FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109491. February 28, 2001]
ATRIUM MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, E.T. HENRY AND CO., LOURDES VICTORIA M. DE LEON, RAFAEL DE LEON, JR., AND HI-CEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
[G.R. No. 121794. February 28, 2001]
LOURDES M. DE LEON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ATRIUM MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, AND HI-CEMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court are
separate appeals from the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] ruling that Hi-Cement Corporation is not liable for
four checks amounting to P2 million issued to E.T. Henry and Co. and discounted
to Atrium Management Corporation.
On January 3, 1983, Atrium
Management Corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila an action
for collection of the proceeds of four postdated checks in the total amount of
P2 million. Hi-Cement Corporation
through its corporate signatories, petitioner Lourdes M. de Leon,[2] treasurer, and the late Antonio de las Alas, Chairman,
issued checks in favor of E.T. Henry and Co. Inc., as payee. E.T. Henry and Co., Inc., in turn, endorsed
the four checks to petitioner Atrium Management Corporation for valuable
consideration. Upon presentment for
payment, the drawee bank dishonored all four checks for the common reason
“payment stopped”. Atrium, thus,
instituted this action after its demand for payment of the value of the checks
was denied.[3]
After due proceedings, on July 20,
1989, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Lourdes M. de Leon, her
husband Rafael de Leon, E.T. Henry and Co., Inc. and Hi-Cement Corporation to
pay petitioner Atrium, jointly and severally, the amount of P2 million
corresponding to the value of the four checks, plus interest and attorney’s
fees.[4]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
on March 17, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision modifying the
decision of the trial court, absolving Hi-Cement Corporation from liability and
dismissing the complaint as against it.
The appellate court ruled that:
(1) Lourdes M. de Leon was not authorized to issue the subject checks in
favor of E.T. Henry, Inc.; (2) The issuance of the subject checks by Lourdes M.
de Leon and the late Antonio de las Alas constituted ultra vires acts;
and (3) The subject checks were not issued for valuable consideration.[5]
At the trial, Atrium presented as
its witness Carlos C. Syquia who testified that in February 1981, Enrique Tan
of E.T. Henry approached Atrium for financial assistance, offering to discount
four RCBC checks in the total amount of P2 million, issued by Hi-Cement in
favor of E.T. Henry. Atrium agreed to
discount the checks, provided it be allowed to confirm with Hi-Cement the fact
that the checks represented payment for petroleum products which E.T. Henry delivered
to Hi-Cement. Carlos C. Syquia
identified two letters, dated February 6, 1981 and February 9, 1981 issued by
Hi-Cement through Lourdes M. de Leon, as treasurer, confirming the issuance of
the four checks in favor of E.T. Henry in payment for petroleum products.[6]
Respondent Hi-Cement presented as
witness Ms. Erlinda Yap who testified that she was once a secretary to the
treasurer of Hi-Cement, Lourdes M. de Leon, and as such she was familiar with
the four RCBC checks as the postdated checks issued by Hi-Cement to E.T. Henry
upon instructions of Ms. de Leon. She
testified that E.T. Henry offered to give Hi-Cement a loan which the subject
checks would secure as collateral.[7]
On July 20, 1989, the Regional
Trial Court, Manila, Branch 09 rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, and plaintiff having proved its cause of action by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby rendered ordering all the defendants except defendant Antonio de las Alas to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the amount of TWO MILLION (P2,000,000.00) PESOS with the legal rate of interest from the filling of the complaint until fully paid, plus the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS as and for attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.”
All other claims are, for lack of merit dismissed.
SO ORDERED.”[8]
In due time, both Lourdes M. de
Leon and Hi-Cement appealed to the Court of Appeals.[9]
Lourdes M. de Leon submitted that
the trial court erred in ruling that she was solidarilly liable with Hi-Cement
for the amount of the check. Also, that
the trial court erred in ruling that Atrium was an ordinary holder, not a
holder in due course of the rediscounted checks.[10]
Hi-Cement on its part submitted
that the trial court erred in ruling that even if Hi-Cement did not authorize
the issuance of the checks, it could still be held liable for the checks. And assuming that the checks were issued
with its authorization, the same was without any consideration, which is a
defense against a holder in due course and that the liability shall be borne
alone by E.T. Henry.[11]
On March 17, 1993, the Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision modifying the ruling of the trial court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“Judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint as against defendants Hi-Cement Corporation and Antonio De las Alas;
(2) ordering the defendants E.T. Henry and Co., Inc. and Lourdes M. de Leon, jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) with interest at the legal rate from the filling of the complaint until fully paid, plus P20,000.00 for attorney’s fees.
