which petitioner’s own
witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared,[33] in which it was stated that
the copper concentrates to be transported to Japan had a gross weight of only
2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric tons, 10 percent more or less.[34] On the other hand,
Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred
petitioner’s claim, prepared a report which showed that a total of 2,451.630
wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point.[35] As the report stated:
It is to be pointed out that there were no actual weighing made at
Benguet Exploration, Inc.’s site. The
procedure done was that after weighing the trucks before and after unloading at
Philex Poro Point Installation, the weight of the load was determined and
entered on “Philex” Trip Ticket which was later on copied and entered by the
truck driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc.’s Transfer Slip.[36]
Considering the discrepancies in
the various documents showing the actual amount of copper concentrates
transported to Poro Point and loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the
exact amount of copper concentrates shipped.
Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the transactions might have
risen from the genuineness and due execution of the Bill of Lading, Certificate
of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mate’s Receipt was successfully rebutted
by the evidence presented by respondent Switzerland Insurance which showed
disparities in the actual weight of the cargo transported to Poro Point and
loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded by the admissions made by Lumibao
and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of the actual amount of copper
concentrates loaded on the vessel. Correctly
did the Court of Appeals rule:
In the face of these admissions, appellant’s claim of loss or
shortage is placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the
accuracy of the figures indicated in appellant’s documentary evidence that could
confirm the alleged loss of 355.736 MT.
Notwithstanding the figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1 (Exhibit
A) that 2,243.496 WMT of copper concentrates was loaded by appellant at the
port of origin, it should be stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence
of the receipt by the carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of
lading. Thus, it has been held that
recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a rebuttable
presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment and as between the
consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh the recital (Saludo
vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 498, 509 [1992]). Resultingly, the admissions elicited from appellant’s witnesses
that they could not confirm the accuracy of the figures indicated in their
documentary evidence with regard to the actual weight of the cargo loaded at
the port of origin and that unloaded at the port of destination, in effect
rebuts the presumption in favor of the figure indicated in the bill of lading.[37]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Composed
of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, ponente, and Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and
Hector L. Hofileña concurring.
[2] Records
(Civil Case No. 12394), p. 1.
[3] Records
(Civil Case No. 13085), p. 1.
[4] Id.,
p. 58.
[5] TSN,
pp. 3-51, Jan. 22, 1988.
[6] Id.,
pp. 54-72.
[7] According
to the draft report (Exh. B), the acronym OMIC stands for Overseas Merchandise
Inspection Co., Ltd.
[8] TSN,
pp. 73-100, Jan. 22, 1988.
[9] TSN,
pp 4-16, Sept. 13, 1988.
[10] Exh.
E-4; Records (Civil Case No. 13085), p. 190.
[11] TSN,
pp. 17-18, Sept. 13, 1988.
[12] Id.,
pp. 21-74.
[13] TSN,
pp. 3-5, May 15, 1989.
[14] TSN,
pp. 3-17, May 22, 1989.
[15] Id.,
pp. 19-35.
[16] TSN,
pp. 9-24, 32-34, July 10, 1989.
[17] TSN,
pp. 10-41, July 25, 1989.
[18] TSN,
pp. 6-33, July 31, 1989.
[19] CA
Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 33.
[20] Rollo,
p. 36.
[21] Id.,
pp. 14-15.
[22] Concepcion
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120706, Jan. 31, 2000.
[23] Rizal
Surety & Insurance, Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112360, July 18,
2000.
[24] TSN,
pp. 62-63, 70, 75-80, Jan. 22, 1988.
[25] Id.,
pp. 75-82.
[26] TSN,
pp. 5-11, Sept. 13, 1988.
[27] Id.,
pp. 72-74.
[28] PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 421 (1998). See
also Restaurante Las Conchas v. Llego, 314 SCRA 24 (1999);
Philippine Home Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 468
(1996); Eugenio v. Court of
Appeals, 239 SCRA 207 (1994).
[29] Hibberd
v. Rohde, 32 Phil. 476, 478 (1917).
[30] Bough
v. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209, 213 (1919).
[31] Hibberd
v. Rohde, supra at 480.
[32] Records
(Civil Case No. 13085), p. 242.
[33] TSN,
p. 74, Jan. 22, 1988.
[34] Records
(Civil Case No. 13085), p. 242.
[35] Exh.
12; Report, dated Jan. 16, 1986, p. 1; Records (Civil Case No. 13085) p. 243.
[36] Id.,
p. 4; Id., p. 246.
[37] CA
Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 33.