SECOND DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 115079. February 19, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO
ALBIOR y GEBAO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision[1], Quezon City, finding appellant, Francisco Albior,
guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim, Lorena Tolentino, moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.
Appellant was charged under an
Information[2] which reads as follows:
That, on or about the 7th day of April, 1993 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned LORENA TOLENTINO y BACATANO, a minor, 11 years of age, without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On arraignment, appellant pleaded
“not guilty.” Thereafter, trial commenced.
Complainant Lorena Tolentino, who
said she was born on November 29, 1981, testified that, at around noontime of
April 7, 1993, appellant, the live-in partner of her mother, raped her in their
house at Sitio Militar, Bahay Toro, Quezon City. He inserted his penis inside her vagina while poking a knife on
her neck and threatening to kill her if she would shout. She said appellant previously abused her at least
five times. However, each time she told
her mother, the latter just dismissed it as a sign of appellant’s
affection. She eventually told her Ate
Malou.[3] With their brother and Malou, they reported the
incident to the barangay captain.[4]
According to Malou, whose full
name is Marilou Avillano, she went to the house of her mother in the morning of
February 5, 1993 and saw appellant on top of her half-sister, Lorena. Both were naked. She told her mother about it but the latter merely instructed
Malou to let Lorena sleep in Malou’s house.
On April 8, 1993, at about 6:00 P.M., Malou said she saw appellant
kicking Lorena in front of her house.
When Malou confronted him, appellant pulled out a bladed weapon and
chased her away.[5]
The prosecution offered the
testimony of Dr. Jesusa Q. Nieves, the medico-legal officer who examined
complainant, but her testimony was dispensed with since appellant already
admitted the contents of Dr. Nieves’ medico-legal report to the effect that
Lorena was no longer a virgin at the time she was brought to the Crime
Laboratory Service, PNP GHQ, Camp Crame, Quezon City on April 10, 1993.[6]
Appellant denied he raped
Lorena. He testified that he was at
home on April 7, 1993 with his common-law-wife, Lorena, his other children, namely,
Alex, Jimmy and Viola and their respective spouses. He said he was being falsely accused by Marilou because he once
slapped Lorena whom he referred to as “Baby.”[7]
Erselina Bacatano, the mother of
Lorena, testified for appellant. She
said on April 7, 1993 she was at home with her husband because she was not
feeling well. She claimed Lorena’s
complaint was false and fabricated upon the insistence of Malou who had an ax
to grind against appellant.[8]
Shirley Cordero, a neighbor of
appellant corroborated the testimony of Bacatano that the latter was sick and
stayed at home on April 7, 1993.
Cordero said she was in the house of appellant from 12:00 noon until
3:00 P.M. of the said day.[9]
On March 15, 1994, the trial court
rendered a decision finding the appellant guilty. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Francisco Albior y Gebao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay Lorena Tolentino the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Appellant interposed this appeal
alleging that the trial court committed the error of:
I. . . . FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE UTTER LACK OF CLEAR FACTUAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION
In gist, appellant raises the
issue of the credibility of the complainant-witness. He argues that the charge of the victim that she was raped is
hard to believe, considering the alleged numerous inconsistencies in her
testimony as well as the contradictions between her and Malou’s
testimonies. Allegedly among them:
(1) Complainant declared that she was advised to stay with her Ate Malou, after the fifth rape. However, during her previous answer, she said that after the second rape when she told her mother, she was already advised to sleep with her sister. The court even asked her where she stays during daytime and she answered she stayed in the house of her sister.
(2) Complainant said she was raped in a one-room house of her Tita Nita on April 7, 1993. However during the cross-examination, she admitted that the offense was committed at the residence of her mother and as testified by witnesses, said house has four rooms wherein the accused, his wife and Lorena occupied one of the two rooms of the ground floor.
(3) Complainant avers that she lived with her Ate Malou when she was grade III when in fact she admitted before the court in her previous declaration that she start[ed] living with her Ate Malou sometime in June, 1993.
(4) Likewise the statement given by the complainant that everytime she was raped by her stepfather, her mother would answer “Lambing lang iyon sa iyo” is highly improbable and unbelievable because no mother in this world would allow her daughter to be sexually assaulted for 5 times by her own husband without even lifting a finger to protect her child and for that matter to testify in court against her.
(5) The statement by the complainant that blood spots came out from her private part during the fifth rape and not during the first rape is inherently impossible….
(6) Complainant admitted before the court that she lived with her
mother and stepfather only for the duration of 1992 when in fact the crime
being imputed to the herein accused happened on April 7, 1993.[11]
Appellant also stresses that no
physical evidence of rape was presented by the prosecution. As shown by the medical reports, he claims
there are no signs of violence inflicted on complainant nor any indication of
the presence of spermatozoa in her genitalia.
