FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113627. February 6, 2001]
CORAZON C. SHIN and CHUNG HWA KYOON, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALORASAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, and NORDY DIPLOMA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review
on certiorari of the decision[1] f the Court of Appeals which set aside the injunction
granted in favor of Corazon Shin and Chung Hwa Kyoon, and the resolution[2] enying reconsideration.
Alorasan Realty Development
Corporation (Alorasan) is the registered owner of a parcel of land and building
located at 2332 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City, with an area of approximately
1,800 square meters.
On January 1, 1981, Alorasan
leased the lot and building to Nordy Diploma for a period of one (1) year.
After a year, the parties verbally renewed the lease on month to month basis.
On May 21, 1990, Nordy Diploma
represented himself to be the owner of the property and leased it to Chung Hwa
Koon for a period of three (3) years, commencing June 15, 1990 to June 14, 1993,
renewable for another two years. Chung
Hwa Koon paid Diploma the sum of P360,000.00 as advance rentals.
On November 14, 1990, Chung
assigned his rights over the lease contract to Corazon Shin. A month later, Chung Hwa Koon and Corazon
Shin entered into a partnership agreement over the property and introduced
improvements for its eventual operation as a restaurant, disco joint, and
offices.
Shin and Chung thereafter
approached Nordy Diploma to negotiate a longer lease period of at least ten
years to allow them enough time to expand their business and construct on the
leased premises a two-storey building to be utilized as a health club. Nordy Diploma approved the proposal. Subsequently, Chung and Shin proceeded with
the construction of the building.
However, in April 1991, Alorasan
learned about the new building being constructed on the premises and manifested
its objection to the construction. Consequently, Shin and Chung discovered that
Nordy Diploma was not the real owner of the leased premises, and that Alorasan
Realty Development Corporation owned the lot.
On April 17, 1991, Alorasan
advised Nordy Diploma in writing that it was terminating the lease contract and
demanded that he vacate the leased premises.
On May 6, 1991, Alorasan sent another letter to Nordy Diploma, giving
the latter fifteen (15) days from receipt within which to vacate the leased
premises. Despite the letters, Nordy
Diploma refused to vacate. Consequently,
on June 7, 1991, Alorasan filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City
an action for unlawful detainer against Nordy Diploma.[3]
Meanwhile, the Pasay City Building
Official, upon complaint of Alorasan, directed Shin and Chung to stop
construction of the building for lack of showing that they had the necessary
building permit. Aggrieved by the turn
of events in the face of the near completion of their building, on October 8,
1991, Shin and Chung filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasay City a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Nordy Diploma, Alorasan
and the Pasay City Building Official.[4]
On July 15, 1992, the trial court
issued an order[5] ranting a writ of preliminary injunction and
enjoining Alorasan, Nordy Diploma and the Pasay City Building Official from
disturbing, obstructing, and/or hampering Shin and Chung’s possession and use
of the leased premises. On August 11,
1992, Alorasan filed with the Court of Appeals a petition questioning the trial
court’s issuance of the injunction order.[6]
In the meantime, on July 28, 1992,
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City decided Alorasan’s complaint for
ejectment against Nordy Diploma. The court ordered Nordy Diploma to vacate the
premises and peacefully surrender possession of the premises to Alorasan.[7] The decision became final and executory and a writ of
execution was subsequently issued.
On August 31, 1993, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision finding that the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction was improper and reversed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals found the injunction
unnecessary, as there was no showing that Nordy Diploma and Alorasan would not
be able to compensate Shin and Chung for the damages sought. The Court of Appeals also noted that Shin
and Chung, while praying for the nullification of their lease contract with
Nordy Diploma, at the same time insisted on maintaining possession of the
premises on the basis of the same lease contract. The Court of Appeals likewise held that the injunction
prematurely assumed that Alorasan was in bad faith, before evidence had been
presented in the trial court. Thus, the Court of Appeals set aside the order
granting the preliminary injunction.[8]
Hence, this petition.[9]
Petitioners contend that the trial
court issued a writ of preliminary injunction considering petitioners’ right of
possession and equity. They allege that
the Court of Appeals improperly based its decision on Alorasan’s defenses even
if there had been no trial on the merits.
Petitioners also ask the Court to rule not only on the injunction but
also on the merits of the damage suit.
On the other hand, respondent
Alorasan contends that the petition has become moot because petitioners had
been ousted from the premises by a writ of execution[10] ssued by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Pasay City in
Civil Case No. 146-91, for unlawful detainer.
The building was demolished and the premises turned over to respondent
Alorasan.
Respondent Nordy Diploma alleges
that the merits of the case had not been heard, thus making the injunctive writ
premature.[11]
The issue is whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred when it set aside the writ of injunction that the
regional trial court issued.
“A preliminary injunction is an
order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or
final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts.”[12] Before a writ of preliminary injunction may be
issued, there must be a clear showing by the complaint that there exists a
right to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of the said right.[13]
As the facts reveal, petitioners
are in effect sublessees, having leased the land from a lessee of the property.
“A sublessee can invoke no right superior to that of his sublessor.”[14] “The sublessees’ right, if any, is to demand
reparation for damages from his sublessor, should the latter be at fault. The sublessees can only assert such right of
possession as could have been granted them by their sublessor, their right of
possession depending entirely upon that of the latter.”[15] Considering that the lessor and real owner of the
property manifested objections to the improvements introduced by petitioners
and the subsequent termination of the lease contract between the lessor-owner
and the lessee-sublessor, petitioners, being mere sublessees, are not in a
position to assert any right to remain on the land.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals
did not err in setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction that the trial
court issued.
With the clear admission that
respondent Nordy Diploma was not the owner of the lot and that petitioners
believed in good faith that they were dealing with the owner of the property,
petitioners may be entitled to damages. We cannot, however, make a ruling on
the extent of the damages to which petitioners are entitled, pending trial of
the case on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition and affirms the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 28643.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] In
CA-G. R. SP No. 28643, promulgated on August 31, 1993, Justice Ricardo P. Galvez, ponente, Justices
Alfredo L. Benipayo and Oscar M. Herrera, concurring. Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 48-55.
[2] Dated
December 23, 1993. Petition, Annex “E”, Rollo, p. 127.
[3] Docketed
as Civil Case No. 146-91. Comment, Annex “C”, Rollo, pp. 175-179.
[4] Filed
October 8, 1991, docketed as Civil Case No. 8455. Petition, Annex “B”, Rollo, pp. 57-78
[5] Petition,
Annex “C”, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 119, Judge Aurora B.
Navarrete-Reciña, presiding, Rollo, pp. 102-103.
[6] Docketed
as CA-G. R. SP No. 28643. Comment, Annex “D”, Rollo, pp. 189-214.
[7] Reply
to Comment, Annex “A”, CA Rollo, pp. 218-224.
[8] Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 48-55.
[9] Petition,
filed on March 17, 1994, Rollo, pp. 9-47.
[10] Comment,
Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 170-172.
[11] Comment,
Rollo, pp. 313-314.
[12] Rule
58, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
[13] China
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 158, 173 (1996).
[14] Heirs
of Eugenio Sevilla, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 559, 566 (1992).
[15] Guevara
Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 478, 482 (1988).