(3) Ordering the plaintiff and defendants E.T. Henry and Co., Inc. and Lourdes M. de Leon, jointly and severally to pay defendant Hi-Cement Corporation, the sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
With cost in this instance against the appellee Atrium Management Corporation and appellant Lourdes Victoria M. de Leon.
So ordered.”[12]
Hence, the recourse to this Court.[13]
The issues raised are the
following:
In G. R. No. 109491 (Atrium,
petitioner):
1. Whether the issuance of the questioned checks was an ultra vires act;
2. Whether Atrium was not a holder in due course and for value; and
3. Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in dismissing the case against Hi-Cement and ordering it to pay
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.[14]
In G. R. No. 121794 (de Leon,
petitioner):
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding petitioner personally liable for the Hi-Cement checks issued to E.T. Henry;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Atrium is a holder in due course;
3. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner Lourdes M. de Leon as signatory of the checks was personally liable for the value of the checks, which were declared to be issued without consideration;
4. Whether the Court of
Appeals erred in ordering petitioner to pay Hi-Cement attorney’s fees and
costs.[15]
We affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
We first resolve the issue of
whether the issuance of the checks was an ultra vires act. The record reveals that Hi-Cement
Corporation issued the four (4) checks to extend financial assistance to E.T.
Henry, not as payment of the balance of the P30 million pesos cost of hydro oil
delivered by E.T. Henry to Hi-Cement.
Why else would petitioner de Leon ask for counterpart checks from E.T.
Henry if the checks were in payment for hydro oil delivered by E.T. Henry to
Hi-Cement?
Hi-Cement, however, maintains that
the checks were not issued for consideration and that Lourdes and E.T. Henry
engaged in a “kiting operation” to raise funds for E.T. Henry, who admittedly
was in need of financial assistance.
The Court finds that there was no sufficient evidence to show that such
is the case. Lourdes M. de Leon is the
treasurer of the corporation and is authorized to sign checks for the
corporation. At the time of the
issuance of the checks, there were sufficient funds in the bank to cover
payment of the amount of P2 million pesos.
It is, however, our view that
there is basis to rule that the act of issuing the checks was well within the
ambit of a valid corporate act, for it was for securing a loan to finance the
activities of the corporation, hence, not an ultra vires act.
“An ultra vires act is one
committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by
the law of its organization and therefore beyond the power conferred upon it by
law”[16] The term “ultra vires” is “distinguished from
an illegal act for the former is merely voidable which may be enforced by
performance, ratification, or estoppel, while the latter is void and cannot be
validated.”[17]
The next question to determine is
whether Lourdes M. de Leon and Antonio de las Alas were personally liable for
the checks issued as corporate officers and authorized signatories of the
check.
"Personal liability of a
corporate director, trustee or officer along (although not necessarily) with
the corporation may so validly attach, as a rule, only when:
“1. He assents (a) to a patently unlawful act of the corporation, or (b) for bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs, or (c) for conflict of interest, resulting in damages to the corporation, its stockholders or other persons;
“2. He consents to the issuance of watered down stocks or who, having knowledge thereof, does not forthwith file with the corporate secretary his written objection thereto;
“3. He agrees to hold himself personally and solidarily liable with the corporation; or
“4. He is made, by a
specific provision of law, to personally answer for his corporate action.”[18]
In the case at bar, Lourdes M. de
Leon and Antonio de las Alas as treasurer and Chairman of Hi-Cement were
authorized to issue the checks.