He likewise argues that if there was penetration of her genitalia, then
complainant’s hymen and vagina would have been severely lacerated. This was
not so in Lorena’s case, he adds, based on the medical-legal
report. In effect, the appellant is
assailing the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence[12] and asserts that it is not enough to warrant his conviction.[13]
The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), for the State, argues that alleged inconsistencies and
contradictions in complainant’s testimony pertains only to minor and collateral
matters and not upon the basic aspect of the crime charged. Hence they do not justify reversal of his
conviction and sentence.
In reviewing rape cases, we are
guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with
facility; it is difficult to prove but even more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of
the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[14]
In support of his argument,
appellant quotes the transcript of stenographic notes regarding Lorena’s
testimony, thus:
Court: Now, you said your mother told you to sleep with your elder sister. Did you do it as you were told?
L. Tolentino: Yes, your Honor.
Court: What do you mean? You just slept there at night or you stayed with your sister the whole day?
L. Tolentino: In the evening I sleep there every night but I only sleep in our house if Tio Fransing is not there.
Court: How about in the daytime, where do you stay?
L. Tolentino: At my elder sister’s house.
Court: So, in other words, you are living already with your sister?
L. Tolentino: Yes, your Honor.
Court: That has been when?
L.Tolentino: From the time I told my sister about it.
Court: Can you recall more or less the date? When was the first time you lived with your sister?
L. Tolentino: I cannot remember anymore, your Honor.
Court: So that after April 7, 1993 or before April 7 when you started living with your sister?
L. Tolentino: 1993
Court: What month in 1993? Was that before or after April, 1993?
L. Tolentino: June, your Honor.
Atty. Bayani: June 1993?
L. Tolentino: Yes, your Honor.
Court: Alright, proceed.
Atty. Bayani: When you were first raped in Grade II, your mother asked you to stay with your Tita Malou?
Court: After?
Atty. Bayani: After the first rape, you told your mother about. . . did you not stay to sleep with your Tita Malou?
Court: Ate.
L. Tolentino: Not yet, sir.
Atty. Bayani: When were you asked to sleep with your Ate Malou?
L. Tolentino: When I told her about it again.
Q: That was the second rape because you said you were raped 5 times?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was in the house of your Tita Nita?
A: Yes, sir.[15]
The appellant points to the
affirmative answer of the complainant when she was asked whether she told Malou
about her ordeal after the second rape, as inconsistent with her statements
that she was advised to sleep in Malou’s house only after the 5th
rape. This inconsistency is more
apparent than real. Further reading of
her testimony reveals that complainant corrected herself and reiterated that it
was after the fifth rape when she was advised to sleep with her Ate
Malou:
Q: So when was that? When you started … when you said after the second rape, you were advised to sleep with your Tita [Ate] Malou. About what year? When was that?
A: Not yet, sir (underline supplied)
Q: When were you advised to sleep with your Ate Malou? After how many incidents?
A: After 5 times. (stress supplied).[16]
Appellant also considers
inconsistent Lorena’s statement that she lived with her Ate Malou since
she was in grade 3, while in court she said she lived with the latter only
sometime in June, 1993.[17] Appellant infers that if complainant had been
staying with Malou while she was in grade 3, she must have been living with the
latter since 1992[18] and not June 1993 as she
previously stated. Appellant did not
confront Lorena with this alleged inconsistency. Well established is the rule on evidence that previous statements
cannot serve as basis for impeaching the credibility of a witness unless her
attention was first directed to the discrepancies and she was then given an
opportunity to explain them.[19]
Appellant also points to the
inconsistency in complainant’s testimony that she was raped in her Tita
Nita’s house which only had one room vis her later admission that she
was raped in her mother’s house which had four rooms. We agree with the OSG that “the private complainant may have only
thought that their house was actually the room occupied by them (with her
mother and appellant) to the exclusion of the three (3) other rooms of the
house occupied by others.”[20] Furthermore, an ample margin of error and understanding
should be accorded to the young complainant who naturally would be gripped by
tension certainly much more than adults, when required to relive an experience
she would rather forget.[21] In People v. Villaraza,
we observed that:
The failure of the private
complainant, an eleven-year old puerile country girl, to respond properly to
some questions propounded to her does not thereby put to naught her reliability
and sincerity. x x x. Minor lapses in
the memory of a rape victim can be expected even as it is an understandable
human frailty not to be able to recount with facility all the details of a
dreadful and harrowing experience.[22]
Further, appellant points to
complainant’s alleged testimony that she stayed with her mother and the
appellant only in 1992 while the rape happened in 1993. We find no such testimony. Lorena clearly stated that she stayed with
her mother and the appellant since 1992 and only transferred to her Ate
Malou on June 1993.[23]
Appellant avers that it is
impossible and improbable that Lorena’s own mother would simply dismiss her
stories of rape, and instead testify against her, if indeed Lorena was telling
the truth. We find nothing impossible
nor improbable about these. It is not
unheard of that, to protect the husband, a wife might even turn against her own
daughter.