However, Ms. de Leon was negligent when she signed the confirmation
letter requested by Mr. Yap of Atrium and Mr. Henry of E.T. Henry for the
rediscounting of the crossed checks issued in favor of E.T. Henry. She was aware that the checks were strictly
endorsed for deposit only to the payee’s account and not to be further
negotiated. What is more, the
confirmation letter contained a clause that was not true, that is, “that the
checks issued to E.T. Henry were in payment of Hydro oil bought by Hi-Cement
from E.T. Henry”. Her negligence resulted
in damage to the corporation. Hence,
Ms. de Leon may be held personally liable therefor.
The next issue is whether or not
petitioner Atrium was a holder of the checks in due course. The Negotiable Instruments Law, Section 52
defines a holder in due course, thus:
“A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument under the following conditions:
(a) That it is complete and regular upon its face;
(b) That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the fact;
(c) That he took it in good faith and for value;
(d) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating it.”
In the instant case, the checks
were crossed checks and specifically indorsed for deposit to payee’s account
only. From the beginning, Atrium was
aware of the fact that the checks were all for deposit only to payee’s account,
meaning E.T. Henry. Clearly, then,
Atrium could not be considered a holder in due course.
However, it does not follow as a
legal proposition that simply because petitioner Atrium was not a holder in due
course for having taken the instruments in question with notice that the same
was for deposit only to the account of
payee E.T. Henry that it was altogether
precluded from recovering on the instrument.
The Negotiable Instruments Law does not provide that a holder not in due
course can not recover on the instrument.[19]
The disadvantage of Atrium in not
being a holder in due course is that the negotiable instrument is subject to
defenses as if it were non-negotiable.[20] One such defense is absence or failure of
consideration.[21] We need not rule on the other issues raised, as they
merely follow as a consequence of the foregoing resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DENIED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 26686, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] In
CA-G. R. CV No. 26686, promulgated on March 17, 1973, Francisco, C., J.,
ponente, Ramirez and Gutierrez, JJ., concurring.
[2] In
G. R. No. 121794.
[3] Consolidated
Memorandum, G. R. No. 121794, Rollo, pp. 191-226, at pp. 192-193.
[4] Original
Record, Decision, Judge Edilberto G. Sandoval, presiding, pp. 356-362.
[5] Petition,
Annex “C”, in G. R. No. 109491, Rollo, pp. 319-339 and Petition, Annex
“A”, in G. R. No. 121794, Rollo, pp. 30-49.
[6] TSN,
September 30, 1985, pp. 6-19.
[7] TSN,
January 29, 1988, pp. 15-16.
[8] Original
Record, Decision, Judge Edilberto G. Sandoval, presiding, pp. 356-362.
[9] Ibid.,
Notice of Appeal, Lourdes, p. 366, and Notice of Appeal Hi-Cement, p. 365.
[10] CA
Rollo, Defendant-Appellant Lourdes M. De Leon’s Brief, pp. 10-10N.
[11] Ibid.,
Defendant Appellant’s Brief, pp.
23C-23II.
[12] CA
Rollo, Decision, pp. 78-99, Francisco, C., J., ponente, Ramirez and
Gutierrez, JJ., concurring.
[13] G.
R. No. 109491, Petition filed on April 13, 1993, Rollo, pp. 3-18; G. R. No. 121794, Petition filed on
October 20, 1995, Rollo, pp. 10-28.
On January 31, 2000, we gave due course to the petition. G. R. No. 109491, Rollo, pp. 244-245;
G. R. No. 121794, Rollo, pp. 152-153.
[14] Petition,
G. R. No. 1109491, Rollo, pp. 10-16.
[15] Petition,
G. R. No. 121794, Rollo, p. 16.
[16] Republic
v. Acoje Mining Co., Inc., 117 Phil. 379, 383 [1963]; Corporation Code
Sec. 45.
[17] Republic
v. Acoje Mining Co., Inc., supra, Note 16, at pp. 383-384.
[18] FCY
Construction Group, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G. R. No. 123358,
February 1, 2000, citing Tramat
Mercantile, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 238 SCRA 14, 18-19 [1994]; Equitable Banking
Corporation v. NLRC, 339 Phil. 541, 566 (1997).
[19] Chan
Wan v. Tan Kim and Chen So, 109 Phil. 706 (1960).
[20] State
Investment House v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 175 SCRA 310, 317
(1989).
[21] Negotiable Instruments Law, Sec. 28.