In several cases, we have held
that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter pervert
herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely
by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.[24]
With respect to the negative
findings of spermatozoa in the victim’s genitalia, absence of spermatozoa does
not necessarily negate rape.[25] Further, as for appellant’s claim that the victim
did not suffer complete laceration and other signs of physical violence,
suffice it to say that even the absence of hymenal laceration does not rule out
sexual abuse, especially when the victim is of tender age.[26] Nor is it necessary for the
victim to suffer external injuries in order for the crime of rape to be
established.[27] Moreover, appellant’s
contention that Lorena lied in her testimony that she bled only after the 5th rape, and not before, has
no logical basis: it is possible that
the first four were bloodless, but that the fifth rape would be bloody.
All told, the inconsistencies and
contradictions raised by the appellant are details which do not destroy the
complainant’s credibility. They have
also been convincingly explained by Lorena’s testimony. Far from casting a doubt upon her testimony,
these minor inconsistencies are badges of truthfulness and candor for they
erase any suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed.[28] They serve to reinforce her credibility.[29] It is when the testimony
appears totally flawless that a court might have some misgiving on its
veracity.[30] This is especially true in
rape cases where victims are not expected to have a total recall of the
incident.[31]
As repeatedly ruled, factual
findings of the trial court are conclusive upon this Court and its evaluation
regarding the credibility of witnesses are given great weight and respect unless
there is a showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the result of the case.[32] Based on the record and findings of the trial court,
we find Lorena’s story credible.
Juxtaposed against Lorena’s straightforward
testimony, appellant’s defense is inherently weak. He interposed denial, which like alibi, cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[33]
There being no error in the
finding of guilt made by the trial court, it should be affirmed. However, a slight modification in the award
of civil damages is called for. The
trial court failed to grant the necessary civil indemnity which is mandated by
jurisprudence to be awarded to rape victims.[34] The award of the trial court of P50,000.00 in
this case was only for the moral damages suffered by the victim. This is separate and distinct from the
amount of P50,000.00 that should be awarded as civil indemnity.[35]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 91, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is declared guilty of rape and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is also ORDERED to pay the
offended party, Lorena Tolentino, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages, as well as the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 24-30, Penned by Judge Marina L. Buzon.1 dated March 15, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 9
[2] Id.
at 9-10.
[3] Also
referred to as Marilou Avillano.
[4] TSN,
August 30, 1993, pp. 2-34.
[5] TSN,
July 26, 1993, pp. 4-13.
[6] Id.
at 1-2.
[7] TSN, September 13, 1993, pp. 4-13.
[8] TSN,
November 10, 1993, pp. 3-12.
[9] TSN,
October 11, 1993, pp. 3-14.
[10] Rollo,
p. 30.
[11] Appellant’s
Brief, Rollo, pp. 56-57.
[12] Based
mainly and primarily upon the private complainant's testimony.
[13] Arrived
at by the trial court after finding the testimony of Lorena Tolentino to be natural
and straightforward, Records, p. 77.
[14] People
vs. Moreno, 321 SCRA 334, 348 (1999); People vs. Quijada, 321
SCRA 426, 431 (1999).
[15] TSN,
August 30, 1993, pp. 19-21.
[16] Id.
at 21.
[17] See
no. (3) of appellant’s list of inconsistencies.
[18] The
complainant had just finished grade 4 when she filed the complaint in April
1993, Sworn Statement, Records, p. 6.
[19] People
vs. De Guzman, 288 SCRA 346, 354 (1998).
[20] Appellee’s
Brief, Rollo, p. 272.
[21] People
vs. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105, 116 (1999).
[22] People
vs. Villaraza, G.R. No. 131848-50, September 5, 2000, pp. 18-19.
[23] TSN,
August 30, 1993, pp. 13-21.
[24] People
vs. Rosales, 313 SCRA 757, 764 (1999); People vs.
Brandares, 311 SCRA 159 (1999); People vs. Onabia, 306
SCRA 23 (1999); People vs. Almaden, 305 SCRA 157 (1999).
[25] People
vs. Gastador, 305 SCRA 659 (1999).
[26] People
vs. Ayo, 305 SCRA 543, 557-558 (1999).
[27] People
vs. Managaytay, 305 SCRA 316, 323 (1999).
[28] People
vs. Vergel, 316 SCRA 199, 211 (1999); People vs. Bermudez, 309
SCRA 124 (1999); People vs. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 (1998).
[29] People
vs. Pacistol, 284 SCRA 520, 537-538 (1998).
[30] People
vs. Talledo, 262 SCRA 544, 550 (1996).
[31] People
vs. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, 371 (1998).
[32] People
vs. Baygar, 318 SCRA 358, 365-366 (1999); People vs. Lomboy, 309
SCRA 440 (1999); People vs. Venerable, 290 SCRA 15 (1998); People
vs. Tejada, 170 SCRA 497 (1989).
[33] People
vs. Magbanua, 319 SCRA 719, 738 (1999).
[34] People
vs. Panique, 316 SCRA 757, 768 (1999) citing People vs. Maglente,
306 SCRA 546 (1999).
[35] People
vs. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478, 492 (1998).